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ABSTRACT 
 
 The American Transcendentalists are often equated with Romanticism in 
nineteenth-century America. This dissertation thoroughly complicates that equation, 
arguing that a group of “Cautious Romantics” emerged as an alternative and 
conservative Romantic religious tradition. Drawing on history, art history, philosophy, 
literature, and theology, this dissertation provides a much fuller picture of the way 
European Romantic texts and authors functioned in American intellectual, cultural, and 
religious history by highlighting the contribution of these Cautious Romantics. 
 Taken together, the Cautious Romantics represented a distinct religious 
discourse. They were American Romantics: relentless and introspective questers who 
emphasized epistemological intuition, artistic inspiration, and spiritual experience. In 
fact, some of them were the first Americans to promote European Romantic influences. 
Nevertheless, the Cautious Romantics continued to embrace Trinitarian Christianity, 
and they celebrated institutions—colleges and churches—in contrast to the often anti-
institutional temperament of the Transcendentalists. Moreover, the Cautious Romantics 
defied religious categorization among standard antebellum groups. They were neither 
evangelicals, nor traditional Congregationalists, nor Unitarians. Although many became 
  v 
Episcopalians or Catholics, their Romantic intellectual lineage and historical 
relationships with one another distinguished them from their denominational kindred.  
 Functioning on two levels, this dissertation resituates several well-known 
American artists and intellectuals such as Washington Allston, Orestes Brownson, 
Richard Henry Dana Jr., and Harriet Beecher Stowe by connecting them historically and 
intellectually with a wider discourse. This dissertation also unearths or re-contextualizes 
numerous lesser-known religious intellectuals such as Richard Henry Dana Sr., James 
Marsh, Sophia Dana Ripley, George Allen, Henry Hope Reed, Gulian Verplanck, Leonard 
Woods Jr., and Isaac Hecker.  
 While conservative, these intellectuals were neither committed to the antebellum 
American South’s unique conservative vision nor did they celebrate the free-market 
conservatism common in twentieth-century America. Thus, in addition to its 
contribution to intellectual and religious history, this dissertation contributes to a 
growing body of literature on cultural conservatism in America. Moreover, although the 
Cautious Romantics were American, this dissertation highlights the important historical 
relationships between the Cautious Romantics and Coleridge, Wordsworth, the Roman 
Catholic Church, and, in Harriet Beecher Stowe’s case, transatlantic social reform, 
thereby demonstrating the transatlantic nature of Romanticism in the nineteenth 
century. 
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Introduction 
 
 In 1834, prior to composing his many notable works, Ralph Waldo Emerson 
wrote to his brother. “Do you draw the distinction of Milton, Coleridge & the Germans 
between Reason & Understanding. I think it a philosophy itself & like all truth very 
practical.”1 Emerson and his famous Transcendentalist friends embraced a critical 
distinction between Reason (a higher, imaginative, perceptive faculty) and 
Understanding (the ability to weigh evidence, make discursive arguments, and get along 
in the physical world) their entire lives, but if this crucial epistemic distinction sprang 
from the depths of their own ingenious Reason, the terminology at least had a specific 
lineage.2 It was Kantian language, co-opted by Samuel Taylor Coleridge and filtered in a 
precise historical way by the American James Marsh, who innocently but earnestly 
published Coleridge in the mistaken belief that Coleridge might reconstitute traditional 
religion in America.   
 For Marsh traditional religion was Trinitarian Christianity, but his love of 
Romantic poetry and philosophy led him to drink at streams whose sources were quite 
different from those of his confessional brethren.3 Revival-oriented evangelicalism could 
not easily accommodate a critical intellectual whose best friends were Unitarians and 
                                                   
 1 RWE to Edward Bliss Emerson, May 31, 1834 in Ralph Waldo Emerson, The Letters of Ralph 
Waldo Emerson: Vol. I, ed. Ralph L. Rusk and Eleanor M. Tilton (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1939), 412. 
 2 Throughout this dissertation I have opted capitalize ‘Reason’ and ‘Understanding’ to signal the 
distinction between the two made by many figures in this story, and to indicate when these figures are using 
‘Reason’ or ‘reason’ to denote a faculty of spiritual vision, religious faith, or other such function that differs 
from our common use of the term. It should be noted that while most of the figures in this dissertation 
embraced the distinction, and many at times capitalized ‘Reason,’ they were not always consistent in this 
practice. 
3 In this dissertation, I have capitalized the word “Romantic” when referring to specific situations 
where Romantic aesthetic theory or epistemology is at play or to specific people and groups employing these 
ideas. I have chosen to, in limited circumstances, keep the word lower-cased when referring to more vague 
but related feelings such as a general love for nature or an emphasis on feeling over logic. 
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high church Episcopalians.4 Likewise, the common-sense epistemology and Protestant 
scholasticism of orthodox intellectuals such as Charles Hodge could not countenance an 
innovator who would routinely “hold communion with [Lord Byron’s] spirit and breathe 
its energy.”5 Despite his friendships with many traditionalist Unitarians at Harvard and 
elsewhere, Marsh maintained his independence from them.6 In addition, he spurned the 
advances of Frederic Henry Hedge, George Ripley, and the other Transcendentalists. So 
where does he fit in the continuum of antebellum intellectual history if not in one of 
these four categories? In large part, scholars have abandoned Marsh at the intellectual 
crossroads where he found himself, despite the recognition that he is “an unjustly 
neglected figure in American intellectual history.”7 
 
 
                                                   
 4 The historical scholarship on antebellum evangelicalism is incredibly vast, and this scholarship 
links the phenomenon with nearly all aspects of American history. Its seminal place in explicitly religious 
histories has long been established as in Sydney E. Ahlstrom, A Religious History of the American People 
(New Haven, Yale University Press, 1972), 403-490 and Mark A. Noll, America's God: From Jonathan 
Edwards to Abraham Lincoln (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 161-224, 330-364. On its 
relationship to antebellum reform movements see Robert H. Abzug, Cosmos Crumbling: American Reform 
and the Religious Imagination (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). On the question of its 
relationship with American political identity and culture see Nathan O. Hatch, The Democratization of 
American Christianity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989) and Mark Y. Hanley, Beyond a Christian 
Commonwealth: The Protestant Quarrel with the American Republic, 1830-1860 (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1994). An informative local study is Paul E. Johnson, A Shopkeeper's Millennium: 
Society and Revivals in Rochester, New York, 1815-1837 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1978). All broad and 
synthesized accounts of the period in recent historiography accord evangelicalism substantial space. See 
such diverse interpretations as Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of 
America, 1815-1848 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 164-202, 286-289, 580-81, etc. and Sean 
Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln (New York: Norton, 2005), 265-72, 279-80, 
349-52, 406-8, 468-70, etc.    
 5 JMR, 25. 
 6 The historical scholarship on Unitarianism, while not as vast as that on the evangelicals, is still 
extensive. Some particularly noteworthy studies include Conrad Wright, The Beginnings of Unitarianism in 
America (Boston: Starr King Press, Distributed by Beacon Press, 1955) and Conrad Edick Wright, American 
Unitarianism, 1805-1865 (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society and Northeastern University Press, 
1989), Daniel Walker Howe, The Unitarian Conscience: Harvard Moral Philosophy, 1805-1861 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1970). On Unitarian influence outside of Boston see Elizabeth M. Geffen, 
Philadelphia Unitarianism, 1796-1861 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1961). On the 
intellectual contours of the debates between Unitarians and Calvinists through primary sources see Bruce 
Kuklick, ed. The Unitarian Controversy, 1819-1823 (New York: Garland Publishers, 1987). 
 7 James Turner, Without God, Without Creed: The Origins of Unbelief in America (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 106. 
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Scope of Dissertation 
 This dissertation examines a determinate group of antebellum intellectuals who, 
like Marsh, have remained largely unexamined. I have labeled these intellectuals 
Cautious Romantics. Largely American—though the narrative attends at some length to 
the connection of the British writers Samuel Taylor Coleridge and William Wordsworth 
to the group—they imbibed the same transatlantic Romantic influences as such well-
known Transcendentalists as Emerson, Thoreau, and Margaret Fuller. But they 
remained significantly more cautious, as they attempted to fuse Romantic epistemology 
and aesthetics with Trinitarian Christianity and a conservative commitment to 
institutions. The Cautious Romantics included Washington Allston, Richard Henry Dana 
Sr., Gulian Verplanck, Leonard Woods Jr., Richard Henry Dana Jr., James Marsh, 
George Allen, Caleb Sprague Henry, Orestes Brownson, Isaac Hecker, Sophia Ripley, 
Henry Reed, and Harriet Beecher Stowe. As artists, literary critics, professors, 
clergymen, writers, and reformers their influence was extensive. To be sure, this 
influence extended to their specific contexts; very few of them demonstrated the primary 
“predilection for literary activity” that characterized the Transcendentalists.8 Although 
Harriet Beecher Stowe, Richard Henry Dana Sr., and Richard Henry Dana Jr. wrote 
literature and poetry and Orestes Brownson’s essays touched nearly every topic 
imaginable, the rest of the Cautious Romantics influenced American culture primarily 
through the church, educational institutions, and other reform efforts. As a painter, 
Allston was the most important American artist of his own generation. By examining the 
antebellum intellectual world and the influence of the Cautious Romantics, I hope to 
illuminate one of the understudied “diversity of Romanticisms within nineteenth-
                                                   
 8 Lawrence Buell, Literary Transcendentalism: Style and Vision in the American Renaissance 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973), 7. 
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century American culture.”9 These intellectuals represent a distinct Romantic discourse, 
united by mutual questions and influences that transcend the limitations of other 
categories of analysis such as religious denomination, gender, or even social class. 
 Chronologically this dissertation begins in 1801, when Washington Allston first 
set sail to Europe—soon thereafter befriending Coleridge—and it continues through 
Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Anglo-Catholic conversion in 1863. In particular, this 
dissertation asks several questions related to establishing the Cautious Romantics as a 
coherent intellectual group. The first question is that of influences. Which European 
authors meant the most to these American intellectuals and why? What role did 
Romantic epistemology and aesthetics play in their thinking, and were these two related? 
To be more specific: why did these Americans so heavily appropriate Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge and other European romanticists, and where does this appropriation lead? 
Conversely, what were the extent and limit to these Americans’ participation in a 
Romantic transatlantic culture? Answering these questions entails carefully explicating 
the relevant philosophical concepts, languages, and texts. I take this project to be the 
beginning but not the end of intellectual history. 
 Throughout my course of research I discovered something that I had not 
anticipated. To a large extent, many of the intellectuals I set out to understand did not 
just participate in the same conservative Romantic discourse; they actually knew each 
another, visited each other, and delivered letters between one another. James Marsh—
currently understood as an isolated Romantic in northern Vermont—travelled frequently 
to Boston to visit with Washington Allston and Richard Henry Dana Sr., a literary critic 
                                                   
 9 Charles Capper, “‘A Little Beyond’: The Problem of the Transcendentalist Movement in American 
History,” in Transient and Permanent: The Transcendentalist Movement and Its Contexts, ed. Charles 
Capper and Conrad Edick Wright (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society and Northeastern University 
Press, 1999), 29. 
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and lecturer on English literature. George Allen, eventually a professor at the University 
of Pennsylvania, studied with James Marsh, helped him edit Coleridge, worked with 
other Cautious Romantic Episcopalians, and eventually converted to Catholicism and 
corresponded with Orestes Brownson. Brownson himself—generally understood as a 
turncoat Transcendentalist who suddenly converted to Catholicism—lectured at the 
University of Vermont on themes consonant with Marsh’s educational philosophy at the 
request of UVM’s president John Wheeler. In short, the Cautious Romantics participated 
in a complex web of historical relationships as well as ideas.  
 Several recent and broader studies in American intellectual history have gestured 
at “alternatives to Baconian reason” and a “fragmented resistance” to the 
aforementioned religious groups of Calvinists, evangelicals, and Unitarians.10 However, 
these alternatives to Baconian reason include Horace Bushnell and the Mercersburg 
theologians, Philip Schaff and John Williamson Nevin, while not including many other 
members addressed in this dissertation. In addition, as broader synthetic studies, they 
do not address the concrete historical relationships between the figures in this story. 
Other more focused studies address pieces of this dissertation in depth. Most of these 
focus exclusively on one of the Cautious Romantics and do not see them in discourse 
with the others. Among these is the array of biographies and focused monographs on 
figures such as James Marsh, Orestes Brownson, Harriet Beecher Stowe and others.11 
                                                   
 10 E. Brooks Holifield, Theology in America: Christian Thought from the Age of the Puritans to the 
Civil War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 395, 452–493; Mark A. Noll, America’s God: From 
Jonathan Edwards to Abraham Lincoln (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 247–252, 320–329, 
406–409. 
 11 Very few of the Cautious Romantics have received more than one, focused scholarly monograph 
or biography if any at all. For Brownson and Stowe, who have received extensive scholarly treatment, I have 
only listed the biographies from which I have derived the most insight. Doreen M. Hunter, Richard Henry 
Dana, Sr. (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1987); Robert W. July, The Essential New Yorker, Gulian 
Crommelin Verplanck (Durham: Duke University Press, 1951); Robert L. Gale, Richard Henry Dana, Jr. 
(New York: Twayne Publishers, 1969); Samuel Shapiro, Richard Henry Dana, Jr., 1815-1882 (East Lansing: 
Michigan State University Press, 1961); Peter C. Carafiol, Transcendent Reason: James Marsh and the 
Forms of Romantic Thought (Tallahassee: University Presses of Florida, 1982); Patrick W. Carey, Orestes A. 
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Washington Allston as an artist has enjoyed numerous art-historical studies, though 
none of these studies relate Allston to the figures discussed in this dissertation.12 A few 
studies attempt to include more than one figure in their narrative, but they usually draw 
the discourse along strictly denominational lines.13 Even when these studies go beyond 
the denominational paradigm, they include and exclude figures central to this study, and 
thus these studies seem focused on a separate discourse.14 Finally, all of these studies fail 
to include figures that are perhaps intellectually marginal due to their lack of literary 
production, but who nevertheless retain historical significance. Among these figures are 
Sophia Dana Ripley, a Transcendentalist founder of Brook Farm who later converted to 
Catholicism, and Leonard Woods Jr., president of Bowdoin College. One of the major 
tasks of this dissertation is to unearth figures such as these and establish their proper 
place in the historical narrative. 
                                                                                                                                                       
Brownson: American Religious Weathervane (Grand Rapids: W.B. Eerdmans, 2004); David J. O’Brien, 
Isaac Hecker: An American Catholic (New York: Paulist Press, 1992); Joan D. Hedrick, Harriet Beecher 
Stowe: A Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
 12 William H. Gerdts and Theodore E. Stebbins Jr., “A Man of Genius”: The Art of Washington 
Allston (1779-1843) (Boston: Museum of Fine Arts, 1979); Edgar Preston Richardson, Washington Allston: A 
Study of the Romantic Artist in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948); David Bjelajac, 
Millennial Desire and the Apocalyptic Vision of Washington Allston (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian 
Institution Press, 1988); David Bjelajac, Washington Allston, Secret Societies, and the Alchemy of Anglo-
American Painting (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Barbara Novak, American Painting of 
the Nineteenth Century: Realism, Idealism, and the American Experience (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 25–39; Bryan Jay Wolf, Romantic Re-Vision: Culture and Consciousness in Nineteenth-
Century American Painting and Literature (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 3–77. 
 13 On Episcopal denominational studies that briefly include George Allen and Caleb Sprague Henry 
respectively, see E. Clowes Chorley, Men and Movements in the American Episcopal Church (New York: 
Scribner’s Sons, 1946); Robert Bruce Mullin, Episcopal Vision/American Reality: High Church Theology 
and Social Thought in Evangelical America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986). Of the numerous 
studies on American Catholicism, Jenny Franchot, Roads to Rome: The Antebellum Protestant Encounter 
with Catholicism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994) and Patrick Allitt, The Catholic Converts: 
British and American Intellectuals Turn to Rome (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997) provide 
particularly intellectual focus. 
  14 There are few monographs that go beyond the denominational paradigm, but an important 
exception is Walter H. Conser, God and the Natural World: Religion and Science in Antebellum America 
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1993). However, Conser uses the lens of “science” to guide 
the discourse, and Charles Hodge could not be further from the Romantic inclinations I seek to highlight. An 
informative art-historical study which mentions Marsh and Dana Sr. in relation to Washington Allston and a 
wider American Christian Romantic culture is Diane Apostolos-Cappadona, The Spirit and the Vision: The 
Influence of Christian Romanticism on the Development of 19th-Century American Art (Atlanta: Scholars 
Press, 1995). This dissertation builds on the connections and arguments made by Conser and Apostolos-
Cappadona by providing both new and more developed historical-intellectual relationships and analysis. 
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Cautious Romantics: Binary Consciousness and an Alternative Discourse 
 I have chosen the phrase “Cautious Romantics” deliberately, as the binary 
suggested by the two terms captures the ambivalence at the heart of each figure’s 
personality, religious views, and intellectual interests and influences. On the one hand 
they were undoubtedly Romantics—relentless and introspective questers who 
emphasized epistemological intuition, artistic inspiration, and spiritual experience—on 
the other hand they proved cautious when adopting certain features of a fully liberated 
Romantic outlook. Debates about Romanticism—whether as an “ism” it is an essential 
way of being or thinking, whether these features represent a clear shift in Western 
consciousness, and which historical figures do or do not belong—have animated 
numerous scholarly careers and affected several humanistic academic disciplines. To 
engage in a fully extended discussion of “Romanticism” as a timeless “ism” or an all-
encompassing historical phenomenon would be more distracting than fruitful here, 
though much of this definition will emerge in the narrative. But if the figures studied in 
this dissertation cannot be fully described by extant historical categories, a new term is 
necessary. Understanding them as Romantics, albeit cautious, is the best way to 
characterize them as intellectuals; the term captures what they were reading, which ideas 
they found meaningful, and what kind of people they were.  
 The most important feature of the Cautious Romantics that united them with 
their European and Transcendentalist counterparts was their consistent emphasis on an 
inward turn to the subjective self as the source of meaning and truth.15 This emphasis on 
                                                   
 15 Among the numerous studies that identify the inward turn to the self as a primary definition of 
the Romantic outlook in both Europe and America are Hoxie Neale Fairchild, “Romantic Religion,” in 
Romanticism: Points of View, ed. Robert F. Gleckner and Gerald E. Enscoe, 2nd ed. (Detroit: Wayne State 
University Press, 1974), 208, 211, 217–218; Northrop Frye, “The Drunken Boat: The Revolutionary Element 
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an inward turn developed into a full-fledged epistemology that became common in 
nineteenth-century America. Invoking corrupted Kantian terminology—mostly by way of 
Coleridge but Victor Cousin used his own schema to foster similar concepts—some of the 
Cautious Romantics were the first American intellectuals to champion the notion of a 
higher, intuitive Reason that stood above the intellect or Understanding. While Emerson 
would make the distinction famous in his lectures and essays, several of the Cautious 
Romantics were the first to import and promote this epistemology. Understanding this 
epistemology helps to contextualize the Transcendentalist movement in a new way, while 
also helping to situate numerous conservative intellectuals such as Washington Allston 
or Orestes Brownson who crop up in antebellum America but prima facie seem isolated. 
The idea of a higher, spiritual Reason was more than any other feature what made the 
Cautious Romantics Romantic, linking them to the Transcendentalists but distinguishing 
them from all other intellectual groups. 
 Intertwined with the notion of a higher, spiritual Reason was the idea of the 
imagination. Coleridge argued that Reason was the internal faculty of spiritual 
perception, while the imagination translated the ineffable insights of Reason to others 
through artistic forms such as poetry, painting, and music. The more careful 
Coleridgeans such as Allston, Dana Sr., and Marsh understood the relationship between 
Reason and imagination fully—as did Emerson—but less systematic thinkers such as 
Ripley or Stowe held a less precise definition of the imagination, its aesthetic potential, 
                                                                                                                                                       
in Romanticism,” in Romanticism: Points of View, ed. Robert F. Gleckner and Gerald E. Enscoe, 2nd ed. 
(Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1974), 304–305, 308; Maurice William Cranston, The Romantic 
Movement (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 13–14; Isaiah Berlin, The Roots of Romanticism, ed. Henry Hardy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 8–10, 94–95, 119–120; Warren Breckman, European 
Romanticism: A Brief History with Documents (Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, 2008), 3, 6; Robert D. 
Richardson, Emerson: The Mind on Fire (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 184–185; Daniel 
Walker Howe, Making the American Self: Jonathan Edwards to Abraham Lincoln (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1997), 2–3, 189–191; Charles Capper, Margaret Fuller: An American Romantic Life, 
Volume II: The Public Years (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), xi; Philip F. Gura, American 
Transcendentalism: A History (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), xv. 
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and its relationship to Reason.16 But whether the Cautious Romantics appealed to 
Romantic Reason, the imagination, or both, the principle was the same: above standard 
definitions of reason stood a higher faculty that could be trusted as an avenue to truth.17  
 Art was the province of the imagination. Most of the Cautious Romantics believed 
that art could communicate truths every bit as reasonable as discursive prose, and thus 
many of them gave art a prominent spiritual role well beyond that allowed by their 
American Protestant milieu. The idea that “the imagination is the residence of truth,” as 
Joshua Reynolds declared in 1797, would catch fire in the early nineteenth century 
among many seminal Romantic thinkers.18 The Cautious Romantics thus tended to find 
the institutional church in its Anglican and Catholic forms most salubrious to this new 
impulse. But again, they controlled the Romantic liberation of the solitary, artistic genius 
by cautiously keeping it within the bounds of orthodox Christian religion. 
 Several of the most prominent intellectuals in this dissertation self-consciously 
embraced the term “romantic” to characterize their intellectual disposition. Washington 
Allston used the word to characterize the artist’s sensitivity to harmony and ability to say 
                                                   
 16 “The Imagination may be defined to be, the use which the Reason makes of the material world.” 
Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Nature,” in Essays & Lectures, The Library of America (New York: Viking Press, 
1983), 34. 
  17 The relationship between the terms “reason” and the “imagination” were not always clearly 
delineated even by important practitioners, and they can often be equated in certain Romantic writers. 
While Emerson and Coleridge were clear enough—if one cared to read carefully—the Cautious Romantic 
George Allen thought Emerson’s definition of Reason was what Coleridge called the imagination (GA to JM, 
Jan. 18, 1841, JDL, 251). Thomas Carlyle, the British intellectual to whom Emerson was closest, 
distinguished between “our Logical, Mensurative faculty” elsewhere called “the Understanding” and “our 
Imaginative [faculty],” see Thomas Carlyle, Sartor Resartus (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, n.d.), 229-230 
and Abrams, Natural Supernaturalism, 347. 
 18 Sir Joshua Reynolds, Discourses I-XV, vol. 1, The Works of Sir Joshua Reynolds (London: T. 
Cadell and W. Davies, 1797), 270–271. Discourse XIII, where Reynolds made the statement, was published 
in French in 1787 but not in English until 1797. For an acute and careful account of the evolving notions of 
the imagination from Reynolds through the Romantic generation, see James Engell, The Creative 
Imagination: Enlightenment to Romanticism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), 186–366. 
Especially helpful is Engell’s account of the “Plateau in Britain” in the 1790s and the German quest for a 
“New Philosophers’ Stone” in the wake of Kant’s disparate definitions of the imagination (184-196, 217-243). 
Engell cites Reynold’s above quotation (186). Though this dissertation is not a comprehensive, focused study 
on the idea of the imagination, it helps to augment Engell’s brief account of the concept in America in his 
otherwise magisterial account of the idea in Europe (188-196). 
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something true, beyond the reach of linguistic discourse. Richard Henry Dana Sr. 
repeatedly invoked the term to characterize the features of the mind provoked by art that 
were not reducible to Enlightenment definitions of reason and realized only by an 
introspective turn. James Marsh, influenced by August Schlegel and Madame de Staël, 
self-applied the term to delineate an emphasis on interior consciousness and a newly 
ascendant cultural–intellectual zeitgeist of which he considered himself a partisan. And 
Harriet Beecher Stowe used the term to refer both to old castles and nature. This was not 
just a vague appreciation of their beauty; Stowe focused on the way these symbols 
inspired the artist and provided deep and symbolic forms of spiritual meaning to all.   
 To be sure, many of the other Cautious Romantics did not self-consciously apply 
the term, but they were all fundamentally influenced by romanticist authors: Coleridge, 
Wordsworth, Kant, Byron, Scott, August Schlegel, Friedrich Schlegel, Madame de Staël, 
Cousin, and in a few cases Schelling and Goethe.19 Whatever scholars decide 
Romanticism is or was, these European intellectuals stand always at the center of the 
debate. The first generation of Cautious Romantics derived intellectual and spiritual 
insight from these authors at a time, at least initially, when American intellectual culture 
was either ignorant or hostile to most European romanticists. 
 Reading romanticist authors, the Cautious Romantics participated in a 
transatlantic exchange of ideas, texts, and persons. They referenced the Atlantic Ocean 
again and again in their writing, consciously aware of its role in both facilitating a 
transatlantic culture and limiting that culture. Pursuing a narrative approach, I have 
tried to voice that consciousness by quoting them. To be sure, they imported European 
texts and corresponded with important European romanticists. But figures like Richard 
                                                   
 19 Jacques Barzun helpfully distinguishes the two adjectives of “romantic” and “romanticist," the 
latter applying to an intellectual-historical moment between 1770 and 1850 and the former to a permanent 
intellectual trait, see Barzun, Classic, Romantic, and Modern, 7–9. 
  
11 
Henry Dana Jr. and Harriet Beecher Stowe published texts of their own that were widely 
read in England and elsewhere. British intellectuals read Dana Sr.’s work, and Caleb 
Sprague Henry’s translation of Victor Cousin garnered enough interest to appear in three 
London editions over a ten-year span. Washington Allston enjoyed lengthy stays in 
Europe and helped Coleridge in particular develop his definition of the imagination, and 
Stowe participated in a transatlantic conversation about social reform while being fêted 
by adoring British audiences. Much less interested than the Transcendentalists in 
developing a national literature, the Cautious Romantics tended rather to embrace a 
transnational Christian orthodoxy. Nearly all of the intellectuals in this dissertation 
became Episcopalians or Catholics, affiliating with churches whose institutional identity 
was thoroughly transnational. 
 But not all the Cautious Romantics participated in transatlantic Romantic culture 
in the same way as Washington Allston or Harriet Beecher Stowe. At least for Richard 
Henry Dana Sr., James Marsh, and Orestes Brownson, the Atlantic served as a financial 
barrier to their own intellectual formation and intellectual authority—a reality they 
consciously acknowledged in their letters. Like progressive economists in the late 
nineteenth century and many psychoanalysts at the turn of the twentieth century, 
American intellectual reputations in the early nineteenth century benefitted immensely 
from extended formation overseas.20 My study might thus be seen best as 
transatlantically informed rather than a full-fledged transatlantic history rooted in place 
or even a fully mutual exchange of ideas.21 Still, to ignore the transatlantic perspective in 
                                                   
  20 Daniel T. Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age (Cambridge: Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 1998), 76-111; Andrew R. Heinze, Jews and the American Soul: Human 
Nature in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004); Alfred H. Fuchs, 
“Contributions of American Mental Philosophers to Psychology in the United States,” History of Psychology 
3, no. 1 (February 2000): 9. 
 21 For some important examples of this kind of study in intellectual and cultural history, see James 
T. Kloppenberg, Uncertain Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and American 
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the Cautious Romantics’ thought and the concrete, historical relationships with 
Coleridge and Wordsworth would distort the record in the opposite direction, causing 
the Cautious Romantics to appear more bound up with the nation-state than their 
intellectual and cultural consciousness really was. The Cautious Romantics help 
demonstrate that a transatlantic Romantic culture existed, but that most Americans, 
especially in the early nineteenth century, struggled to participate fully in that culture. 
 But despite their Romantic features, these figures also existed in the liminal 
space between two perspectives: the Christian and the full-fledged Romantic spirituality 
that emphasized a more liberated seeking and spiritual experience apart from 
supernatural religion.22 They might adequately be characterized “half a Romantic,” as 
Isaiah Berlin has christened the French Catholic aristocrat René de Chateaubriand, 
though the term “cautious” more accurately captures their temperament.23 They were in 
many ways the American counterparts to such European romanticists as Joseph de 
Maistre, Chateaubriand, Clemens Brentano, Ludwig Achim von Arnim, Novalis, and the 
later Coleridge, Wordsworth, and Fredrich Schlegel, though context mitigated most truly 
reactionary tendencies in the Americans, with the possible exception of Richard Henry 
Dana Sr. Coleridge aptly summarized their position: “We begin with the I KNOW 
                                                                                                                                                       
Thought, 1870-1920 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Daniel T. Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: 
Social Politics in a Progressive Age (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998); Leslie 
Butler, Critical Americans: Victorian Intellectuals and Transatlantic Liberal Reform (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2007); Brooke L. Blower, Becoming Americans in Paris: Transatlantic 
Politics and Culture Between the World Wars (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Thomas Albert 
Howard, God and the Atlantic: America, Europe, and the Religious Divide (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011). 
 22 Some important articulations of this dichotomy include M. H. Abrams, Natural 
Supernaturalism; Tradition and Revolution in Romantic Literature (New York, Norton, 1971); Fairchild, 
“Romantic Religion”; Brian Barbour, “Between Two Worlds‘: The Structure of the Argument in ’Tintern 
Abbey,” Nineteenth-Century Literature 48, no. 2 (1993): 147–168. 
 23 Berlin, Roots of Romanticism, 132. 
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MYSELF, in order to end with the absolute I AM. We proceed from the SELF, in order to 
lose and find all self in GOD.”24 
 While in some cases the Cautious Romantics sought to use the inward turn to the 
self to rehabilitate an already held Christian faith, one of the animating questions in this 
dissertation is why so many Cautious Romantics—Washington Allston, the Danas, 
Orestes Brownson, Isaac Hecker, and Sophia Ripley—converted to more orthodox and 
traditional forms of Christianity out of either establishment Unitarianism or some form 
of sympathetic Transcendentalism. The answer is that all the Cautious Romantics found 
within the self both great power, potential, and creativity and at the same time a 
diabolical darkness—at times of overwhelming proportions—that kept their Romantic 
impulses from remaining strongly optimistic. They suffered from what one commentator 
has called “Romantic Agony,” which was at times proto-modern in its recognition of the 
power of the unconscious and the irrational.25 This fear that arose from the inward turn 
made them cautious, seeking to control the subjective Romantic impulse by turning to 
Trinitarian Christianity and to institutions under whose auspices their restless desire to 
explore the entirety of human existence could be directed and to some extent controlled. 
 If Romantic Reason and the imagination linked the Cautious Romantics to the 
Transcendentalists, they could not have been more religiously opposed to each other. 
Looking within the self, the Cautious Romantics discovered a need for salvation of the 
supernatural sort promised by traditional Christianity. Religiously, the Cautious 
                                                   
 24 STC, Biographia Literaria, CW, 7:2:283. 
 25 The quotation is from Douglas Hedley’s characterization of Coleridge, see Douglas Hedley, 
Coleridge, Philosophy, and Religion: Aids to Reflection and the Mirror of the Spirit (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 243–244. Jacques Barzun identifies this deep sense of humankind's simultaneous 
greatness and wretchedness, "infinite in spirit and finite in action," as the defining aspect of "intrinsic" 
rather than historical Romanticism, see Jacques Barzun, Classic, Romantic, and Modern (Boston: Little, 
Brown, 1961), 16–17. The Transcendentalist Margaret Fuller argued with Ralph Waldo Emerson that sin and 
suffering could lead to a higher redemption, though for her this was personal and psychological, unmediated 
by supernatural religion, see Capper, Margaret Fuller, 2007, 2:53–54. 
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Romantics were or became transcendental Trinitarians, embracing Romantic 
epistemology—in one way or another—but retaining most orthodox Christian doctrines. 
In nearly every case they demonstrated an intensely affective commitment to Christ’s 
incarnation as the Son of God. Understanding them as transcendental Trinitarians helps 
to situate them both apart from the Calvinism and Unitarianism that defined each other 
through mutual polemic and between the evangelicalism and Transcendentalism they 
grew to loathe.26 George Allen summarized their posture aptly: “It is not likely than an 
unevangelical, transcendental, semi-high-churchish Episcopalian can always be 
comfortable or always be an object of peculiar love,” even among New-School 
Presbyterians who shared his general Christian orthodoxy and revulsion for Calvinist 
extremes.27  
 But while most of the Cautious Romantics became Episcopalians or Catholics, 
focusing exclusively on their denominations fails to capture either their intellectual 
transitions, many of which took decades, or the important historical relationships 
between the Catholics and Episcopalians highlighted in this dissertation. The most 
ambitious and philosophical of the Cautious Romantics—Marsh, Henry, and Brownson—
attempted to justify the Trinity itself by using the new definition of Reason, although not 
surprisingly a fully convincing account of the paradoxical doctrine eluded them. Allston, 
Stowe, and Hecker all ventured connections between the Spirit and artistic genius, 
although Allston was the only sophisticated aesthetician among them, and even he left 
the idea suggestive but underdeveloped. In sum, the Cautious Romantics sought shelter 
from Romantic excess in Trinitarian Christianity. They were willing to jettison and even 
                                                   
 26 Brooks Holifield has pointed out that while William Ellery Channing claimed Unitarianism 
sought to exclude controversy through a more liberal theology, “the polemic against Calvinism shaped 
Unitarian theology from beginning to end,” see Holifield, Theology in America, 199. 
 27 GA to JM, Jan. 18, 1841, JDL, 249.  
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attack traditional Calvinism for its emphasis on total depravity and predestination, but 
they stood aghast as the Transcendentalists took Romantic spirituality well beyond the 
bounds of a more broadly orthodox Christianity. 
 The tension between Romantic Reason and conservative religion has required 
careful attention to the organic development of the Cautious Romantics’ thought. To put 
it bluntly: why did several intellectuals such as Allston, Dana Sr., Dana Jr., Orestes 
Brownson, Isaac Hecker, and Sophia Ripley decide to convert from more liberal religious 
beliefs to more orthodox forms of Christianity? Also, why did James Marsh, Caleb 
Sprague Henry, and Orestes Brownson think the new, Romantic understanding of 
Reason could render the paradoxical doctrines of Christianity—the Trinity and the 
Incarnation—rational? The answer lay partially in their thought, but also in the 
intersection between their thought and their experiences. In many cases, these 
intellectuals’ commitment to Christian orthodoxy came from the poignant loss of a loved 
one or a personal frustration with intractable social inequality. Thus their biographies 
are critical to understanding their thought as they sought to make sense of their own 
intellectual and emotional existence. As many of them emphasized the organic 
connection between thought and life, so this dissertation provides analysis within a 
narrative framework. Whatever the merit of the Cautious Romantics’ philosophical 
theology, taken together they exerted an extraordinary influence on American thought 
and culture. Understanding their thought requires understanding their motivations. 
 Carefully understanding these intellectual actors as people also reveals a complex 
attentiveness to egalitarianism among many of them, which was somewhat surprising, 
given the conservative conclusions these intellectuals embraced. As intellectuals, they 
fundamentally wrestled with their relationship to an increasingly egalitarian democracy. 
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They exemplified a lived tension—identified by thinkers such as Richard Hofstader—
between the self-selecting, relatively elite nature of intellectual life and the anti-elitist 
assumptions of American democracy.28 Some, like Marsh and Brownson, came from 
modest means, while Brownson and his friend Isaac Hecker were deeply disturbed by the 
intractable nature of oppressive social structures seemingly impervious to even the 
expanding franchise. Seizing on their new definition of a Reason above the intellect and 
employing it for their religious concerns, they argued that Christianity actually validated 
the intellect of common people. However, they also maintained against the 
Transcendentalists that Romantic Reason needed to be guided by the inherited cultural 
forms of schools and churches, a posture that made them conservative. 
 While many scholars have rightly argued that Emerson or Thoreau embodied and 
adapted European Romanticism to an American context, it was the Cautious Romantics 
who chose to do so through the existing American educational and religious institutions 
that intrigued the French observer Alexis de Tocqueville so much.29 If the 
Transcendentalists articulated the “idealistic, anti-institutional, ‘come-outer’ spirit of the 
era” in their avant-garde journal The Dial, the Cautious Romantics sought to use their 
idealism to reinvigorate existing institutions.30 The institutional emphasis tended to take 
three forms. The first, highlighted by Marsh, Henry, Woods Jr., and Verplanck—but also 
practiced by George Allen and Henry Reed—emphasized education as a way to guide and 
                                                   
 28 Richard Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life (New York: Vintage Books, 1963), 46–
51. 
 29 See for example, David S. Reynolds, Waking Giant: America in the Age of Jackson (New York: 
Harper, 2008), 253-254 on Emerson’s democratic tendencies in language or Mary Kupiec Cayton, “The 
Making of an American Prophet: Emerson, His Audiences, and the Rise of the Culture Industry in 
Nineteenth-Century America,” The American Historical Review 92, no. 3 (June 1987): 597-620 on the 
challenges of adapting such elevated notions as intuition, the spirit, and self-reliance to an avaricious 
democratic culture subject to the vagaries of the market. On Tocqueville’s fascination with America’s schools 
and churches see Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba 
Winthrop (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 489-493. 
 30 Capper, Margaret Fuller, 2007, 2:17. 
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form the new Romantic mind. The second, exemplified by the Anglo-Catholic Danas and 
the Catholic converts from Transcendentalism, emphasized the church as the sure 
institutional authority where spiritual seeking could be guided and even controlled. Isaac 
Hecker and Sophia Dana Ripley even found satiation for their transcendental come-
outerism in the Catholic Church and its sanctioning of the ascetic, communitarian 
vocations of monasteries and convents. Finally, Sophia Ripley and Harriet Beecher 
Stowe sought to ameliorate poverty by supporting benevolent institutions. 
 The draw to educational institutions, churches, and other social reform was not 
mutually exclusive. Many of the educational reformers still trusted in institutional 
churches, and Orestes Brownson applied his organic vision of society to education as 
well as the church. Thus, the Cautious Romantics fundamentally altered American 
cultural institutions by working within them, complicating the assertion of historians 
such as Stanley Elkins, who has maintained: “Whatever institutional stability American 
capitalism could conceivably develop was at its lowest possible ebb in 1830.”31 The 
Cautious Romantics thus stood between the inherited cultural forms of church and 
university and the effervescent desire to create new forms, articulated so powerfully by 
the Transcendentalists or Jacksonian Democrats.32   
                                                   
 31 Stanley M. Elkins, Slavery; A Problem in American Institutional and Intellectual Life (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1968), 32. See pages 32-37 for the extended argument, which supports his 
characterization of antebellum America. See also George M. Fredrickson, The Inner Civil War: Northern 
Intellectuals and the Crisis of the Union (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 7-35. My study nuances 
Fredrickson’s neat divide between the extreme anti-institutionalism of the Transcendentalists, abolitionists, 
and Jacksonian intellectuals and the few “Conservatives in a Radical Age” who were opposed to the 
“romantic visions” of the former group, as Horace Bushnell critically put it (26). 
 32 By tracing out Theodore Parker’s, James Freeman Clarke’s, Frederic Henry Hedge’s, and Convers 
Francis’s efforts to reform the Unitarian Church, William Hutchison has helpfully corrected a still common 
assumption by historians such as Arthur Schlesinger that the Transcendentalist movement was entirely anti-
institutional. Philip Gura builds on this insight to introduce numerous clergy into his synthetic account of 
Transcendentalism. Still, Transcendentalist scholarship tends to bifurcate the Transcendentalist movement 
between literary individualists and reformers, with the reformers interested in creating new associations for 
reform—such as the radical communitarian experiment at Brook Farm—rather than working within existing 
institutions. Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Age of Jackson (Boston: Little, Brown, 1953), 380–388; William R. 
Hutchison, The Transcendentalist Ministers; Church Reform in the New England Renaissance (New 
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 When several of the Cautious Romantics attended to institutions, this attention 
often directly related to their own sense of vocation. When Marsh sought to articulate the 
role of education in the Republic, he did so in the course of seeking a fitting vocation for 
himself as an intellectual. Isaac Hecker, though not as rigorously philosophical, likewise 
articulated a vision of the Catholic Church that could foster vocations for ascetic, 
spiritual seekers like himself. The question about the proper vocation for an intellectual 
in antebellum democratic society unites biographical elements of the characters whom I 
discuss with the intellectual and historical narrative. If German and British intellectuals 
and artists struggled to find their place in their own rapidly evolving societies, how much 
more did antebellum American intellectuals who lacked the patronage and intellectual 
traditions that could still be taken for granted in Europe?33 Although antebellum 
America is often portrayed as a period of unique flowering for the American intellect, 
this flowering carried with it a great deal of vocational angst.34 
 
Chapter Summary: Network, Movement, Discourse 
 The impulse to fuse Romantic aesthetic and intellectual principles with 
Trinitarian Christianity was initially an idiosyncratic view, shared only, it seems, by 
Washington Allston and Richard Henry Dana Sr.—at least among serious American 
                                                                                                                                                       
Haven, Yale University Press, 1959); Gura, American Transcendentalism, esp. xiv; Anne C. Rose, 
Transcendentalism as a Social Movement, 1830-1850 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), viii-ix, 109-
161; Barbara L. Packer, The Transcendentalists (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2007), 94-170. 
 33 Raymond Williams characterizes these problems facing British romanticist intellectuals—
including an emerging middle class reading audience which began to perceive art as a market commodity—
in Culture and Society: 1750-1950 (New York: Harper and Row, 1958), 30-48. On the related but different 
problem in Germany, where artists and writers came largely from middle class families but could not find 
gainful employment in the evolving but limited social apparatus, see Henri Brunschwig, Enlightenment and 
Romanticism in Eighteenth-Century Prussia (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), particularly 
Chapter Eight. 
 34 Recognizing the American mid-nineteenth century as a unique and profound cultural moment is 
perhaps commonplace, but this scholarly fact is a function of work such as F. O. Matthiessen who helped 
define the contours of this moment in American Renaissance; Art and Expression in the Age of Emerson 
and Whitman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1941). 
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intellectual figures. Part One traces the development of Allston’s thought, laying the 
categorical groundwork for the rest of the dissertation while establishing the thoroughly 
transatlantic intellectual friendship of Allston and Samuel Taylor Coleridge. By the late 
1820s and 1830s, the intellectuals who shared Allston’s impulse began to coalesce into 
an historical network. They exchanged letters with each other, visited each other 
frequently, and attempted to articulate their own distinctiveness from the groups around 
them. This network included Guilian Verplanck, Leonard Woods Jr., Richard Henry 
Dana Jr., James Marsh, George Allen, and Caleb Sprague Henry as well as Allston and 
Dana Sr. Parts Two and Three explain the emergence of this network, attending to its 
various participants, while focusing on the two most important nexus figures: Richard 
Henry Dana Sr. and James Marsh. Dana Sr. served as an early exponent of American 
Romantic thought, but he served more importantly as an historical nexus for members of 
the group through his correspondence and his physical location in Boston. Marsh served 
as the philosophical spokesman for the group; thus Part Three attends carefully to his 
motivations, thinking, and connection to the larger Cautious Romantic network.  
 But while these Cautious Romantics remained in close contact, they never formed 
a high-profile intellectual club such as the Transcendental Club or the later Metaphysical 
Club. As the Transcendentalists began to liberate the more constricted Christian 
Romantic vision of the Cautious Romantics, Cautious Romantic thinking became a more 
diffuse movement rather than a network between the mid-1830s and 1863. The ideas 
themselves were as evident as ever—Romantic interiority, appeals to art and the 
imagination, Trinitarianism, institutionalism, and a rejection of Transcendentalism—but 
these ideas were taken up by Catholic converts out of the Transcendentalist movement, 
which the early Cautious Romantics had inadvertently helped to inspire. Parts Four and 
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Five trace the development of this movement, from its reaction against 
Transcendentalism to its embrace of either Catholicism or Episcopalianism. But 
although Cautious Romantic thinking developed from an idiosyncratic mentality, into an 
historical network, and ultimately into a more diffuse movement of ideas and tropes, the 
historical relationships between individual actors remained intellectually important. One 
finds, for example, Orestes Brownson praising Dana Sr.’s literary work and delivering 
Marsh-like speeches at the University of Vermont and Harriet Beecher Stowe praising 
the Dana family as likeminded. Ultimately, then, Cautious Romanticism was a complex 
discourse of intellectual affinity, historical relationships, and questions as the 
participants struggled to unify the life of mind with that of the spirit. 
 In framing this study I have been guided by the notion of discourse as defined by 
David Hollinger. For Hollinger, “Discourse is a social as well as an intellectual activity . . . 
[wherein] the most concrete and functional elements shared, surely, are questions.”35 
The emphasis on questions as well as the social element of intellectual inquiry allows 
Hollinger’s theory to do two things. First, understanding the questions and eventual 
answers given by historical actors demands that the relevant ideas and texts be carefully 
explicated; one must “sort out the ideas” to quote one contemporary scholar.36 By 
insisting on the clarification of terms and ideas, my method remains loyal to the history 
of philosophy generally and the history of ideas tradition in particular, whence comes the 
discipline of modern intellectual history. 
 However, by emphasizing questions and historical relationships rather than just 
ideas, Hollinger’s approach also allows one to grapple with the particularities of history 
                                                   
 35 David A. Hollinger, “Historians and the Discourse of Intellectuals” in In the American Province: 
Studies in the History and Historiography of Ideas (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 132. 
 36 Bruce Kuklick, The Rise of American Philosophy: Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1860-1930 (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), xviii. 
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that are often ignored by the history of ideas tradition.37 These particularities include the 
fact that intellectuals often ask the same questions, being driven by similar intellectual 
influences, but eventually come to different conclusions. For example, understanding the 
questions, categories, and relationships between the Cautious Romantics helps not only 
to place certain Catholic intellectuals within a discourse beyond Catholicism but also to 
partially explain their conversions. In short, this approach allows the contours of inquiry 
to be defined with sufficient specificity to be informative while remaining malleable 
enough to capture the frequently messy historical reality. One does not need to “verify in 
each of its apparent members . . . a fully uniform pattern of intellectual behavior” to 
conclude that a coherent, intellectual discourse exists.38 
 Hollinger’s careful but flexible approach is crucial to my study precisely because 
the figures whose views I seek to explicate did not fit into the more clearly defined and 
researched intellectual categories of the time, such as evangelicalism or 
Transcendentalism. The reason why scholars have not identified these Cautious 
Romantics as participants in a distinct discourse is because they admittedly did not 
demonstrate a “uniform pattern of intellectual behavior.”39 However, the Cautious 
Romantics were influenced by the same sources such as Coleridge, Wordsworth, and 
Victor Cousin, and they used these sources to ask the same questions about the mind, 
about the role of an intellectual in a democratic society, about education, and about the 
church. Moreover, while the Catholic converts’ decision to join a still-maligned church 
represented an important break with the Protestant Cautious Romantics, this 
                                                   
 37 Hollinger is explicit about his commitment to the oft-cited notion of  “thickness” made famous by 
Clifford Geertz in The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1977). Hollinger, “Historians and 
the Discourse of Intellectuals,” 138. 
 38 Hollinger, “Historians and the Discourse of Intellectuals,” 148. 
 39 Ibid. 
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dissertation demonstrates that the Catholics retained important intellectual affinities 
and historical relationships with their Protestant counterparts. 
 The Cautious Romantic emphasis on spirituality, the inward turn to the 
subjective self, and the role of arts, architecture, nature, and other external forms of 
spiritual experience anticipated important features of liberal Protestantism, embraced by 
many seminaries and churches at the end of the nineteenth century. In general, 
nineteenth century religious and intellectual historians explain the shift in theological 
consciousness by citing the Unitarians, the Transcendentalists, and Horace Bushnell as 
intellectual pioneers. The Romantic religion of the latter two flowered fully once biblical 
criticism and Darwinian science forced establishment Protestantism to intellectually 
reinvent itself.40 Coleridge, Wordsworth, and the American Cautious Romantics were an 
important part of this story, laying the groundwork for liberal Romantic Trinitarianism. 
On the other hand, the generally orthodox preoccupations of the Cautious Romantics in 
their own time, and their commitment to the authority of institutions—seen most 
prominently among the four Catholic converts—meant that a strong conservative 
impulse existed as well. This tension and its historical importance for late nineteenth 
century religion are addressed in the epilogue. 
  
                                                   
 40 Sydney E. Ahlstrom, A Religious History of the American People (New Haven, Yale University 
Press, 1972), 597–614, 776–779; William R. Hutchison, The Modernist Impulse in American Protestantism 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); Gary J. Dorrien, The Making of American Liberal Theology: 
Imagining Progressive Religion, 1805-1900 (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), 1–260. 
Dorrien also cites Henry Ward Beecher and Elizabeth Cady Stanton as important influences on late-
nineteenth century liberal Protestantism. 
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Chapter 1: The Artist and the Philosopher, Washington Allston and Samuel 
Taylor Coleridge in Rome 
 
Introduction 
 In May of 1801, Washington Allston embarked for England “determined . . . to be 
the first painter, at least, from America.”1 He returned to America in 1818 with just such 
distinction. While several scholars have traced the development of Allston's painting 
from an art-historical perspective, this chapter seeks to develop our historical and 
intellectual understanding of Allston. As his intellectual commitments guided his 
painting, it is necessary to carefully understand these commitments. Furthermore, like 
most intellectuals, Allston’s philosophical commitments were bound up with his intimate 
relationships and with the circumstances of his life. To this day, Allston’s legacy in 
American art remains ambiguous. Some scholars privilege his position as the first 
important American painter of the nineteenth century, while others ignore him 
completely.2  Understanding that Allston was a key member of a much larger intellectual 
discourse, one that transcended the boundaries of visual art, helps to understand his 
precise place in American intellectual history. 
 Allston was the first of the Cautious Romantics, and he became thus through an 
intimate friendship with Samuel Taylor Coleridge at the precise moment that Coleridge 
converted to Trinitarian Christianity in Rome. Coleridge introduced Allston to a new 
epistemology that would become a hallmark of the Cautious Romantics and 
Transcendentalists. This chapter articulates that view of the mind and seeks to capture 
                                                   
1 WA to Rachel (Moore) Allston Flagg, Aug. 12, 1800, CWA, 15. 
 2 For an example of the former see Barbara Novak, American Painting of the Nineteenth Century: 
Realism, Idealism, and the American Experience (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 25–39; for an 
example of the latter see Robert Hughes, American Visions: The Epic History of Art in America (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 2006). 
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America's first encounter with it. To do this, the chapter analyzes the intellectual 
relationship of Coleridge and Allston in Rome in 1806 taking a balanced, transatlantic 
approach to both of their intellectual development. The philosophical contours of this 
relationship can only be understood by a careful reading of Coleridge’s notebooks and 
other evidence. Coleridge once opined: “Are books the only channel through which the 
stream of intellectual usefulness can flow? Is the diffusion of truth to be estimated by 
publications? Would that the criterion of a scholar’s utility were . . . the number and 
value of the minds, whom by his conversation or letters, he has excited into activity, and 
supplied with the germs of their after-growth!”3 In context, Coleridge’s point might be 
read as personal angst over his own publication record, but as a point of intellectual 
history it is well taken.  
 
The Crucible of Revolution and the Launching of an American Artist 
 The American Revolution decidedly recast American politics and society, but it 
also inexorably changed the course of Washington Allston’s life. At the Battle of Cowpens 
(Jan. 17, 1781), Daniel Morgan and the “Swamp Fox,” Francis Marion, finally bested the 
British in open battle, catalyzing the morale of the beleaguered patriot cause in the 
South. Prior to Cowpens, the Americans endured loss after loss in the field; but within 
ten months of the fateful battle, the Americans and French outmaneuvered Lord 
Cornwallis and forced his surrender at Yorktown, effectively ending British activity on 
the American mainland.4   
                                                   
3 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria or Biographical Sketches of My Literary Life and 
Opinions, CW, 7:1:220. 
4 The patriots were reeling from the loss of Savannah (1778) and the failure to regain the important 
port, despite French aid (1779). 1780 proved a particularly bleak year as the British seized Charleston (May 
12), decimated the ranks of the southern Continental Army, and continued to deliver sound whippings in the 
field at the Battle of Waxhaws (May 29) and the Battle of Camden (Aug. 16). 
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One of Marion’s ranking aids at Cowpens was Capt. William Allston, the father of 
the infant Washington Allston, born just a year earlier and named after George 
Washington, the illustrious American general.5 William was a wealthy planter who 
supported Marion with his purse as well as his gun, providing supplies and shelter for 
Marion’s guerilla outfit in between forays against Cornwallis.6 While Cowpens was the 
beginning of the end for Cornwallis and the British war effort, it also undid the Allston 
family. During the battle, Captain Allston took sick with fever and died upon returning 
home. With his wealthy, patriotic, southern father gone, Washington’s mother, Rachel, 
married Dr. Henry C. Flagg, the chief of Gen. Nathaniel Greene’s medical staff and the 
son of a well-to-do Rhode Island shipping merchant. Though there was always a piece of 
the southern gentleman in Allston, the Revolution set him on the course of the artistic, 
Yankee cosmopolite. He seems to have never looked back. 
 When Allston was only seven, Dr. Flagg enrolled the boy at the school of Robert 
Rogers in the doctor’s hometown of Newport, Rhode Island. Allston made several 
lifelong friends at the school. One was the young William Ellery Channing, to whom all 
of his earliest, extant letters were addressed. The second, was Channing’s younger cousin 
Richard Henry Dana (Sr.), who later became Allston’s closest friend. Finally, it was in 
                                                   
 5 There is a minor discrepancy in the sources as the earliest biographer of Washington Allston, 
Moses Sweetser, suggested that the William Allston who served under Marion was not Washington’s father 
but his great uncle, see Moses Foster Sweetser, Allston (Boston: Houghton, Osgood and Company and the 
Riverside Press, 1879), 8-10. However, Sweetser’s account was based on Mason Locke Weems and Gen. 
Peter Horry, The Life of Gen. Francis Marion: A Celebrated Partisan Officer in the Revolutionary War, 
against the British and Tories in South Carolina and Georgia (Philadelphia: J. Allen, 1852), 119-120, which 
does not enlighten the question either way. Though the source material is not entirely conclusive, the bulk of 
it insists that Marion’s William and Washington Allston’s William are indeed the same person. See William 
Dobein James, A Sketch of the Life of Brig. Gen. Francis Marion, and a History of His Brigade, from Its 
Rise in June, 1780, Until Disbanded in December, (Charleston, SC: Gould and Riley, 1821), 55; Jared B. 
Flagg, The Life and Letters of Washington Allston (New York, B. Blom, 1892, 1969), 2-4; Joseph Asbury 
Groves, The Alstons and Allstons of North and South Carolina (Atlanta: The Franklin Printing and 
Publishing Company, 1901), 50-51. The most careful secondary scholars of Allston seem to agree on this 
point as well, see GS, 10-11, and CWA, 531-32. 
 6 Weems and Horry, The Life of Gen. Francis Marion, 119-120. 
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Newport that Allston met Channing’s sister, Ann, whom he would marry many years 
later.   
Allston attended Harvard from 1796 to 1800 and there developed a very clear 
vocation to painting, but his identity as an artist and an American Romantic intellectual 
was still inchoate, at best partially formed. At the time, Allston had only a vague 
appreciation for such proto-romantics as Friedrich Schiller and Robert Southey, who 
inspired in Allston what he would later call “bandittimania”—a love for dramatic tales of 
daring and adventure.7 Landscape painting—filled with beloved banditti—inspired 
several of Allston’s most interesting juvenile paintings. He dabbled in portraiture only of 
close friends and family—a trait that would set his entire career apart from most of his 
contemporaries, who were forced to rely on portraiture for patronage. One such portrait 
was an unfinished self-portrait. Painted during his Harvard days, Allston never finished 
painting his own hands, which had yet to realize their unique vision.  
 
Forging a Romantic Persona: The “First Painter from America” 
 While Allston’s literary predilections and general temperament at Harvard were 
romantic in a general sense, he could not have known how fortunate he would be as a 
matter of dates. As he set sail for England in 1801, he arrived just in time to participate in 
the stirring of a new cultural-intellectual moment, which scholars would later call 
“Romanticism.” Between 1797 and 1802, both Coleridge and Wordsworth in Britain, and 
a cadre of young Germans—Friedrich and August Schlegel, Friedrich Schelling, Novalis, 
Schliermacher, and others—had begun to assert that art granted access to higher, or at 
                                                   
 7 GS, 18-19. 
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least different, truths not granted by reason.8 Where reason was critical and destructive, 
art became the creative medium by which the self could be reunited to the world and 
others in the wake of French revolutionary violence and the problematic mind-matter 
dualism that aggravated late-eighteenth century philosophy. This celebration of art led 
these early Romantics to venerate the creative artist and search throughout their lives to 
explain the artist’s powers. 
 Allston arrived in England in the summer of 1801, a burgeoning and somewhat 
brash artist himself. The remaining record of his time between 1801 and 1806 is minimal 
but intellectually rich and suggestive. The Old World sparked much ambivalence that he 
would carry for the rest of his life. As an artist, he valued the cultural refinement that 
presupposed power and wealth; as an American he wondered at the moral consequences 
of that power and wealth, concentrated as it was in the aristocracy and in cities. “I 
arrived in this country big with the anticipation of every species of grandeur,” he 
declared, “but I have found London but a city, and its inhabitants like the rest of the 
world: much in them to admire, more to despise, and still more to abhor.”9 Like 
President Jefferson, Allston found European cities full of “misery and splendor . . . 
princes and beggars” and bemoaned the fact that “the most respectable among the 
middle ranks” had no pride and self-possession but were forced to “condescend to 
flatter” those of rank.10 Like his later friend Washington Irving, he found the English 
                                                   
 8 Frederick C. Beiser, The Romantic Imperative: The Concept of Early German Romanticism 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 39–55, 73–87; William Wordsworth, Lyrical Ballads, 2nd ed. 
(Harlow, England: Pearson Longman, 2007), 302. Beisner has pointed out that the early German Romantics 
were ambivalent about whether art superseded reason or cooperated with it (53-55). 
 9 WA to Charles Fraser, Aug. 25, 1801, CWA, 25. 
10 Ibid. “I view great cities as pestilential to the morals, the health, and the liberties of man, true 
they nourish some of the elegant arts; but the useful ones can thrive elsewhere; and less perfection in the 
others, with more health, virtue and freedom, would be my choice.” Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin Rush, 
Sep. 23, 1800 in Thomas Jefferson, Letters and Addresses of Thomas Jefferson, eds. William B. Parker and 
Jonas Viles (New York: A. Wessels, 1907), 133-134. 
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countryside “beyond [his] expectation beautiful and picturesque,” the people “happy and 
content.”11 
 Despite his loathing of cities, Allston reveled in the artistic community London 
afforded. This community in turn rewarded Allston by opening his eyes to the aesthetic 
tensions—the beauty and terror, the good and evil—that would lead him to embrace 
Coleridgean epistemology and ultimately prompt a conversion to Trinitarian 
Christianity. In ranking the artists with whom he was privileged to study, he 
demonstrated these tensions emerging in his own mind. He ranked Benjamin West, the 
American-born president of the Royal Academy first, being drawn to the breadth of 
West’s corpus, which ranged from settled historicism to the “sublime and awful” when 
appropriate.12 This latter quality he found equally remarkable in the work of Henry 
Fuseli, whose Miltonic visions both fascinated and repelled Allston. “Artist sublime,” he 
declared, “I own thy powerful spell / I feel thy fire and hear the blasts of Hell. . . . 
Convulsive now I lift the admiring eye, / And now with horror from his presence fly. . . . I 
hate, admire, admire, and hate by turns.”13 
 Fuseli’s artistic visions enchanted Allston, and he began to envision his own 
ability to participate in them as both recipient and creator. He was so carried away by 
vocational commitment to art that he earnestly urged his friend Charles Fraser to 
“beware of love” and focus on painting.14 “Love in its place I revere; but it is not at all 
times to be indulged. There are many very beautiful girls in Charleston. But Raphael and 
                                                   
 11 WA to Charles Fraser, Aug. 25, 1801, CWA, 25. Irving thought the English “strongly gifted with 
the rural feeling . . . [with] a quick sensibility to the beauties of nature,” see Washington Irving, “Rural Life in 
England” in History, Tales, and Sketches, The Library of America (New York: Literary Classics of the United 
States and Viking Press, 1983), 795. 
 12 WA to Charles Fraser, Aug. 25, 1801, CWA, 26. 
 13 WA to Charles Fraser, Aug. 25, 1801, CWA, 26-27. 
 14 Ibid., 28. 
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Michael Angelo are still more beautiful than they.”15 Given that Allston did not return to 
marry his beloved, Ann Channing, for eight years, this statement proved perhaps a bit 
too heartfelt. Buoyed by West’s confidence in him, he seemed to see his opportunity for 
what it was. “I am not very modest,” he declared, “Confidence is the soul of genius . . . 
[and] great men rise but by their own exertions.”16 These were ominous words for a 
painter who would achieve remarkable distinction but never finish his great masterpiece 
after twenty-five years of trying. 
 In this emphasis on what Allston called “solitary confidence”—or the “vast 
conceptions of the [artist’s] mind” realized by a particular kind of exclusion and 
individuality—he was, at an early stage, articulating for himself what would become the 
guiding idea of the Romantic artist.17 Possessing what Wordsworth called an “immortal 
soul with Godlike power” many Romantics insisted that artists (including poets and 
composers) possessed a special ability to not just mirror reality, as in a representational 
painting, but reveal something new about it through their own specific vision.18 These 
visions could range from social commentary, as in Shelley’s “England in 1819,” to proto-
psychological explorations, as in Franciso Goya’s The Sleep of Reason Produces Madness 
(1799, fig. 1), to haunting suggestions about the will and human moral nature, as in 
Coleridge’s “Rime of the Ancient Mariner” (1798).   
This peculiarity of vision allowed for striking insights but also a degree of 
alienation—whether natural or self-imposed—from the dominant society. The reason 
why the condescension and flattery in European cities bothered Allston so much is that 
                                                   
 15 Ibid., 28. 
 16 Ibid., 28. 
 17 WA to Jon Knapp, Aug. 24, 1803. CWA, 35. 
 18 William Wordsworth, The Prelude (London: Edward Moxon, 1850), 92. On the previous 
conceptions of the artist mirroring reality vs. the Romantic conception of the artist illuminating it see M. H. 
Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition (New York, Oxford 
University Press, 1953). 
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he felt the irony inherent in the need to cultivate patronage while simultaneously 
pursuing his own peculiar vision as a Romantic artist.19 This concern bedeviled him 
throughout his life. While the artistic epistemology that emphasized unique vision 
defined Romantic intellectuals and is clearly visible in hindsight, it was only just being 
articulated in such works as Wordworth’s Preface to the Lyrical Ballads (1800, 1802 
editions). Allston’s art would come of age with this principle.  
 While Allston articulated this vision of himself as a Romantic artist, he was no 
iconoclast. His temperament, background, and convictions all led him to a cautious 
veneration of the artist. He believed, as Samuel Taylor Coleridge would put it, “The dwarf 
sees farther than the giant, when he has the giant’s shoulder to mount on.”20 The new 
emphasis on solitary genius was a product of the Romantic Era, but as Allston explained 
to Henry Pickering and the young Thomas Cole, “the Old Masters . . . express the highest 
truth—such as nature reveals only to the gifted few. Their effects may be called the 
poetical moods of nature—occurring rarely, and only known to occur in poetical 
minds.”21 The moment of genius, praised by the Romantics, had always occurred when 
great artists composed, but the process as well as the result fascinated Allston, Coleridge, 
and many others of their generation. 
                                                   
19 The question of patronage was becoming particularly complex in this period as aristocratic 
patronage was giving way to the democratic patronage of the market, producing different but not less 
profound frustrations and ambivalences for Romantic artists in England. On Great Britain, see Raymond 
Williams, Culture and Society, 1780-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 30–48, esp. 36. In 
Prussia, a defining characteristic of the rising generation of Romantic writers after 1780 was their middle 
class background and education, the lack of employment equivalent to their talents, and their general 
discontent with the condescension and flattery required of them socially, see Henri Brunschwig, 
Enlightenment and Romanticism in Eighteenth-Century Prussia (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1974), 147–163. 
20 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, The Friend, CW, 4:1:249. This image of the dwarf and the giant seems 
itself to stand on the shoulders of forebears as it has been traced to the sixteenth-century Spanish 
philosopher-theologian Diego de Estella at Salamanca (see The Friend, CW, 4:1:249, fn. 1) and all the way 
back to the twelfth-century Bernard of Chartres. For this latter connection I am indebted to Randall Smith. 
21 WA to Henry Pickering, Nov. 23, 1827, written with advice for Thomas Cole, CWA, 245-246. 
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Allston knew that his own particular vision required studying the great masters 
on the Continent so as to stand on their shoulders; thus in November 1803, he set sail for 
France to visit the Louvre, the Alps, and eventually Rome. Confirming his artistic 
earnestness, he gradually sold off most of his inheritance in the South Carolina 
plantations to finance these crucially formative years between 1800 and 1809, seemingly 
never regretting a moment.22 In Paris, Allston shunned the artistic establishment, which 
apparently shunned him as well, in favor of the historical masters in the Louvre.23 He 
was drawn to the Italian Renaissance painters, especially Titian, and here he began to 
embrace a distinctive style of painting that would provide him with a painting technique 
worthy of his emerging identity as a Romantic artist. 
 
Unity in Diversity: Rediscovering a Lost Technique 
 Much as Allston had fashioned for himself an individual artistic vision, he was 
now developing a technique that would allow him to realize these visions. The 
fundamental tension for most Romantics, whether English poets or German 
philosophers, was the desire to embrace the natural world with both arms while not 
squeezing out the spiritual or supernatural resources traditionally provided by religion—
which the Romantics accused Enlightenment rationalism of doing. This resulted in what 
has aptly been described as “natural supernaturalism” in which careful attention to and 
veneration of nature by the immortal soul with godlike powers yielded experiences of the 
sublime and beautiful equivalent to those often associated with religious experience.24 As 
                                                   
 22 Allston seemed to gradually sell off his inheritance in stages as his financial needs dictated given 
his exclusive focus on art. For the progression of these transactions between 1800 and 1809, see Nathalia 
Wright in CWA, 36-37. 
 23 Henry Greenough, “Washington Allston as a Painter: Unpublished Reminiscences of Henry 
Greenough,” Scribner’s Magazine 11 (January-June 1892): 223. 
 24 M. H. Abrams, Natural Supernaturalism; Tradition and Revolution in Romantic Literature 
(New York, Norton, 1971). 
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a result, the mind—particularly that of the artist but also of any human being—existed in 
a dynamic relationship with nature wherein nature constantly called the mind to her own 
concrete forms to thereby awaken, again and again, the mind’s godlike faculty which in 
turn discovered new insights about nature. These insights were unavailable to either 
cursory observation of nature or the solipsistic musings of the same mind sequestered 
from nature.25 Nature sparked the mind, and the mind revealed nature. 
 In Allston’s case, he sought the colors and techniques in painting that would 
communicate the union of the natural and the supernatural. He believed he found these 
in the lost glazing technique, vellatura, practiced by the Renaissance painters. This 
technique came to define the two most remarkable aspects of his painting that critics 
then and now have identified: color and luminosity. The American architect Henry 
Greenough remembered Allston speaking frequently and passionately about this 
discovery: 
You must have observed the difference in lustre between silks woven from different-
colored threads and those dyed with a compound hue. . . . The first has a luminous 
appearance like the human complexion. This luminousness is the grand characteristic of 
flesh. It is what Titian calls the ‘luce di dentro’ or internal light. When I first heard that 
expression of Titian’s it opened to me a world of light. It is common with painters to talk of 
the transparency of flesh; it is not transparent, but luminous.26 
 
 The technique of glazing that Allston sought involved carefully painting thin 
and subtle layers of color on a painting one by one to produce the desired tone and 
effect. In a few cases he would delicately mix colors with the paintbrush, but he 
insisted that grinding the colors together with the palette knife—the dominant 
                                                   
 25 See for example Wordsworth, The Prelude, 59 or 19-20. “. . . ofttimes did I quit / My comrades, 
leave the crowd, buildings and groves . . . the mind / Drooped not; but there into herself returning, / With 
prompt rebound seemed fresh as heretofore,” (59) or “Wisdom and Spirit of the universe! . . . didst thou 
intertwine for me / The passions that build up our human soul; / Not with the mean and vulgar works of 
man, / But with high objects . . . With life and nature, purifying thus / The elements of feeling and of 
thought” (19-20). This theme likewise emerged in paragraph two of Tintern Abbey where “nature provides 
the moments when the poet transcends nature,” see Barbour, “Between Two Worlds,” 159. 
 26 Henry Greenough, “Washington Allston as a Painter: Unpublished Reminiscences of Henry 
Greenough,” Scribner’s Magazine 11 (January-June 1892): 222. 
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technique of color-mixing at this time—robbed a painting of its luminosity. The 
striking colors produced by this elusive technique derived their clarity and potency 
from the diversity of parts that retained their subtle distinctness upon close 
inspection (which pre-mixed colors could not), but they produced a striking unity of 
color to the eye. “If you were to take a magnifying-glass and examine the tint you will 
find small particles of pure color which give great brilliancy,” Allston explained.27  
 Allston’s belief that beauty consisted in a distinct diversity of parts—united 
but not subsumed in a larger unity—prepared him to embrace Coleridgean theories 
about the mind and artistic creation he would encounter in Rome. Unity in diversity 
proved a fecund concept among many romanticists. The German philosopher 
Friedrich Schelling articulated the idea most forcefully: “Just as unity is unintuitable 
without plurality, so plurality is unintuitable without unity, and so both mutually 
presuppose one another,” Schelling insisted.28 In art, Allston sought the unified effect 
of a careful diversity of colors, but in the hands of the later American philosopher 
Orestes Brownson, the idea would serve as an avenue to the ontological Christian 
Trinity (discussed in Chapter Nine). 
In the Wordsworthian language of natural supernaturalism, Allston insisted 
that the “magic” effect produced by the vellatura technique was magical precisely 
because it was “so true to nature.”29 The technique was true to nature because the 
ambient effect of a glistening moon or the tonal subtlety of human flesh was too 
complex, too profound for the artist to be able to mix these colors up beforehand. The 
technique was magical because Allston thought the luminous result pointed to 
                                                   
 27 Ibid. 
 28 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism (1800), trans. Peter 
Heath, 3rd reprint (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1978), 146–147. 
 29 Greenough, “Washington Allston as a Painter,” 221-223. Wordsworth himself spoke of seeing 
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higher, spiritual principles present within nature and within humankind. The 
examples below exemplify Allston’s aesthetic goals. 
In Moonlight (1819, fig. 2), the moon’s direct beam on the water, its more 
subtle suffusion in the clouds, and its precise silhouetting of the ship and human 
figures were all true to nature. However, Allston meant to create a transcendent 
experience with the unifying quality of the ambient light, its penetration throughout 
the entire painting, and its beckoning of the eye back to the source of light. In Samuel 
Taylor Coleridge (1814, fig. 3), Allston attempted to recreate the “‘luce di dentro’ or 
internal light” that animated Coleridge by contrasting his flesh with the subtle layers 
of darkness behind him and the very stark darkness of his coat.30 The successful 
effect prompted Wordsworth, who had explicitly claimed that an “internal light” 
animated Coleridge’s genius, to have the National Gallery acquire it as the best 
likeness of Coleridge ever painted.31 
 Allston was not particularly religious, much less pious, prior to 1806, but in 
his developing theory of glazing one can see the inklings of what would become for 
him his most treasured belief and “the very life of his soul.”32 What fascinated Allston 
about the Venetian technique was not only its ability to communicate the warm tones 
and luminosity suggestive of the spiritual or supernatural, it was also that the effect 
was still “so true to nature” because it could communicate “the grand characteristic 
                                                   
 30 Greenough, “Washington Allston as a Painter,” 222. 
31 Wordsworth cited in Richard Holmes, Coleridge: Early Visions (New York: Viking, 1990), 32. 
 32 RHDS to GCV, July 14, 1843, DFP, MHS. All manuscripts from this collection are organized by 
date, thus the folder is only cited in the following footnotes if a date is not otherwise provided. William H. 
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of flesh.”33 Many commentators have focused exclusively on Allston’s attempt to 
communicate transcendence in his painting, which does not account for why he 
eventually became a Trinitarian Christian versus a Hegelian, a spiritual disciple of 
Spinoza or Schelling, or a gnostic Freemason.34 Allston was equally interested in the 
embodied nature of humanity, and eventually this particular insistence on a fleshy 
natural supernaturalism would, in a later moment of crisis, lead him to embrace the 
Christian incarnation and atonement. In this theology, the divine Logos not only 
emanated into the natural world, as all Neo-Platonists would have it, but also 
incarnated itself as a God-man and, in Allston’s later words, a “second Adam . . . 
palpable in flesh.”35 
 Strictly speaking, Allston’s technique of vellatura was a revival of 
Renaissance technique, but its application to different subject matter, for different 
motivations, and using a developing Romantic aesthetic theory all marked the event 
as a synthesis rather than a mere renaissance of the Renaissance. His command of 
color at times led some to think his work strikingly similar to that of the old masters, 
                                                   
 33 Greenough, “Washington Allston as a Painter,” 222. Emphasis mine. 
 34 David Bjelajac has located Allston, the reception of his art, and in particular his technique, within 
the context of freemasonry, alchemy, and the quest for secret knowledge and spiritual experiences. While 
some of Allston’s patrons are seen more clearly through this lens, it confuses Allston’s motivating impulses. 
For example, equating what would become Allston’s Christian catholicity with Masonic universalism (very 
different ideas) or arguing that Allston ignored the orthodox Protestant dualism between matter and spirit 
when it is more accurate to see Allston reconciling them in an authorized way by using his painting to 
discover the sine qua non of orthodox Protestantism, namely the incarnation and atonement of Christ. See 
David Bjelajac, Washington Allston, Secret Societies, and the Alchemy of Anglo-American Painting (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 1-4, 32-65. 
 35 Washington Allston, “The Atonement,” in Lectures on Art and Poems, 1850; and Monaldi, 1841 
(Gainesville, Fla.: Scholars' Facsimiles & Reprints, 1967), 320. R.W.B. Lewis has argued that the Adamic 
trope in early nineteenth-century America can be broken down into three categories. The party of Memory, 
those who emphasized the corruption of humankind and society like Charles Hodge; the party of Hope, 
exemplified by those who argued for a new innocence and optimism in America like Emerson, Thoreau, and 
Whitman; and the party of Irony, that managed a tragic optimism, holding the two principles in tension. In 
this camp, Lewis places Henry James Sr., Horace Bushnell, and Nathaniel Hawthorne. The American 
Allston’s view of Adam seems here part of both the party of Memory in its orthodoxy but also holding the 
tragic optimism of the party of Irony as Allston embraced the Fortunate Fall. See R. W. B. Lewis, The 
American Adam; Innocence, Tragedy, and Tradition in the Nineteenth Century. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1955), 7-8. 
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but his ability to “allow memory to blur the edges and soften the atmosphere” places 
him in “that rarer current of pure romanticism.”36 
 
Alpine Ardor and American Angst 
 Allston’s fascination with Venetian vellatura inevitably took him to Rome to join 
numerous other aesthetic pilgrims from Britain, North America, and the Continent, but 
his road led through the Alps, as it had for so many romanticists before him. Some thirty 
years later he recalled: “The impressions left by the sublime scenery of Switzerland, are 
still fresh to this day. A new world had been opened to me—nor have I met with any 
thing like it since.”37 In his sublime Alpine experience, Allston articulated a common 
Romantic formation narrative where the Alps played a central role in the development of 
the artist’s perception and sensibility. Venerating the Alps was so common during the 
early nineteenth century that it is tempting to think it cliché. While this might be the case 
for some travelers with generally romantic sensibilities, for those who became great 
poets, painters, and musicians the Alpine experience was always unique because it 
provoked the imagination in different ways.38 
 For a Romantic spokesman like Wordsworth, the Alpine experience was the 
apotheosis of natural supernaturalism, and the mountains were so overwhelming and 
provocative his own imagination could not decide how to articulate their essence. At 
times the Alps were “Nature’s throne” or podium, whence Nature like the ancient 
                                                   
 36 When John Wheeler, James Marsh’s successor at the University of Vermont visited Coleridge, 
Coleridge praised Allston extensively and told him people constantly mistook an Allston painting of an Arab 
and Turkish horse for a Titian. STC, Table Talk, CW, 14:2:431. Quotations are from Barbara Novak, 
American Painting of the Nineteenth Century: Realism, Idealism, and the American Experience (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), 34-35. 
 37 WA to William Dunlap, ca. Feb. 18, 1834, CWA, 351-352. 
 38 On the influence of mountains and the Alps even on the development of Romantic music in the 
work of Beethoven, Schubert, and Schumann see Charles Rosen’s chapter on “Mountains and Song Cycles” 
in The Romantic Generation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), 116-220. 
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goddess Sophia communicated wisdom to the youthful and wayward poet.39 At times the 
Alps ironically provoked the imagination of the poet into its own revelry and revelation 
precisely because they failed to sensually stimulate him any more; their absence was the 
stimulation to reflection.40 At times the Alps taken as a whole were a pantheistic 
manifestation of God, “workings of one mind, the features of the same face” with rocks 
that “muttered” and “black drizzling crags that spake,” but even here his language shifted 
upon itself as he questioned the Alpine apotheosis and suggested that the mountainous 
features were merely “characters of the great Apocalypse, / The types and symbols of 
Eternity,” to which God was not entirely reducible.41   
Ultimately it was the paradoxes available in the Alps that proved so provocative, 
to Wordsworth and the other Romantics. As we shall see, Coleridge, Allston and the 
other Americans in this study saw the most fundamental truths of existence as 
paradoxes—truths that emerged from realizing the limitations of the human mind. In the 
essence of the Alps, “stationary blasts of waterfalls” and “woods decaying, never to be 
decayed” combined to communicate the “tumult and peace, the darkness and the light” 
that was at the heart of existence.42 It is small wonder then that Allston—simultaneously 
attracted to and repelled by Fuseli’s dark visions and seeking a unity born of diversity in 
his painting technique—was so profoundly affected. When he reached Rome, he 
embarked on two of his best landscape paintings, inspired by his Alpine experience: 
Landscape with a Lake (1804) and Diana and Her Nymphs in the Chase (1805). 
                                                   
 39 Wordsworth, The Prelude, 153. In this part of The Prelude, Wordsworth counterpoises his 
youthful, present-minded, male (“riotous men”) zeal with Nature’s patient, historicist, and feminine 
command: “Your impious work forbear.” Wordsworth’s interest in the distinction between youth and 
wisdom is confirmed elsewhere in the poem (340). The trope of Wisdom calling out to impious and riotous 
young men also appears in the book of Proverbs, but there she constantly calls in the streets, at the gates of 
the city, and lays sumptuous feasts for her guests. Here Wordsworth places Wisdom in the heart of nature, as 
far from the city as possible. 
 40 Wordsworth, The Prelude, 159-160. 
 41 Wordsworth, The Prelude, 161. 
 42 Wordsworth, The Prelude, 161. 
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 While the Alps were Nature’s Bible to the European natural-supernatural types, 
in 1804 similarly inclined Americans like Allston ironically could only find such grandeur 
in Europe despite being citizens of  “Nature’s Nation.”43 While the Appalachians could 
inspire—particularly the Catskills for the early American landscape painters—their 
ability to evoke the Burkean sublime paled in comparison to the Alps as a simple matter 
of physical geography.44 This was particularly true for Allston, who even in the 1820s 
remarked, “We have no mountains here, at least I have never seen any thing but round 
hills. Nothing like the broken, romantic, angular character of the Alps and Pyrenees. 
Neither have they any mountains in England, Scotland or Wales. Their mountains are 
but dumplings.”45 
 In many ways, the Alps were the natural equivalent of the Old World cultural 
refinement that allured American intellectuals, although the price for such experiences 
was the American cultural inferiority complex that was becoming acute in the early 
nineteenth century. Washington Irving complained of the “illiberality of British authors” 
that caused the “British public [to] have less pure information . . . [and] more numerous 
prejudices” against Americans than against any other people.46 As Allston wandered 
through the Alps, Lewis and Clark were a few months from the Continental Divide, 
opening the West not only to settlement and exploitation, but also to visions of nature in 
the Rocky Mountains and the California Redwoods that would liberate Americans from 
                                                   
43 Perry Miller, Nature’s Nation (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967). 
Barbara Novak has argued effectively for the union of nature with American self-identity and even 
nationalism during this period (though she overstates the case for pantheism), see Barbara Novak, Nature 
and Culture: American Landscape and Painting, 1825-1875 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), esp. 
17. 
44 The average peak in Appalachia is ~3000 ft., the highest peak Mt. Mitchell is 6,684 ft. 
Switzerland alone has 15 peaks higher than Mt. Mitchell and the highest peak in the Alps, Mt. Blanc, is 
15,782 ft. 
 45 Entry in Allston’s “Color Book,” CWA, 622. 
 46 Washington Irving, “English Writers on America” in History, Tales, and Sketches, The Library of 
America (New York: Literary Classics of the United States and Viking Press, 1983), 786, 794. 
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the Alpine idiom. This helps to explain the popularity of Albert Bierstadt’s Western 
landscapes and why painters such as Edwin Church and Asher Durand ventured to the 
Andes in South America to seek inspiration after their Catskill phases. Thomas Cole, the 
father of the Hudson River School and the American landscape tradition, was as 
overcome as Allston by “the most wonderful and sublime view that [he] ever beheld,” 
and he admitted that the “lower mountains” of the Bernese Alps would be “giants in 
other lands” and were “too beautiful to be compared with anything on Earth.”47  
 
Romantic Epistemology in Rome: The Intellectual Friendship of Coleridge 
 Descending from the Alps, Allston visited Milan, Florence, and Siena, eventually 
arriving at Rome in early 1805. He would call Rome home until March 1808, when the 
combination of the American Embargo Act (Dec. 1807) and Napoleon’s invasion of Rome 
(Feb. 2, 1808) prompted him to return home. It is difficult to describe how profoundly 
the ancient city affected him. He continued his pursuit of the “pure Venetian” technique, 
becoming ever more enraptured with the Italian masters, particularly Michelangelo who 
“[stood] alone” with “wondrous power.”48 Though single-minded in his work, he socially 
enjoyed the society of a large and cosmopolitan community and numbered Portuguese, 
French, Belgian, and Austrian painters among his friends.49 He hobnobbed with the 
German community of artists and intellectuals assembled around the Prussian foreign 
minister Wilhelm von Humboldt. It was also in Rome that Allston met the young 
                                                   
47 Louis Legrand Noble, The Life and Works of Thomas Cole, ed. Elliot S. Vesell (Cambridge: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1964), 228–229. 
48 See Allston’s reflective poem “On Michael Angelo” in Washington Allston, Lectures on Art and 
Poems, 1850; and Monaldi, 1841 (Gainesville, FL: Scholars’ Facsimiles & Reprints, 1967), 375. 
 49 WA to John Vanderlyn, June 28, 1813, CWA, 62-63. 
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American Washington Irving, who briefly considered turning painter, being inspired by 
Allston’s grace and vocation.50 
 While this cosmopolitan intellectual community provided all the aesthetic and 
intellectual stimulation that an aspiring artist could hope for, there was one person in 
particular who seemed fated to befriend the young Allston. Samuel Taylor Coleridge 
arrived in the city a year after Allston. As always, Coleridge was simultaneously ebullient 
and tragic, an “archangel a little damaged,” as Charles Lamb remembered him.51 
Coleridge had traveled through Italy after serving as an advisor and secretary to Sir 
Alexander Ball, the British governor of Malta. He had initially sought the Mediterranean 
for his health, but also as an escape from a frustrated marriage and unrequited love for 
another woman (whom he constantly idealized throughout his travels). Despite his flaws, 
it was Coleridge who exerted an exceptionally strong influence in America—particularly 
among the Cautious Romantics—and it was Allston who met him first. 
 Throughout his entire life, Coleridge kept a copious chronicle of his mind’s 
development—an invaluable resource for the intellectual historian. Unfortunately, the 
majority of Coleridge’s Rome notebooks disappeared beneath the Mediterranean as a 
result of the Napoleonic Wars. While leaving Rome under duress thanks to Napoleon’s 
evicting all British subjects, Coleridge found an American ship to take him back to 
England. During the voyage, a Spanish privateer boarded the neutral vessel and ordered 
the American Captain Derkheim to “throw overboard his & [Coleridge’s] papers 
promiscuously.”52 A few notebooks survived, but these contain a mere twenty-four pages 
chronicling Coleridge’s intellectual life in Rome when he had been averaging four times 
                                                   
 50 Evert A. Duyckinck and George Long Duyckinck, eds., Cyclopaedia of American Literature; 
Embracing Personal and Critical Notices of Authors (New York: C. Scribner, 1855), 14–17. 
 51 Charles Lamb to WW, April 26, 1816 in Charles Lamb, The Best Letters of Charles Lamb, ed. 
Edward Gilpin Johnson (Chicago: A. C. McClurg, 1892), 223. 
 52 STC to Daniel Stuart, Aug. 22, 1806, CL, 2:1177. 
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that amount of reflection for the previous two years.53 In intellectual and aesthetic 
confraternity, Coleridge maintained that the six months in Rome were as profound as his 
early days with Wordsworth in the Lake District or his trip to study German philosophy. 
It would seem on this frustrating occasion that the historian, for want of Coleridge’s 
Rome notebooks, is as much at Napoleon’s mercy as was early nineteenth-century 
Europe. 
 The challenges notwithstanding, a careful reconstruction of Allston and 
Coleridge’s relationship in Rome is essential. It was in Rome that Allston first explicitly 
encountered the Coleridgean epistemology that would come to explain his art, and it was 
in Rome that Allston gave Coleridge a much deeper appreciation for visual art.54 It was in 
Rome that Coleridge first began to work through his conversion to Trinitarianism—the 
trait that would endear him to the Cautious Romantics in America—and Coleridge’s 
metaphysics prepared Allston for his later conversion to Christianity. Finally, Allston 
provided the emotionally needy Coleridge with unwavering friendship at a crucial time in 
Coleridge’s Mediterranean wanderings. In short, Rome was the beginning of an 
intellectual friendship crucial to both Coleridge and Allston and therefore crucial to 
understanding the advent of Romantic thinking in America. 
 Fortunately, the task of reconstruction is not as difficult as it might seem, for 
Coleridge was notoriously loquacious. Though his mind worked in books and ideas, he 
confessed a much greater desire to converse with others; he even saw reading as 
                                                   
 53 From January 1804 to December 1805, Coleridge’s notebooks contain 322 printed pages, over 80 
pages every six months. From January 1806 to June 1806 they contain 24 pages. Donald Sultana is also 
helpful here in narrating the complicated and harrowing experience enjoyed by all of Coleridge’s papers that 
migrated around the Mediterranean and only found their way back to England much later. Donald Sultana, 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge in Malta and Italy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1969), 388-401. 
54 Though Coleridge appreciated visual art prior to Rome he ranked it at the bottom of an aesthetic 
hierarchy where music reigned and poetry—as lyrical music and Coleridge’s particular gift—ranked just 
below music, see CN, 1963, 2035. Later, as a result of Allston’s influence, Coleridge came to see painting as 
equal and even in some ways superior in its ability to translate the insights of Reason to a wider audience. 
The importance of this shift is discussed later. 
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primarily a conversation between the author and reader. “I become restless,” he 
confessed in Malta before traveling to Rome, “for my very nature is social.”55 He was to 
everyone who knew him “an incomparable declaimer” who enchanted estranged 
relatives, Lord Byron, and everyone in between by “how wonderfully he talked.” Even the 
extremely critical William Hazlitt couldn’t help but concede, “He talked on for ever; and 
you wished him to talk on for ever.”56   
Coleridge dazzled many, but few were as smitten as Allston: 
To no other man do I owe so much intellectually as to Mr. Coleridge, with whom I became 
acquainted in Rome. . . . He used to call Rome ‘the silent city,’ but I could never think of it as such 
while with him . . . the fountain of his mind was never dry, but, like the far-reaching aqueducts that 
once supplied this mistress of the world, its living stream seemed specially to flow for [sic] every 
classic ruin over which we wandered; and when I recall some of our walks under the pines of the 
Villa Borghese, I am almost tempted to dream that I have once listened to Plato in the groves of the 
Academy.57 
 
The “fountain of [Coleridge’s] mind” while partially preserved in his Rome notebooks is 
extensive in the Mediterranean notebooks written just prior to Rome. These contain the 
myriad of questions and reflections that Coleridge entertained at the time and outline the 
living stream that flowed from Coleridge’s mouth beneath the pines of the Villa 
Borghese. By carefully applying these questions and reflections to the minimal material 
preserved in the Rome notebooks and comparing it with Allston’s concerns to date, the 
living stream of thought that passed between them once again springs to life.58 
                                                   
 55 CN, 2322. 
 56 Quotations are from Henry Crabb Robinson, Lord Byron, and Hazlitt respectively and are quoted 
in Richard Holmes, Coleridge: Darker Reflections, 1804-1834 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1999), 223, 246, 
and 470. For Coleridge’s influence on Thomas DeQuincey see p. 100, over his nephews see p. 248, Keats p. 
497, etc. It is one of Holmes primary and compelling arguments that Coleridge’s talk distinguished him to 
many other notable intellectuals. 
 57 JF, 64. 
58 The most careful study of the precise intellectual relationship between Allston and Coleridge is 
Morton D. Paley, Samuel Taylor Coleridge and the Fine Arts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). Paley 
would agree with the method pursued here as he suggests that many of the ideas he later analyzes (1811-
1818) were “likely to have been transmitted verbally . . . considering what Allston says about their long 
conversations in Italy” (134). However, the majority of Paley’s book focuses on Allston’s and Coleridge’s 
relationship after Rome; as the book focuses on Coleridge, the sections on Rome focus on the myriad art 
Coleridge likely encountered. My approach focuses on Allston and the philosophical and religious ideas he 
learned from Coleridge in Rome. 
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Samuel Taylor Coleridge: The Formation of a Romantic Mind 
Coleridge arrived in Rome virtually friendless, fearing to go home to face his wife and 
children and fresh off of two years of furious introspection. His intellectual wrangling on 
questions of nature, the mind, the will, and God mingled with moral dejection, guilt, and 
self-doubt. In Rome he met the young Allston, seven years his junior, who must have 
reminded Coleridge of a younger version of himself replete with a penchant for Schiller, 
a fascination with the moon, an evolving and personal notion of the Romantic genius, 
and most importantly the “copious, animated, and highly graphic conversation” that 
would keep both of them “up until cock-crowing.”59 Indeed, Coleridge despaired shortly 
after leaving Rome: “To you & to you alone since I have left England, I have felt more 
and had I not known the Wordsworths should have loved & esteemed you first and most 
and as it is, next to them I love & honor you. Heaven knows, a part of such a Wreck as my 
Head & Heart is scarcely worth your acceptance.”60 In addition to copious and highly 
graphic conversation on art, the mind, and God, Allston provided Coleridge with 
something even more important for a damaged archangel: a sympathetic, human friend. 
 While Allston had been perfecting his technique and studying the great masters 
in 1804 and 1805, Coleridge’s wrecked head and heart followed his body through the 
Mediterranean seeking physical healing, vocational direction, and spiritual clarity. A 
growing opium addiction and related, debilitating bowel complaints tortured his body, 
while his psyche wrestled with the guilt of a failing marriage and an unrequited 
infatuation with a woman named Sara Hutchinson.  He obtained a literary reputation by 
collaborating with his best friend Wordsworth on the Lyrical Ballads (1798, 1800, 
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 60 STC to WA, June 17, 1806, CWA, 53. Emphasis original. 
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1802), by writing political journalism, and by generally overwhelming notable 
intellectuals and well-to-do patrons with his aforementioned “wonderful talk.”61 
However, his faults and afflictions were overwhelming his abilities and triumphs by 
1804. The trip forced Coleridge to take serious stock of both his soul and the grand 
intellectual enterprises he had always hoped to accomplish. He was morbidly doubtful 
whether he would even return at all.62 
 Understanding Coleridge’s expansive intellectual longing—or “my delving and 
difficulty” as he called it—is the first step to understanding Coleridge.63 But making sense 
of him and what he imparted to Allston, even in the constricted period between 1804 and 
mid-1806, requires carefully identifying and organizing the living streams of his mind. 
He was anything but systematic in his thinking, especially at this stage. A careful study of 
Coleridge’s notebooks reveals four predominant intellectual streams that competed with 
and modified one another. Often commentators are forced to privilege one of these 
streams at the expense of the others for the sake of their arguments and narratives. 
However, in the period between 1804 and mid-1806, these streams were all converging 
into a violent, tempestuous river; an accurate historical narrative demands keeping them 
in tension. 
The first stream was a literary and aesthetic sensibility; this was Coleridge, the 
Romantic poet, whose immortal soul with godlike powers could see the world in a unique 
way and craft his vision into such haunting and critically acclaimed poems as “Kubla 
Khan” and “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner.” The second stream was a philosophical 
                                                   
 61 Among his intellectual friends he counted Robert Southey, William and Dorothy Wordsworth, 
Charles Lamb, William Hazlitt, and the scientist Sir Humphrey Davy (though Hazlitt and Southey were 
becoming disillusioned with Coleridge). Among his patrons he numbered Thomas and Josiah Wedgwood, Sir 
William Sotheby, and Sir George and Lady Margaret Beaumont who would come to play an important role 
providing patronage for Allston. 
62 Coleridge’s letters to numerous friends and relatives during his departure ring with wistful and 
even morbid talk of “the Voyage of Death” and of never returning, see CL, 2:1104-1123. 
63 CN, 2509. 
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disposition that insisted on probing the most fundamental questions about the world, 
the mind, and the relationship between the two. This disposition grew directly out of 
questioning what precisely happened when the poet saw the world and composed. While 
Wordsworth contentedly asserted that “poetry is the first and last of all knowledge” and 
moved on, Coleridge wanted to ground his and Wordsworth’s aesthetics on more 
sophisticated philosophical systems.64 Thus the complexities of German idealism allured 
him, though he fashioned this philosophy in his own way.  
The third stream was a religious and theological impulse. As we shall see, his 
poetic vision drew him again and again to believe that “the lovely shapes and sounds 
intelligible” in nature were an “eternal language” best understood by reference to 
“God.”65 Coleridge’s actual religious views were at times explicitly Unitarian, at times 
vaguely pantheistic, and eventually just prior to and during his sojourn in Rome he 
became a Trinitarian Christian. Coleridge’s conversion arose directly out of his 
intellectual commitments and previous experiences, but a very real sense of guilt, the 
fourth and final stream, had launched him on his Mediterranean journey in the first 
place and lurked in many of his private reflections. Parsing this stream requires supreme 
care; one must avoid both overemphasizing and understating its influence. All of these 
streams modified each other in complex ways. Though it is important to separate them 
for the sake of clarity and historical precision, they were simultaneously parts of 
Coleridge’s complex intellect. 
From an early age, Coleridge demonstrated his aesthetic sensibility. Like Allston, 
Coleridge lost his father in 1781, and like Allston this led to a family decision to send him 
away to more affordable schooling—in this case London—at the tender age of nine. Torn 
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from his father’s provincial vicarage at Ottery St. Mary in Devon, he often sat “at the 
barr’d window” or “upon the leaded School-roof [in London] . . . sky-gazing in ‘ecstatic 
fit’” as “the Sky was all [he] knew of Beautiful.” Wordsworth later insisted it was this 
two-fold experience—first being reared in nature, and then suddenly being wrenched 
from it—that awakened in the young Coleridge the “internal light” (captured so well in 
Allston’s painting of Coleridge), the godlike ability of the poet to perceive nature, and to 
articulate this vision to a wider audience.66  
In London, Coleridge began to embrace two related principles as he sat staring at 
the individual stars held together in an inky sky. First, he began to embrace a definition 
of beauty he encountered in Plotinus during these school days. He later translated this 
principle directly as follows: “The sense of beauty subsists, in the simultaneous intuition 
of the relation of parts, each to each, and of all to a whole.”67 This was the same 
definition of beauty as unity in diversity that Allston came to independently while 
developing his painting technique. Second, as Wordsworth suggested, Coleridge began to 
believe that the ability to perceive this unity in diversity and to articulate it was the 
special gift of the poet. This gift enabled the poet to communicate a sense of relatedness 
and even oneness through symbolic language, and it was this creative use of language 
that gave “[p]oetry . . . a logic of its own.”68 These beliefs in beauty as unity in diversity 
and the poet’s quest to discover and articulate that beauty sustained Coleridge 
                                                   
66 Holmes, Early Visions, 2, 32. For the quotations and the general narrative I am indebted to 
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throughout his most productive poetic period between 1795 and 1802, coming to an end 
with the unfortunate but aptly titled “Dejection, An Ode” (1802). These principles, as we 
have seen, were remarkably similar to Allston’s own intellectual and aesthetic 
development. 
 “Alas! Alas!” declared the dejected Coleridge as he sailed between Gibraltar and 
Malta in early 1804, “What have I been doing on the Great Voyage of Life since my 
Return from Germany but fretting upon the front of the Wind—well for me if I have 
indeed kept my ground even!"69 He had traveled to Germany in 1798-99 to indulge his 
philosophical disposition. Not content with perfecting the poet’s craft—as was 
Wordsworth, who spent his time in Germany composing in a quiet cottage—Coleridge 
sought to understand the philosophical principles that undergirded his vision of the poet, 
and by extension, all of existence. He yearned to unite the worlds of nature and the mind, 
to unify philosophy, theology, poetry, literature, and politics. In this spirit, he had 
traveled through Germany, practicing the language, translating Lessing and Schiller, 
conversing with the notable historians, scientists, and theologians at Göttingen 
(primarily J.F. Blumenbach and J.G. Eichhorn), and purchasing the works of Kant and 
other philosophers. All of this he sought to unify in “the one work, to which [he] hoped to 
dedicate in silence the prime of [his] life.”70 However, five years later, he had little to 
show for his delving and difficulty. 
Throughout mid and late 1804, Coleridge began finally to link his aesthetic and 
literary views with the philosophy of Kant. Recalling his youthful perceptions of beauty 
in the night sky, he wrote: 
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breadth of Coleridge’s studies in Germany, mentioned in the paragraph. 
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Saw in early youth as in a Dream the Birth of the Planets; & my eyes beheld as one what 
the Understanding afterwards divided into 1. the origin of the masses, 2. the origin of their 
motions, and 3. the site or position of their Circles & Ellipses—all the deviations too were 
seen in one intuition of one, the self-same, necessity . . . in matter all beheld the past 
activity of others.71 
 
The references to celestial bodies and the intuition of their unity we have already seen in 
the younger, literary Coleridge. However, “the Understanding” was a specific reference to 
Kant’s epistemology, the numbered list was directly from Kant’s relatively obscure 
Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens (1754), and the idea that “in 
matter all beheld the past activity of others” suggested one of Kant’s and Coleridge’s 
primary critiques of David Hume—namely that discreet, individual sense perceptions 
were a fiction.72 
 Responding to Hume’s skepticism but still recognizing the empirical tradition, 
Kant had postulated that the mind was equipped with transcendental categories of 
organization. Instead of being able to access objects as “things in themselves” (Ding an 
Sich) as empiricists maintained, Kant insisted humans only had access to phenomena, or 
their perceptions about that world. For Kant, sensory experience caused this 
perception—keeping a degree of continuity with Locke and Hume—but the mind 
interpreted these sensations with categories such as time, space, and causation. Apart 
from these categories experience would be a morass of isolated sense perceptions à la 
Hume. 
 Though Kant’s argument was notoriously complex and seemingly contrary to 
common sense, his position addressed two primary and pressing problems identified by 
Hume. First, the empiricists’ position forced them to maintain that all knowledge had to 
be reducible to and therefore analyzable as individual, discreet sense perceptions on 
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introspection. Second, and related, Hume had argued to the consternation of many that 
if this were the case, the principle of causation itself became suspect because when sense 
experience was broken down to its individual and discreet parts, all one could be sure of 
was constant conjunction. I see the wind blow, and I see leaves fall, but there is nothing 
in the individual sense perceptions that firmly establishes a link between the two events; 
no amount of research could establish the laws that Enlightenment science touted.   
Kant attacked Hume on both counts. First, he lambasted empiricism’s necessary 
claim that sense perceptions were ever individual or discreet.73 A single, discreet 
perception was impossible because it involved a simultaneous experience of an object in 
space, in time, and related to numerous other objects all at once. Second, to answer 
Hume’s critique of causation, Kant simply postulated it as an embedded organizational 
category of the mind itself.74 The reason why humans perceived causation was that the 
mind already possessed the category of causation, and it was by this category that 
humans organized individual sense perceptions. Fully developing this view, Kant 
postulated eleven other categories along with causation by which the mind organized 
every sense experience; taken together these categories Kant called the understanding 
(Verstand). 
 Coleridge, given his aesthetic experiences and his belief in the unifying 
perception of the poet, had always felt the critique of Hume’s psychological atomism—
the conclusion that discreet sense perceptions composed experience. However, in 
December 1804 while working through Kant, Coleridge became particularly adamant as 
he related his previous experiences of unity in diversity to the question of epistemology:  
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How opposite to nature & the fact to talk of the one moment of Hume; of our whole being 
an aggregate of successive single sensations. Who ever felt a single sensation? Is not every 
one at the same moment conscious that there co-exist a thousand others in a darker shade, 
or less light. . . . And what is a moment? Succession with interspace? Absurdity!75  
 
At this point, Coleridge excitedly claimed that the ideas of Kant, Fichte and others had 
been “full formed in [his] own mind, before he had ever heard of these Writers.”76 This 
claim has animated the careers of several Coleridge apologists and even more huffy 
skeptics who painstakingly point out that Coleridge had not actually worked out an 
entire epistemology as subtle as Kant’s. The skeptics’ conclusion is warranted but not 
particularly surprising. Comparing a visionary, opium-addicted poet who wandered 
throughout Europe with one of the most careful philosophers in history is likely to yield 
contradictory results. Actually, Coleridge himself nuanced his own claim. In the entry, he 
went on to suggest that perhaps he was more indebted to Kant than he said but that 
“much of the matter remains my own, and that the Soul is mine.”77 The matter that 
remained his own was the poetic language with which he anticipated, received, and later 
articulated Kant to an English audience; Coleridge freely admitted that his limitations as 
a systematic philosopher were due to his strengths as a wielder of metaphors and 
images.78 The “soul” he began to bring to Kant was Trinitarian Christianity allied with 
Coleridge’s own unique sense of guilt. 
 Embracing Kant’s critique of Hume and his categories of the understanding 
brought Coleridge to another key Kantian distinction. Developing his notion of the 
understanding, Kant insisted that above the categories of the understanding stood 
reason (Vernunft). “If the understanding may be a faculty of unity of appearances by 
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means of rules, then reason is the faculty of unity of the rules of understanding.”79 In its 
proper form, reason organized the categories so that they could relate to one another as 
subjects analyzed their sense experience. However, Kant was very cautious about 
reason’s power, which is why he entitled his treatise the Critique of Pure Reason. 
Because reason functioned to unify the categories of the understanding, reason was 
divorced from experience. Kant argued that many philosophers, including most 
Platonists and certainly theologians, erred by using reason to attempt to transcend 
experience by applying the categories of the understanding to objects or beings beyond 
sense experience. Some common examples of this were arguments for the existence of 
God or the immortality of the soul, which could not be conclusively proved or refuted 
and thus for Kant could not count as knowledge. 
 While Coleridge leaped at Kant’s formulation of a higher faculty above the 
understanding (to which the empiricists were essentially limited), he believed that more 
could be said for reason than Kant was willing to say. Kant said that reason aimed for but 
never arrived at the creation of a unified system of knowledge; in a sense it unified the 
categories of the understanding but never conclusively or completely. Reason stimulated 
“endeavor” to gain greater and more precise unified knowledge, but it was only a 
“precept” or “prescription” for further seeking.80 Moreover, according to Kant: “The 
unity of reason is therefore not the unity of a possible experience.”81 Coleridge thought 
he had experienced moments of perceptive unity, and he and Wordsworth had 
maintained for years that this was what occurred in the artistic process. The ability to 
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perceive and then articulate unity in diversity defined the artist; it was this ability that 
gave poetry a logic all its own, and the ability to capture this unity in diverse materials 
and symbols that defined art as beautiful. 
 At this point in his journals just prior to arriving in Rome, Coleridge began a 
decades-long attempt to articulate his theory of artistic creation in terms commensurate 
with the sophisticated philosophical systems of German idealism. Was Kant’s reason the 
power he and Wordsworth had been trying to identify all along? Could it achieve more 
than Kant maintained? Was there another faculty, the imagination, which supervened on 
the limitations of reason to grant the artist the unity of possible experience Kant denied? 
Was imagination like Kant’s reason available to all people or only the artist?82 Coleridge 
wove these terms throughout his notebooks in 1804-1805, but he had not yet fully 
worked them out; this would have to wait for the publication of the Biographia Literaria 
(1817) and Aids to Reflection (1825). Coleridge’s argument in the Aids to Reflection (Am. 
Ed., 1829) is explored at length in Chapter Six. What emerged from these reflections as 
Coleridge came to Rome was a reinforced belief that his aesthetic perceptions and 
articulations of unity in diversity were true if inchoate anticipations of the new German 
epistemology. 
 Coleridge’s pursuit of German idealism, and his insatiable quest to explain poetic 
perception, inspiration, and creation grew in the same soil as his religious and 
theological impulse. As he wrestled through Kant, he resorted to the language of 
contemplative Christian Platonism. “A perpetual and unmoving Cloud of Darkness . . . 
hangs over this Work,” he declared, “I apply the Categoric forms to a Tree—well! But first 
what is this tree? How do I come by this Tree?”83 This was a perceptive if inchoate 
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critique. Despite Kant’s erudition in addressing Hume’s conundrums, Kant could never 
fully answer those who wondered how the noumenal world caused phenomenal 
perception if indeed the mind did not have access to the Ding an Sich. Coleridge 
perceptively sensed this problem early on and it never left him; it struck at the heart of 
his poetic concern to put the artist in closer contact with the natural world than Kant 
would allow. 
Since the late 1790s, Coleridge had been drawing on Plato, Neo-Platonic, and 
Christian Platonist sources. His reference to a “Cloud of Darkness” invoked the language 
of the fourteenth century anonymous work The Cloud of Unknowing, which in turn drew 
on a long Christian Platonist tradition including Pseudo-Dionysius and John Scotus 
Erigena.84 As early as 1796 he had read Plato and the Cambridge Platonist Ralph 
Cudworth and thus had become “a Trinitarian (i.e. following the pattern of Plato) in 
philosophy, yet [he remained] a zealous Unitarian in Religion.”85 In other words, he 
embraced Plato’s contention that all reality consisted of sameness, difference, and unity 
(or form, distinction, and relation).86 However, with respect to God he remained a 
Unitarian because he could see no moral or practical benefit to identifying Jesus Christ 
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with the Logos of Platonic philosophical theology in a special way. He especially objected 
to the idea of God’s punishing himself through an objective atonement.87 
Coleridge’s concerns were not only intellectual. He labored with a deep sense of 
guilt just prior to arriving in Rome. His guilt was existential, not merely guilt feelings, 
and he knew it.88 He had fallen in love with another woman besides his wife, he had 
abandoned his children, and he had become addicted to opium. “My bodily infirmities 
conquer me,” he declared, “and the cowardice of pain . . . drives me to stimulants that 
cannot but finally destroy me.”89 In his torments his thoughts returned constantly to his 
children, and he desperately tried to purify his love for Sara Hutchinson into something 
virtuous and noble.90 Although no one surpassed Coleridge for strong feeling, Coleridge’s 
morals were those of the duty-bound Kantian rather than the Byronic libertine. Indeed, 
his love of Sara kept him from consummating a relationship with a charming Italian 
operatic singer, Anna-Cecilia Bertozzi.91 
Remembering his children, he moved toward Christianity prompted not only by 
his guilt, but also by the inkling that the Platonic Logos—the rational, governing 
structure of the universe—might be God’s Son and might mysteriously redeem nature by 
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being incarnated in a physical body, as Allston’s “second Adam . . . palpable in flesh.”92 
Could Reason or the Logos actually manifest tactilely in time and space as a fixed symbol 
for needy people like Coleridge? This idea certainly didn’t square with Coleridge’s 
insistence on the “impassiveness of the Divine Being . . . the sacred distinction between 
things and persons,” and the offensiveness of “the vicarious payment of a debt and 
expiation of guilt.”93 But on the other hand, when he thought of his children, he was 
struck by how a father could communicate personality, reason, and even his soul—in 
Platonic parlance—to his son, Hartley. "When I have seen certain tempers & actions in 
Hartley, that is I in my future State / so I think oftentimes that my children are my Soul. 
/ that multitude & division are not (o mystery) necessarily subversive of unity. I am sure, 
that two very different meanings if not more lurk in the word, one."94 Was filial language 
then appropriate to pure Platonic Trinitarianism? If so, it was ancient Christianity that 
had applied the categories Father and Son to the Platonic One and Logos.  
In the end, his guilt and desperate need for vicarious atonement prompted him to 
embrace Christian Trinitarianism: 
Assuredly the doctrine of Grace, atonement, and the Spirit of God interceding by groans to 
the Spirit of God is founded on a constant experience / and even if it can be ever explained 
away, it must still remain as the rising and setting of the Sun, yea, as the Sun itself, as the 
Darkness and as the Light / it must needs have the most efficient character of Reality, 
quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus!—Deeply do I both know and feel my 
Weakness—God in his wisdom grant that my Day of Visitation may not have been past! 
S.T.C.95 
 
This entry, marked oddly and emphatically with his own initials, prompted a flurry of 
weeklong Trinitarian speculation that culminated in the declaration: “No Christ, No 
God!—This I now feel with all its needful evidence, of the Understanding . . . No Trinity, 
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No God.”96 He became convinced that the “radical theology of the Platonists . . . [is] 
strictly conformable with the true meaning of Plato, and harmonizable with the doctrines 
of orthodox Xstian,” and he began to use the words Father, Son, and Holy Spirit freely 
despite clearly reading authors who objected to the Christian corruption of Platonism.97 
He even took to sealing his letters from Malta with the symbol of a triangle.98 Looking 
back on the aesthetic, philosophical, and religious road he had walked, he saw the 
previous eight years as a “necessary passage from Unitarianism . . . thro’ Spinosism into 
Plato and St. John.”99   
There is no precise moment of Coleridge’s conversion to orthodox Christianity. 
To insist on Puritan evidences of faith or definitive evangelical conversion moments is a 
dubious project, considering that Coleridge did not much like these groups. Though he 
now embraced the Christian Trinity and Incarnation sufficiently to call it a “conviction,” 
he prayed that “this Conviction may work upon [him] and in [him]” to further cement his 
conviction “as to the character of Jesus, and of historical Christianity” as firmly as his 
belief in “intellectual or spiritual Christianity.”100 This conviction began to solidify 
substantially between February 1805 and January 1806, when Coleridge entered Rome. 
Blinded by “the Shekinah of the Conscience,” he declared himself “now more weak than 
ever,” a fish “gasp[ing] on the glittering mud . . . of this once full stream” of aesthetic and 
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philosophical speculation.101 By August 1805, he conceded “how sweet a Thing a deep 
Conviction is,” and he now granted that even if some biblical miracles were false or 
exaggerated, the need for redemption and regeneration compelled one to faith. 
Still must thou repent, & be regenerated, and be crucified to the flesh. . . . Still will the 
Trinity, the Redemption, the assumption of Humanity by the Godhead remain Truth . . . 
the living fountain of all true virtue, the seed . . . all the leaves, sprayes, flowers, & trunks 
of true good being only the development of that form, & its combination with the real 
world, it the vital form, that its material? . . . Then shalt thou know from God whether or 
no Christ be of God.102 
 
Morally, Coleridge led a life of slow and gradual conversion, no less agonizing for its 
distension. He never did fully reconcile with his wife—although he eventually overcame 
his desire for Sara Hutchinson—but he developed close relationships with his children as 
they matured. 
 
Conclusion: Coleridge and Allston in Rome 
 As Coleridge arrived in Rome on New Year’s Eve, 1805, his mind churned like the 
wheels of his carriage on the Via Appia.103 In a single entry dated “Rome-Jan 1, 1806,” he 
employed four languages in a cryptic page summarizing his thoughts of the last two years 
and clearly outlining the living streams of thought that continued to animate him. He 
spoke in Greek of the “body shaped by the soul” and the “soul shaped by the body,” and 
the “Spinozo-Kantian, Kanto-Fichtian, Fichto-Schellingian Revival of Plato-Plotino-
Proclian Idealism.” He equated the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost with the One, the Logos, 
and the World Soul of that Neo-Platonism, and he explained to himself that all his 
“Convictions in the Opinions of the men of supposed gesunder Menschenverstand” were 
really another way of articulating “the naked Flesh & Blood, Bone and Muscle of [his] 
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individual Faith.”104 Ending his summary on this incarnational note and worrying about 
the fact that Napoleon’s troops had just arrived in Rome, Coleridge went out to see the 
sights and came across the American painter Washington Allston, primed for the 
copious, animated, and highly graphic conversation that Coleridge had been having with 
himself for the past two years.   
What then of all this delving and difficulty did Coleridge impart to Allston in 
Rome? Having outlined the living streams of Coleridge’s mind, it now becomes clear 
what Allston meant when he felt himself “tempted to dream that I have once listened to 
Plato in the groves of the Academy.”105 This Plato’s “mind was never dry” but had “far-
reaching aqueducts” into the languages and concepts of Platonism, Kantian idealism, 
and Christian incarnational theology. As Allston put it, “To no other man do I owe so 
much intellectually. . . . He used to call Rome ‘the silent city,’ but I could never think of it 
as such while with him.”106 For his part, Coleridge ached to converse with a likeminded 
companion, and he claimed he found that companion in Allston, whom he compared to 
Wordsworth of all people! As we have seen Allston had already begun to articulate the 
ideal of the Romantic artist and the Plotinian-Coleridgean definition of beauty (unity in 
diversity) on his own. Moreover, his time in the Alps gave Allston his first substantial 
taste of the sublime in nature, an experience that Coleridge already possessed in spades. 
 Finally, the minimal written record between January and June of 1806 confirms 
all the circumstantial evidence. They lived together for months at Allston’s house in 
Olevano, and the setting prompted Coleridge to feel himself again in the Lake District. 
“Olevano-Am I at Keswick?” he exclaimed.107 They clearly spoke of unity in diversity and 
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the unifying perception of the artist, as Coleridge was struck by Allston’s critique of a 
painting they viewed together. “[The artist] looks too much at the particular Thing, 
instead of overlooking—ubersehen.”108 They also clearly conversed about the Alps, as 
Allston’s journey had inspired him to paint two separate Alpine landscapes during this 
period. These paintings prompted extended reflections by Coleridge where he marveled 
at the “divine semitransparent and grey-green Light” of one and the “exquisitely 
picturesque . . . effect” of the other.109 
Allston’s thinking attuned him for this intellectual friendship with Coleridge, but 
his first explicit encounter with Coleridgean epistemology and robust Platonic 
Trinitarianism, not to mention its link with incarnational theology, occurred in Rome. 
Thus, it also becomes clear why Coleridge and Allston would forever declare not only 
personal esteem and affection for one another, but also a close intellectual kinship. 
Allston embraced Coleridgean epistemology for the rest of his life, and it would guide his 
art, his explanation of his art, and his own later conversion to orthodox Christianity. 
More importantly, this was the first encounter by any American with Coleridgean 
epistemology. As that epistemology would become an animating principle in Cautious 
Romantic discourse, it is important that the intellectual historian identify how it was 
encountered, even if Napoleon’s whole navy stands in the way. As Henry Nelson 
Coleridge stated in the collection of his uncle’s sayings Table Talk: “I would fain hope 
that these pages will prove that all is not lost;—that something of the wisdom, the 
learning, and the eloquence of a great man’s social converse has been snatched from 
forgetfulness.”110 
 
                                                   
108 CN, 2794. 
109 CN, 2796 and 2818. 
110 STC, Table Talk, CW, 14:2:7. 
  
60 
Chapter 2: Painting and Piety: Washington Allston’s Vocational Quest and 
Trinitarian Conversion 
 
Introduction 
Allston and Coleridge parted ways in 1806, but would reunite again when Allston 
returned to England. The epistemology and religious consciousness that Coleridge 
imparted to Allston in Rome continued to develop in Allston’s thinking as the American 
painter attempted to establish himself while finally marrying his beloved Ann Channing. 
After a three-year return to America in 1808, Allston returned to England in 1811 where 
his reputation flourished. He returned again to America in 1818, bearing the illustrious 
artistic reputation he sought as far back as 1800. But Allston also bore the emotional 
scars of the grief-stricken lover as Ann died just as his career began to blossom. Her 
death led him to a newfound Trinitarian piety that supervened on his Coleridgean view 
of the mind. Meanwhile, Coleridge’s reflections on the imagination also continued to 
germinate, partially influenced by Allston, who also attended to what would become a 
seminal Romantic principle. As this chapter demonstrates, both Allston’s and Coleridge’s 
lives were intellectual and aesthetic pilgrimages, intricately bound up in their 
relationship to one another and a transatlantic community of Anglo-American artists 
and intellectuals.  
 Methodologically, this chapter seeks to probe not only Allston’s painting, as many 
others have, but also his poetry. Allston was recognized in his own time as a poet, if a 
step below those who attained greatness. At the very least the poems provide key insights 
into Allston's mind, but when read in the context of Allston’s life and his intellectual 
milieu, one begins to make sense of why these poems met with the general approbation 
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of such great poets as Coleridge, Wordsworth, and Southey. This chapter also seeks to 
attend carefully to the impact that Ann had on Allston’s heart and his intellectual 
development. Her presence in and absence from his life were fundamentally linked to 
positions that he espoused for the rest of his life in a way that only a lover can be. 
 
Poetry, Piety, and Portraiture: Allston in America, 1807-1811 
The intellectual friendship between Allston and Coleridge significantly affected 
their intellectual trajectory for the next several years. Eventually Napoleon’s evicting all 
British subjects from Rome forced Coleridge’s unsteady hand, and he went home in May 
of 1806. A gracious American, Captain Derkheim, obtained Coleridge a passport by 
swearing he was Derkheim’s American steward and that the good captain knew his 
parents who lived in a red brick house outside of New York.1 While Coleridge made it 
safely home, Spanish privateers tossed his Rome notebooks into the sea when they 
boarded Derkheim’s vessel en route to Britain. 
Thanks to American neutrality, Allston remained in Rome perfecting his 
technique and musing about his conversations with Coleridge, but he now had two 
competing mistresses. In 1801, the aspiring artist in Allston insisted, “Love and painting 
are two opposite elements,” and he had encouraged his friend Charles Fraser to “beware 
of love.”2 But at the height of his intellectual and aesthetic stimulation in Italy, he began 
to yearn for his fiancée Ann Channing. In a rapturous letter to a friend, he insisted that 
love between a man and a woman was “the surest basis of earthly happiness,” that his 
“purest emotions, and . . . most agreeable moments” came from his love for Ann, and 
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that women were therefore “the source of every thing refined, benevolent, and pure.”3 He 
concluded that “matrimony [was] the greatest blessing on earth” and he felt himself 
dependent on Ann for both “the improvement of [his] virtue” and “the promotion of [his] 
happiness.”4 
In December of 1807, Thomas Jefferson passed the Embargo Act, leading to a 
further deterioration of Franco-American relations, and when Napoleon’s troops entered 
Rome on February 2, 1808, Allston left to return to America. The political events made 
Allston nervous, but he had already planned to return home and marry Ann. “[A] man 
who is expected home by his bride is not likely to risk . . . much,” he explained to the 
painter John Vanderlyn in Paris.5 Anticipating his return to Ann after eight years, he 
apologized to Vanderlyn: “If I run on at this rate, I shall write more nonsense than either 
you may wish to read, or will be conducive to my health.”6 
Allston married Ann Channing on June 19, 1809. For two years they enjoyed each 
other’s company and that of friends and family until Allston felt he had to return to 
England to continue his artistic career as America still struggled to support painting 
beyond portraiture. Coleridge’s influence shone through in Allston’s intellectual activity 
during this period, in form and philosophy as well as content. As he reflected back on his 
experiences in Europe, Allston began to write poetry himself, experimenting with its 
logic by evaluating his favorite paintings.7 While he composed several longer poems, a 
series of sonnets—which one critic has called “the most successful of the pieces”—
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5 WA to John Vanderlyn, Apr. 23, 1808, CWA, 54. 
6 Ibid. 
7 See Nathalia Wright, CWA, 593 for dating poems published in Sylphs of the Seasons in this period 
between 1808-1811. 
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revealed a mind coalescing around Coleridgean principles.8 Moreover, all of these 
sonnets reflected on the particular works of art that most inspired Allston. 
The exalted language of natural supernaturalism shone through in his sonnet 
devoted to Pelligrino Tibaldi’s Aeolus, as he praised the painter’s artistic vision: 
‘T was thine, deciphering Nature’s mystic leaves, 
To hold strange converse with the viewless wind; 
To see the Spirits, in embodied forms, 
Of gales and whirlwinds, hurricanes and storms.9 
 
And reflecting on Rubens’s masterpieces in the Luxembourg Gallery, Allston articulated 
the Romantic vision of genius—the artist’s free reign and subversion of established 
norms: 
There is a charm no vulgar mind can reach, 
No critic thwart, no mighty master teach; 
. . . Thy lawless style, from timid systems free, 
Impetuous rolling like a troubled sea, 
High o’er the rocks of reason’s lofty verge10 
 
Although he had been developing these views on his own before Rome, they seemed now 
to have cemented themselves in his mind. 
 More strikingly, by this period Allston displayed keen awareness of romanticized 
Kantian epistemology as well as a fascination with the Christian Trinity born out of the 
concept of unity in diversity. These undoubtedly came from Coleridge. In praising 
Rembrandt’s Jacob’s Dream, Allston became smitten with Jacob who came from a more 
enchanted time: 
When e’en the learned, philosophic sage, 
Wont with the stars through boundless space to range, 
 
Subtly equating Jacob with Coleridge, Allston gave himself fully to the spell: 
 
E’en so thy visionary scenes I hail; 
That, like the rambling of an idiot’s speech, 
                                                   
8 Nathalia Wright, CWA, 593-4. 
9 Washington Allston, The Sylphs of the Seasons, with Other Poems, 1st American from 1st London 
(Boston: Cummings and Hilliard, 1813), 151. It is unclear whether Allston saw a finished painting or simply 
the study in oil that still exists today. 
10 Ibid., 153. 
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No image giving of a thing on earth, 
Nor thought significant in Reason’s reach, 
Yet in their random shadowings give birth 
To thoughts and things from other worlds that come, 
And fill the soul, and strike the reason dumb.11 
 
“The learned philosophic sage, Wont with the stars through boundless space to range” 
and the “visionary scenes” and “rambling speech” provoking otherworldly visions 
certainly evoke Coleridge as he was: the star-gazing poet, the philosopher invoking 
Kant’s Universal Theory of the Heavens, the fabulous talker. But even more telling was 
Allston’s distinction between Reason and reason. In the poem, Reason reached out to the 
images and thoughts provoked by the visionary—perhaps Jacob, perhaps Rembrandt 
himself, perhaps both of them—but it recoiled again as it could not transcend its function 
as the regulative faculty of the Understanding. Kant had warned that reason would try to 
reach beyond its proper bounds, but he condemned this as speculation, which could 
never count as knowledge. Allston here conceded the point to Kant, but he insisted that 
the artist still delivered “thoughts and things from other worlds” that “strike the reason 
dumb.” Here Allston distinguished the lower-cased reason from Reason. It was the 
Coleridgean Understanding, Enlightenment reason—the ability to contain, relate, and 
logically articulate experience—that was struck dumb. The distinction was Kantian, the 
language was Allston’s, and the discourse was Romantic. The trope of Jacob’s Dream 
would appear again in one of Allston’s most famous paintings, Hazlitt’s criticism of 
Coleridge, Richard Henry Dana Sr.’s stories, James Marsh’s reflections, and Harriet 
Beecher Stowe’s experience. 
Continuing with the theme of an external force that struck the reason dumb, 
Allston marveled at Raphael’s Three Angels Before the Tent of Abraham. What struck 
him was the beauty, the unity in diversity, of the three angels: 
                                                   
11 Ibid., 152. Actually the Jacob’s Dream Allston referenced here was ascribed to Rembrandt at the 
time, but is now attributed to Aert de Gelder, see GS, 99. 
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Of Grace, harmonious, boundless, and intense. 
In thee, celestial Group, embodied lives 
The subtle mystery, that speaking gives 
Itself resolved; the essences combined 
Of Motion ceaseless, Unity complete 
. . . Mine eyes . . .  
From part to part with circling motion rove . . . 
From line to line through endless changes run, 
O’er countless shapes, yet seem to gaze on One.12 
 
Christian theology had for some time considered the three angels in Genesis 18 an early 
theophany of the Christian Trinity since the story stated that the Lord (singular) 
appeared to Abraham as three men and that Abraham addressed these three men jointly 
as “lord.”13 Allston’s reference to the “subtle mystery . . . the essences combined” is an 
orthodox reference to the formulations of the early ecumenical church councils, namely 
that all the persons of the Trinity shared the same essence. Furthermore, the 
dichotomies of boundless and harmonious, motion and unity, and countless shapes that 
all combine to form One, were rich with Trinitarian suggestiveness. 
Reflecting on his conversations with Coleridge and beginning his life with Ann, 
Allston began a process of deepening piety that culminated many years later in the 
darkest moment of his life. He had looked to Ann, the sister of the esteemed minister 
William Ellery Channing, for “the improvement of [his] virtue.”14 Though the evidence is 
limited, it seems that while Coleridge provided the intellectual and aesthetic groundwork 
for Allston’s religious convictions, Ann provided much of the substance as well. Several 
years later the painter Charles Leslie insisted to Samuel F.B. Morse that he be sure to 
marry a woman who had “a deep sense of true religion,” and he thought Ann and 
                                                   
 12 Ibid., 150. 
 13 Genesis 18:1-5 (King James Version). Saint Augustine, the key interpreter of Western 
Christianity, argued for this Genesis Trinitarian theophany in The Trinity, II.19, II.34, and III.25, see Saint 
Augustine, The Trinity (De Trinitate), ed. John E. Rotelle, trans. Edmund Hill (New York: New City Press, 
1991), 110–111, 121, 142–143. In Eastern Orthodox Christianity, the Genesis story inspired the early fifteenth 
century iconographer, Andrew Rublev, to paint The Trinity, one of the most recognizable icons in the 
Orthodox tradition. 
14 WA to Benjamin Wells, Dec. 29, 1804, CWA, 50. 
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Allston’s relationship the exemplar. “You and I have seen how very greatly true 
Christianity conduces to domestic comfort in the instance of Mr. and Mrs. Allston.”15 
Ann’s influence over Allston was so strong that Coleridge at times begrudged it, 
suggesting she intentionally came between them.16 
Though Allston’s return and union with Ann delighted him, he faced a vocational 
problem. Although Allston relished capturing his close family and friends on canvas, 
throughout his career he was reticent to paint portraits. He did not object to the form per 
se but rather the mercenary manner in which painters, even those with great talent, 
pursued their art.17 For Allston, engaging in portrait painting had to be a study in the luce 
di dentro and the psyche, and he had no patience for the distracting conventions of 
posture and superficial props.18 As a result, he tended to avoid portrait painting 
altogether with the exception being close friends and family, people he really knew and 
thus felt he could in some limited sense capture their essence. 
Allston’s aversion to portraiture contrasted strikingly with the few American 
artists who had earned a reputation at this time. The first generation of American 
painters, such as Benjamin West and John Singleton Copley, came of age at a time when 
to be American was to be British and both moved to Europe prior to the American 
Revolution, never to return. After the Revolution, a few American artists like Gilbert 
Stuart managed to gain domestic reputations (although Stuart was actually born in 
                                                   
15 S.F.B. Morse cited in Samuel Irenæus Prime, The Life of Samuel F. B. Morse, LL. D.: Inventor of 
the Electro-magnetic Recording Telegraph (D. Appleton and Co., 1875), 102. 
16 STC to J.J. Morgan, July 7, 1814, CL, 3:516-519. 
17 Writing to his student Samuel F.B. Morse’s father, Jedidiah, asking for more time with Morse he 
insisted: “I should grieve to hear at any future period that on the foundation now laid, he shall have been 
able to raise no higher superstructure than the fame of a portrait painter.” WA to Jedidiah Morse, Mar. 15, 
1814, CWA 71-72. In his much later Lectures on Art Allston reaffirmed his suspicion of portraiture’s 
“doubtful empiricism” and the way it could easily “close every avenue to the imagination,” see Washington 
Allston, Lectures on Art and Poems, 1850; and Monaldi, 1841 (Gainesville, Fla: Scholars’ Facsimiles & 
Reprints, 1967), 130-131. 
18 GS, 86. 
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Scotland), but this was on account of their portraiture of revolutionary generals and 
politicians or in the case of Col. John Trumbull, paintings of the revolutionary battles 
themselves. In this climate, even Allston’s friend John Vanderlyn, who enjoyed strong 
patronage in America, was advised by his largest patron, Aaron Burr, to return to Europe 
to pursue anything other than portraiture.19 
Portraiture for profit was a microcosm of a larger, more general artistic angst 
about the market. While the condescension and flattery associated with patronage 
bothered Allston in London in 1801, he could largely ignore this problem while studying 
in Paris and Rome. It certainly helped that his inheritance, the best form of patronage, 
funded these studies. By 1809, however, his funds had begun to run low, just in time for 
his new marriage to Ann and the full flowering of both his training and the philosophical 
commitments that guided his painting.20 His new brother-in-law William Ellery 
Channing, while thrilled about the match, worried that “we have not yet sufficient taste 
for the arts to give Mr. Allston the encouragement he deserves.”21 To Channing it was a 
question of inclination rather than income. “We have indeed, money enough to spend on 
cumbrous furniture, which another generation will throw into the garret as antiquated 
and absurd, but we cannot afford to adorn our walls with the productions of genius.”22 
Allston clearly shared this concern, as one of his last pieces before departing again for 
England was a rare satirical piece on the subject of patronage. In The Poor Author and 
the Rich Bookseller (1811, fig. 4), the viewer observes a harried author insulted not only 
by the red-faced publisher, but also by the young boy who swipes at the author’s feet with 
                                                   
19 In 1802, “Burr advised Vanderlyn to return to Europe, where he could devote himself to history 
painting rather than to portraiture.” When Vanderlyn did return to America in 1815, the only commissions 
he could obtain continued to be portraits. ANB. Vanderlyn was a friend of Allston’s in London and Paris. 
20 Nathalia Wright, CWA, 36-37. 
 21 William Henry Channing, The Life of William Ellery Channing, D.D. (Boston: American 
Unitarian Association, 1880), 314. 
 22 Ibid., 314. 
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his broom. The hair, sideburns, and general facial structure are not unlike Allston’s own 
at this time, but an outright confession of this nature was probably beneath him. In any 
event, Allston set sail for England once again. 
 
Return to England 
Allston arrived in Liverpool in early August 1811, and by the end of the month he 
had settled with Ann at 49 London Street, London. In addition to Ann, the young Samuel 
F.B. Morse accompanied Allston as his art student. Morse lived with another American 
painter, Charles Robert Leslie, “but about three minutes’ walk” from the Allston’s, and 
they all enjoyed an intellectual and aesthetic confraternity with “three or four other 
painters and poets.”23 Among these friends were the American writer Washington Irving, 
who served as London agent for his brother’s New York firm until its bankruptcy in 1816, 
and of course the mercurial Coleridge. 
After leaving Rome in 1806, Coleridge had divided his time between London and 
the Lake District. He had enjoyed some success with his Lectures on the Fine Arts 
delivered in London and a short-lived, heady periodical entitled The Friend, which he 
had doggedly published himself from the Lake District. By late 1811, he had arranged to 
deliver another series of London lectures on the history of English poetry. However, his 
sins were ever before him. He continued to struggle with opium addiction, and his 
friendship with William Wordsworth began to deteriorate by 1810. Allston arrived in 
London just in time to watch first hand as one of the most important friendships in the 
history of British letters fell to pieces. 
                                                   
23 Prime, The Life of Samuel F. B. Morse, LL. D., 36-37, 40-41. At one point, a particularly pouty 
Coleridge complained about the exclusivity between these American comrades, see STC to J.J. Morgan, May 
15, June 11, and particularly July 7, 1814, CL, 3:492, 507, and 518. 
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There were many interpretations as to the cause of this rupture, but the efficient 
cause was that the longsuffering Wordsworth gave up on Coleridge. Coleridge stayed 
with the Wordsworths and Sara Hutchinson—the object of his unrequited love—between 
1808 and 1810, but when Wordsworth warned a patron, Basil Montagu, not to take 
Coleridge in and support his literary endeavors in London, Coleridge was devastated. For 
the next year and a half, the spurned Coleridge indiscreetly spoke of Wordsworth’s 
perceived betrayal such that their severed relationship became, in the words of 
Coleridge’s biographer, “the talk of literary London,” and “their friends were now forced 
to take sides as if it were a marital divorce.”24 
The newly arrived Americans, who had yet to form strong attachments, seemed to 
provide Coleridge with much-needed friendship at a desperate time in his life when he 
could no longer rely on even the Wordsworths. Coleridge’s loyal English friends, such as 
Charles Lamb and Henry Crabb Robinson, were forced to play peacemakers between 
their mutual friends. In this context, Coleridge became a frequent but despondent visitor 
to Leslie’s and Morse’s rooms, where they intentionally distracted him from his troubles 
by baiting the fabulous talker into “an eloquence and depth of metaphysical reasoning . . 
. far beyond the comprehension of his auditors.”25 It is telling that Morse, Leslie, and 
Allston sat with Coleridge in his box the night his play Remorse debuted, in January 
1813.26 Remorse turned out to be one of Coleridge’s only financial successes in his 
literary career, and the crowd greeted the play with “great and almost unmixed 
applause.”27 The surprising success struck Henry Crabb Robinson in particular: “That 
Coleridge should have ever become a popular man would at one time have been thought 
                                                   
24 Holmes, Darker Reflections, 298-299. 
25 Prime, The Life of Samuel F. B. Morse, LL. D., 53. 
26 Ibid., 53. 
27 Henry Crabb Robinson, Diary, reminiscences, and correspondence of Henry Crabb Robinson 
(Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, & co., 1898), 261. 
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a very vain hope.”28 His popularity with large audiences in London was, in truth, short-
lived, but his immense popularity in American intellectual circles was just beginning. 
Coleridge’s metaphorical box would continue to fill up with American supporters until, at 
the climax of his American influence in the 1830s, it was too full to be his box any longer. 
Coleridge reciprocated Allston’s support. Shortly after Allston’s arrival, Coleridge 
sang Allston’s praises to the most important patron of early British Romantic artists, Sir 
George Beaumont. Coleridge alerted Beaumont that “Allston is hard at work on . . . the 
dead man recalled to Life by touching the Bones of the Prophet,” and that he held out 
high hopes for the young Allston because of his careful, dedicated technique and his 
promising mind. He praised Allston’s “quiet unenvious spirit . . . his lofty feelings 
concerning his Art, . . . and the religious Purity of his moral character.” “He models every 
figure,” Coleridge continued, “Canova at Rome exprest [sic] himself to me in very warm 
terms of admiration on the same subject.”29 Coleridge’s high praise impressed 
Beaumont, who wanted to see the young American genius. 
In the Spring of 1812, Allston joined Coleridge in dining with Sir George and Lady 
Beaumont at least twice during the Wordsworth controversy, just before and just after 
Coleridge and Wordsworth came to an icy truce.30 It would, of course, be intriguing to 
learn how the graceful and warm-hearted Allston handled such a delicate situation, but 
the record is silent. Allston intrigued Beaumont, and the latter determined to see for 
himself this meticulous painter who had the approbation of such important poets and 
sculptors as Coleridge and Canova. “Your picture [The Dead Man Restored to Life 
                                                   
28 Ibid., 261. 
29 STC to Sir George Beaumont, Dec. 7, 1811, CL, 3:352. Antonio Canova was a preeminent sculptor 
of the period noted for his careful and virtually flawless command of neoclassical form. He knew Allston in 
Rome, and his praise of Allston’s modeling was the highest available anywhere in Europe at the time. 
30 For dates see STC to Mrs. S.T. Coleridge, Apr. 21, 1812, CL, 3:386 and Purton, Coleridge 
Chronology, 96. 
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(1814)] . . . so fully answered all the expectation which had been raised in my mind 
respecting your power,” he averred to Allston.31 He encouraged Allston’s continued 
development of the vellatura technique and thought Allston perhaps capable of uniting 
the “excellencies” of both Rembrandt’s command of light and shadow and 
Michelangelo’s command of color in a way that would “delight and astonish the world.”32 
This standard was probably impossible, but it surely inspired Allston whose poetry at the 
time fingered Rembrandt and Michelangelo as preeminent among his influences. More 
exciting than the praise was Beaumont’s offer for a commission. In the process of 
restoring his family estate at Coleorton Hall in Leicestershire, Beaumont asked Allston to 
propose a subject for the walls of his church. Allston chose The Angel Releasing St. Peter 
from Prison (1814-16, fig. 9) as his subject, although he did not complete the commission 
for several years. 
Coleridge’s early support for Allston remained unfailing, but it was not without 
its share of straight talk as he cautioned his American friend that patronage might 
actually be harder to come by in England. “The first Hour, I was with him after his re-
arrival in England, I told him what a Devildom the [Race of Painters] were all member 
of,” remembered Coleridge.33 Coleridge thought that painters suffered even more than 
the average artist because they, unlike writers, absolutely had to be based in “the 
Metropolis” to display their work and participate in exhibitions. Secondly, painting 
experienced the “double competition of Bread and Reputation”; the bread in the 
Metropolis was more expensive and the fighting for reputation more fierce as a result.34 
Finally, Coleridge alleged that painters in particular suffered from “vulgar Birth & want 
                                                   
31 George Beaumont to WA, Aug. 21, 1812, CWA, 61. 
32 Ibid. 
33 STC to J.J. Morgan Jun. 16, 1814, CL, 3:510. 
 34 Ibid. 
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of all the Discipline of classical & gentlemanly education.”35 This final allegation is 
difficult to evaluate and seems more an ejaculation of prejudice, but Coleridge’s other 
concerns certainly did not miss the mark. To break into this seething market, particularly 
as an American, Coleridge advised Allston to focus all of his energies on “two or at the 
most three pictures” to overwhelm his initial critics with his quality and to demonstrate 
that “his mind had . . . discovered it’s main current.”36 Allston’s mind had discovered its 
main current, thanks in large part to Coleridge himself, and thus Allston could now 
throw himself into his work in preparation for his most productive artistic period 
between 1814 and 1818. 
 
Poetry and Allston’s Mental Imagination 
 The current of Allston’s mind, while evident in his painting and letters, became 
even clearer in his book of poetry The Sylphs of the Seasons, published in both England 
and America in 1813. Sylphs contained the sonnets previously mentioned, three longer 
narrative ballads, a few simple poems reflecting on themes such as love and art, and two 
eerily prescient explorations of madness. Allston’s poetry received mixed reviews, which 
trickled out over time. The reviews were gradual for two reasons. First, Great Britain 
enjoyed the poetic effervescence of the early Romantics and a plethora of journals and 
books, so the competition for attention was fierce. Conversely, America was struggling to 
develop its early intellectual journals. The Sylphs of the Seasons debuted in between the 
two early American intellectual journals of note in Boston, The Monthly Anthology (-
1811) and The North American Review (1815-). 
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 Though most people agreed that Allston’s brush exceeded the power of his pen, 
eminent poets took his poetry seriously. According to Coleridge’s friend and literary 
executor Joseph Henry Green, “Coleridge never failed, when Allston’s name was 
mentioned, to express his high admiration of his genius, both as a poet and a painter.”37 
One might expect this from a close friend such as Coleridge, but Wordsworth and 
Southey—the current and future poet laureates of the crown—also found Allston’s poetry 
compelling if a bit short of ingenious.  William Collins informed Allston: 
I presented your poems to Lady Beaumont, who had never seen them, and I had the very 
high gratification to hear them spoken of in terms of considerable approbation not only by 
her ladyship but by Southey and Wordsworth. Southey said that, whatever defects some of 
them might have, he had no hesitation in saying that they could not have proceeded from 
an but a poetic mind; in which sentiment he was most cordially supported by 
Wordsworth.38 
 
Southey’s invocation of the “poetic mind” comported with the Romantic 
epistemology that Allston had now embraced and explored in his poems. In his sonnets 
on Rubens and Rembrandt (as we have seen), he spoke of charms that no master could 
teach and a power that struck reason dumb, and he developed this theme further in the 
title poem “The Sylphs of the Seasons.” In the poem, the four sylphs of Spring, Summer, 
Autumn, and Winter courted the affections of the poet. Spring appealed to her ability to 
awaken the love of nature, Summer to her “genial influence / Which made the body’s 
indolence / The vigor of the mind,” and Autumn to her ability to awaken a longing for 
immortality and a reconciliation with death.39  
In the poem, Allston privileged the Sylph of Winter, for she alone built on the 
powers of the other three to awaken the “nobler powers . . . [of the] poet’s soul.”40 In the 
context these powers came from the deity and were thus akin to Wordsworth’s poet who 
                                                   
37 JF, 106. 
38 William Collins to WA, Nov. 4, 1818, CWA, 126-127. 
39 Washington Allston, “Sylphs of the Seasons,” in The Sylphs of the Seasons, with Other Poems, 1st 
American from 1st London ed. (Boston: Cummings and Hilliard, 1813), 19-35. 
40 Washington Allston, “The Sylphs of the Seasons,” 38. 
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possessed a “soul with Godlike powers.”41 But Allston’s reflections on this power more 
specifically anticipated Coleridge’s much cited definition of the imagination, his most 
famous contribution to literary criticism, which would not debut formally until the 
publication of the Biographia Literaria (1817).42 To be sure it had much in common with 
Wordsworth, but by 1815 Wordsworth and Coleridge were hashing out the issue in print 
instead of in person because of the distance between them; Allston anticipated both of 
them. 
Allston never used the word imagination, but he named it the power “which 
language vain has dar’d to name,” perhaps waiting for Coleridge’s more discursive 
definition of the imagination in prose form.43 In 1813, the power remained unnamed, 
although both Wordsworth and Coleridge were about to name it. In the poem, Allston 
tellingly distinguished Fancy from the power that language vain had dared to name, 
placing him squarely within the Romantic discourse about the imagination and its 
relationship to quasi-Kantian epistemology.44 In Winter’s appeal to the heart of the poet, 
she conceded all the charms of her sisters Spring, Summer, and Autumn: 
Though Autumn grave, and Summer fair, 
And joyous Spring, demand a share 
 Of Fancy’s hallowed power, 
Yet these I hold of humbler kind, 
To grosser means of earth confined, 
Through mortal sense to reach the mind, 
 By mountain, stream, or flower.45 
 
                                                   
41 Wordsworth, The Prelude, 92. It is interesting to note that while Wordsworth had composed The 
Prelude at this point, he had not yet published it, so it is doubtful Allston was influenced by it. 
 42 There are also hints of it in the slightly earlier, but less developed Lay Sermons which later 
became known as the Statesman’s Manuel (1816).  
43 Washington Allston, “The Sylphs of the Seasons,” 42. 
 44 Materialists like Hobbes had insisted there was no distinction between the imagination and the 
fancy, pointing out that the Latin imaginatio was simply a translation of the Greek phantasia, and this was 
simply the memory of images implanted on the passive brain by the world. It was “therefore nothing but 
decaying sense.” Hobbes quoted in Douglas Hedley, Livings Forms of the Imagination (London: T&T Clark, 
2008), 51. Coleridge would object to this arguing that “in all societies there exists an instinct for growth” and 
a progress to more clearly articulate tangled distinctions often by “desynonomiz[ing] those words originally 
of the same meaning.” STC, Biographia Literaria, CW, 7:1:82-83. 
 45 WA, “Sylphs of the Seasons,” 42. Emphasis original. 
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Although Spring, Summer, and Autumn all appealed to the various experiences for which 
they were responsible, Winter insisted these were the province of the Fancy only. They 
were the sensual experiences that kindle pleasure—as Keats would say, “Ever let the 
fancy roam”—but only Winter could use these experiences to inspire the poet:46 
But mine, of purer nature still, 
Is that which to thy secret will 
 Did minister unseen, 
Unfelt, unheard, when every sense 
Did sleep in drowsy indolence, 
And silence deep and night intense  
 Enshrouded every scene; . . .  
 
. . . And taught thee from the motley mass 
Each harmonizing part to class 
 (Like Nature’s self employ’d;) 
And then, as work’d thy wayward will, 
From these with rare combining skill, 
With new-created worlds to fill 
 Of space the mighty void.47 
 
 What distinguished the poet—and as we shall see, we can include the painter in this 
category—was the ability to not just receive and be inspired by nature but to fill new 
worlds with the recombined forms of nature, harmonizing them into an organic whole 
just as nature would. 
 This was the precise way Coleridge characterized what he called the secondary 
imagination, the special ability of the poet: “It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to 
re-create. . . . It is essentially vital, even as all objects (as objects) are essentially fixed and 
dead.”48 This then was the definition of the immortal soul with godlike powers that he 
                                                   
 46 John Keats, “Fancy” in The Complete Poems of John Keats (New York: Modern Library, 1994), 
188. 
 47 WA, “Sylphs of the Seasons,” 43-44. 
 48 STC, Biographia Literaria, CW, 7:1:304. Coleridge actually distinguished between the passive 
receptivity of the Fancy and a form of active receptivity, which he termed the “primary imagination.” This 
faculty was available to all people, not just artists, but artists also possessed “secondary imagination,” which 
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contemporary psychology, see Hedley, Livings Forms of the Imagination, 46-55. Hedley points out: 
“Primary imagination is simply the Kantian idea of ‘apperception’” (49). The re-creation that occurred with 
the secondary imagination took the form of different but organically coherent forms. It is unclear in the 
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and Wordsworth had initially postulated in the Lyrical Ballads. It was the power Allston 
had inchoately venerated in his youthful praise of the “solitary confidence . . . [and] vast 
conceptions of the artist’s mind.”49 The fact that Coleridge, Wordsworth, and Southey 
could declare Allston a poetic mind meant that Allston now commanded the distinction 
he sought as he brashly set out to become the first painter from America. In fact, as we 
shall see, Coleridge’s famed definition of the imagination was intertwined with his 
relationship to Allston. 
 The “Sylphs of the Seasons” was only the first of a series of poems that nuanced 
the prima facie arrogance of such a self-referential notion as the secondary imagination. 
In “Eccentricity,” Allston played with this theme, criticizing those who sought to christen 
themselves geniuses, or worse still, slavishly court the critics of the day to crown them 
so: 
Where’er he goes, there goes before his—fame 
And courts and taverns echo round his name; 
Till, fairly knocked by admiration down, 
The petted monsters crack his wonderous crown. 
No longer now to simple Nature true, 
He studies only to be oddly new50    
  
Allston insisted that genius did not correlate to eccentricity and warned readers: 
Nor wrongly deem, by [the] eccentric rule, 
That nature favors whom she makes a fool51 
 
In the end, Allston recognized that pride was the foulest fiend “that blinds the eye of 
reasoning man” and thus he pleaded against an overweening confidence in one’s 
secondary imagination: 
Come then, Humility, that surest guide! 
On earth again with frenzied men reside; 
Tear the dark film of vanity and lies,  
                                                                                                                                                       
imagination, but what is clear is that he embraced the more important and clearly Romantic distinction 
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and inward turn their renovated eyes:52 
 
Invoking the virtue of humility, though frequently compelling, can also mask 
timidity. T.S. Eliot in the “Four Quartets” gained the insight that “the only wisdom we 
can hope to acquire is the wisdom of humility” from a handwringing distrust of humanity 
itself.53 Likewise, Allston struggled to come to terms with the standards set out in the 
doctrine of the imagination and his own cautious desire for genius if not distinction. 
Under the watchful eye of patrons like Sir George Beaumont, the stakes were high when 
the standard was a fusion of Rembrandt and Michelangelo. 
 The technique necessary to realize Allston’s genius, not to mention the desires of 
his patrons, guided the amusing but equally philosophical poem “The Two Painters.” In 
the poem, Allston juxtaposed the idealist master of form with the realist, who was true to 
nature and master of color. The two enemies crossed the River Styx and appeared before 
the judgment seat of Minos, arguing all the while. The master of color accused “the 
champion bold of mind” of producing “classic forms of mud” while he through his 
privileged technique realized the “wholesome flesh and blood” that is true to nature.54 
The idealist artist retorted that “mind and body are distinct,” and in a fit of Gnostic ultra-
Platonism crowed: 
I left my col’ring all to chance; 
Which oft (as I may proudly state) 
With Nature war’d at such a rate, 
As left no mortal hue or stain 
Of base, corrupting flash, to chain 
The Soul to Earth; but, free as light, 
 E’en let her soar till out of sight.55 
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The spirits of the departed, led by Leonardo, then stood in judgment over the two 
painters and found both of them guilty of the other’s charges. They then sentenced the 
two quarrelsome and pompous painters:  
Five Centuries to paint together. 
If, thus by mutual labors join’d,  
Your jarring souls should be combin’d,  
The faults of each the other mending . . .   
‘One Leg alone shall never run,  
Nor two Half-Painters make but One.’56 
 
Embedded in the lighthearted nature of the fanciful tale lay a dire warning. What 
damned the two painters was not only their overweening pride and thirst for recognition, 
but also an arrogance that led them to an unforgivable neglect of their craft—to a 
“shallow art” born of “indolence.”57 Allston insisted that the only way to realize the 
proper union of the ideal and the real, of form and flesh, was to realize that “mortal 
works, maturing slow, / From patient care and labour flow.”58 In retrospect, Allston 
never seemed in danger of producing shallow art, but he was accused of indolence.59 At 
times patient care and labor crippled him and stifled his productivity, but that is surely 
something different than indolence, and with the publication of Sylphs of the Seasons he 
was about to enter his most productive artistic period. 
 In addition to the poems that gave insight into Allston’s mind, there were a few 
windows into his heart, his love for Ann, and her influence on him. He republished a 
poem entitled “First Love, A Ballad,” which seems to have been written for her during his 
Harvard days or even earlier. It bore a striking resemblance to Wordsworth’s famed Lucy 
poems, but it likely predated them raising an unanswerable question of influence.60 In 
the poem Lucy sat at a wheel and drew the lovesick Allston in with her spell, causing his 
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head to reel and his heart to race. The poem spun a few too many lines that ended in 
“sighing,” but it ended on a hauntingly foreboding note: 
Ah me! This restless heart I fear 
Will never be at rest, 
Till Lucy cease to live, or tear 
Her image from my breast.61 
 
In his more mature reflections in “The Mad Lover,” Allston explored the corollary 
to the pining love prompted by his lover’s presence and the darker despair that occurred 
when death stole that presence. Rich allusions and a terribly prophetic vision filled the 
poem. 
Ye creeping Zephyrs, hist you, pray, 
Nor press so hard yon wither’d leaves; 
For Julia sleeps beneath this clay— 
Nay, feel it, how her bosom heaves! 
 
Oh, she was purer than the stream 
That saw the first created morn; 
Her words were like a sick man's dream 
That nerves with health a heart forlorn. . . .  
 
. . . Yet these were to her fairer soul 
But, as yon op’ning clouds on high 
To glorious worlds that o’er them role, 
The portals to a brighter sky. 
 
And shall the glutton worm defile 
This spotless tenement of love, 
That like a playful infant’s smile 
Seem’d born of purest light above? 
 
And yet I saw the sable pall 
Dark-trailing o’er the broken ground— . . .  
 
. . . Avaunt, thou Fiend! Nor tempt my brain 
With thoughts of madness brought from 
Hell! . . .  
 
. . . Oh, speak, beloved! lest I rave; 
The fatal truth I'll bravely meet,  
And I will follow to the grave,  
And wrap me in thy winding sheet.62 
 
The poem exhibited a whiff of the melodramatic but it revealed Allston’s 
relationship with Ann, and whatever part seemed melodramatic in 1813 carried all the 
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profundity of death two years later. Allston's comparison of his lover with the pure 
stream on the first created morn recalls Milton's “pure ethereal stream . . . [b]efore the 
sun” that dazzles Satan with its purity despite the Fiend’s ill intent.63 “The glutton worm” 
who “defile[ed the] spotless tenement of love” while “creeping Zephyrs” blow “hard on 
wither’d leaves” evokes the grotesque imagery of William Blake’s “The Sick Rose,” where 
“The invisible worm / That flies in the night / In the howling storm” burrows into the 
heart of the rose’s “bed [o]f crimson joy” killing it with its “dark secret love.”64 
Referencing his lover’s “fairer soul” possessing the depth of the universe as “yon 
op’ning clouds on high / To glorious worlds that o’er them role / The portals to a brighter 
sky,” Allston raised his lover to a Romantic ideal. The image of rolling, glorious worlds 
beyond the clouds reminds one of the young Coleridge sky-gazing in ecstatic fit on the 
leaded roof of London, and it served as an inspiration for one of Allston’s later paintings: 
Jacob’s Dream (1817-19, fig. 11). But most profound was the philosophical depth with 
which Allston treated his beloved. Indeed his vision takes one all the way back to Plato’s 
vision of the Oversoul in the Timaeus: 
Now when the creator had framed the soul according to his will, he formed within her the 
corporeal universe, and brought the two together and united them center to center. The 
soul, interfused everywhere from the center to the circumference of heaven, of which also 
she is the external envelopment, herself turning in herself being a divine beginning of 
never ceasing and rational life enduring throughout all time.65 
 
For Plato, the sovereign part of the human soul was reason, and it was reason that 
partook of the divine Oversoul. By careful contemplation “a man may train and be 
trained by himself so as to live most according to reason” and thus “correct the courses of 
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the head which were corrupted at our birth. . . . By learning the harmonies and 
revolutions of the universe . . . [thereby] renewing [our] original nature.”66  
 Although Allston embraced Platonism, his love for Ann and its presentation in 
the poem subverted the harsher aspects of Plato’s Timaeus. For one, Allston sensually 
emphasized “lovely speaking lips” and the “rosy hue” of her cheeks, which stood in stark 
contrast to the emphasis on disembodied rationality one finds in the Timaeus and many 
later Platonic traditions. As in his vellatura technique and his poem “The Two Painters,” 
Allston ever concerned himself with the reality of the physical world as well as the 
transcendental mind and whatever transcendent principles or experiences he believed 
the mind might afford.67 Secondly, Allston’s granting of a supreme human rationality to a 
physical woman was not only far beyond Plato’s sexism on the matter, but also beyond 
the general discourse of the time and the equation of the masculine mind with 
rationality.68 In the poem, Allston’s lover’s words enlivened a sick man, who in the 
context of the poem was mentally sick—on the verge of madness. The distressed author 
remembered how his lover edified his own rational soul through her “words,” her 
“speaking lips.”  
 In the one surviving portrait of Ann, Allston idealized her as a flesh and blood 
embodiment of the contemplative Platonic soul. This painting of Ann continued to 
inspire further presentations of the contemplative woman such as his painting The 
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Valentine (1809-1811), which in turn inspired his later painting Contemplation (1817-
1818, fig. 5).69 In Ann Channing Allston (1809-1811, fig. 6), Gerdts and other critics have 
identified “the contemplative nature . . . of the subject . . . her deep concentration,” 
literary posture, and “solitary and withdrawn role.”70 Moreover, the strength of the 
portrait lay in the subtle suspension between the composed serenity and the sustained, 
serious earnestness—the two polar characteristics of Platonic contemplation. Ann’s soft 
but settled expression mingled with her intense attentiveness to the text at hand. The 
scene prominently featured her face and the text and remained uncluttered by anything 
other than light and a solitary book that snuck into the picture—suggesting the next step 
in the ongoing formation of the mind but not the overwhelming imposition of a scholar’s 
stacks of books or other affairs of life. The text appeared to be a book of aphorisms—with 
the telltale gap between clumps of text—a variegated literary form that both Coleridge 
and Allston came to value extremely highly.71 It was in this literary form that Coleridge 
most influenced the American mind when James Marsh published Coleridge’s Aids to 
Reflection in America in 1829, arguing for the primacy of Romantic Reason.  
 
An Emerging Artist 
Though his book of poetry represented a degree of success, Allston's main gift 
and vision was of course painting. Throughout 1813 he took Coleridge's advice about 
focusing all of his energies, and the pressure from himself, from Beaumont, and even 
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from Coleridge began to mount.72 By late 1813, Allston had pushed himself to the point 
that his health hung in the balance. His physician in London recommended that he 
withdraw to Bristol to try and recover, but on the way there he became so sick that 
Samuel Morse ran back to London to get Coleridge, who brought along with him a Dr. 
Tuthill. Coleridge's tenderness and concern for Allston struck Charles Robert Leslie, who 
also traveled with the party, and Leslie became one of Coleridge's permanent defenders. 
Despite Coleridge’s moral shortcomings, Leslie wrote, “I witnessed his performance of 
the duties of friendship in a manner which few men of his constitutional indolence could 
have roused themselves to equal.”73 Allston continued on to Bristol in agonizing pain, 
and Coleridge quickly wrote to Southey, who in turn procured Allston the services of an 
eminent physician named Dr. King.74 
Allston's condition—apparently a stricture or thickening of the colon—required 
King to perform several operations, and it would continue to plague him and drain his 
energy throughout the rest of his life.75 No doubt Coleridge's kind attentions were in part 
due to his empathy with Allston's condition, suffering as Coleridge did from a vicious 
cycle of intestinal pain and opium addiction. Incapacitated for several months, Allston 
began to improve in late October through November of 1813, and by January 1814 Ann 
declared him “a picture of health.”76 
The timing of Allston's recovery came none too soon. In the same letter in which 
he testified to his improving health, he also confessed: “Since my return I have had the 
courage to examine the state of my finances at my bankers, and found the balance in my 
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favor to of been reduced to so small a sum as makes me think it is time to look about 
me.”77 The precise event that precipitated Allston's financial setbacks is unclear, but 
Coleridge later that year mentioned that “his little property [was] lost in a London 
bankruptcy.”78 Thankfully, Allston had already put the finishing touches on the Dead 
Man Restored, and upon its exhibition at the British Institution he was awarded 200 
guineas and universal acclaim with the effort. Beaumont was impressed and approved 
Allston's commission for The Angel Releasing St. Peter, and another important patron, 
the Marquis of Stafford, expressed interest in commissioning Allston as well.79 After its 
unveiling at the British Institution, the British Gallery acquired the Dead Man Restored 
and in an extremely gratifying moment for Allston, they hung it in place of a painting of 
his mentor, Benjamin West's Christ Healing the Sick.80 Allston followed up this success 
with an exhibition in Bristol in the summer of 1814, and by the end of the year he had 
managed to sell several more paintings to a wealthy uncle.81 
 
Two Loves: Coleridge and Ann 
Things were looking up for both Allston and Ann, and by the summer of 1814 he 
confessed himself “in every respect better than when [he] left London.”82 However, as far 
back as 1813, tensions had begun to mount between Ann and Coleridge, his two closest 
companions and influences. Just a few days after Allston's optimistic assertions, 
Coleridge let loose with a stinging accusation that provided several key insights into both 
of their minds and that of Ann: 
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then to the good bad little Hydatid’s.—The same game in Bristol as in London—A.  can 
visit me; but his own House and real Feelings belong as exclusive Property to his 
‘Countrymen’, as he called one of the Beasts last night: . . . ‘Countryman?’ (said I) ‘Live the 
age of Methusalem, & you may have a right to say that, Allston!—At present, either the 
World is your Country, & England with all it’s faults your Home . . . or you are morally not 
worthy of your high Gifts, which as a Painter give you a praeternational Privilege, even 
beyond the greatest Poet, by the universality of your Language: and you prefer the 
accident of Place, naked Place, unenriched by any of the associations of Law, Religion, or 
intellectual Fountaincy, to the essential grandeur of God in Man.’ . . . Good heavens! That 
such a man with such a Heart & such Genius should be—not an American, but downright 
American, & I do believe, 9 parts in 10 owing to the little Hydatid. O that (if only his 
Health could have been preserved) instead of being a good little Hydatid she had been an 
absolute Sarah+Mary+Edith+Eliza—Fricker.83 
 
This was Coleridge at his worst. Petulant, condescending, nationalistically chauvinistic, 
and even suggesting that he wished Allston the same domestic turmoil that he had 
brought on himself. 
 The letter is difficult to interpret, but it is also revealing. It is unclear which 
Americans upon whom Coleridge meant to bestow the title “beasts,” but it seems unlikely 
that it was Morse or Leslie whom he had invited with him to Remorse and who both 
testified to friendly relations with Coleridge. Most likely it was a group of less talented 
Americans with whom Allston was friendly, their beastliness enhanced by the fact that 
Ann welcomed them when she apparently refused to welcome Coleridge. Ann’s precise 
objections to Coleridge's company were not clear, but they likely stemmed from 
Coleridge's own moral shortcomings and Ann's begrudging his potential impact on her 
husband. Coleridge’s accusations underscored the fact that Allston, despite his growing 
fame in British intellectual circles, was inveterately American—or in Coleridge’s words 
“downright American.” Allston’s respect for and deference to Ann shone through if he 
allowed her to exclude his close friend and greatest intellectual influence from their 
company.  
 
Theorizing the Imagination: Allston’s Influence on Coleridge  
                                                   
 83 STC to J.J. Morgan, July 7, 1814, CL, 3:518. 
  
86 
 The remarks also demonstrated Allston’s impact on Coleridge’s thinking, as 
Coleridge conceded that painting boasted a “preternatural privilege” over poetry in the 
“universality of [its] Language.”84 While in Rome, Allston had given Coleridge an even 
deeper appreciation for visual art, showing him around the galleries and giving his own 
aesthetic analysis that dovetailed with Coleridge’s developing views.85 Though Coleridge 
had recently gained an appreciation for visual art, thanks to his friendship with George 
Beaumont, prior to Rome Coleridge ranked painting at the bottom of an aesthetic 
hierarchy where music reigned and poetry ranked just below music—as lyrical music and 
Coleridge’s particular gift. In March 1804, he insisted, "The generic how superior to the 
particular illustrated in Music, how infinitely more perfect in passion & its transitions 
than even Poetry—Poetry than Painting."86 Elsewhere he yearned to bring his poetry up 
to the excelsior standard of music: "Oh that I had the language of Music / the power of 
infinitely varying the expression, & individualizing it even as it is / —my heart plays an 
incessant music."87 Coleridge’s ranking music and poetry above painting came from his 
personal notebooks just prior to Rome, while he worked through Kant. 
 After encountering Allston in Rome Coleridge declared, “I acquired more insight 
into the fine arts in the three months that I was at Rome, then I could have done England 
in 20 years.”88 In 1814, when Coleridge developed his Principles of Genial Criticism 
Concerning the Fine Arts, he had come to see painting as “equal in rank” to other art, 
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including music, because of “the universality of its language.”89 In other words, the 
imagination at work in painting could more easily translate the insights of Reason to a 
broader audience.90 In Genial Criticism, Coleridge exemplified his “principles by 
continued reference to Allston’s Pictures,” and he insisted that Allston’s painting 
demonstrated the two highest ideals of Romantic art: unity in diversity (or “multeity in 
unity” in Coleridge’s words) and the ability to unite viewers with nature.91 
 While music stood as Coleridge’s standard for poetry prior to meeting Allston, in 
1817, while articulating his now developed view of the imagination in the Biographia, 
Coleridge’s standard had shifted. “The Poet should paint to the imagination,” he 
insisted.92 The greatest poetry eschewed a laborious line-to-line logic in favor of a holistic 
aesthetic effect as exemplified by Allston’s paintings. Coleridge considered Wordsworth 
and Milton the embodiment of this ideal in poetry, but he considered Allston its 
embodiment in painting.93 
 Coleridge’s aspersions on America were actually quite out of character, for the 
new nation always held a special place in his mind. In his early years, he had planned 
with Southey to found an ideal intellectual community, the Pantisocracy, on the banks of 
the Susquehanna River. Furthermore, a few years after this letter, Coleridge published 
Allston’s poem entitled “America to Great Britain” in his Sibylline Leaves (1817). Allston 
wrote the poem celebrating the union of manners, arts, and morals between the two 
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nations and the “Genius of [the American] clime,” and Coleridge commended it for “its 
moral, no less than its poetic spirit.”94 Coleridge even printed Allston’s insistence that the 
poem was simply a “tribute of respect . . . to the land of his ancestors” and it should not 
be read “at the expense of the independence of that which gave him birth”—no doubt 
remembering the father he lost in the Revolution.95 America would eventually hold an 
even warmer place in Coleridge’s heart, for as he fondly explained to the young Arthur 
Hallam and Richard Monckton Milnes while urging them to travel to America: “I am a 
poor poet in England, but a great philosopher in America.”96 In his twilight years, 
Coleridge even praised the United States politically, suggesting that as a more open 
society they had avoided the oppression of the English class system where “the upper 
classes . . . have made the lower classes, things.”97  
It seems clear then that Coleridge directed his tirade entirely at Ann and not 
America. His repeated and insulting reference to her as “hydatid”—a morbid cyst on the 
body caused by tapeworm larva—underscored the point. Their relationship was always 
touchy. Eight months earlier Allston had tried to make excuses for Ann's coldness toward 
Coleridge on account of poor health and “bashfulness,” though Coleridge knew better.98 
But Coleridge would not have to endure Ann’s slights forever, and perhaps if he had 
known this he might never have written the spiteful words at all. 
 
The Madness of Grief, the Atonement, and the Politics of a Romantic 
Federalist  
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 On February 2, 1815, Ann Channing Allston died. She was not ill long, and the 
suddenness of her departure severely shocked everyone. "I write in great haste and much 
agitation,” Morse scribbled to his father Jedidiah Morse. “Mrs. Allston, the wife of our 
beloved friend, died last evening, and the event overwhelmed us all in the utmost sorrow. 
As for Mr. Allston, for several hours after the death of his wife he was almost bereft of his 
reason. Mr. Leslie and I are applying our whole attention to him, and we have so far 
succeeded as to see him more composed."99 John Morgan, his wife, and their sister 
Charlotte Brent—Coleridge’s longsuffering friends and landlords at this time—were 
apparently as close to Ann and Allston as to Coleridge. On receiving the news they were 
“stupefied with affliction . . . [and] terrorstricken.”100 Mrs. Morgan and Charlotte felt Ann 
“more than [a] sister” and grieved they were not sent for. “For Heaven's sake, write us!” 
Morgan exclaimed, “Tell us every thing concerning Allston; tell us every thing concerning 
our excellent friend departed—the pain, during her illness; the burial, where. . . .”101 
Morgan went on to characterize the pathos of the situation aptly. Referring to Allston’s 
financial challenges, his recent debilitating physical ailments, and now this inscrutable 
tragedy he moaned, “Allston, who is every thing that is amiable, kind, and good, has been 
bruised, blow after blow; and now, indeed, his cup is full!”102   
 His cup was indeed full. He had finally turned a financial and medical corner in 
life with Ann, only to watch her hurdle into the abyss of death leaving him prostrate on 
the even more terrible precipice of madness. All the eerie terror of “The Mad Lover” 
rushed in upon him and as Morse said, he was almost bereft of reason.103 Concerned that 
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having settled him they might lose him again, Morse and Leslie convinced Allston to 
remain at home while they attended the graveside funeral—no doubt they worried he 
would be tempted, like the Mad Lover, to “follow [her] to the grave . . . and wrap 
[himself] in [her] winding sheet.”104 But although not literally mad, Allston sunk into 
“extreme depression of spirits. He was haunted during sleepless nights by horrid 
thoughts,” Leslie remembered, “and he told me that diabolical imprecations forced 
themselves into his mind.”105 Leslie did not say precisely what these imprecations were, 
but based on Allston’s state of mind in “The Mad Lover” it seems clear they were suicidal 
thoughts as he sought release from the “Fiend,” the “thoughts of madness brought from 
Hell,” and memory’s “blackest cell.”106 
 Allston’s suicidal depression was a mental torment, and he desperately wanted to 
consult Coleridge about it, given Coleridge’s own strong influence on his epistemology. 
However, his depression made it so he “could not summon resolution.”107 Concerned for 
his friend, Leslie went to Coleridge for him. Coleridge's advice, derived from his own 
Kantian moral view, was surprisingly direct and simple for the speculative poet: “Allston 
should say to himself, ‘Nothing is me but my will. These thoughts, therefore, that force 
themselves on my mind are no part of me, and there can be no guilt in them.’ If he will 
make a strong effort to become indifferent to their recurrence, they will either cease, or 
cease to trouble him.”108 After delivering this message to Allston, Leslie blithely reported 
that Allston quickly recovered, but his claim was misleading. 
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 Allston's coming to terms with the death of Ann was more than a simple matter of 
Kantian resolution or Coleridge’s exhortation. Instead, Allston drew in a new way on the 
religious, intellectual, and aesthetic resources that had been growing in his mind since 
Rome. "An abiding effect of this loss,” explained his friend Leonard Jarvis, “was to turn 
his thoughts, affections, and desires toward another world, in a greater degree than 
before.”109 In particular, Allston sought consolation in the traditional Christian doctrines 
of the incarnation of God in Christ and the atonement of Christ’s death. In the agony of 
his thoughts and the fear of imprisonment in his own dark memories, Allston turned to a 
symbol of even deeper suffering that could redeem him from himself. 
 Years later, Allston explained this experience to the transcendentalist Elizabeth 
Palmer Peabody. Peabody, like the other Transcendentalists, took the same line as 
Coleridge in response to Allston's concern that one could become imprisoned in one's 
own mind as a result of dark thoughts and memories. “[U]nless the affections and Will 
adopt the evil thoughts and recollections which constitute a part of memory, the latter 
must fall off, like the deciduous foliage of the pine-tree,” insisted Peabody.110 But 
Peabody and Coleridge's approach was not enough for Allston, who like Jonathan 
Edwards worried that evil was more ingrained in the human psyche, corrupting the 
desires and affections that in turn determined the will.   
But the affections themselves are too often corrupted, and assimilate to what they feed on. 
Can an evil thought ever come to act, unless it has suborned some affection? It is not the 
evil thoughts merely, but the evil affections combining with them, or out of which they 
grow.111 
 
 Allston's view approached but fell short of Jonathan Edwards’ stringent Calvinism, but 
the underlying psychological concern was the same. Edwards maintained that “the will 
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always is as the greatest apparent good.”112 Allston did not believe, as Edwards did, that 
the affections were always corrupted, but only that they were too often corrupted. Like 
the other Cautious Romantics, he stood between Edwardsian determinism and 
Transcendentalist optimism. His struggles with suicide called into question the ability of 
the will to overcome evil at crucial moments. In truth, Coleridge’s advice was hypocritical 
anyway; he delivered it to Leslie while having another bout with opium addiction, which 
led him to leave the Morgans and settle permanently with the physician James Gillman 
on Highgate Hill outside of London.113 
 Allston, like Coleridge, ultimately turned to religious resources to overcome his 
affliction. When Peabody suggested that Christ might serve as an exemplar of inspiration 
on account of his perfection, Allston seized upon her suggestion: 
Ah! yes, that is the solution . . . to recognize the divinity in Christ; and this was revealed to 
me—I say revealed to me, for I cannot call it any thing else. It was not spun out of my 
brain, I know. It was a dim, misty night in November that I was walking in London; the 
fog enveloped the lamps, so that each looked like a huge bundle of cotton-wool; the air was 
comfortless; my own spirit was even drearier than the outward scene; a heavy weight was 
on my heart and in my brain. Then this question of memory and dread of imprisonment in 
my own self forever, with the sense that it would be a relief to get out of such a dungeon, 
even into the cold, raw, wretched November, were hardly living, but obscurely burrowing 
in my brain. Suddenly, there came to me a train of thought, in verse, as if it were 
whispered by a spirit objective to mine, who made me the automaton of its utterance. I 
actually uttered it in words, which I subsequently wrote down.114 
Leaving aside the doubtful issue of plenary dictation by spiritual forces—an issue Allston 
would explore in some of his later painting—this moment nevertheless represented the 
second key turning point in his intellectual life in addition to his encounter with 
Coleridge in Rome. Leonard Jarvis also remembered that along with the increased piety 
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resulting from his sorrow that “[Allston] repeated to me at this time some beautiful lines, 
which evidently had originated in the melancholy scenes through which he had 
passed.”115 Allston entitled this poem “The Atonement,” and it was certainly his best from 
a philosophical standpoint. While he maintained that the lines were dictated to him from 
without, they were actually a culmination of all his influences, questions, and 
convictions—the vellatura merging of the physical and spiritual, the mind and the limits 
of reason, love and loss. As Peabody aptly stated, the poem represented the “’holy of 
holies’ of his mind.”116 
 “The Atonement” was a study in Christian orthodoxy born of desperate emotional 
trial.117 Through the symbol of a crucified God-man, Allston found consolation for his 
“compunctious, agonizing grief” and the accompanying madness by hiding it “beneath 
the Cross.” He found an antidote for “the thoughts that herald forth the Will” by 
embracing the “palpable in flesh . . . second Adam . . .  who again began the human will.” 
Admitting that reason was a “vagrant o’er earth” and needed to be called down “from the 
four farthest towers of the four warring winds” –an image redolent of the young 
Coleridge sky-gazing in ecstatic fit—Allston embraced a Kierkegaardian leap of faith. 
Somehow, Allston insisted, “the sweat of blood, the nameless agony” of an incarnated 
God could mysteriously conquer sin and death, and overcome his grief and madness. 
There was subjectivity to it as he insisted that no one could make him doubt “the truth I 
need.” But grief’s tyranny in the “eternal Now,” led Allston to conclude that one “who’s 
tenure is to think” had to embrace “no partial suicide” if thus imprisoned—thus the leap 
made some psychological sense. 
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 Not only did the poem crystalize his moment of grief and spiritual experience, but 
it also put Allston’s many influences on display. Milton appeared as Allston invoked his 
unholy trinity of Sin, Death, and the Prince of Earth haunting the mind.118 Allston also 
invoked a mystery that overcomes reason (lower-cased), the project he and Coleridge 
continued to pursue together (which would not find its formal statement until 
Coleridge’s Aids to Reflection in 1825). Given the poem’s strongly religious character, 
Allston fittingly ended it by invoking St. Paul’s famous declaration: “O death, where is 
thy sting? O grave, where is thy victory?”119 Even the concern with uniting the spiritual 
and physical worlds was on display as Allston emphasized a Christ “palpable in flesh” full 
of “the sweat of blood,” contrary to Peabody’s suggesting Christ serve as merely an 
exemplar of moral inspiration. 
 The most striking part of the poem was the deep fear of the irrational, born of 
grief, but allowing “no partial suicide.” Allston’s and Coleridge’s elevated view of Reason 
had a flip side. There were equally dark and diabolical principles at work both in the 
world and in the human mind “in whose dark presence e’en the Reason cowers.”120 
Allston believed in an extra-mental Evil principle—he frequently capitalized the word—
“subtile [sic] Powers that wear / No shape their own, yet to the mind dispense” evil 
ideas.121 But Allston also believed that assent to these ideas came from an evil principle 
within the mind itself, and much more of his reflection in poetry and his gothic novel 
Monaldi (1841) explored this theme.122 From an early period, Allston had been fascinated 
by the manifestation of evil in human madness, but now Ann’s death brought the 
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concern home. Recall that when first in England Henry Fuseli’s paintings of dark 
psychological nightmares transfixed him (fig. 7), and Allston’s Tragic Figure in Chains 
(1800, fig. 8) joined Francisco Goya’s The Sleep of Reason Produces Monsters (1798, fig. 
1) in questioning Enlightenment hope in reason’s all pervasive potential.123 
 For Allston, “thoughts of madness” were “brought from hell,” perhaps by the 
“Fiend” himself or “dread enchanters, whose terrific call may never be gainsaid.”124 His 
Miltonian view of both cosmic and psychological dualism was so strong as a result of 
Ann’s death that he later inadvertently wandered into the heresy of Manichaeism, 
insisting against every Platonist including Coleridge that  “the Idea of Evil . . . bred in the 
mind . . . cannot therefore be a mere negation of Good: it is then absolute,” its own self-
constituting force.125 The depth of this fear required an equally strong counter-force, 
which Allston thought could be found in the grand scheme of redemption offered by 
orthodox Christianity. 
 Allston’s cosmic and psychological dualism guided his conservative, pessimistic 
politics, though he stood largely disengaged from the actual question of power. Unlike 
Washington Irving he never got involved, and rarely voiced his opinion. His position 
was, in many ways, a timid politics, but this timidity grew out of his own experience and 
had its intellectual reasons. Like other disillusioned Romantics such as Coleridge, Allston 
had seen the results of the French Revolution and found them wanting. But for Allston 
this had little to do with American security, financial reversals, travel restrictions, or any 
number of other material interests. Instead, his proto-modern concern about the 
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irrational, born of his own psychological affliction, led him to fear the collective 
irrational.  Like Freud, he worried that revolution and war released the irrational forces 
of unreason slumbering in every human mind.126 
 In “The French Revolution” Allston argued that madness, born of oppression but 
also false hopes and lies, had seized the collective consciousness of France. “The deadly 
Tree that first gave Evil motion . . . sent its poison through Earth’s sons and daughters . . 
. [until] The King of Hell . . . [took] A Nation’s congregated form” and shook the earth, 
“drunk with sin and blood.”127 He objected to the massive domestic bloodshed in France, 
the political tyranny that resulted, and most of all Napoleon’s military conquest. This 
was more than American Federalist bombast. Allston believed every human was in 
danger of succumbing to madness, moral evil, or an unholy union of the two. The 
language he used to characterize the personal experience of loss and grief was the precise 
language he used in assessing the French Revolution: “Avaunt, thou Fiend! Nor tempt 
my brain / With thoughts of madness brought from hell!”128 Thus, like the later 
American Whigs, his politics arose not out of disrespect for any particular class of people 
or desire for power per se, but rather a psychological position that saw a stable political 
society as an out-working of the terrifying task of personal psychological control.129 
  Beyond the personal pathos, Allston's presentation of his concerns in the poetic 
form using symbols like the King of Hell represented a Romantic augmentation of 
traditional Federalist political psychology. The Federalists had built upon late 
eighteenth-century faculty psychology to construct a political ideal based on their 
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understanding of the human mind. In The Federalist, government itself incarnated the 
mixed faculties of the rational mind: the legislature correlating to the understanding, the 
will to the executive branch, and the judicial branch to the conscience. On this view, 
factionalism and self-interest arose when the passions of individuals were allowed to 
dominate the rational goal of the common good.130 But even on this view, the passions 
had a quasi-rational feature to them, namely they sought to gratify the needs and desires 
of those who pursued them. Thus, while the formation of interest groups was perhaps 
contrary to the public good and irrational for the nation, it was in some sense prudential 
and beneficial for the members of those interest groups.  
 Allston's concern went beyond this. Having approached the precipice of the 
thoroughly irrational, he recoiled in fear at the darkest possibilities present within the 
human soul when the evil principle that lurked within it embraced the external Evil 
principle. While Thomas Jefferson could sanguinely speak of the tree of liberty being 
watered with the blood of patriots and tyrants—an implicitly rational account of 
revolutionary violence—Allston could do no such thing. Instead, like Freud he feared the 
irrational forces within each individual, which might combine to form what to him 
seemed a bloodlust beyond rational accounting even when appealing to the simplest of 
animal passions. When he sought Coleridge’s aid the diabolical imprecations came from 
outside, when he spoke with Peabody he worried like Jonathan Edwards that the will 
often proceeded from the dark desires of the human heart. Thus his view of politics was 
in some ways that of the frustrated, timid, and disengaged modernist rather than the 
pessimistic but still hopeful Federalist who hoped to carefully balance impulses within 
government to solve the problem. As Jacques Barzun would say, this “recoil from risk, 
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[came] not out of cowardice, but out of self-knowledge.”131 Allston’s high-stakes 
psychological view, which utilized religious categories to describe psychological states, 
could also be seen in later Transcendentalists such as Thoreau. The difference of course 
was Thoreau’s liberal optimism: “Action from principle . . . it is essentially revolutionary . 
. . it divides the individual, separating the diabolical in him from the divine.”132 But 
Allston’s subjective exploration of the irrational self convinced him that the divine within 
required a God-man from without. 
 
Dejection and Liberation: Allston’s Artistic Themes 
 Liberated from his own prison of depression, Allston returned to his art with a 
new intensity. From 1816 until his return to America in August of 1818 he completed 
numerous paintings, impressive both for their style and number. The effort earned him 
an election to the Royal Academy as an associate member, and he would have soon been 
made a full member had he not chosen to return to America. Fully understanding the 
mind of Allston allows one to understand the themes of this incredibly productive 
period. 
 In The Angel Releasing St. Peter from Prison (1816, fig. 9) and Elijah in the 
Desert (1818, fig. 10) Allston explored the theme of dejection and liberation by outside 
spiritual forces. In St. Peter, the angel’s brilliance illuminated the entire picture, 
contrasting with the implicit darkness prior to the angel’s arrival and still present in the 
background. The chains—grasped not only by Peter but also his guards—enhanced the 
sense of oppression and confinement. Allston completed the effect by carefully 
developing Peter’s face, where Allston contrasted the calm and upraised hope of the head 
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with the wild look in the eyes.133 In both contrast and complement to the confinement of 
the prison, the vast, barren space of Elijah’s wilderness communicated the terrible 
emptiness of death. The tree—a mangled mockery of the organic principle that gave it 
life—dominated the prostrate Elijah, and even sinister roots reached out to threaten the 
prophet who knelt utterly dependent on God for his food. St. Peter, likewise, seemed 
bent in prostration prior to the angel’s arrival given the orientation of the body. The 
confident Romantic artist now knelt in the face of forces beyond himself. 
 But though Allston now advocated a thorough surrender to God’s will, this was 
not the utterly depraved will of more severe Protestant varieties. The way upward still led 
inward, a theme he explored in Jacob’s Dream (1817, fig. 11) and Contemplation (1817-
1818, fig. 5). While Allston had long contemplated Jacob’s Dream, he determined to give 
the biblical scene a whole new conception compared to the way that artists usually 
treated the subject. “I have treated it in a very different way from any picture I have ever 
seen,” he insisted, “I have endeavoured to give the idea of unmeasurable flights of steps, 
with platform above platform, rising and extending into space immeasurable. Whether 
this conception will please the matter of fact critics I doubt . . . men without imagination 
will call it stuff! But if I succeed at all, it will be with those whom it will be an honour to 
please.”134 The ethereal and ascending stairs were certainly reminiscent of the Platonic 
return to God, but the billowing clouds were particularly striking as they reminded one 
of Allston’s previous reference to Ann’s soul possessing the depth of the universe as “yon 
op’ning clouds on high / To glorious worlds that o’er them role / The portals to a brighter 
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sky.”135 The effect was so striking that it caused Wordsworth to change the third stanza of 
his poem after seeing Allston’s painting in December of 1817.136 
And if those whom broken ties  
Afflict, or injuries assail,  
Yon hazy ridges to their eyes 
Present a glorious scale, 
Climbing suffused with sunny air, 
To stop – no record hath told where! 
And tempting Fancy to ascend 
And with immortal Spirits blend! 
-Wings at my shoulders seem to play. 
 
The poem must have touched Allston, for Wordsworth was certainly among the highest 
ranks of those whom he wished to please. Furthermore, Wordsworth seemed to 
understand what Allston was about; in the poem “broken ties” and “injuries” turn the 
eyes toward heaven, just as they had for Allston. 
 
Conclusion: The Return 
 Having accomplished everything he set out to do in his artistic training, Allston 
returned to America in August of 1818. Despite his growing fame and number of 
commissions, he still struggled to overcome the financial setbacks of 1814, a point he 
confessed in a later letter.137 Despite protests from Wordsworth, Beaumont, and 
Washington Irving, he decided it would be best to return to America and continue his 
ascent there. The fact that creditors seemed to be harrying him helped make the 
decision. 
 But the move was not entirely pecuniary. He had sought back in 1800 to become 
the first painter from America, and it could now plausibly be argued that he had reached 
this distinction (unless one had a penchant for portraits, in which case Gilbert Stuart was 
clearly the choice). Evidence mounted that America would now prove suitable to his 
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interests and that he might contribute to the ascendency of the arts in the young country. 
Indeed, although the British establishment awarded Allston for The Dead Man Restored 
and displayed it for some time, the Pennsylvania Academy of Fine Arts actually 
purchased the painting for the impressive sum of $3500. In 1816, Allston explained to 
Morse: “Pleased as I was, on account of the very seasonable pecuniary supply it would 
soon afford me, I must say that I was still more gratified at the encouragement it seemed 
to hold out for my return to America.”138 In early 1818, the newly constituted American 
Academy of Fine Arts elected him a member, and Allston’s response summed up his state 
of mind concerning the arts in America: 
The establishment of your Institution has been hailed by our professional brethren on this 
side of the Atlantic. . . . As an artist, I need not say how heartily I too have hailed it; but, as 
an American, more deeply interested in all that may add to the reputation of my native 
land, I cannot but congratulate my countrymen.139 
 
When read alongside Coleridge’s accusation that Allston was downright American, these 
statements demonstrated that Allston had always hoped to return, and that he genuinely 
believed the time was ripe for the full flowering of American art and the institutions to 
support them. Of course if the arts did flower it would have the salutatory effect of 
providing him with bread as well. While Britain provided more extensive patronage, it 
also provided extensive competition and a much higher cost of living. Thus, Allston took 
the calculated risk to return to his native land and bring his brush and his pen—informed 
by his Romantic epistemology and enhanced Christian piety—home. 
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Chapter 3: Romantic Trinitarians: Richard Henry Dana Sr. and Washington 
Allston in Boston 
 
Introduction  
 When Allston returned to America he cut a unique figure. As an intimate of the 
Lake Poets, a writer of Romantic poetry, a Trinitarian Christian, and an acknowledged 
artistic genius, he stood out in a Boston Unitarian culture hostile to Romantic aesthetics 
but yearning for home-grown artistic talent with transatlantic prestige. While Boston 
embraced Allston for his brush, Richard Henry Dana Sr.—an early and isolated 
champion of Wordsworth and Coleridge in America—became Allston’s closest friend and 
shared his entire worldview. Dana Sr. had come to Allston’s belief in a higher Reason and 
in the imagination independently, and like Allston, Dana became a Trinitarian Christian 
after losing his wife. As Romantic Trinitarian intellectuals they were virtually alone in 
Boston, but they spoke for a slowly rising generation that sought a new way forward in 
the ossified debates between Unitarians and Orthodox Calvinists. Their friendship 
proved to be an important collaboration leading to an alternative Romantic tradition to 
Transcendentalism. 
 This chapter carefully charts Dana Sr.’s thought, career, and eventual Trinitarian 
conversion, further explicating the important Romantic emphases on introspection, 
higher Reason, and the artistic imagination. But these ideas did not develop in a vacuum. 
Boston Unitarian culture—particularly the intellectuals associated with the North 
American Review—was hostile to Allston’s and Dana’s Romantic aesthetics, and these 
cultural politics served to isolate Dana at the precise time he, like Allston, was forced to 
  
103 
watch his wife suffer and die. As with Allston, Dana’s loss led him to an affective, 
Trinitarian piety, and he and Allston lent their support to minority Trinitarian churches 
in Boston. Religiously, Allston and Dana were minorities, but Allston’s artistic 
reputation—based as it was on his transatlantic formation—kept him from becoming as 
isolated as Dana. Attending to this difference between them, this chapter also begins to 
draw the boundaries of a Romantic culture that was transatlantic but not thoroughly or 
equally so. 
 
Washington Allston, Guilian Verplanck, and Richard Henry Dana Sr. 
 Allston arrived back in America pursued by well wishes and regrets from an 
illustrious group of British and American ex-pat intellectuals. Coleridge, the 
Wordsworths, the Beaumonts, Southey, and Leslie all bemoaned his departure.1 In a 
twist of irony, he received an appointment as an Associate of the Royal Academy in 
London right after arriving in America, which surprised him since he “never would nor 
did solicit a vote.”2 But despite the protests of friends, he kept his sights set on America, 
hoping he might benefit the nation’s fine arts just as he hoped to benefit from their 
nascence. “Something like encouragement seems to appear in our horizon,” he insisted, 
“and if we have talents we owe something to our country.”3 
 Allston quickly launched into several commissions, pleased that his friends in 
America were “disposed to give [him] a substantial welcome.”4 One such friend was 
Guilian Crommelin Verplanck, a New York Assemblyman, later U.S. Representative, and 
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tireless advocate for keeping American artists and intellectuals at home. Throughout his 
career, Verplanck sought to use his political position to advance the arts, education, 
copyright protection, and other causes closely related to the development of American 
culture. This has prompted his biographer to christen him “one of America’s first cultural 
nationalists.”5 While George Beaumont and other patrons of British Romantic artists 
lobbied for Allston’s return to England, Verplanck hoped Allston’s decision augured a 
trend that would see American cultural talent stay home.6 Verplanck bemoaned the 
previous losses of Copley and West to England, and he queried Allston constantly on the 
prospects of Charles Leslie’s and Washington Irving’s returning to America. He worried 
particularly that “Irving will loiter about London for a long time & waste the most useful 
part of his life out of his proper sphere.”7 In addition to his cultural nationalism, 
Verplanck would emerge as an important, though not preeminent Cautious Romantic, 
and his ideas are discussed at length in Chapter Four.  
 While Verplanck kept Allston connected to New York intellectual circles—Allston 
sought his advice, for example, when invited to join the highbrow but factious New York 
Historical Society—Allston’s most important relationships developed in Boston.8 His 
limited means led him to take up residence with an old friend, Edmund T. Dana, with 
whom he had travelled in England and the Continent from 1801 to 1804.9 Shortly after 
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Leslie and Irving is found in WA to GCV, Mar. 12, 1819, CWA 139; GCV to WA, Mar. 22, 1819, CWA, 143; WA 
to GCV, Apr. 19, 1819, CWA, 147. Quotation is from GCV to WA, Mar. 22, 1819, CWA, 143. 
 8 WA to GCV, Apr. 19, 1819, CWA, 147. 
 9 WA to Henry Pickering, Oct. 28, 1819, CWA, 164. Biographical information on Edmund T. Dana 
from CWA, 543.  
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his return home, Allston found his closest friend and companion in Edmund’s younger 
brother, Richard Henry Dana Sr. In a Boston culture ignorant of Coleridgean 
epistemology and generally hostile to anything smacking of Romantic cultural taste, 
Dana Sr. proved a dear companion to the returning artist accustomed to the heady 
company of Coleridge, Wordsworth, Leslie, and Beaumont. From 1819 until Allston’s 
death in 1843, he and Dana Sr. were rarely apart. They dined together frequently, 
strolled along the seashore discussing philosophy, and were wont to “play the owl . . . 
talking night after night” about art and poetry.10 Allston and Dana both viewed 
friendship as a sacred bond—Dana once referred to it as “a peculiar and holy term”—and 
their friendship would sustain not only their own intellectual lives but also give rise to a 
growing network of intellectual friendships in New England and beyond.11 
 
Richard Henry Dana Sr. and the North American Review 
 Dana Sr., like many intellectuals at this time, struggled to find a vocation suitable 
to his reflective, and at times quite melancholy, interests. Like so many of his station, he 
read law and attempted to practice, first in Baltimore, then in Western New York, then 
Sutton, Massachusetts, and finally Cambridgeport.12 But throughout this period between 
1812 and 1818, “a feeling of melancholy . . .  black and portentious” frequently afflicted 
him.13 Martha Dana, Richard’s sister, served as his primary emotional ballast during his 
early years away from home, and a newfound love for one Ruth Charlotte Smith inspired 
                                                   
 10 See Scrap, Folder 1826, Box 6; RHDS to WCB, Mar. 26, 1827; RHDS to C.C. Western, Aug. 31, 
1829; RHDS to RHDJ, Oct. 24, 1831; RHDS to SA, Oct. 31, 1831; RHDS to WCB, Oct. 18, 1832; RHDS to 
RCD, Apr. 14, 1834; RHDS to RCD, July, 1838; RHDS to RCD, Aug. 17, 1838, DFP, MHS. The quotation is 
fused from the following two letters: RHDS to WCB, Aug., 1838 and RHDS to RCD, Jun. 29, 1841, DFP, 
MHS.  
 11 RHDS to ETC, Jan. 1, 1817, DFP, MHS. 
 12 RHDS to MRD, Jan. 21, 1812; Official Document of RHDS’s admission to the Maryland Bar: Apr. 
28, 1812; RHDS to MRD, May 12, 1812; WE to RHDS, Apr. 11, 1813, DFP, MHS. 
 13 RHDS to WE, Mar. 1, 1817. See also RHDS to MRD, Feb. 2, 1812; RHDS to ETC, Nov. 21, 1812; 
RHDS to MRD, Dec. 15, 1812; RHDS to WE, Jan. 1, 1816, DFP, MHS. 
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him to work toward the goal of domestic comfort with her.14 He even seems to have 
courted her using an earlier version of Allston’s “The Mad Lover,” which Dana read in 
manuscript while Allston was home in Boston between 1809 and 1811.15 When Dana 
returned to establish his law practice in Cambridgeport, he married Ruth Charlotte on 
May 11, 1813.16    
 Dana loved Charlotte deeply, which made her constant health problems that 
much more agonizing. When his literary career with the North American Review began 
to pick up in 1817, he felt relatively relieved from the anxiety that stalked him as he 
searched for an intellectual vocation. Yet he ominously confessed anxiety about his wife 
Charlotte’s health to his uncle William Ellery.17 The couple had four children: Ruth 
Charlotte, Richard Henry Jr., Edmund (Ned), and Susan. Dana adored them all, and his 
letters constantly demonstrated his “daily cause to thank God for the gifts of such sons 
and of a daughter so dear to me.”18 A dramatic love for his family and prescient literary 
insight proved the more positive corollaries to his intensely melancholic and at times 
depressive disposition.  
 By 1817 Dana was holding his “blue Devils,” as his uncle called them, largely in 
check.19 His “strengthened and steadied nerves” resulted not from an increase in law 
business, but the opportunity to write as a central contributor for the newly established 
                                                   
 14 RHDS to MRD, Jan. 7, 1812; RHDS to MRD, Feb. 2, 1812; RHDS to MRD, May 12, 1812; MRD to 
RHDS, Feb. 15, 1812. 
 15 This connection seems likely but not fully certain. While away from Boston and yearning to be 
with Charlotte, Dana wrote to his sister Martha: “Should [Charlotte] at any time visit my home I wish, if you 
think it not improper, to give her The Madman, which Allston gave me. I know that you will write her. I wish 
I could talk to you of her: But I cannot. I can only sit and think of her.” RHDS to MRD, Jan. 21, 1812, DFP, 
MHS. In his later review of Allston’s poetry, Dana claimed: "We are of the number of those, who saw most of 
these poems in manuscript.” Richard Henry Dana, “Sylphs of the Seasons,” North American Review 5, no. 
15 (September 1817): 388. The title of the piece is slightly different, but as there is no other logical text dating 
from this period entitled “The Madman”, the interpretation that “The Madman” and “The Mad Lover” are 
the same seems the most plausible. 
 16 Note, Folder 1812-1813, Box 5, DFP, MHS. 
 17 RHDS to WE, June 4, 1817, DFP, MHS. 
 18 RHDS to RHDJ, Aug. 9, 1841, DFP, MHS. 
 19 WE to RHDS, Mar. 7, 1817, DFP, MHS. 
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North American Review and Miscellaneous Journal (later simply North American 
Review or NAR). Established in 1815, primarily under the control of William Tudor, the 
Review expanded its intellectual scope significantly in 1817 when Jared Sparks became 
the new editor and relied on Dana, Edward Tyrell Channing, Nathan Hale, John 
Gallison, and William Powell Mason as a coherent group of primary contributors. In 
1818, Channing became the editor and Dana, his close friend since college, became the 
assistant editor and enjoyed a salary of $500 and the promise of a career helping to 
guide America’s most promising answer to what Washington Irving complained was the 
“illiberality of British authors” in journals such as Blackwood’s Magazine, The Quarterly 
Review, and The Edinburgh Review.20 
 With his new position, Dana launched into a full-blown offensive against the 
established intellectual and aesthetic norms, no doubt encouraged by the fact that his old 
friend Channing shared some of his sympathies. While some of his articles were reviews, 
Dana always used the occasion to champion Wordsworth, Coleridge, Allston, and the 
emerging Romantic culture they represented; Dana’s page count frequently dwarfed that 
of other articles in a given issue.21 In “Old Times”, Dana channeled the Wordsworth of 
“Tintern Abbey” to “brood over the heartlessness and noisy joys of the world,” and he 
equated the joys of childhood to times, places, customs, and memories now vanished.22 
                                                   
 20 Quotation is from Washington Irving, History, Tales, and Sketches, The Library of America (New 
York: Literary Classics of the United States and Viking Press, 1983), 794. Facts are from Doreen M. Hunter, 
Richard Henry Dana, Sr. (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1987), 26–27. Dana’s salary was ~$9000-$10,000 in 
contemporary currency, but connection with the journal provided the hope of promotion and reputation to 
empower other intellectual work. 
 21 For example, in the following three articles, Dana’s writing ran to 18, 47, and 35 pages 
respectively. The average article length in each issue was 12, 27, and 21 pages respectively. Richard Henry 
Dana, “Edgeworth’s Readings on Poetry,” North American Review 7 (May 1818): 69–86; Richard Henry 
Dana, “Hazlitt’s English Poets,” North American Review 8 (March 1819): 276–322; Richard Henry Dana, 
“The Sketch Book,” North American Review 9 (September 1819): 322–356. 
 22 Richard Henry Dana, “Old Times,” North American Review 5, no. 13 (May 1817): 5–6, 8. In 
“Lines Composed a Few Miles Above Tintern Abbey,” Wordsworth bemoaned “the fretful stir / Unprofitable, 
and the fever of the world / [which] Have hung upon the beatings of my heart,” and he explained that he was 
“changed, no doubt, from what I was when first / I came among these hills” when in “the coarser pleasures of 
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He then turned to reviewing Allston’s Sylphs of the Seasons and emphatically claimed 
the poet-painter for America, wielding the cause of American nationalism to champion 
the Romantic literary taste of the future. 
We should be sorry to have it said of us, a few years hence, when these poems shall be 
more generally read and understood, that we were so wanting in good taste as to pass 
them by without notice; and that while we were joining in the common lamentation over 
the lack of American poetick genius, we were too dull to discern the almost single 
exception from the cause of our mortification and grief.23 
 
Evaluating Allston’s poetry, Dana demonstrated a keen command of both the Romantic 
belief in the symbiotic relationship between the mind and nature and the belief that the 
imagination combined and translated these perceptions and experiences in a unique 
way.24 He praised Allston accordingly: “He has not only an eye for nature, but a heart 
too, and his imagination gives them a common language, and they talk together.”25  
 However, this was not a simple puff piece for a friend, and Dana’s commitment to 
the cause of Romantic art in America trumped any desire to overlook Allston’s faults. To 
Dana, Allston failed to display “a mastery over the more intense passions”—neither the 
“breathless speed of Scott,” nor the “fiery passions . . . [and] dark and mysterious depths” 
provoked by Byron, nor the “serious and sad [vision], like Wordsworth, showing you a 
stained world. . . . His senses for the most part are of the beautiful . . . though the clouds 
are sometimes seen mustering up . . . like dark spirits.”26 Of course, Allston wrote Sylphs 
of the Seasons before Ann’s death, and had Dana been able to include Allston’s visions 
                                                                                                                                                       
my boyish days” . . . ”nature then . . . to me was all in all.” William Wordsworth, “Lines Composed a Few 
Miles Above Tintern Abbey,” in Lyrical Ballads, ed. R.L. Brett and A.R. Jones, Reprint. (London; New York: 
Routledge, 2011), 158. It should be noted, however, that Wordsworth used this explanation to cultivate a 
hopeful posture toward the future where nature might renew him once again, this hopeful posture is less 
evident in Dana’s “Old Times.” 
 23 Dana, “Sylphs of the Seasons,” 365. 
 24 “Nature is suggestive, and makes him that studies her, work with her.” And he insisted that “the 
mind is in this way left to its own pursuits, it gains vigour and quickness, and truth of observation from its 
independence.” Ibid., 368. 
 25 Ibid., 370. 
 26 Ibid., 370–371. 
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from “The Atonement” or “The French Revolution” he might have taken a different view 
(as we have seen in Chapter Two). 
 By the time Allston returned to America, Dana had come into his own 
intellectually. Five months before Allston sailed into Boston Harbor, Dana used the 
occasion of reviewing Maria Edgeworth’s Readings on Poetry (1816) to praise Coleridge 
and articulate a robustly Romantic view of poetry, the mind, and education. He lamented 
the “dull tranquility—a solemn parade of reason, holding boastful dominion over 
passions too feeble for rebellion, and laying restrictions upon the wanderings of earth-
bound and sluggish imaginations . . . we are made mere reasoning machines. In our new-
gotten zeal for the useful,” he continued, “we overlook our mixed condition; not 
considering that . . . every faculty of the mind, is bestowed on us for good—that the 
romantick may give a warmth and action to feelings dulled in the tame business of the 
world.”27 This was the quintessential Romantic critique of Enlightenment reason: that its 
narrow definition of reason missed key features no less a part of the human mind, 
despite the difficulty in defining experiences like wonder, faculties like the imagination, 
or the more unruly emotions frequently referred to as the passions. Dana’s attack on 
Edgeworth centered on this narrow definition of reason, which he argued tended to 
measure all taste in poetry and standards in education by their ability to produce docile, 
prudent, and productive members of industrial society. “Poetry is no less necessary to 
society, than well ordered industry,” he insisted, and appreciation of poetry required 
“imagination, a poetical sense, and the unnumbered and defineless connexions and 
feelings, which make up that wonder of creation.”28 He insisted that this was not just 
intellectual cant applicable to a few aesthetes, but that attentiveness to the whole mind, 
                                                   
 27 Dana, “Edgeworth’s Readings on Poetry,” 71. Emphasis added. 
 28 Ibid., 73, 76. 
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including the passions and imagination “better fitted [people] to understand the world” 
and live productively in the “repose of reality.”29  
 Dana provided two arguments for his “romantick” criticism. First, fostering the 
imagination and freer development of individual education helped fit students to develop 
“that faculty which teaches them to consider and determine for themselves, and begets 
that independent wisdom, without which their heaped up knowledge is but an 
incumbrance [sic].”30 Secondly, humanity’s “mean vices [were] too thoroughly 
engrained, to be reasoned out.” Instead, “opposite passions must be brought into the 
contest—self sacrificing love—ardent longings after far-off excellences, and all glimpses 
of forms and undefined creations, that live and move in the beautiful and glorious 
spectacles of warmed imaginations.”31 These passions could serve as a counterbalance to 
less worthy ones and provide motivation to do good. He even wielded Locke against 
Edgeworth claiming that Locke’s educational views militated against Edgeworth’s 
overemphasis on practical skills and her doctrinaire force-feeding of definitions and 
interpretations in Readings on Poetry.32 Locke claimed: “‘Everyone’s natural genius 
should be carried as far as it could’,” and Dana insisted this principle undercut 
Edgeworth’s simplistic and uniform educational tendencies.33 But in the end, it was not 
Locke but Coleridge who gave Dana the greatest support. “We have always thought all 
the great powers of the mind to be united in poetry; and Coleridge, the most tasteful and 
acute of criticks, has told us, that in imagination and words, are the highest 
metaphysicks.”34  
                                                   
 29 Ibid., 72. 
 30 Ibid., 73. 
 31 Ibid., 72. 
 32 Ibid., 74–80. 
 33 Ibid., 74. 
 34 Ibid., 75–76. 
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 In emphasizing the organic development of individual genius and independent 
wisdom, Dana swam against increasingly swift currents in American education. For one 
thing, colleges preferred a rigorously classical system and remained hostile to the poetry 
and modern literature that clearly animated Dana’s thinking.35 Between 1790 and 1830, 
university curriculums became more, not less, standardized along these lines.36 At the 
level of common schools, reformers touted Locke’s emphasis on the malleability of mind, 
but not to foster individual, natural genius as Dana suggested; they rather sought to form 
children’s minds in the moral and religious ways they thought best.37 Between 1830 and 
1860, mandatory, state-sponsored education became not only universal but also much 
more uniform as authorities saw the potential to establish habits and values conducive to 
the rapidly industrializing economy, to mitigate crime, and to facilitate common, 
democratic political responsibilities.38 In his uniting Coleridge to the educational 
development of a free individual, Dana anticipated his later friend James Marsh at the 
University of Vermont, who attempted to reform the college curriculum and foster 
individual, organic development and the role of poetry and modern literature in that 
development. It is not surprising then, that when Dana found someone who actually 
sought to integrate these views, he entrusted his children to their care. 
 
 
Transatlantic Romantic Sympathy 
                                                   
 35 Louis Franklin Snow, The College Curriculum in the United States (New York: Teachers College, 
Columbia University, 1907), 102–154. 
 36 Ibid., 141. 
 37 Carl F. Kaestle, Pillars of the Republic: Common Schools and American Society, 1780-1860 (New 
York: Hill and Wang, 1983), 32–33. 
 38 Ibid., 62–103. 
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 Dana’s views encouraged Allston, supporting as it did Allston’s hope for the 
simultaneous flowering of both American and transatlantic Romantic culture. “Perhaps 
it may be gratifying to Mr. Wordsworth to know that he has [a] great many warm 
admirers on this side of the Atlantic,” he wrote to William Collins, and he suggested that 
whereas England was conservative and hostile, America might prove particularly fertile 
ground for a new intellectual culture. “In spite of the sneers of the Edinburgh Review, 
which, with the Quarterly [Review], is reprinted and as much read here as in England, 
there is still taste enough amongst us to appreciate [Wordsworth’s] merits. I was also 
pleased to find the same independence with respect to Coleridge and Southey; who are 
both read here & admired.”39 Allston’s claim was a bit optimistic. Whatever the reading 
tastes of Allston’s other friends, between 1815 and James Marsh’s later article on 
“Ancient and Modern Poetry” in 1822, the only author to treat the Lake Poets and 
Romantic aesthetic theory consistently, seriously, and sympathetically in the North 
American Review was Dana.40 Indeed, as late as 1823, Ebenezer Tracy of Dartmouth 
                                                   
 39 WA to William Collins, Apr. 12, 1819, CWA, 145-146. It is interesting to note that Allston went on 
in the letter to tell Collins he would not be coming back to England “soon if ever.” The reason was that “the 
engagements I have already entered into here will employ me for several years; & I have others in prospect 
that will probably follow them which will occupy me as many more.” Allston planned to remain in America 
and perhaps establish an English School modeled on his experiences in London. Wordsworth’s reputation in 
the Edinburgh Review started off badly. In 1802, Francis Jeffrey attacked his literary program and verse as 
“affectation” and later even a “perverted taste for simplicity.” What particularly irked Jeffrey was the 
assumption that “an author should make use of the language of the vulgar, to express the sentiments of the 
refined,” cited in Scott McEathron, “Wordsworth, Lyrical Ballads, and the Problem of Peasant Poetry,” 
Nineteenth-Century Literature 54, no. 1 (June 1999): 2–3. George Ticknor, who visited Wordsworth in 1819 
remembered that up to that point Wordsworth’s works “had been no source of profit to him” but that 
Wordsworth's reputation, particularly in the Edinburgh Review, had changed greatly in the time between 
1819 and 1835. “The Edin* Review would now hardly begin an article about him, as it began the one about 
the Excursion 'this will never do',” cited in Judson Stanley Lyon, “Wordsworth and Ticknor,” Pmla 66, no. 4 
(June 1951): 434. 
 40 The record from the NAR between 1815-1822 demonstrates almost no in depth knowledge of 
Coleridge and only passing references to Wordsworth. Southey’s works cited are almost always his historical 
works on The History of Brazil and his Life of Wesley. The one voice sympathetic to Dana’s Romantic views 
during the NAR’s early years was his friend Edward Tyrell Channing, although Channing’s praise of the 
imagination and new Romantic aesthetics was guarded and did not address specific authors. Walter Scott’s 
and Madame de Staël’s novels were widely read and referenced in America, and Americans also read Byron’s 
poetry. However, only Scott met with universal approbation. De Staël received praise for her literary 
expression and wide learning, but criticism for her forays into speculative German philosophy and her 
general philosophical outlook. In Edward Everett’s words she sometimes confounded “argument with truth, 
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and the art of reasoning with reason itself. Her system of liberty too might probably end in slavery, and her 
philosophy in ignorance, and her vision of perfectibility is contradicted by the experience of past ages.” 
Byron’s poetry, while admired for strength of expression, was criticized for formal violations, moral 
violations, or both, and more than once the NAR contributors mocked the young men who worshipped at 
Byron’s altar—though by the mid-1820s other NAR authors joined the chorus of Byron’s admirers. By the 
early 1820s, one observes an awareness of the Schlegels’ literary criticism on the part of Edward Everett and 
William Prescott, though in these two cases the Schlegels were appropriated in relation to classical subjects 
such as Aristophanes or neoclassical dramatic tragedy. Prescott briefly mentioned an appreciation for A.W. 
Schlegel’s Shakespearean criticism but seemed to have an impoverished understanding of it as he accused 
Schlegel of an overweening idealism that ignored Shakespeare’s ability to express “the impurities of our 
earthly nature.” Schlegel himself argued Shakespeare unified ideal and universal aspects of human nature in 
the real and individual experiences of his characters and that he commanded all the passions experienced in 
real human life, see August Wilhelm von Schlegel, A Course of Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature, 
trans. John Black, vol. 2, 1st ed. (London: Baldwin, Cradock and Joy, 1815), 130-132. Throughout the 1820s 
Coleridge was dismissively derided on the very few occasions he was mentioned—once in connection with 
Dana Sr. himself—and as late as 1829 one observes an inner-circle, NAR contributor such as William Bourn 
Oliver Peabody sweepingly bemoaning the state of poetry thanks to Byron and Wordsworth—whom he 
criticized—and Coleridge, Shelley, and Keats whom he dismissed. A marked exception to this trend in the 
NAR was James Marsh’s “Ancient and Modern Poetry”; not surprisingly Marsh would become an intellectual 
ally of Allston and Dana Sr.. On general rejections of Romantic philosophy and denunciations of the state of 
poetry, see W. Tudor, “The Story of Rimini,” The North American Review and Miscellaneous Journal 3, no. 
8 (July 1816): 272–284; “Praelectiones Academicae Oxonii Habitae,” The North American Review and 
Miscellaneous Journal 3, no. 1 (January 1821): 1–16; Alexander Hill Everett, “Friedrich von Schiller’s 
Leben,” North American Review 14, no. 39 (April 1823): 397–425; William Bourne Oliver Peabody, “Lord 
Byron and his Contemporaries; with Recollections of the Author’s Life, and of his Visit to Italy. By Leigh 
Hunt,” North American Review 29, no. 62 (January 1829): 1–18; on de Staël, see A. Ritchie, “Considerations 
sur les principaux évènetments de la Révolution Française,” The North American Review and Miscellaneous 
Journal 8, no. 22 (December 1818): 58–61; Theophilus Parsons, “Notices sur le caractère et les écrits 
Madame La Baronne de Staël Holstein,” The North American Review and Miscellaneous Journal 11, no. 28 
(July 1820): 130–140; Edward Everett, “Letters from Geneva and France . . . addressed to a Lady in Virginia, 
by her Father,” The North American Review and Miscellaneous Journal 11, no. 28 (July 1820): 21–22; on 
Byron, see “For the North-American Journal, Edinburgh, 1814,” The North American Review and 
Miscellaneous Journal 1, no. 3 (September 1815): 346; “Verses by Lord Byron,” The North American Review 
and Miscellaneous Journal 4, no. 12 (March 1817): 367–377, esp. 369; “Airs of Palestine; a Poem: by John 
Pierpont,” The North American Review and Miscellaneous Journal 4, no. 12 (March 1817): 411–413; Willard 
Phillips, “Childe Harold,” The North American Review and Miscellaneous Journal 5, no. 13 (May 1817): 
109–110; “Marino Doge of Venice. A tragedy, in five acts, by Lord Byron,” North American Review 7, no. 32 
(July 1821): 227–246, esp. 240; Peabody, “Lord Byron and his Contemporaries; with Recollections of the 
Author’s Life, and of his Visit to Italy. By Leigh Hunt,” 7–13; on the Schlegels, see Edward Everett, “The 
Comedies of Aristophanes. By T. Mitchell,” North American Review 10, no. 35 (April 1822): 273–296; 
William Hickling Prescott, “Sylla; by E. Jouy and Catiline; by the Rev. George Croly,” North American 
Review 13, no. 38 (January 1823): 133–134; on Coleridge in the 1820s, see William Cullen Bryant and North 
American Review Editors, “The Club Room and The Idle Man,” North American Review 10, no. 35 (April 
1822): 329–330; Prescott, “Sylla; by E. Jouy and Catiline; by the Rev. George Croly,” 148; Everett, “Friedrich 
von Schiller’s Leben,” 420–421; Peabody, “Lord Byron and his Contemporaries; with Recollections of the 
Author’s Life, and of his Visit to Italy. By Leigh Hunt,” 17; on voices sympathetic to Allston, Dana, and 
Romantic ideas generally, see Edward Tyrell Channing, “On Models in Literature,” The North American 
Review and Miscellaneous Journal 3, no. 8 (July 1816): 202–210; James Marsh, “Intorno all’ ingiustizia di 
alcuni giudizii letterarii Italiani. Discorso di Lodovico Arborio Gattinara di Breme, figlio. 8vo. Milano, 1816.,” 
North American Review 6, no. 11 (July 1822): 94–131; for an intriguing equation of Scott's "romantic" 
narratives with the Puritan errand into the wilderness, see John Gorham Palfrey, “Yamoyden a tale of the 
wars of king Philip, in six cantos. By the late Rev. James Wallis Eastburn,” The North American Review and 
Miscellaneous Journal 3, no. 2 (April 1821): 466–488. 
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College could still write to the young Romantic scholar James Marsh that “the curse of 
the Edinburgh Review” had kept certain English authors “from crossing the Atlantic.”41 
But Allston hoped for a new generation of edifying, cultural exchange. Acknowledging 
“an American Journal is not often seen in England,” Allston sent copies to Wordsworth 
and Southey highlighting in particular Dana’s Review of “Hazlitt’s Lectures” as indicative 
of a new appreciation emerging in America and exemplified by Dana and Edward T. 
Channing.42 
 Allston demonstrated judgment in highlighting Dana’s “Hazlitt’s Lectures.” In 
this piece Dana displayed a wide-ranging intellectual acumen that climaxed in an incisive 
critique of Hazlitt at his weakest point—a critique that substantiated Allston’s claims that 
America harbored sympathy with British Romantics. Dana followed Hazlitt carefully 
through Chaucer, Spenser, Pope, Cowper, and Burns, conceding much to Hazlitt’s 
perception but never failing to chide the great critic when he found him wanting. He 
praised Hazlitt especially for capturing “what has been strangely passed over by others” 
in Chaucer, namely his “pathos and love of nature,” but Dana also chided Hazlitt for 
ignoring Ben Jonson, Donne, and others.43 However, when Dana sensed that Hazlitt was 
guilty of a deep contradiction smelling of bad faith, he locked his jaw on the snout of the 
great English bull of letters and held on. Dana agreed wholeheartedly with Hazlitt’s 
generally Romantic definitions of poetry, which privileged the imagination’s active 
capacity in translating between nature and individual mental perception. According to 
them both, poetry must be:  
At one time neither mere description of natural objects, nor mere delineations of natural 
feelings . . . there must be imagination and passion, and an uneasy, restless sense of 
                                                   
 41 Ebenezer C. Tracy to JM, Oct. 8, 1823, JMC. 
 42 WA to WW, Nov. 15, 1819, CWA 166. In this letter, Allston emphasized that Dana and Channing 
were the principle and most meritorious writers and expressed his regret that they had only recently left the 
NAR. 
 43 Dana, “Hazlitt’s English Poets,” 281, 284. 
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beauty, which be relieved by connecting itself with other images of beauty and grandeur, 
and these be thrown off, and come floating before us accompanied by sounds that change 
and harmonize with them. The words, too, must be as pictures to our minds. This, and 
more is true.44    
 
The problem for Dana then became acute as he could not understand why Hazlitt could 
celebrate the achievements of Alexander Pope, while denigrating the living English poets 
who more than any had developed the theories of nature and the imagination favored by 
Hazlitt. “We have been a good deal puzzled to ascertain what Mr. Hazlitt’s notions of 
poetry are,” insisted Dana who went on to wonder whether Hazlitt’s characterizations in 
poetry might “not mean everything or nothing to suit Mr. Hazlitt’s humour.”45 In the 
end, Dana rightly discerned a “sort of fatality which [Hazlitt] seems to labour under of 
attacking, on all occasions, what some call the Lake school.”46 When Hazlitt offered the 
timid defense that the merits of contemporary poetry were difficult to ascertain in their 
own time, Dana declared victory: 
He has elsewhere said that the world is a spurner [sic] of living and a patron of dead merit; 
and lest his assertion should prove false he has done all in his power to make it true. It was 
frank in him, too, to confess that he could not speak of them with the same confidence as 
of the dead, as he had not the sanction of posterity for his opinion. For our own parts, we 
have never suspected Mr. Hazlitt of a want of confidence at any time. We shall go on then 
without particularly regarding the remarks of a man who, it appears, can have no decided 
opinion of his own. We do not feel the same timid anxiety as to our future critical 
reputation that he does. We are willing to form our opinion of the living poets as well as we 
can, upon our own notions of what good poetry is, apart from what may be said of them 
hereafter.47 
 
 Following this brazen sally, Dana confidently argued that Wordsworth in fact 
reached the highest pinnacle of poetry as he most perfectly navigated the balance 
between natural objects, natural feelings, the imagination of the poet, and the 
imagination of the reader. While many great poets of high imagination wielded words 
                                                   
 44 The quote is from Dana. Dana's characterization of Hazlitt's general definition of poetry was fair, 
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and forms to spark new visions in the imaginations of their readers, for Dana, only 
Wordsworth did this so effortlessly that the reader lost all self-consciousness of this 
process. “When we read other men, we look at the scenery they are describing, with the 
sense upon us that it is seen by us through the imagination; but in Wordsworth this is 
lost, and every thing he shows us appears to the eye and with the same distinctness and 
immediate reality, as if the object itself was directly before us.”48 And yet, Wordsworth’s 
revelations were not a mirror of the external world either: “He has formed another 
creation, but it is one within ourselves—the mountains and valleys . . . to our eyes they 
are the same as when we saw them yesterday; but a new sense is in our hearts, new and 
delightful relations have grown out from them . . . and from the riot of imagination 
comes our holiest calm.”49 As we have previously seen, Romantic criticism favored an 
entwined and dynamic relationship between the mind and nature wherein each 
provoked and revealed the secrets of the other. To Dana, Wordsworth wielded this 
process so carefully that nature, the mind of the poet, and the mind of the reader became 
indiscernibly fused. Moreover, Wordsworth, while sometimes dealing with disturbing 
themes, kept the “riot of the imagination” in check—a point surely not lost upon Allston 
who worried deeply about the prospect of a diseased imagination that preyed upon 
itself.50  
 Dana’s criticism of Wordsworth demonstrated admirable command of Coleridge 
as well; indeed Dana insisted that Coleridge’s criticism of Wordsworth “ha[d] more good 
taste and philosophy in it” than anything else written.51 In the recently published 
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Biographia Literaria (1817), Coleridge had identified many of Wordsworth’s strengths to 
which Dana assented. Point by point, Coleridge praised first “the perfect truth of nature 
in [Wordsworth’s] images and descriptions,” then Wordsworth’s “sympathy with man as 
man”—his ability to see that “no difference of rank conceals the sameness of the nature . . 
. the image of the Creator” in all humans.52 This second strength opened Wordsworth’s 
vision to prompt poems about common people, but more importantly this sympathy with 
man as man allowed Wordsworth more powerful access to the minds of his readers. As 
Dana put it, “He has formed another creation, but it is one within ourselves.”53 Finally 
Coleridge insisted that these strengths proved Wordsworth possessed “the gift of 
IMAGINATION in the highest and strictest sense of the word” and that he stood “nearest 
of all modern writers to Shakespeare and Milton.”54 All of these points Dana 
incorporated into his own praise of Wordsworth, demonstrating that Dana had carefully 
read the Biographia. However, Dana’s highlighting the loss of self-consciousness in the 
reader was a distinct development on the views of Coleridge, whose point-by-point 
praise focused primarily on Wordsworth and the power of the poet. The different 
emphases were thoroughly compatible, but Coleridge focused on the poet. Dana’s critical 
acumen shone through in his ability to add depth to his favorite poets’ aesthetic theory. 
 But was Dana’s criticism of Hazlitt fair? Was Hazlitt’s criticism really, as Dana 
insisted, a “vulgar . . . attack upon the characters of Wordsworth and Coleridge?”55 After 
all, Hazlitt acknowledged Wordsworth “the most original poet now living” and insisted 
that “it is not possible to speak in terms of too high praise” of The Lyrical Ballads 
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(1798).56 But the praise Hazlitt allowed the early Lyrical Ballads was both backhanded 
and conditioned by a political grudge.  Hazlitt’s claim was backhanded in that he quickly 
turned Wordsworth’s originality against him, insisting that “he cannot form a whole . . . 
[and was] totally deficient in all the machinery of poetry.”57 In other words, 
Wordsworth’s penchant for originality in individual lines and thoughts led him 
ultimately to undermine the organic whole in each of his poems; as Hazlitt well knew, 
this was a damning critique for the Lake Poets given their emphasis on organic form. 
Furthermore, Hazlitt’s taste for the Lake Poets’ rebellion against the old Augustan and 
French poetic forms extended only as far as this aesthetic rebellion coincided with the 
social and ideological rebellion underway in the French Revolution.58 When Wordsworth 
and Coleridge became disillusioned with the French Revolution, Hazlitt became 
disillusioned with them. 
 Hazlitt’s political frustration with the Lake Poets led him to attack them for being 
too radical in rejecting all learning and art that preceded them and not radical enough in 
their politics. He suggested the impulse for the Lake Poets’ innovations—poems 
eschewing rhyme and emphasizing common themes and people—arose during the 
political fervor of the French Revolution. But the Lake Poets now cared not for the 
subjects of their art: “He does not even like to share his reputation with his subject; for 
he would have it all proceed from his own power and originality of mind.”59 Hazlitt then 
threw them into a pit of unfettered narcissism:  “A thorough adept in this school of 
poetry . . .  sees nothing but himself and the universe. . . . He hates all science and all art . 
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. . he hates all poetry but his own . . . he hates music, dancing, and painting; he hates 
Rubens, he hates Rembrandt; he hates Raphael, he hates Titian.”60  
 This characterization was simply false, both in several particulars—Coleridge, for 
example, loved both Titian and metaphysics—but also in its general characterization. As 
we have seen in Chapter One, Coleridge insisted that “[t]he dwarf sees farther than the 
giant, when he has the giant’s shoulder to mount on.”61 The conservative temperament 
that emerged in Coleridge, Wordsworth, and Southey militated against the unfettered 
intellectual narcissism that Hazlitt accused them of; the fear of revolutionary excess gave 
them an appreciation for ideas and institutions that existed outside of the self.62 While 
this rejection of the past might be found in someone like Emerson’s more iconoclastic 
writings, in 1818 Coleridge and Wordsworth were clearly on record holding the opposite 
view.63 Moreover, Shelley and Blake, who roughly shared Hazlitt’s progressive politics, 
also retreated from external revolution and into the artistic imagination and the cult of 
unfettered genius as they sought, in M.H. Abrams words, “an inner revolution in man’s 
moral, intellectual, and imaginative economy,” guided by poet-prophets.64 Hazlitt’s 
history—equating aesthetic innovation with the heady politics of the French Revolution—
was surely correct, but his leap to equating political disillusionment and intellectual 
narcissism might have been more nuanced. 
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 Perhaps most telling was the strangely confessional note with which Hazlitt chose 
to end his Lectures. With rapturous praise, he recalled Coleridge when he first knew him: 
“He is the only person I ever knew who answered to the idea of a man of genius. . . . And 
shall I, who heard him then, listen to him now? Not I! . . . That spell is broke; that time is 
gone forever; that voice is heard no more.”65 Coleridge’s youthful descriptions had 
inspired Hazlitt with their vision of “the progress of human happiness and liberty in 
bright and never-ending succession, like the steps of Jacob’s ladder.”66 But Coleridge’s 
search for the Platonic transcendence symbolized by Jacob’s ladder had now moved from 
politics to religion, and Dana rightly discerned that Hazlitt’s wounded emotional and 
political perspective fueled much of his attack. 
 
Cultural Politics and Transatlantic Authority 
 Thus Allston returned home to find a literary critic to carry on in print what he 
could accomplish with his brush. But despite Allston’s hope and his optimistic letters 
back to England, he and Dana swam against a swift, cultural tide. While Dana’s assault 
on Hazlitt could be celebrated as the flexing of American cultural muscle, his triumphant 
attack on Pope proved too daring and premature. Most of his fellow NAR contributors 
and much of the educated public still preferred older Augustan forms, and shortly after 
his review of Hazlitt, Dana confessed in a letter to his grandfather, William Ellery, that 
his article had scandalized some. Nevertheless, he found this encouraging. “What I said 
must have had something in it else they would not have talked so long, and so much and 
with so great heat about it.” 67 He felt himself secure with Edward T. Channing as the 
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editor: “I know what Ned and the sacred few . . . think about it.”68 However, his sagacious 
grandfather urged caution in what would be portentous advice. “An indifference to the 
opinion of others is not recommended by St. Paul; but rather the contrary,” Ellery 
warned his grandson.69 
 September 1819 proved the turning point. Channing, always the more cautious 
and diplomatic of the Romantic sympathizers, decided to accept the Boylston Professor 
of Rhetoric and Oratory at Harvard, leaving the NAR editorship open.70 Dana believed 
that his own erudition, prolific contributions, and position as Channing’s primary 
assistant more than qualified him for the job. But as the later American literary critic 
Rufus Griswold reported, Dana had argued too strongly that “there were truths beyond 
the understanding and the senses” and had “broached many paradoxes not to be 
tolerated” at a time when “the POPE and Queen ANNE school was then triumphant.” 
Thus, “a strong party rose against [Dana’s] opinions,” and Dana was left bereft of 
Channing’s support and “a minority with the ‘North American Club’.”71 Griswold’s 
account was not the entire story, but it was a substantial part of it. The NAR record 
through the 1820s supported Griswold’s conclusion, as did the NAR inner-circle’s 
unprofessional hostility to Dana and his later literary venture The Idle Man, discussed 
later.72 
 As a matter of intellectual history, this bit of cultural politics illustrated that 
Romantic philosophy and aesthetics simply had yet to realize their destiny in an America 
that would become quite favorable to them some fifteen years later. For those like 
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Allston, Dana, and their later friends, it was a temporary setback and nothing more. 
Indeed, by 1822 a young philosopher, James Marsh, would debut in the NAR with a 
Schlegel-inspired analysis of modern literature and by 1829 Marsh would provide 
philosophical muscle to Allston’s and Dana’s Coleridgean Trinitarianism.73 However, a 
retrospective pathos emerged from Dana’s confident letter to his grandfather three 
months earlier. “My own health seems gaining ground with my years,” he joyfully 
declared, “so that if the world otherwise goes well with me, I may live to be a cheerful old 
man.”74 He would live to be an old man, outlasting his generation of intellectual 
comrades, but by 1820 the world had not gone well with him and he would be anything 
but cheerful for most of the next two decades.   
 In addition to the cultural politics, intellectual authority likely played a role in 
deciding the next editor of the NAR. Instead of Dana, Edward Everett became 
Channing’s successor. Like Allston, Everett was both wealthy and connected. In 1815 
Harvard University appointed the twenty-year-old Everett to the newly endowed Eliot 
Professor of Greek Literature and promptly granted him a four-year leave and full salary 
which, combined with his own personal means, enabled Everett to study at the 
University of Göttingen and travel extensively.75 When Everett returned in 1819 as one of 
the first Americans to receive a Ph.D. and with the polished panache of his extensive 
travel, he possessed intellectual credentials few Americans could rival. Emerson 
remembered that upon Everett’s return from five years of study in Europe he exerted an 
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influence like “Pericles in Athens” in the “unoccupied American Parnassus” as he was the 
first to imbibe German classical and biblical criticism firsthand.76 
 With Allston as his closest friend and Everett as an intellectual antagonist, Dana 
recognized the importance of transatlantic intellectual formation.77 Shortly after losing 
out to Everett at the NAR, Dana wrote to William Cullen Bryant yearning for the 
intellectual society in London and how it might improve their poetry.78 He later pined to 
his friend Sarah Arnold: “I pray you all to go [to Europe]; and when you return, you shall 
tell me many things about that land (England, I mean) which I now no longer hope to 
see.”79 In his continued correspondence with her it was Coleridge, the Alps, and the 
Italian Masters in Rome he wished he could have seen as he now sullenly concluded that 
he would never get there and that if he did Coleridge was already dead.80 This was the 
precise intellectual program Allston had pursued, each encounter critical to forming 
Allston’s mind, art, and reputation. Though both Coleridge, Wordsworth, and William 
Whewell—the polymath, master of Trinity College, Cambridge from 1841 to 1866—would 
read and praise Dana’s writing from afar, Dana knew the effect was too little and too late. 
His American reputation and intellectual opportunities might have been rectified by an 
extended sojourn across the Atlantic, or so he thought. 
 
The Idle Man 
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 Despite his disappointment with the NAR, Dana embraced the setback as an 
opportunity and launched his own journal in January of 1821. Taking his cue from the 
English poet William Cowper—“how various his employments, whom the world calls 
idle”—Dana entitled his work, The Idle Man. The title provided a succinct, ironic 
commentary on the challenges faced by professional intellectuals in a society allegedly 
obsessed with material production and commercial success.81 In getting the work started, 
Dana benefitted from Allston’s intellectual networks, which were naturally sympathetic 
to Dana’s position. Gulian Verplanck helped to arrange publication in New York with 
Washington Irving’s publisher, Charles Wiley, away from the prying eyes of Dana’s 
Bostonian enemies.82 Allston’s friend and colleague in London, the American painter 
Charles Robert Leslie, helped to promote the work with Coleridge and London 
publishers to court a potentially more favorable transatlantic audience. Coleridge 
expressed “the highest opinion of all of the articles [in Nos. 1, 2, and 3]” and composed a 
strong recommendation to the London publisher Colburn.83 While Dana valued the 
professional help, he was more touched by favorably impressing such an important 
influence as Coleridge. “When you see Mr. Coleridge,” he wrote to Leslie, “will you be so 
kind as to give him a poor author’s best thanks? I want the praise of the crowd, for it 
turns to account; but the praise of such a man satisfies the mind and heart.”84 
 Dana contributed the majority of essays and stories for The Idle Man, but the 
journal also served to bring two more of Allston’s pieces into the public view, as well as 
aid the burgeoning career of the young poet William Cullen Bryant—beyond these 
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likeminded friends, Dana struggled to find any other contributors.85 Bryant emerged on 
the American intellectual scene with his poem “Thanatopsis” (1817) in the North 
American Review, and he had benefitted greatly from the Romantic rebels’ control of the 
journal. Between 1817 and 1819, he appeared in all but one volume, publishing a healthy 
mix of poetry and criticism. It is telling that after September 1819, Channing’s and 
Dana’s last issue, Bryant’s profile in the NAR dwindled substantially.86 By 1821 he had 
begun to establish a reputation, delivering the Harvard Phi Beta Kappa commencement 
address, aided by some coaching from Channing, and releasing his first volume, Poems 
(1821), aided by literary criticism and practical advice from Dana.87 During this time, 
Bryant and Dana established a lifelong intellectual friendship, providing criticism and 
personal edification through a lively and voluminous correspondence. The Idle Man 
provided a more sympathetic, if brief, venue for Bryant’s poetry than the North 
American Review.  
 Both authors sought to help each other as much as they could professionally. 
Dana encouraged Verplanck and other New York intellectuals to take note of Bryant’s 
Poems, and Bryant, for his part, wrote a laudatory review of The Idle Man for the North 
American Review. Dana’s efforts on Bryant’s behalf were more successful. The 
sympathetic Verplanck reviewed Bryant’s Poems favorably in New York, but Everett and 
“the ‘rest of the club’” at the NAR insisted on rewriting Bryant’s review of Dana, retaining 
its criticisms but little of its praise.88 Bryant, thoroughly frustrated by the cultural 
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politics of the NAR, later insisted that had Dana been made editor of the NAR “he would 
have imparted a character and decision to its critical articles which no other man in the 
country was at that time qualified to give it.”89 
 In The Idle Man, Dana experimented with form, composing essays, fiction, and 
imaginative commentaries that lay somewhere in between. Liberated from the strictures 
of NAR taste, he explored with reckless abandon the boundaries of the imagination and 
what it meant to be “romantic.” His ideas came through most clearly in his aptly named 
“Musings,” where he argued that one of “ardent and romantic mind” exemplified both 
the heights of human experience and the depths of its challenges. He began with the 
premise, echoed by Emerson fifteen years later in The American Scholar (1837), that 
American society cared “only to part off men into professions and trades, and to tell the 
due proportions required to stock each.”90 But against the demands of material life and 
the alienated specialization it demanded, “Man has another and higher nature . . . the 
spirit within him finds an answering spirit in every thing that grows, and affectionate 
relations . . . with his fellow man.”91 As in his writings on Edgeworth, Dana insisted that 
the Romantic individual need not be good for nothing or a “lazy, luxurious dreamer” as 
he once called himself.92 Rather, “he reasons as ingeniously and wisely as you” about the 
real and “[does] his part in the affairs of the world,” but he is constantly drawn also by 
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the imagination to higher visions inspiring longing, sentiment, and further discovery—a 
condition that Dana referred to as a “two-fold life.”93 This condition allowed one an 
authentic earnestness that bordered on the prophetic, as Dana insisted that the two-fold 
life allowed one to “speak with an honest indignation against oppression and trick . . . 
[and avoid] factitious sensibility.”94  
 The idea of an earnest, active, imaginative, and prophetic individual represented 
the ideal of the Romantic intellectual. It was a theme Brownson would reiterate in an 
oration at the University of Vermont. Overcoming mere sentimentality by acting in the 
world, Dana theorized that the ardent imagination of a Romantic mind gave its possessor 
a broader perspective on the factitiousness of a given historical moment. Dana himself 
struggled to exemplify this ideal fully. When he did speak out prophetically against the 
ills of the American political economy, he reverted to a reactionary critique of democracy 
itself. He once delivered a vehement defense of hierarchy and harangued equality during 
a Fourth of July oration!95 But the idea that an imaginative cast of mind might be 
combined with an active vigor that worked to address societal ills could be seen in 
various forms among other Cautious Romantics such as James Marsh, Orestes 
Brownson, Isaac Hecker, Sophia Ripley, and Harriet Beecher Stowe. 
 According to Dana, the intensity of a “romantic” disposition allowed for enhanced 
perception and deep friendships, but it also tended to produce “a wounded heart which 
others can never feel.”96 Ultimately, nature, friends, and God were all necessary in a two-
fold way. The imagination was drawn to them out of desire, but also out of necessity, as 
they provided the ballast to keep the imagination from wandering into a “fearful 
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melancholy” (42). “The vices of our nature are sometimes revealed with a violence of 
passion and a terrible intellectual energy which fasten on the imagination . . . while they 
call out opposing virtues to pass before it in visions of glory” (44-45). The antidotes to 
the possible terrors of the imagination were likeminded friends and a perception of God 
in nature. Like Wordsworth, Dana perceived the paradoxes of existence seen in “the new 
life beginning even with decay,” and like Coleridge he “wander[ed] away into the 
measureless depths of the stars” (46, 48).97 Ultimately, he began to see this process as 
religious: “love and reverence of the Creator make their abode in [the] imagination” (47). 
Connecting an appreciation of nature with a love for a Creator that resided in the 
imagination, Dana began to write his way toward the Romantic Christian Platonism of 
Allston and Coleridge, but Dana’s full assent would not come until, like Allston, personal 
loss brought him to these convictions. 
 Dana explored the themes of an unfettered imagination and its checks 
throughout The Idle Man. In addition to friends, family attachments and romantic love 
served to ground and even stimulate the imagination to operate healthfully. In 
“Domestic Life” Dana insisted that the imagination went through stages, in childhood 
“forever giving objects the hue that best pleases us” but maturing to recognize “the 
hardness of reality [that] makes us feel that there are things not to be moulded to our 
fancies.”98 Family life checked the disillusionment of the maturing imagination by 
providing an arena for ideal yearnings and attachments, by localizing universal longing. 
In “The Son”—allegedly a true story—Dana explored how this familial attachment 
between a mother and a son manifested itself at death.99 In the story, Arthur, “a lad of 
thoughtful, dreamy mind” who possessed “the romance of life,” experienced stages of 
                                                   
 97 These concepts are treated more fully in Chapter One. 
 98 Richard Henry Dana, “Domestic Life,” The Idle Man 1, no. 1 (1821): 15–16. 
 99 Dana did not hint as to who he had in mind when composing this story. 
  
129 
successive grief in losing his mother.100 Dana idealized death as a mere parting and a 
moment of “holy inspiration” to one formed as Arthur, but he accurately characterized 
the “dreary emptiness . . . not to be relieved by tears” that sunk in after the funeral.101 
Allston found “The Son” particularly moving, probably because of his own experience 
with death and Dana’s ability to put into words the duality of Allston’s experience: the 
feeling of “invisible spirits, ascending and descending” during moments of “holy 
inspiration,” recalled Allston’s Jacob’s Dream (1817), and the “[u]nconnected and 
strange thoughts, with melancholy but half-formed images . . . floating in [the] mind” 
during intense grief, recalled Allston’s “diabolical imprecations” while grieving his wife’s 
death.102   
 In “Edward and Mary” Dana also endowed romantic love with the ability to 
balance and channel the imagination. While he gestured at the Courtly Love tradition, 
conceding that “thwarted love is more romantic than even that which is blessed” and 
could even spur the imagination to intense and creative longing, he ultimately concluded 
that this tendency was dangerous if overly indulged.103 “At last [the mind] loses sight of 
the world, and becomes bewildered in the many and uneven paths it had trodden out for 
itself,” and the narrator of the story informed the reader at the end: “Sensitive minds are 
prone to a melancholy, which may in the end weaken the intellect, unless they have some 
object to engage them, and give action to the affections.”104 Hence, after seventy pages of 
amorous tumult, Dana allowed Edward and Mary to be reconciled finally in marriage.   
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 But Dana, partly from his own experience and partly with an eye toward Hazlitt 
and other critics, made it very clear that recklessly embracing the imagination and 
solipsistic musing outside the boundaries of nature, family, romance, friends, and God 
could lead to madness and death. In “Thomas Thornton” Dana explored the results of 
unbridled and willful independence, emphasizing the fairly conventional distinction 
between reason and the passions. Tom, a vigorous, independent, and talented character, 
from an early age chose to thumb his nose at all authority and societal convention. “I’ll 
not lead a milksop life of it, to be called respectable by old dames, young sycophants, and 
money lenders,” he insisted.105 “He had never thought for a moment of checking his 
[passions],” Dana explained. By the end of the story, despite warnings from a mysterious 
widow and his caring parents, Tom became a “slave of his passions.”106 In “Paul Felton” 
Dana applied this willful independence to an alienated and obsessively introspective 
Paul. Though Paul exemplified many of the most noble Romantic tendencies to see the 
world as a “grand and beautiful mystery . . . [and to] feel the living Presence throughout 
the whole,” he chose to indulge these perceptions intentionally at the expense of 
others.107 Thus, throughout the story, even nature was an unreliable check on the 
predatory tendencies of his own mind, and his thoughts took on increasingly demonic 
proportions. Ultimately, Paul’s thoughts prompted him to murder his wife out of 
misguided jealousy, dying himself when he realized what he had done.  
 Dana commanded plot devices less than flawlessly—in particular, each story 
relied on a deus ex machina device at least once—but he was more interested in mental 
and moral philosophy anyway. Taken together, the two stories illustrated Dana’s 
commitment, like that of Coleridge, to a Kantian-like emphasis on the will, despite 
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Dana’s praise of nature and the imagination.108 Ultimately duty—imposed by the moral 
law—had to be followed at all costs, no matter what a diseased imagination or deluded 
passions suggested. Tom Thornton had brief moments of desiring to subdue his passions 
but ultimately chose not to, and Paul Felton intentionally fostered his alienated feelings 
by “giv[ing] them rein that he might feel all the self torture they would bring.”109 Dana’s 
knowledge of these tendencies was self-knowledge, but like Coleridge, Dana insisted that 
the will ultimately decided the issue. Dana’s emphasis on an internal moral sense and 
controlling the will was not dissimilar from the Common Sense moral philosophy of his 
milieu, but his desire to flagrantly explore the darker aspects of human nature as far as 
they would lead him exemplified a Romantic impulse that would have made the Harvard 
moralists squirm.110 Ultimately, this impulse to explore the darker aspects of human 
psychology would prove a common theme in the Cautious Romantic quest to rehabilitate 
orthodox Christianity using Romantic authors and categories.  
 Dana’s biographer has argued that The Idle Man represented a “remarkable 
progression” from exploring the imagination as “a beautiful source of recreation in 
childhood and youth” to a full-fledged transcendentalism that argued for the 
imagination’s reliability in accessing spiritual truth, to a terrifying disillusionment with 
and fear of the imagination as the source of subjective madness and alienation from 
reality.111 Moreover, she has maintained that this disillusionment came about as Dana 
tried to write real characters that embraced the optimistic views he stated in his non-
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fiction essays.112 Actually, Dana’s views in The Idle Man must be understood as a 
complete unit, not a progression from one view to the next. Prior to its publication, Dana 
was already on record praising the imagination but also fearing it. For example, while the 
death of Dana’s wife in 1822 brought home deep fears about madness, he had anticipated 
these in his letters, and his writing on “Domestic Life” must be interpreted with this 
knowledge in mind and not simply as rosy or idealistic sentimentalism. As we have seen, 
Allston had already come to the conclusion that the imagination might lead to madness, 
and they undoubtedly discussed it. Moreover, in “Thomas Thornton” and “Paul Felton,” 
Dana maintained his perspective from earlier essays, explaining the reasons for his 
characters’ deficiencies in these later stories, which suggests The Idle Man was more 
consistent than progressive. 
 
The Activity of The Idle Man 
 The Idle Man ran for six issues through 1821 and 1822. It helped to advance 
Dana’s literary reputation but did not cement it completely. Distribution reached across 
the country including Boston, Providence, New Haven, New York, Albany, Philadelphia, 
Washington D.C., Baltimore, Richmond, and Lexington, Kentucky.113 Initially printing a 
respectable 750 copies, the publishers increased the number to 1,000 for the later 
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issues.114 The distribution was impressive as the North American Review enjoyed no 
more than 600 subscribers in 1820, and many journals were happy to count 300 
regulars.115 Beyond Dana’s sympathetic friends, and Coleridge’s favorable opinions, 
several disinterested American intellectuals found the work compelling. Jared Sparks, 
the former editor of the NAR, gave encouragement.116 Christopher Gore, the learned and 
wealthy ex-governor and United States Senator, offered unmixed praise and 
enthusiastically promoted The Idle Man, helping it meet with early success in Boston 
circles before the NAR Club could exercise its power against it.117 Horace Holley, the 
President of Transylvania University and Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy, 
confessed himself “indebted to [Dana’s] numbers for some of my finest views of nature 
and human character. The highest delicacy is mingled,” he continued, “with the best 
philosophy, the truest pathos and the most perfect liberality. Critics, who say they cannot 
understand him may rest assured that the fault is in themselves.”118  
 Encouragement such as this suggested American literary taste might be 
developing sympathy with Dana and Allston’s new views, but The Idle Man suffered 
from too few active contributors. William Cullen Bryant’s poems generally met with 
approbation, but Dana’s publisher insisted that the work needed more variety to increase 
its popularity after No. 3 debuted in late 1821.119 Allston tried to help, but could not 
complete his story Monaldi in time to publish it. No other contributors were 
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forthcoming. It is tempting to speculate on the potential for The Idle Man had Allston 
completed the story; it would have allowed Dana to release his own stories serially to 
give The Idle Man the variety the publisher asked for and the time to court further 
contributions and write more stories. But life had turned against Dana as well, 
conspiring, it seemed, to test the Idle Man’s ideas in the crucible of the family he had so 
venerated.   
 
Family Woes and Conversion 
 The challenges to The Idle Man were not solely pecuniary or literary. In 1822 
both Dana’s daughter and his wife died, leaving Dana paralyzed with grief. Little Susan 
had been playing on a seat near a window, and fell bruising her head; Dana watched 
helplessly as she died in convulsions six hours later. He confessed to Bryant that the loss 
had left him unable to write for months.120 His wife, Charlotte, had struggled with a 
debilitating pulmonary illness for some time, and even at the height of his success and 
confidence at the NAR, Dana confessed: “I have one cause which does and ought to make 
me anxious. I mean my wife’s health. . . . At times I tremble for her for myself and our 
children and dare not look forward to what a little period might bring about.”121 In 
December of 1821, Dana realized his worst fears. Charlotte took a decided turn for the 
worse, and Dana’s agony came close to equaling her own. “To see her suffer,” he 
confessed to Bryant, “to sit at midnight in the room beneath and hear her groan with 
pain as I did last night and have many and many a night before. . . . It is a deadening 
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misery.”122 This misery, as had been the case with Allston, came close to madness when 
his wife died.  
 Losing a spouse, while traumatic to anyone, particularly devastated those like 
Allston and Dana, whose temperament and intellectual convictions made their romantic 
devotion to their wives so strong. In “Domestic Life,” Dana had insisted that family 
attachments provided the crucial ballast for a Romantic mind, and he explicitly argued in 
“Edward and Mary” that sensitive minds were prone to melancholy that could weaken 
the intellect. These sensitive artists and intellectuals thus required “an object to engage 
them and give action to the affections.”123 Conjugal, romantic love—and in a different 
way the love of children—were necessary to escape a solipsistic sentimentalism. The 
crucial distinction between sentimentalism and Romantic love was action toward real 
persons.124 The concrete actions of love directed toward persons in family relationships 
rescued the Romantic intellectual from the twin dangers of his subjective idealism: effete 
sentimentalism or the more terrifying prospect of melancholy and even madness and 
imprisonment within the self.  
 In Charlotte, Dana found his closest companion, a woman who embodied all of 
his idealism. 
Yet a man who knows a woman thoroughly, and loves her truly—and there are women who 
may be both so known and loved—will find, after a few years, that his relish for the grosser 
pleasures has lessened, and that he has grown into a fondness for the intellectual and 
refined without an effort . . . the gentle play of that passion which is the most inward and 
romantic in our nature . . . [has] held him in a kind of spiritualized existence. He shares his 
very being with one who, a creature of this world, and with something of the world’s 
frailties, is 
---yet a Spirit still, and bright 
With something of an angel light. 
 Wordsworth125 
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The idea that romantic passion could purify and develop the intellectual and the spiritual 
life in ways otherwise unavailable was a particular emphasis of numerous Romantic 
authors. While an outgrowth of the eighteenth-century emphasis on feeling in morals 
and sexual relations—among such philosophers as Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and 
Adam Smith in the former group and among Henry Fielding and Pierre Marivaux in the 
latter—Romantic writing on love emphasized the ability of passion to inform reason 
rather than always acting subservient to it. Dana drew on Wordsworth throughout the 
piece, but Coleridge had also insisted—perhaps because of his own marital failings—that 
union between a man and woman inspired not only all other forms of love but also 
intellectual development itself. “All the operations of the mind,” Coleridge insisted, “all 
that distinguishes us from brutes, originate in the more perfect state of domestic life.”126 
This was why Dana and numerous other Romantic authors emphasized union with the 
beloved as the actual fusion of one’s being; it grounded one’s entire consciousness and 
outlook on the world.127   
 Reading Dana’s piece by itself, one is tempted to wonder whether Dana’s 
romantic flights were genuine rather than just crafted to inspire his audience, but a 
careful reading of his letters confirms the conviction behind the phrase “and there are 
women . . . both so known and loved.”128 Thoughts of Charlotte sustained Dana through 
his early vocational crisis as he travelled between Baltimore, New York, and Sutton, 
Massachusetts in 1812 and 1813, and it is all but certain that he used Allston’s poem “The 
Mad Lover” to court her.129 At one point, while Dana and Charlotte were in the throws of 
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romance, Dana’s uncle William Ellery insisted he stop referring to her as a “being” and 
instead think of her in the more conventional and gender reinforcing term of “help 
meet.”130 As the intrepid feminist Margaret Fuller would later say, “The lover, the poet, 
the artist, are likely to view [woman] nobly.”131 Like Allston with Ann, Dana’s emotional 
and intellectual union with Charlotte ran deep, and her loss equally devastated him.  
 Unfortunately, the parallel with Allston ran even deeper. Dana’s son, Richard 
Henry Dana Jr., remembered that at the death of his mother “to us who saw our father's 
grief . . . no description we have read of agony short of madness has equaled [it].”132 The 
Romantic apotheosis of spousal love could be a sinister gamble as what Irving Singer has 
called “the metaphysical craving for unity” was channeled toward an individual 
person.133 When this person died, the melancholy of the Romantic artist could be that 
much greater, which was precisely why Romantic love could be as strongly pessimistic 
and obsessed with death as it could be gloriously optimistic.134 Like Allston, Dana Sr. 
began to seek consolation in religion. Prior to this period, Dana’s religious views seemed 
to lie somewhere between respectful Unitarianism and Wordsworthian pantheism, 
where God’s primary function was to benevolently reveal himself in nature.135 He drew 
initial consolation after Charlotte’s death from “a sense of God’s presence,” but confessed 
to Bryant: “I am but a miserable Christian, inept in practice.”136 For the next several 
years, Dana embarked on a process of increasingly devout introspection. His attention to 
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Bible reading increased throughout 1823 and 1824, and he exhorted his young son 
Richard Henry Dana Jr. ad nauseum to “remember that God is always near you . . . [and] 
do not forget to read your little Bible.”137 
 Dana’s conversion revealed the increasing influence of sources beyond, or rather 
in conjunction with, Coleridge that shaped the minds of Cautious Romantics. In general, 
what distinguished the Cautious Romantics from other Trinitarian groups such as Old 
School Calvinists or various strands of Reformation-derived evangelicalism was their 
penchant for reaching outside of the Protestant Reformation for intellectual as well as 
spiritual resources. This was in many ways a new moment in American religion, at least 
for those seeking Trinitarian ends. Orthodox New England and Princeton usually drew 
their inspiration from Calvin, Luther, William Ames, William Perkins, Jonathan 
Edwards, Joseph Bellamy, Samuel Hopkins and others. Indeed, even the most innovative 
orthodox theologians such as Nathaniel Taylor still worked within these sources.138 On 
the other hand, the Cautious Romantics embraced Coleridge, Wordsworth, the 
Cambridge Platonists, Pascal, Bernard of Clairvaux, Thomas à Kempis, and Victor 
Cousin as some of their most formative influences.139 While Thomas à Kempis was read 
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as devotional literature among many Trinitarians in accordance with their own 
theological frameworks, the epistemology and intellectual method that relied on inward 
contemplation for arriving at truth represented an important difference from most early 
nineteenth-century Trinitarian intellectuals.140 Exemplified by Dana’s and Allston’s 
soon-to-be friend James Marsh’s “Preliminary Essay” (1829)—where Marsh grounded 
his intellectual method on Bernard of Clairvaux’s insistence that “we must retire inward 
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if we would ascend upward”—this approach was a fresh fusion of Christian Platonism 
with the interiority and individualism of the Romantic Age.141  
 Dana’s experience exemplified this shift from devotional influence to a new 
spiritual epistemology. While embarking on a program of Bible reading and 
introspection between 1822 and 1826, he came across Thomas à Kempis’s The Imitation 
of Christ, which affected him profoundly. Though it belonged to a friend, Dana 
confessed, “I have so marked it that I do not like to have it go out of my hands.”142 
Organized in three books, à Kempis designed the text to take the reader through three 
stages from “Preparatory Instructions,” through “Intimate Enjoyment of the Spiritual 
Life,” to “Divine Illumination.” Though arranged in a fairly logical sequence, the 
numbered paragraphs throughout the book functioned as individual aphorisms around a 
theme rather than the point-by-point logical arguments of medieval philosophers such as 
Thomas Aquinas. Redolent with Trinitarian references to the Eternal Word and the 
Spirit, The Imitation of Christ stood thoroughly in the same Christian Platonist tradition 
that had so inspired Coleridge and Allston. 
 Dana did not say which passages received the attention of his liberal pen, but it is 
not hard to ascertain. With reflections on “the benefits of adversity, the consideration of 
human misery, the consideration of human death, and the disconsolate state”—where à 
Kempis spoke of “patient resignation . . . to part with thy dearest and most intimate 
friends”—Dana found in this medieval Catholic a form of Christianity that overcame his 
grief.143 Dana followed à Kempis from a reflection on death, mortality, and human 
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suffering to a Platonic belief in a Christ that manifested himself only through interior 
reflection and intellectual humility. “With the views I have of sickness and death, I 
hardly know how to call them evils when taken in connexion with what our moral 
natures require,” Dana explained to his friend Sarah Arnold.144 Criticizing the New 
England clergy’s doctrinal haggling, he articulated a position that could have been lifted 
equally from à Kempis or James Marsh’s later “Preliminary Essay” to Coleridge’s Aids to 
Reflection.145 “Would [the clergy] and all of us give up disputing upon points of doctrine 
and look honestly and thoroughly into ourselves we should there find [that] which would 
lead us to a truer view of God’s Word than all the hard delving of the scholar or ingenuity 
of the metaphysician.”146 Like Coleridge in his “delving and difficulty” before he met 
Allston in Rome, Dana also sought refuge in a Platonic Christ as Word that revealed 
himself through the self—though Coleridge would ultimately seek to give a metaphysical 
account of his conversion.147 
 This newfound conviction gave Dana little patience with the debates between 
Unitarians and Orthodox Calvinists that rankled theological discourse.148 Since at least 
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1805, New England had exploded in discord. Certain liberal Congregationalists—
particularly in Massachusetts—began to deemphasize the doctrines of the Trinity, the 
Incarnation, Christ’s substitutionary atonement, and total human depravity much earlier 
in the eighteenth century. But these issues came to a head in Boston when Henry Ware 
Sr., a liberal, was elected Hollis Professor of Divinity at Harvard. Orthodox 
Congregationalists, now a minority at Harvard, removed to Andover, Massachusetts and 
founded Andover Seminary, commencing a print war that lasted decades. The Unitarians 
bludgeoned Orthodox Calvinists with the alleged incoherence of the Christian Trinity 
and the more egregious immorality of original sin and arbitrary election. The Orthodox 
responded with accusations of impiety, arrogance, and a willful ignorance of the clear 
fact that all human beings sinned and could not be naturally good.149 Dana thought they 
both missed the point. “When I think of the Saviour and then of those who would blast 
the world with fire, or of those who would have him to be no more than one of 
themselves, it makes me melancholy,” he confessed.150 In his Boston context, he worried 
more about the impact of Unitarian “coldness” and “presumption”—no doubt carrying a 
professional grudge in addition to his spiritual concerns—but he had little taste for either 
outlook.151 
 
Boston Trinitarians 
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 For a brief time, Dana linked his religious identity with Lyman Beecher and the 
evangelical Trinitarians who sought to breech the citadel of Boston Unitarian culture: its 
command of the Congregational councils, Harvard College, and the press. From 1827 to 
1829, Dana defended the Trinitarian cause in the First Congregational Church of 
Cambridge. In an increasingly polemical Boston environment, the Reverend Abdiel 
Holmes stopped exchanging pulpits with Unitarian ministers and encouraged Trinitarian 
Calvinists to lecture at his church on Sunday evenings. Holmes, the father to Oliver 
Wendell Holmes Sr., had been considered a moderate Trinitarian to that point, carefully 
steering a mild course through the stormy Boston waters.152 His newfound zeal alienated 
the Unitarians of the wider parish, though the majority of full church members 
supported him. Eventually parish leaders, including Richard Henry Dana’s brother 
Francis, succeeded in persuading an Ecclesiastical Council dominated by Unitarians to 
remove Holmes from office against Richard Henry and other church members’ 
protests.153 In response, Dana and other Trinitarians founded the Shepard 
Congregational Society at Cambridge in 1829. 
 Allston was sympathetic to the new congregation. Although in the 1810s, he and 
Dana had been Unitarians, he had returned to America a zealous Trinitarian and was 
confirmed at St. Paul’s Episcopal Church, Boston in 1821.154 But while Allston continued 
to attend St. Paul’s for feast days and other high church festivals, he found the Shepard 
Church equally supportive of his more basic Trinitarianism, which emphasized the 
Trinity and the Incarnation instead of Calvinist dogma (or the Anglican distinctives of St. 
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Paul’s).155 Allston helped the Shepard Church by drawing up plans for a new 
meetinghouse, and he enjoyed showing visitors the church by moonlight while quoting 
from Walter Scott’s Lay of the Last Minstrel: “If thou wouldst view fair Melrose aright, / 
Go visit it by the pale moonlight.”156 Trite as this brief ditty was, it indicated a deeper 
impulse among the Cautious Romantics to fuse the independent spiritual insights and 
experiences prompted by European Romantic authors with their own personal 
Trinitarian religion. These same lines from Scott inspired Harriet Beecher Stowe’s quest 
for a more aesthetic and affective religion while she travelled through Scotland—a quest 
discussed in the final chapter of this dissertation. 
 But Allston’s Romantic Trinitarianism lay much deeper than offhand references 
to Scott. While his affective commitment to an orthodox Christ was evident in poems like 
“The Atonement” and the testimony of numerous friends, Allston also incorporated the 
doctrine of the Spirit into his theory of artistic creation. Speaking of Michaelangelo’s 
sculpture Aurora, he insisted that the artist could not fully explain the processes of his 
own creative imagination. The artist might describe the steps he took to accomplish his 
task, but he was still beholden to “the informing life . . . the presiding Spirit” at the time 
of artistic creation.157 Allston’s italicizing of an “informing life” was a reference to a 
Coleridgean Trinitarian principle, which James Marsh explicated in his 1829 edition of 
Coleridge’s Aids to Reflection. For Coleridge and Marsh, who drew on a long legacy of 
Christian Platonism, Christ the Word was the “informing” or governing principle in the 
universe, while the “life-giving Breath or Spirit” of God animated organic life.158 Like 
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many Romantic artists, Allston insisted that great art was organic; just as a plant grew by 
mysteriously fusing and assimilating inorganic elements, so the artist seamlessly 
dissolved, diffused, and reconstituted the elements of nature into living forms of art.159 
Like Wackenroder, who saw art as a “creative power vouchsafed to mortals . . . [which] 
turns our gaze inward, and shows us the Invisible,” Allston saw art as a divine gift, 
administered through God’s Spirit, that could help guide the soul in its Platonic return to 
God.160 It was a “mighty plan which the Infinite Wisdom has ordained for the evolution 
of the human spirit,” and thus the artist’s calling was “one of no common 
responsibility.”161 
 Dana’s equal affinity for Christian Platonism and his own aesthetic sensibility 
would prove to be an ill match for the evangelical religious temperament which led him 
to briefly associate with Lyman Beecher in the 1820s. They were convenient allies rather 
than intellectual kindred. Eventually, in 1843, Dana would follow his dear friend Allston 
into the Episcopal Church. Over time, there developed a strong tendency among many of 
the Cautious Romantics toward the Episcopal Church as the synthesis between Catholic 
aesthetics and spirituality, Unitarian cultural refinement, and evangelical Calvinist 
Biblicism and soteriology. But even here, the conviction was less that Episcopalianism 
fully embodied Christian truth than that it most carefully steered between other 
Trinitarian denominational excesses. As another Episcopalian, Henry Reed, would later 
report to the older, Anglicanized William Wordsworth, Allston and Dana stood virtually 
alone in the 1820s as Boston Trinitarians sympathetic to Wordsworth’s aesthetics.162 
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Conclusion 
 While Allston and Dana Sr. were intellectual minorities in Boston Unitarian 
culture, they would not remain so forever. By the mid-1820s and 1830s many other 
likeminded intellectuals would join the conversation Allston and Dana Sr. were having 
with themselves in 1818. These intellectuals included Guilian Verplanck, Leonard Woods 
Jr., Richard Henry Dana Jr., James Marsh, and Caleb Sprague Henry. As philosophers 
and theologians, most of these men—Dana Jr. excepted—would provide more formal 
articulations of Allston’s and Dana Sr.’s worldview and help to consolidate it into a 
discernible network. But while the themes of Romantic interiority, a higher, spiritual 
Reason, and the importance of the imagination would appear in various Trinitarian 
forms throughout the next several decades and also help to inspire the Transcendentalist 
movement, Dana Sr. became an historical nexus as well as an intellectual spokesman. 
His home served as an important gathering place for the gradually emerging network of 
likeminded intellectuals, and his correspondence provided one of the most copious links 
between other Cautious Romantics. Carefully understanding his thought and Boston 
context, as well as his relationship to Allston, provides the important link between 
Allston’s and Coleridge’s thinking and its manifestation as a wider American historical 
network. 
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Chapter 4: The Growth of a Network: Gulian Verplanck, Leonard Woods Jr., 
Richard Henry Dana Jr., and the Emergence of a Cautious Romantic Type 
 
Introduction 
 Throughout the 1820s, Allston’s and Dana’s vision of a Romantic American 
cultural renaissance, imbued with Trinitarian Christianity, germinated slowly; it waited 
for likeminded intellectuals to help take up the cause. But slowly many likeminded 
intellectuals including Guilian Verplanck, Leonard Woods Jr., and Richard Henry Dana 
Jr. began to join them. By 1840, they had developed into an historical network and 
particular intellectual type, discernable in hindsight. They read each other’s work, visited 
one another, and corresponded frequently. They combined an almost obsessive 
Romantic interiority and preference for romanticist sources with a conservative 
commitment to Trinitarian Christianity and to the reassuring stability of institutions.  
 These traits would continue to delineate the many other antebellum American 
intellectuals discussed in this dissertation, but this chapter focuses on the thinking of 
Guilian Verplanck, Leonard Woods Jr., and Richard Henry Dana Jr. and the ongoing 
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historical relationships among them, Allston, and Dana Sr. Moreover, it articulates the 
important institutional impulse that helped to set the Cautious Romantics apart from the 
Transcendentalists. The Cautious Romantics’ influence on American culture was 
multivalent, corresponding with their personal vocations and the specific institutions 
they chose to work through, but taken together they represented a distinct and generally 
overlooked intellectual type in American history. To be sure, there were fellow travellers 
as well, and a full story must account for them. The well-known poet William Cullen 
Bryant and the artist Thomas Cole shared their aesthetic commitments and appeared at 
important junctures. But Bryant’s zealous Unitarianism kept him from being a full ally, 
and Cole’s intellectual networks were largely different, despite his religious affinities.   
 
Guilian Verplanck: The Polymath Politician 
 When Allston had returned home to the United States, he had been welcomed by 
an intriguing polymath, Guilian Verplanck, who in 1824 would deliver a religious salvo 
that supported Allston’s and Dana’s religious views. Verplanck was born on Wall Street 
to wealthy, illustrious parents. His paternal grandfather, Samuel Verplanck, was a 
prominent Wall Street merchant and banker as well as a governor of King’s College (later 
Columbia College); Guilian’s father, Daniel, lived primarily by managing the immense 
fortune his forebears had accumulated. Gulian’s mother was the granddaughter of the 
Anglican divine Samuel Johnson, first president of King’s.1 Not content to live off of an 
inheritance like his father, Verplanck took full advantage of all the opportunities afforded 
him by his lineage and wealth and became well-known in both New York political and 
intellectual circles. In 1820, he won a seat in the New York Assembly and served as 
chairman of the committee on science, literature, and schools where he pressed for 
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expanded statewide education—a chant he continued when chairing the committee on 
prisons in 1823. Throughout the 1810s and 1820s, Verplanck could be found at 
Shakespeare’s Tavern and Charles Wiley’s bookshop alongside Washington Irving, 
James Fenimore Cooper, the writer James K. Paulding, the poet Robert Sands, William 
Dunlap—the Shakespeare promoter and owner of Park Theatre—and the painter Henry 
Inman. Later, after helping to bring William Cullen Bryant to New York, Verplanck 
became a charter member of Cooper’s Bread and Cheese Club, which also included 
Sands, Asher Durand, and Samuel F.B. Morse.2 
 Verplanck’s intellectual influences were as wide-ranging as his networks. At 
Columbia College—from which he graduated at the age of fourteen, the youngest 
undergraduate in the history of the institution—Verplanck gained facility with the 
dominant forms of Scottish Common Sense epistemology and moral theory, evident in 
his later work. More broadly, by 1824, he seemed to ably command seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century philosophical and religious writing, including such diverse figures as 
Pascal, Newton, Locke, Fenelon, Gibbon, Paley, Butler, and Voltaire. But his literary 
interests began to lead him into Dana’s and Bryant’s Romantic taste. While traveling in 
Europe and Britain between 1815 and 1818, he demonstrated a taste for both Scott and 
Byron.3 By 1822, he and Dana were firm literary allies. While Dana cast about for a 
position following the implosion of the The Idle Man, Verplanck hoped Dana might 
become a Professor of Literature at Columbia College—on whose board Verplanck sat—
to provide “the ardour [sic], the feeling, the views diviner of literature” which the two of 
them shared.4 According to Verplanck, the current instructors in literature—including 
John McVickar with whom James Marsh would later clash over the interpretation of 
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Coleridge—were only “capable and industrious” and wanted Dana’s deeper approach to 
literature.5 
 Verplanck’s panoply of interests, abilities, and networks extended also into the 
religious realm. As a pious Episcopalian, he used his political influence in the New York 
Assembly to help found the General Theological Seminary in New York in 1821 to train 
Episcopal clergymen.6 Verplanck taught at the seminary as Professor of Revealed 
Religion, joining John Henry Hobart and Benjamin Onderdonk on the faculty. He served 
until 1824 when he won election to the U.S. House of Representatives, a position he held 
until 1832. Verplanck’s lecturing and study culminated in a prescient text entitled Essays 
on the Nature and Uses of the Various Evidences of Revealed Religion (1824). In this 
work, Verplanck articulated many of Dana’s and Allston’s emerging theological views 
and anticipated a more formal statement of them in James Marsh’s edition of Coleridge’s 
Aids to Reflection (1829 American ed.). 
 
The Internal Evidence of the Soul 
 In Evidences of Revealed Religion, Verplanck criticized popular authors like 
William Paley and James Beattie for ignoring the “internal evidence” for Christianity 
arising from “the character of the doctrines taught.”7 He argued for the “close and 
intimate connexion which exists between the purely rational, and the moral and 
sentimental parts of our nature” and asserted that if a belief was suited to the “actual 
condition of man, [it] may be also considered intellectually, and thus furnish no feeble 
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proof of its divine origin” (vii). He called this internal evidence and characterized it as 
follows: 
[I]t is founded on the conformity of the doctrines to enlightened reason and to truth, 
either previously known, or intuitively acknowledged as soon as presented-upon their 
utility, their beauty, fitness, and moral excellence; and in a more practical point of view, as 
relates to our individual reception of them . . . their adaptation to our nature and wants, 
and their effect upon the heart and life. (22) 
 
Verplanck insisted that the paradoxical wants of human nature made humankind 
religious. He concluded his first chapter insisting, like Coleridge and Pascal, that it was 
“in the grandeur of his thoughts—in the lowness of his desires—in the aspirations which 
lift him towards the heavens—in the vices which weight him to the earth—in his sublime, 
his inexplicable conceptions of Infinity and Eternity—in his humiliating experience of 
folly, misery, and guilt” that humankind realized a need for God (33). Verplanck’s 
language aptly described Coleridge’s own psychological experience in Chapter One, and 
Verplanck referenced Pascal as an important philosopher who likewise attempted to 
argue that Christianity’s internal evidences met the wants of human nature.8  
 Verplanck repeatedly encouraged his readers to reflect on the dark side of their 
individual experience, to embrace the terrible feelings of loss felt during the death of a 
loved one or the horror of moral guilt, which arose by reflection and required no external 
revelation to conjure it up. The latter experience of crippling guilt animated Coleridge’s 
conversion as it would that of Richard Henry Dana Jr.—discussed later—but like Allston 
and Dana Sr., Verplanck also had experienced the devastating loss of his beloved spouse, 
Eliza. Her death haunted him throughout his life. When he died over fifty years later, his 
friends found her letters, rings, long tresses of hair, and poetry she had copied locked in 
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a drawer of his desk.9 While his wealth and worldly position brought Eliza to the 
Mediterranean climates and the best Paris doctors, it could not save her life.10 When 
Verplanck spoke of the internal evidence of misery, sorrow, and fear, he certainly spoke 
from experience.   
 Verplanck, like the other Cautious Romantics, sought a middle way between the 
religious liberalism of Unitarianism that celebrated human character, achievement, and 
potential and the Orthodox Calvinist emphasis on guilt, depravity, and the utter inability 
of human beings to save themselves apart from a supernatural infusion of divine grace. 
This celebration of humankind’s simultaneous grandeur and misery often reached a 
fevered pitch among the Cautious Romantics. Their appeals to humankind’s misery in 
need of redemption made them orthodox Christians in the broad sense, but their 
willingness to trust human inward contemplation as a sound avenue to truth made them 
of a mind with the more liberated epistemology of the Romantic Age. Their continual 
celebration of humankind’s grandeur and misery was not the confident appeal to clear, 
Enlightenment-style demonstrations assented to by all reasonable people. Rather, their 
apologetic involved an individualistic appeal to each person’s unique experiences of 
hope, desire, grief, and remorse meant to prompt conversion to a larger religious reality, 
a process Jacques Barzun has called “Romantic striving . . . [namely] the effort to create 
order out of experience individually acquired.”11 This is why Verplanck emphasized 
internal evidence so strongly.  
 Having staked his claim on the idea of internal evidence, Verplanck then explored 
“the Power of Human Reason” to judge this evidence.12 Throughout his reflections on 
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reason, Verplanck emphasized the importance of sustained contemplation or reflection—
one must consult “the faithful records of his own breast” (89).13 He insisted that God 
gave human beings actual faculties that allowed them “to understand his revelation, to 
perceive its truth, excellence and beauty, and to become sensible of their own wants of its 
instruction” (54). He argued that reason was distinct from the internal moral lights of 
conscience—which he claimed awakened “shame, sorrow, remorse and fear”—and also 
distinct from the affections—“warm sympathies, social affections, feelings of gratitude, 
veneration and devotion”—but he went on to insist that it was rational to consider the 
moral lights of conscience and the affections as warrant for belief and even knowledge 
(55). “The existence of such a congruity between the faith so proposed, and our purest 
and truest sentiments, in addition to its direct influence upon the affections, constitutes 
an argument forcibly addressed to the understanding” (56). In other words, all of human 
mental experience was welcome in the process of belief and even knowledge; Reason’s 
reflection on its own function should assent to the limits of its own powers and embrace 
conscience and sentiment as able to make a rational “argument” to the understanding.  
 Verplanck’s apologetic embraced an ambiguous scheme that would become 
common among his likeminded friends such as the later James Marsh. On the one hand, 
Verplanck thought his religious philosophy and argument from internal evidences was 
different from “the spirit of the Scotch school of metaphysicians, who have applied, 
probably too exclusively, the principles of Lord Bacon’s philosophy of observation and 
experiment to the study of the mind, and the investigation of moral truth” (40). Hence, 
Verplanck began his entire book insisting that his argument differed from those of 
William Paley and James Beattie, the darlings of American Christian apologists who 
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argued that careful observation of external evidence—both scientific and historical—
proved the validity of Christianity.  
 On the other hand, Verplanck’s general epistemological scheme had a great deal 
in common with Thomas Reid, the patriarch of Scottish Common Sense philosophy. 
Verplanck consistently explained that his internal evidence was that which convinced the 
vast majority of people. Likewise, egalitarian appeals were a favorite technique of Reid in 
his polemics with David Hume’s epistemological skepticism. Moreover, Verplanck’s 
overarching epistemology embraced many of the dominant concepts that guided Scottish 
Common Sense epistemology. Reid divided the mind into faculties of the 
understanding—including perception, memory, judgment, and reason—and faculties of 
the will—including habits, appetites, desires, affections, and conscience. This general 
schema and terminology, seemingly taken for granted in the American intellectual 
zeitgeist of the 1820s, thoroughly informed Verplanck’s account. Finally, Reid had 
maintained that “conscience” or the “moral sense” was an intuitive faculty, which reliably 
informed reason of right and wrong; Verplank heartily concurred. 
 Working within a tradition of moral rationalism—which included Joseph Butler, 
Richard Price, and Immanuel Kant—Reid wanted to establish conscience as the primary 
“rational principle of action” that should control the affections. He thus placed the 
affections under the “animal principles of action” along with an appetite for food or 
desire for power.14 For Reid, conscience reliably delivered knowledge of right and wrong 
just as our senses gave us knowledge of the external world (181). Conscience was such a 
potent faculty for Reid, that he thought it the only faculty that was both “an intellectual 
power” of the understanding and an active power of the will; all other faculties he placed 
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in either one or the other group (205). In the rational tradition, reason and conscience 
were preeminent, governing allies over all other human faculties. On Reid’s account, 
conscience determined what was right or wrong (moral ends), and reason guided one in 
figuring out how to obtain these ends (moral means).15  
 But Verplanck’s repeated emphasis on the suitability of Christianity to “the 
sentiments and sympathies of our breasts” represented a kind of hybrid between Reid’s 
emphasis on conscience as a rational power and the alternative tradition of moral 
sentimentalism.16 (55-56). Articulated by Francis Hutcheson and developed by David 
Hume and Adam Smith, sentimentalism argued that human morality arose from 
benevolent affections and sympathies with others. These sentiments and sympathies 
were feelings divorced from reason, a position that distinguished the sentimentalists 
from moral rationalists such as Butler, Price, and Reid. For Hutcheson and Hume at 
least, these moral feelings were akin to the aesthetic feeling of beauty. They arose 
spontaneously, even in situations in which humans had no selfish interest whatsoever—
such as a feeling of pity which arose when seeing someone beaten—and they could be 
trusted generally to undergird human morality.17 Verplanck agreed with Reid that 
conscience discerned right from wrong, but Verplanck also thought that “our purest and 
truest sentiments” were engaged in an equal dialectic with reason or the understanding 
in arriving at both moral and even metaphysical truth.18 These sentiments did not just 
produce affections which needed to be properly bounded and controlled by reason, they 
“constitute[d] an argument forcibly addressed to the understanding.”19 In other words, 
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sentiment could instruct reason as long as sentiment did not violate conscience; 
sentiment was an equal rather than subservient faculty. 
 But Verplanck was less interested in providing careful lists of moral sentiments 
than in employing the insights of moral sentimentalism to prompt a kind of Romantic 
individualism and interiority, which he thought could inspire individual spiritual 
experience and convince reason of the orthodox truths he embraced. He repeatedly 
encouraged his readers to reflect on “the time of danger and sorrow, on the bed of 
sickness and death, when the mind is forced in upon itself” and on their “instinctive and 
irrepressible hopes and fears” (61, 67). Verplanck thought this internal reflection on the 
negative sentiments of sorrow, loss, and fear could be aided by conscience, which 
inspired “a dread pause [in] the feverish tumult of life” and awakened a moral “shame, 
sorrow, remorse, and fear” as humans realized they could not live up to their own 
internal moral law (55). At this moment, Verplanck thought the Christian religion 
addressed itself to humankind’s longing for immortality, its realization of moral failure, 
“the possible excellences of his own nature,” and the need for moral forgiveness and 
redemption (63-64). 
 The sentiments were not a part of speculative or logical reason, but Verplanck 
insisted “these mysterious but certain first truths” were “rational instincts” (69). In his 
zeal to establish internal evidence, Verplanck stumbled toward an epistemological 
distinction that James Marsh, Emerson, and many other American intellectuals would 
later articulate more forcefully. Verplanck lamented that philosophers from Aristotle to 
Edwards were willing only to grant common people valid moral sensibilities without 
conceding to them “any really rational perception of truths” (69). He thought these 
moral sentiments were rational, and could even provide arguments to the intellect. He 
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thus began to theorize that there might be two intellectual faculties in the mind and 
wanted to make sentiment a constitutive part of Reason, but he understood that this idea 
flew in the face of inherited Enlightenment terminology. “If philosophers will not confess 
them to be of reason, they must then be considered as something nobler and more divine 
than reason itself” (69). Thomas Reid had cautiously granted benevolent affections a role 
in aiding moral motivation, and the Boston Unitarians would grant sentiment a larger 
role in enlivening strong emotions attached to rationally discovered principles such as a 
love of beauty or virtue, but Verplanck’s daring to theorize a faculty nobler and more 
divine than reason itself prefigured James Marsh’s later distinction between Reason and 
the Understanding.20 Verplanck might have been reading Coleridge during these years, 
he later confessed to James Marsh that Coleridge had greatly influenced his thinking. In 
addition to theorizing this faculty above reason, Verplanck applied the Christian 
Platonist language of John 1:9 to characterize this faculty: “we know, and are conscious, 
that ‘there is a light given to every man that cometh into the world’” (49). References to 
John 1 with its Christian Platonist notions of Christ the Word or Logos as an internal 
Reason, possessed by all, were common in Cautious Romantic discourse.   
 Emphasizing the inward turn to the light within, Verplanck grounded his 
argument on an intriguingly egalitarian premise. In his reflections on democracy, Alexis 
de Tocqueville insisted that in the new democratic age, “Each new piece of knowledge, 
each new idea had to be considered as the seat of power put within reach of the people.”21 
Verplanck, who had recently shifted his allegiance from the Federalists to the 
Republicans from conviction as well as opportunism, perceived that one of his strongest 
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defenses for religious belief lay in an appeal to the common man. He pointed out that the 
common debates about the external evidences of Christianity—Paley’s argument about 
natural facts or debates about biblical criticism—generally presupposed an elite and 
erudite audience that could effectively weigh the evidence. If pushed to its logical 
conclusion, only elites could be reasonable; properly weighing the evidence required 
knowledge of history, antiquity, and an ability to carefully weigh testimony, motives, and 
character when deciding which authoritative authors to believe.22 Verplanck expressed 
concern for “the thousands and hundreds of thousands of people in the past, the present, 
and probably in many future generations . . . to whom it is idle to talk of fathers, and 
ancient classics, of historical proof, of the evidence of quotations, manuscripts, and 
translations” (59-60). He dismissed the “learned arrogance” of educated skeptics who 
looked down on the common citizen, and he insisted that among “the illiterate, there is 
always a multitude of sound and active understandings, who reason fairly and justly 
upon all matters within the range of their examination” (60). Anticipating George 
Bancroft’s later expansive reliance on common judgment in 1835—“the common 
judgment in taste, politics, and religion, is the highest authority on earth”—Verplanck 
relied, at least in religion, on common judgment for justification, and his appeal would 
be echoed by James Marsh, Orestes Brownson, and Isaac Hecker.23 
 Romantic epistemology, not just politics, guided Verplanck. He continued the 
argument by insisting that common, and even illiterate people, reason not only fairly but 
also “wisely upon points in which they cannot argue fluently” believing themselves to 
hold a “rational conviction” without being able to articulate its rationality (60). In 
                                                   
 22 Verplanck, Essays on Revealed Religion, 57–58. 
 23 George Bancroft, “The Office of the People in Art, Government and Religion,” in Literary and 
Historical Miscellanies (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1855), 415. Originally a speech delivered before the 
Adelphi Society of Williamstown College in 1835. 
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distinguishing between rational belief and the ability to articulate rational belief in 
words or propositions, Verplanck drew on an explicitly Romantic perspective. As we 
have seen in Chapter One, Coleridge, Wordsworth, Allston, and the German Romantics 
venerated the ability of the poet to communicate in ways that transcended rational 
argument. They experimented with creative forms and maintained that these forms 
provided an avenue to truth equal to rational demonstration; thus they venerated the 
Romantic artist accordingly. Similarly, Verplanck argued that a person might engage his 
or her Reason without any ability to articulate the reasonableness of their intellectual 
commitment. In other words, Reason transcended language. Logical, linguistic argument 
was only one form Reason’s insights might take; not all of Reason’s insight could 
necessarily be placed into words. The perceptions of both conscience and the sentiments 
were “not the less efficient” in establishing rational belief “because they are not 
embodied in words” (69). For Verplanck, Reason was not limited to what could be 
articulated or even conceived in language.24 
 Verplanck’s position cohered with Coleridge's view of the imagination. In the 
Biographia Literaria (1817), Coleridge had emphasized the distinction between a 
primary imagination possessed by all—a faculty that could be inspired by poetry, art, and 
nature—and the secondary imagination, possessed by poets and artists which allowed 
them to communicate these experiences to others. Ultimately, Coleridge thought the 
primary imagination translated the insights of Reason to the faculties of the 
Understanding itself—in his co-opted Kantian language—and the secondary imagination 
                                                   
 24 Johann Georg Hamann, whom Isaiah Berlin has described as “the first person to declare war 
upon the Enlightenment in the most open, violent and complete fashion” emphasized the limited nature of 
language as the only avenue to truth. According to Berlin, one of the Romantics’ “principal contributions to 
understanding in general” was the belief that some truths or some works of art not only defied the ability to 
articulate them in descriptive prose and “lucid literal terms,” but that this defiance is precisely what we mean 
when we call an idea "profound" or "deep." No matter how hard one tries to explain such an idea in clear, 
logical propositions, continual vistas of meaning open, see Isaiah Berlin, The Roots of Romanticism, ed. 
Henry Hardy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 46–49, 102–103. 
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allowed the artist to communicate the insights of Reason to others through creative 
forms.25 While Verplanck did not use the explicit distinction between Reason and 
Understanding, which Coleridge, Allston, Dana Sr., James Marsh, and later Emerson 
embraced, he came close to theorizing it himself.26 When James Marsh published 
Coleridge’s Aids to Reflection (1829), Verplanck thanked him heartily, explaining that 
Coleridge had already greatly influenced Verplanck’s own opinions.27 Moreover, 
Verplanck’s use of an egalitarian epistemology to argue for the rationality of religious 
conviction anticipated James Marsh’s and Orestes Brownson’s embrace of a similar 
principle. Marsh’s conviction about egalitarian epistemology arose not only from his 
philosophy but also from his life. It was a principal that allowed the Cautious Romantics, 
easily open to the charge of elitism, to appeal to a wider audience while simultaneously 
attempting to justify their own Romantic religious commitments as intellectuals. This 
principle will be explored in greater depth in Chapter Six. 
 
Likeminded Friends 
 Verplanck saw Allston and Dana as intimately connected with his project. He 
dedicated the Essays on Revealed Religion to Allston “as a slight mark of respect, for his 
talents, works, and character.”28 After completing this “little book,” Verplanck wrote 
                                                   
 25 Douglas Hedley, Living Forms of the Imagination (London; New York: T&T Clark, 2008), 30; 
Engell, The Creative Imagination, 338–339. As Engell has demonstrated, this definition of the imagination 
emerged in various parts of Coleridge’s writing. The clearest statement can be found in Coleridge’s Lay 
Sermons, where he defines the imagination as “that reconciling and mediatory power, which incorporating 
the Reason in Images of the Sense, and organizing (as it were) the flux of the Senses by the permanence and 
self-circling energies of the Reason.” CW, 6:29. 
 26 Verplanck, Essays on Revealed Religion, 49. 
 27 GCV to JM, Oct. 14, 1830, JDL, 112-113. The context of the letter suggests that while Verplanck 
had been influenced by Coleridge prior to the Aids to Reflection it was probably not Aids that influenced 
him. This suggests that Verplanck had likely mined the Biographia Literaria for his insights given his 
literary friendship with Dana and his praise for Dana’s views—which had been informed by the Biographia, 
but the connections are intellectual rather than definitively historical. 
 28 Verplanck, Essays on Revealed Religion, iii. 
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Dana that he was “anxious for [Allston] and your opinion about it.”29 Dana, in the midst 
of his own soul-searching conversion, liked it exceedingly. When settling accounts with 
Charles Wiley, Dana’s and Verplanck’s publisher, Dana insisted that Wiley publish 
Verplanck’s book in a second edition in Boston. “Here all our theologians, young and old, 
gather, black as so many crows,” he declared. “A work like his is wanted here; for our 
liberal clergy are mainly too much of the cucumber temperament.”30 This statement, 
though ambiguous, highlighted Dana’s adherence to Verplanck’s philosophy. It is not 
clear what Dana meant by “cucumber temperament,” but his characterizing all 
theologians as crows suggested that, as he had confided to Sarah Arnold, he was fed up 
with New England theological infighting. Dana thought that both liberal and Orthodox 
clergy missed the mark. Verplanck’s essay explicitly eschewed engaging in “those 
debated questions, which divide Christians,” and Dana found this ecumenical approach 
exceedingly appropriate.31 Allston, characteristically late in replying, insisted that the 
work gave him not only pleasure but also “spiritual profit.”32 What appealed to him most 
was that “many of your arguments appeared . . . new,” and he thought “the whole . . . 
cogent and eloquent.”33 Here at last was a more formal religious prose that spoke for 
Allston and Dana’s own intellectual and religious commitments. 
 Verplanck, despite his increasingly successful political career, never forgot the 
kindness of his like-minded friends and sought continually to help them. In 1830, while 
chairman of the newly constituted Committee on Public Buildings, he solicited Allston to 
paint American history on an epic scale for use in the Capitol rotunda, completed in 1826 
                                                   
 29 GCV to RHDS, Dec. 3, 1824, DFP, MHS. 
 30 RHDS to C. Wiley, Nov. 8, 1825, DFP, MHS. 
 31 Verplanck, Essays on Revealed Religion, viii. 
 32 WA to GCV, Jan. 31, 1828, CWA, 252. 
 33 Ibid. 
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by Charles Bulfinch after a halting, thirty-three year construction process.34 Allston 
relished the opportunity to use “the glory of painting for my country,” but he insisted he 
was unable to paint the revolutionary battle scenes so en vogue in American art.35 
Suitable subjects from American civil history also eluded him. Allston relished the 
success of American arms—“I yield in love of country to no man,” he insisted—but he 
thought poets and historians were better able to capture “the ominous prelude of silent 
emotion” followed by the “fearful din of human thunder” that constituted the art of war. 
On the other hand, he thought battle paintings suffered by necessity from the “monotony 
of colour, of costume, of form” and the “smallness of parts” that Allston found “fatal to 
breadth and grandeur.” 
 Instead, the increasingly pious Allston begged Verplanck and the committee to 
allow him to paint, of all things, Christ’s resurrection for the walls of Washington at a 
time when the last vestiges of state churches were disappearing! As he warmed to the 
project, Allston feverishly pressed his argument. “I fear this is a forlorn hope,” he 
admitted. “Yet why should it be? This is a christian [sic] land. And the Scriptures belong 
to no country but to man. The facts they record come home to all men, to the high and 
low, the wise and simple. But I must not enlarge on this topic to you.”36 Allston pressed 
Verplanck on the latter’s assertion in Essays on Revealed Religion that Christianity 
provided an intellectual system suitable to both the learned and unlearned, seeking to 
use this principle as justification to enshrine his own personal religious experience on 
the walls of the new Capitol. In “The Atonement,” Allston had quoted St. Paul’s assertion 
that Christ’s resurrection blunted the sting of death and the victory of the grave, and 
                                                   
 34 The precise scale Verplanck looked for is not entirely clear as his initial letter to Allston has not 
been preserved. The sizes discussed in their preserved letters range from 13 x 12 ft. to Trumbell’s massive 18 
x 12 ft. Capitol paintings. 
 35 WA to GCV, Mar. 1, 1830, CWA, 282. All future citations in this paragraph are to this letter. 
 36 WA to GCV, Mar. 1, 1830, CWA, 283. 
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Allston confided to Verplanck that “the angel sitting on a stone before the mouth of the 
sepulcher . . . I consider this one of my happiest conceptions. I wish I could see [the angel 
and the three women at the tomb] on the walls at Washington!”37  
 Notwithstanding Verplanck’s own piety and Allston’s implicit use of his book 
against him, Verplanck called Allston back from his spiritual ascension to the world of 
politics and worldly commissions. “To Scripture I fear we cannot go in the present state 
of public opinion and taste,” Verplanck wistfully declared. Apparently the new capitol 
needed historic symbols to bolster civic religion, not overtly controversial Christian 
symbols likely to irk deist or Unitarian sensibility. But Allston’s argument against battles 
persuaded him. “Your letter only convinces me the more that we must, if we can, have 
one specimen of ‘high art’ on the wall of the Capitol.”38 They eventually reached a 
compromise between Allston’s pietistic flights and Verplanck’s need for historical 
symbols by settling on Columbus’s landing. In the end, the subject of the painting 
mattered not, for Congress dragged their feet in appropriating funds for the next several 
years, but the earnest episode demonstrated the way in which religious conviction 
dominated Allston’s and Verplanck’s own imagination. 
 
New York Networks and Vocations 
 Despite the frustration with the lack of governmental support for the arts, 
American art began to expand. In late 1825, Verplanck wrote excitedly to Dana, “Some 
capital landscapes of a very young artist (Cole) have made a noise in the Arts at N.Y. In 
Fact with all the impediments in their way the Arts are advancing among us.”39 The artist 
was the twenty-one year old Thomas Cole—slight, pale, and shy. Asher Durand later 
                                                   
 37 WA to GCV, Mar. 1, 1830, CWA, 284. 
 38 GCV to WA, Mar. 9, 1830, CWA 285. 
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remembered that even at this age, “His fame spread like fire,” and Cole’s talent struck 
William Cullen Bryant with “the scenes of wild grandeur peculiar to our country.”40 
Allston, always eager to help other American artists as a “pleasant duty,” wrote to Cole’s 
friend Henry Pickering with a lengthy itinerary and program of European study, a course 
that Cole largely followed.41 Dana later found Cole “a sound conservative” as Cole guided 
him on a tour of New York galleries in 1841.42 Cole, like Allston and Dana, would later 
undergo a Trinitarian conversion to Episcopalianism that came to dominate his life and 
art in the 1840s. He read Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Dana, but his closest companions 
became William Cullen Bryant and Asher Durand, and his networks remained largely 
based in New York.43 
 Although the ranks of Romantic intellectuals and artists seemed to be growing, 
many culture makers like the NAR men were still wary of Romantic literary taste. In the 
mid-1820s, Verplanck and William Cullen Bryant found other outlets for their minds. 
Verplanck won election to the U.S. House of Representatives, where he continued his 
crusade on behalf of American cultural nationalism. Bryant moved to New York and 
began writing for the New-York Evening Post in 1826. He assumed the full editorship in 
1829 and crafted the paper into a liberal democratic voice that was ideologically 
Jacksonian. As the second leading Democratic newspaper to James Watson Webb’s 
Courier and Enquirer, Bryant’s Evening Post advocated for Indian removal, anti-tariff 
                                                   
 40 Louis Legrand Noble, The Life and Works of Thomas Cole, 3rd ed. (New York: Sheldon, 
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policies, moderate but non-abolitionist reform, and the destruction of the Bank of the 
United States. For nearly fifty years, the Evening Post gave Bryant a substantial national 
voice while also putting bread on the table.44 But while bringing a stable salary, the job 
limited Bryant’s ability to write poetry and engage in criticism, a point with which Dana 
needled Bryant in their correspondence. 
 Nevertheless, Bryant and Verplanck’s intellectual life in New York was anything 
but dull. In 1829, they both became charter members of the Sketch Club, a selective 
group of twenty-one intellectuals and artists that included Thomas Cole, Asher Durand, 
and Samuel F.B. Morse. Modeled on recent European precedent, the members met 
weekly to practice impromptu sketching—especially inspired by Byron and Scott—and 
enjoyed elevated conversation often lubricated by a few drinks.45 But the Sketch Club 
was more of a social outlet than a serious intellectual affair.46 While Bryant continued to 
write poetry when and where he could, politics and the newspaper demanded most of his 
waking hours. The centrality of politics to Bryant became evident when Verplanck 
defected to the newly constituted Whigs in 1834 after losing his seat in Congress. The 
move prompted a more distant though still cordial relationship and an increasingly 
infrequent correspondence. Bryant claimed Verplanck wanted the distance, but 
Verplanck’s wishes were surely aided by Bryant’s constant attacks on Whig policies and 
politicians in the Evening Post.47  
 Bryant and Dana continued to exchange criticism of each other’s poetry, and 
Bryant helped Dana revise and publish his first book of poems in 1827. But while their 
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literary aesthetics and friendship held strong, Dana’s and Allston’s emphasis on 
Romantic Trinitarianism kept Bryant from being a full ally. For some time Bryant had 
favored the expansion of Unitarianism with almost Jeffersonian fervor.48 In an 1823 
letter that read like a spy report from enemy territory, Bryant reported on the state of 
Unitarianism in western Massachusetts to Andrews Norton, who would become the so-
called Unitarian Pope. Bryant carefully charted Unitarianism’s minimal rise and the 
specific towns that contained substantial Unitarian numbers. He also actively courted 
the Universalists to the Unitarian cause by handing out tracts.49 Valuing both Bryant’s 
intellectual stature and his commitment to Unitarianism, Henry Ware Sr. invited Bryant 
to participate in “an annual meeting for the purpose of union, sympathy, and 
cooperation in the cause of Christian truth.”50 Though Bryant could not attend, he 
insisted “my heart however will be with them” and with triumphal verve declared that 
there were “many friends of rational Christianity” who lived “under the very frown of 
orthodoxy,” but that “we do not suffer ourselves to doubt that religious truth will 
ultimately prevail.”51 Throughout their lives, Bryant and Dana remained good friends. 
Dana appreciated that they could respect each other’s differences, but he could not 
refrain from consistently jabbing Bryant, lamenting that the latter’s “clear region of 
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poetry should be tainted and blackened with the vapour and smoke of politics” and that 
Bryant was so overcome by the Unitarian arguments against the Trinity.52 
 
Expanding Networks 
 Throughout the 1830s, Dana continued to build a modest but respectable career 
as a poet and literary critic. He gained a particular reputation in the late 1830s by 
delivering a course of lectures on English literature, first to wealthy young women in 
Boston, then across the country, taking advantage of the opportunities afforded by the 
American lecture circuit.53 A young and voraciously reading Margaret Fuller thought 
Dana had read “no modern criticism” since August Schlegel and Coleridge, but in some 
ways this was appropriate for Dana, who was the first American intellectual to illuminate 
Shakespeare using Romantic literary criticism.54 Like his later friend, George Allen—
discussed in Chapter Ten—Dana urged his American audience to see poetry as a serious 
part of the spiritual life. Poetry did not just adorn intellectual life or simply augment 
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spiritual devotion, it “unseal[ed] our eyes to the beauty, grandeur, and secret spiritual 
meanings of the outerworld . . . and our inner selves.”55 The belief that art and poetry 
could play a seminal role in spiritual experience became a common theme among other 
Cautious Romantics, and helped spur many of their conversions to the Episcopal and 
Catholic churches. But Dana's primary importance began to shift from being an intrepid 
champion of Romantic literature and a Trinitarian convert to serving as a key hub in a 
network of cautious, Romantic intellectuals that grew substantially in the 1830s. As Dana 
once declared: “Well, if I’m not titled myself, I have the honour of being in 
correspondence with the titled—with Professors, Presidents, and Doctors.”56 These 
historical relationships were every bit as crucial to the diffusion of the ideas he, Allston, 
and Verplanck embraced as were the ideas themselves. 
 Although he would be in correspondence with the titled, Dana Sr.’s own family 
served as a key intellectual nexus point. All three of his children maintained important 
relationships with other Romantic, Trinitarian intellectuals. Richard Henry Dana Jr., 
succeeding as both a writer and a lawyer in ways his father could have only dreamed, 
studied first with Leonard Woods Jr. and was later influenced by James Marsh at the 
University of Vermont. Dana Sr.’s second son, Edmund or “Ned,” studied with James 
Marsh for four years, and at Vermont became close friends with Henry Jarvis 
Raymond—an influential Marsh student as the founder of the New York Times. Dana 
Sr.’s daughter, Ruth Charlotte Dana—whose “views of things, tastes, casts of thought” 
Dana once insisted were “in an unusual manner in harmony with [his]”—assiduously 
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studied James Marsh’s thought and became the closest friend and confidant of the 
Transcendentalist Sophia Dana Ripley, inspiring the latter’s conversion to Catholicism.57  
 
Kindred Spirits: Richard Henry Dana Jr. and Leonard Woods Jr. 
 In the 1830s, the Dana family relationships began to expand into wider networks 
of intellectual kinship. In July 1831, Richard Henry Dana Jr. entered Harvard College at 
the age of sixteen, but he quickly found himself persona non grata with the faculty. 
Apparently, a Harvard student committed some unknown offense that the faculty was 
investigating. When faculty members ascertained that a young “charity-student” named 
Augustus Kendall Rugg knew the perpetrator but would not tell, they invoked the local 
sheriff and Rugg left Harvard “willing to endure imprisonment rather than to disclose 
what had been committed to him in confidence.”58 Outraged, Dana and his fellow 
students made resolutions such that for several days, whenever “Dr. Ware just opened 
the Bible to read . . . [his] class set up a hissing, groaning & scraping which completely 
drowned his voice.”59 Continuing their chapel stunts, they also began to skip recitations. 
The faculty panicked, dismissing several students, and worried parents whisked away 
their sons to rescue them from a similar fate. Dana Sr. was encouraged, perhaps by 
Edward T. Channing, to keep Dana Jr. away from Harvard Yard for several days to avoid 
adverse consequences. The eccentric father—who was closer to his son than to his 
intellectual and religious enemies at Harvard—felt disinclined to stop Dana Jr.’s defiance 
of the faculty and allowed Dana Jr. to determine his own course. The next morning, the 
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resolutely dissident Dana Jr. walked to Harvard Yard and claimed his six-month walking 
papers from the Harvard Overseers. 
 Dana Jr. remembered the event as “a most fortunate occurrence,” for it allowed 
him to leave the stifling air of the Harvard recitation room to embark on a more 
extensive formation under an emerging, likeminded tutor at Andover, Leonard Woods 
Jr.60 Fluent in six languages, the twenty-four year old Woods Jr. embodied many of the 
Romantic principles Dana Jr. came to value as the telos of all intellectual pursuit. Like 
Verplanck, Woods Jr. displayed a Christian ecumenism “more free from prejudice, 
opinionatedness & exclusiveness than most students of theological systems. More than 
any person I ever knew,” declared Dana Jr., a one-time student of both Emerson and 
later George Ripley, “[Woods] seemed to read, study, think & converse for the purpose . . 
. of coming to a knowledge of truth.”61 But Woods wore his immense learning lightly and 
like Verplanck believed his role as an intellectual did not exempt him from the concerns 
of the many; this struck Dana Jr. further. “[H]is society was very agreeable to the most 
unlearned & simple, & much sought after by them, a thing not usual with the learned & 
accomplished.”62   
 Moreover, Woods’ capacious mind took him well beyond the confines of the 
conservative theology and philosophy housed at Andover. As James Marsh would fondly 
remark: “He sees too clearly I am confident the need of higher ground for the 
maintenance of orthodox and spiritual views of religion ever to rest satisfied with his 
father’s [Leonard Woods Sr.’s] system as a whole.”63 Like Coleridge, Allston, and Dana 
Sr., Woods Jr. represented a new generation coming of age in that “[p]oetry he studied 
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as high philosophy,” an exciting prospect for the young Dana weaned on his father’s 
ideas of art and the mind.64 Like Allston and Coleridge in Rome walking “beneath the 
pines of the Villa Borghese” conversing on Romantic aesthetics and the Christian Trinity, 
Dana and Woods walked together, discussing Schiller, Goethe, and “God’s nature & the 
nature of man . . . the Holy Spirit & the fallen will of man, with a force, 
comprehensiveness & beauty which [Dana Jr.] could neither gainsay nor resist.” After 
this most intellectually formative six months, Dana Jr. reluctantly returned to Harvard—
“to college recitations, college rank, college gossip . . . as a slave whipped to his 
dungeon.” 
 Despite Dana Jr.’s love and respect for Woods, he later confessed, “I had my 
prejudice & inclinations strongly in [the Unitarians’] favor”; it seemed in his Boston 
context “the only faith consistent with the advancement of man, freedom of thought & 
the dignity of our natures.”65 Dana Jr.’s penchant for enlightened views worried his 
family. In addition to his newly pious father’s urgings to attend to his soul, Dana Jr.’s 
Aunt Elizabeth insisted that nothing compared to following Christ.66 Not to be outdone, 
Dana Jr.’s Aunt Martha—now married to Allston—joined the fray. Martha’s concern 
extended so far as to enlist the dead. “Your sainted mother was dear to me and I often 
think if she was on earth that her prayers would daily ascend for you,” she pleaded while 
insisting he attend to eternal matters as well as earthly ones.67 
 Like Dana Jr.’s family, Woods Jr. sought to sway his young friend to embrace a 
more orthodox form of Christianity, and with new friends came new intellectual 
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influences. Like the other Cautious Romantics, Woods reached outside the Reformed 
tradition: 
I send you “Pensées de Pascal”. . . . You will be struck with the vividness of the colors on 
wh. He describes the greatness, and the same time, the misery of man. I know of no other 
book, besides the Bible, so well calculated to teach that most important science, the 
knowledge of ourselves. It is my most earnest desire, and frequent prayer, with regard to 
you, my dear friend, that you may obtain that personal acquaintance with your own heart, 
wh. Will lead you to feel your need of a Saviour, and cordially to embrace Him who is 
offered in the Gospel. . . . You will find the view of Pascal respecting the character of Christ 
uncommonly elevated. May you do as he did, renounce worldly pleasures and honors and 
consecrate your talents and all your powers to the service of the Redeemer.68 
  
Invoking Pascal delighted Dana Sr., long concerned with the state of his son’s soul. “Read 
your Pascal with great care,” Dana Sr. insisted, “He had an infinitely rich mind and will 
mature yours as well.”69 Woods Jr.’s equating the term “science” with “knowledge of 
ourselves,” and “personal acquaintance with your own heart” pointed to the Romantic 
epistemology that made Pascal appealing beyond all books save the Bible.  
 In the Pensées, Pascal took a psychological approach to conversion; his entire 
program sought to emphasize the simultaneous greatness and wretchedness of 
humankind in order to create a yearning for revelation. But the need for revelation came 
through intense introspection, through people “getting to know themselves,” to quote the 
great Pascal scholar Jean Filleau de la Chaise.70 “What sort of freak then is man!” Pascal 
insisted, “How novel, how monstrous, how paradoxical, how prodigious! Judge of all 
things, feeble earthworm, repository of truth, sink of doubt and error, glory and refuse of 
the universe!”71 This intense introspection on humankind’s dual nature yielded what 
Pascal insisted was a rational transcending of reason: “Know then, proud man, what a 
paradox you are to yourself. Be humble, impotent reason! . . . Learn that man infinitely 
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transcends man, hear from your master your true condition, which is unknown to you.”72 
If man infinitely transcended himself, Pascal thought reason must do the same. 
“Reason’s last step is the recognition that there are an infinite number of things which 
are beyond it. It is merely feeble if it does not go as far as to realize that.”73 Pressing the 
argument, Pascal insisted that transcending reason was not only rational, but that 
human reason became impoverished when it failed to recognize its own limitations. 
Ultimately Pascal thought humankind’s simultaneous greatness and wretchedness—its 
greatness lying in its awareness of its wretchedness—pointed to the truth of Christianity. 
Humans must have existed in a blessed state from which they became corrupted 
otherwise humankind would either possess truth and contentment, or have no notion of 
or yearning for these things.74  
 Pascal employed the traditional distinction between reason and what he called 
“the heart,” unlike Coleridge and other Romantics who attempted to co-opt Reason by 
placing it above the Understanding. But Pascal’s argument employed similar tactics to 
these later Romantic thinkers. With paradoxical statements like “the heart has its 
reasons of which reason knows nothing” and the earlier cited claim that reason’s last step 
was to realize its own limitations, Pascal argued alongside Coleridge and his American 
friends that while the conviction of truth arose through mental processes, these 
processes transcended a straightforward appeal to Enlightenment reason.75 Like the 
Romantics, Pascal felt “the need to find organic unity within the human animal,” which 
was why he and Spinoza were the two great thinkers spurned by the Enlightenment but 
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rediscovered in the Romantic Era.76 His obsessive turn to the self was the sine qua non of 
the Romantics, but his fear of the darkness he discovered within led him back to 
orthodox, revealed Christianity. His was a seventeenth century version of the Cautious 
Romantic program. 
 Woods embraced this program of sustained introspection. Citing Pascal, Woods 
thought that the reasonableness of Christianity required “first [a] resort to the closet . . . 
[to] prayer and devout contemplation.”77 For Woods, as for Pascal, it was through the 
heart, not the head that one discovered the reasonableness of Christianity.78 Woods Jr.’s 
epistemology was akin to that of the other Cautious Romantics. As Edwards Amasa Park 
remembered: 
He preferred Plato to Aristotle, the German metaphysics to the Scotch. He had a decided 
antipathy to John Locke, and was no admirer of Thomas Reid. He was one of the earliest 
American scholars who enjoyed the lucubrations [sic] of Cousin and Coleridge, and hailed 
the advent of the transcendental intuitional philosophy into our land. He was one of the 
earliest advocates of the ‘Aids to Reflection.’ President Marsh had a high admiration for 
him.79 
 
While Woods preferred Romantic epistemology to what he called “our mechanical, 
shallow, sensuous” epistemology, like the other Cautious Romantics he sought to make 
revelation rational.80 He worried that Kant, German idealism, and even Platonic idealism 
was still too hostile to revelation.81 Instead, he insisted on what he called “impartial 
eclecticism,” which recognized that all parties in philosophical and theological disputes 
partially held the truth.82 But his epistemological ends were essentially conservative. 
Woods thought that all modern philosophies rejected divine revelation out of hand, but 
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that a true eclecticism should recognize divine revelation, idealism (or internal reflection 
on the mind itself), and the senses’ encounter with the external world as the three 
sources of knowledge granted by “the great Parent Mind.”83 
 Many of Woods’ close intellectual relationships were with the other Cautious 
Romantics, as were most aspects of his thinking. Moreover, many of his primary 
influences were either prominent romanticists—Friedrich Schlegel, Coleridge, 
Wordsworth, and Goethe—or the historical, Catholic thinkers Pascal and Bernard of 
Clairvaux, whom the other Cautious Romantics lauded.84 He also venerated the 
imagination as “one of the noblest powers of our nature,” claiming it held “a prominent 
place with reason, memory, and the other leading attributes of the soul.”85 His 
celebration of the imagination went far beyond the Orthodox circles he inhabited, and he 
criticized Christians who “condemn romantic writing” and failed to recognize it as an 
avenue to truth about human nature.86 Indeed, while Woods yearned for the Middle Ages 
when theology was still queen of the sciences, he criticized medieval scholastics for 
abandoning the poetry and fine arts that would have made their philosophy more 
meaningful both conceptually and rhetorically.87  
 Drawing on Friedrich Schlegel, Woods Jr. also embraced a progressive 
historicism and a belief in an awe-filled, constant seeking after new intellectual 
discoveries—albeit under the aegis of Christian revelation. Schlegel in his later Catholic 
phase had argued that Christ introduced a “divine power of love” and sacrifice into 
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human consciousness, which continued to spread throughout human history “binding all 
who felt it in an indissoluble union” and stronger than mortal violent conquest.88 
Schlegel had also tried to blunt attacks on Christianity as absolutist by complaining that 
scientific hubris, unmitigated egoism, and a pantheism that reduced God to the natural 
world were the truly “absolute” systems. For Schlegel, these approaches attempted to 
explain everything, whereas Christianity remained more comfortable with indeterminacy 
given its emphasis on faith and the limits of human knowledge.89  
 Woods embraced Schlegel’s point about Christianity as an evolving principle of 
love and self-sacrifice. But he also emphasized the historical development of Christian 
doctrine itself, initially “partial and incomplete” in the early church but constantly 
engaged in a “progressive development” throughout time based on internal debates and 
external challenges.90 Woods also maintained, like Schlegel, that Christianity was not a 
limiting, absolute system, but rather an inexhaustible matrix of meaning that inspired 
continual seeking throughout one’s intellectual and emotional life.  
In the boundlessness of its disclosures, it affords ample range to the speculative mind, 
whose powers can never fully expand over the incommensurateness of finite themes, but 
whose joy it is to see, as each point of inquiry is gained, still new objects looming up upon 
its vision from the darkness of an unexplored distance, inviting it to still more adventurous 
research, and furnishing it, as the goal of its pursuit ever flies before it, with the sure 
pledge of the imperishableness of its own nature.91  
 
In this passage, Woods attempted to paint Christianity in Romantic strokes, akin to 
those of Caspar David Friedrich’s The Wanderer Above a Sea of Fog (1817, fig. 12). 
Rather than recoil from the unknown in fear, Woods thought Christianity provided a 
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confidence in immortality that could empower adventurous research and ever-new 
visions. While the mind never reached its final destination, the process of constant 
seeking could and should be relished. In its fully liberated form, constant religious 
seeking outside of doctrinal strictures became a new religion of its own, inspired strongly 
by the Transcendentalists.92 But while Woods’s emphasis on doctrinal development and 
spiritual seeking carried germs of later religious liberalism, he ultimately developed 
sympathies with the Catholic Church of Friedrich Schlegel and Orestes Brownson, with 
whom he became friendly. In sum, it seems Edward Amasa Park’s memory of him 
captured his ambivalences: “Was he a cautious man? Yes. Was he incautious? Yes.”93 
 
Two Years Before the Mast and Dana Jr.’s Trinitarian Conversion  
 In 1832, Woods Jr.’s Romantic Christianity and his invoking of Pascal revealed 
more about his own views than Dana Jr.’s. Dana Jr. remained generally committed to 
Unitarianism until after he returned from a two-year sea voyage in 1836. In 1834, Dana 
Jr. dropped out of Harvard for the second time to work before the mast as a common 
sailor. Herman Melville would later warn ship’s captains to avoid hiring “the many 
romantic, melancholy, and absent-minded young men, disgusted with the carking care of 
earth, and seeking sentiment in tar and blubber,” but Dana Jr. proved himself doughty 
for two and a half years before the mast.94 
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 He returned on September 22, 1836, to learn that Leonard Woods Jr.’s sister, 
Sarah, had died a few weeks earlier. Dana Jr. and Sarah had been “quite intimate” in a 
friendly sense, and Dana “sincerely respected” her “simple purity of heart, kindness & 
religious faith & practice.” Initially sad but not overwhelmed, Dana soon learned that in 
her last days Sarah suffered from delirium and “prayed for me; for my safety from 
suffering & death, & above all for my eternal salvation.” She even told her mother she 
hoped to use her influence in the other world to keep Dana from sin in the present and 
influence him “toward God and holy things.”95 Cut to the quick, Dana Jr. suddenly 
surrendered his soul to the orthodox God of his father, who wrote to Ruth Charlotte 
confirming that Dana Jr. was depressed and “under deep religious impressions.”96  
 But why did the death of Sarah Woods prompt such a radical response from Dana 
Jr.? The answer lay in the timing of her passing, corresponding as it did with his return 
from sea. Though Dana Jr. had lived a moral life and thought “Unitarian preaching 
justified [him],” the thought that his father and Leonard Woods Jr. might be right in 
their darker, evangelical views nagged him.97 In his reflections on his time at sea, Dana 
Jr. dropped cryptic notes about “the wickedness which I was placed in the midst of . . . 
[and] the dangers to a young man’s moral purity.”98 In his published material, Dana 
frequently mentioned profanity and other coarse behavior as examples of this 
wickedness, but it seems unconvincing that Dana would be brought under deep religious 
impressions merely for a mouth unsuited to Boston parlors. Indeed, in the first 
manuscript of Two Years Before the Mast Dana seemed to revel in the drinking, card-
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playing, Sabbath-breaking, foul-mouthed life of the sailor, proud of the way it set him 
apart from insipid Boston life.99 His first manuscript included copious references to 
these sins of the sailor; his publisher Harper Brothers insisted he excise many of these 
references and carefully express regret for the ones they allowed him to leave in.100 But in 
explaining why Sarah’s death and her request that she be allowed to watch over him had 
such an effect, Dana ejaculated, “if God has granted your prayer, what perverseness, 
what insensibility, what wickedness have you been obliged to see!”101 In truth it seems a 
Byronic secret seethed in Dana’s heart, his circumspect moral convictions outstripping 
his actions at sea. 
 Shortly after publishing Two Years Before the Mast (1840), Dana received a 
strange letter from one of his old shipmates, Benjamin Stimpson. Stimpson praised 
Dana’s work for his accuracy in all but two points. First, Stimpson thought Dana let their 
ruthless Captain Thompson off too easy. Second: 
. . . I think also you have not described, the beautiful Indian Lasses, who so often 
frequented your humble abode in the hide house, and rambled through those splendid 
groves attached thereto yet no doubt it would call to your remembrance such feelings that 
in describing them you might implicate yourself in some love affair, which deterred you 
from informing your friends of the happy hours experienced rambling over those romantic 
hills, or sitting at twilight on those majestic rocks, with a lovely Indian Girl, resting on 
your knee, gazing with delight upon the nobleness of the scene, or the beauty of the sea, as 
the billows washed against the rocky coast. That you experienced these pleasures no one 
can doubt, situated as you were, and knowing your love of romance.102 
 
Dana hastily scribbled on the letter: “This is all fun, and neither is nor was ever intended 
to be taken as true,” but the evidence suggests otherwise.103  
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 In the middle of his adventures, Dana managed to get assigned to hide-curing 
duty on shore in San Diego. For six weeks, he enjoyed leisurely afternoons and evenings 
following mornings of hard work, and soon all the hides were cured, leaving Dana and 
his comrades free to pursue whatever endeavors they wished until the “close of the 
summer. We kept up a constant connection with the presidio,” Dana explained, and 
eventually “made the acquaintance of nearly everybody in the place.”104 According to 
Dana, the lot of the Indians in the missions and presidios had only gotten worse with 
Mexican independence and the stripping of priestly temporal power. Never known for 
their liberality, the priests were at least “attached perpetually to one mission . . . and the 
people were, in the main, well treated, and attached to those who had spent their whole 
lives among them. But the administradores [were] strangers sent from Mexico, having 
no interest in the country . . . for the most part, men of desperate fortunes—broken down 
politicians and soldiers—whose only object is to retrieve their condition in as short a 
time as possible” (210-211). This predatory arrangement found the missions “going 
rapidly to decay” with “very little care for the plight of the Indians” (211, 215). In 
desperate straits, Dana observed “the entire want of any sense of morality or domestic 
duty among them,” and prostitution with the sailors was common, even for married 
women whose husbands encouraged the arrangement (215). 
 Of course, Dana was careful not to publicly implicate himself in such 
reprehensible behavior. But when taken in the context of Stimpson’s letter, Dana’s 
extensive leisure, and his hints about “perverseness . . . insensibility . . . and wickedness” 
it seems clear that this incorrigible twenty year-old, removed from the moral constraints 
of family and friends, carried a secret guilt strong enough to make him yearn for 
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redemption in the orthodox mood. The cognitive dissonance between sympathizing with 
the Indians’ plight and yet participating in their oppression mirrored Coleridge’s own 
inability to live up to his moral standards. Coleridge’s case was writ large enough for all 
to see; Dana’s of necessity remained secret.  
 The evidence for Dana’s participation in sexual oppression is circumstantial. His 
amorous relationships with multiple Indian women may have all been consensual, these 
experiences possibly prompting his conversion. It might also have been the drinking and 
swearing that put Dana under religious impressions when he returned, though this 
seems highly unlikely. What is clear is that Dana maintained a particular revulsion for 
prostitution throughout his life. While leaving the House of Commons, London at 2:00 
a.m. in 1856, he wandered the streets for over an hour and mourned prostitution as one 
of the “piteous results of modern civilisation [sic]” as desperate women were drawn to 
the city from “the hills and valleys of the country” by the economic necessities of modern 
life. From “little springs” in the country they joined the “muddier outflows of the city . . . 
forming one great river, ever flowing, and ever plunging over the precipice into a sunless 
sea.”105 Dana’s sunless sea—made thus by the oppression of modern civilization coaxing 
girls from their pastoral homes—stood in stark contrast to Stimpson’s description of 
romantic sunsets and “the beauty of the sea” they enjoyed in California.106 But whatever 
prompted Dana’s guilt, he and Coleridge both turned to the enduring Christian trope of a 
vicarious sacrifice to expiate the guilt they had incurred relative to their own ethical 
commitments. 
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Two Years Before the Mast: A Transatlantic Cultural Triumph 
 Two Years Before the Mast (1840) represented much more than a microscope 
into the darker recesses of Dana’s moral mind. In many ways it represented a cultural 
triumph for the growing network of Cautions Romantics. While Allston’s art became 
iconic and Marsh and Brownson profoundly influenced American philosophy and 
theology in the 1830s, the contribution to literature by this group was thus far limited to 
Dana Sr.’s insightful but limited criticism, poetry, and lectures. Like Harriet Beecher 
Stowe’s later Uncle Tom’s Cabin (1851-2), Two Years Before the Mast succeeded on a 
much larger scale, garnering a substantial transatlantic audience. 
 When Dana Jr. sought to publish Two Years Before the Mast, he relied heavily on 
his father’s intellectual networks. Leonard Woods Jr., recently appointed as the new 
president of Bowdoin College, brought the initial manuscript to the publisher Harper’s 
on one of his frequent trips to New York City. In addition, William Cullen Bryant and 
Caleb Sprague Henry advised on the original manuscript.107 Henry was a founding 
professor of history, literature, and philosophy at the University of the City of New York 
(later New York University), and as an important Episcopalian intellectual he also edited 
the New York Review from 1837 to 1840. He corresponded extensively with Dana Sr. 
and James Marsh, and his thought is discussed at length in Chapter Eight. 
 For several weeks in January and February of 1840, while Dana Sr. lectured in 
New York, Bryant, Henry, Woods Jr., and he all worked together to edit the work and get 
it published.108 Meanwhile, Dana Jr. remained in Boston working on his own revisions 
with Allston.109 Coleridge’s influence was likewise evident as Dana Sr. encouraged his son 
to follow his own muse and never alter the work against his own judgment. By 
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combining his own judgment with a careful attention to natural description, Dana Sr. 
insisted that the work would reach “the inexperienced through the imagination, [and] 
have not only the effect of the ideal upon them, but also that of imparting that sense of 
satisfaction which the conviction of the truth . . . always gives to the mind.”110 Dana Jr. 
concurred, trusting the correspondence between his and his audience’s imagination to 
illuminate the parts of his book where his reader wanted “technical knowledge.”111 Not 
surprisingly, when Edmund Dana suggested that Dana Jr. quote from Coleridge’s 
translation of Wallenstein on the title page—“Housed on the wild sea with wild usages”—
Dana Jr. found the advice sagacious.112 
 The parallels with Coleridge extended to the unfortunate terms of publication. 
Despite Bryant and Dana Sr.’s extended haggling, Harper’s would only give Dana Jr. 
$250 for the full copyright, with no stake whatsoever in the sales of the work. And sell it 
did. The publisher cleared $10,000 in two years.113 Distribution ranged across the 
country and the reviews poured in. While on a stagecoach between Chicago and St. 
Louis, one of Dana Jr.’s college friends reported that an old New York farmer asked him 
if he had read Two Years Before the Mast.114 Horatio Greenough wrote to Charles 
Sumner from Italy praising the book “in as high terms . . . as any [Dana] had heard used” 
finding his descriptions particularly strong.115 A correspondent for The Dial reported 
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from Germany that a German sailor had translated the work, published it at Bremen, 
and that it now commanded “quite commendatory” reviews there.116 
 The response in Britain was equally as strong, and Edward Moxon, Wordsworth’s 
publisher since 1830, proved substantially better mannered than Harper’s. Woods Jr. 
reported from London that the work had found its way into the hands of a Captain Jones 
of the Royal Navy and John Kenyon, a world traveler and renowned patron of English 
poets.117 Both Jones and Kenyon praised the work exceedingly and recommended that 
their friend Moxon bring out an English edition. Within a few months Moxon had sold 
7,000 copies in England, with another, cheaper publisher selling 5,000 more.118 The 
Lords of the Admiralty were so impressed that they ordered 100 copies for their 
seamen’s libraries across the country.119 “I wish you could come over here and allow us to 
lionize you,” Moxon crowed. “I should be proud to introduce you to Mr. Rogers, to 
Wordsworth, to Campbell, to Moore, and to the sister of poor Charles Lamb. . . . You can 
hardly imagine how popular you are here.”120 Dana Jr., for his part, sought to honor the 
editorial assistance that his father and Allston gave him and queried Moxon on 
publishing an English edition of Dana Sr.’s poems as well as Allston’s finally completed 
gothic Monaldi. Moxon demurred on the poetry, claiming that only famous poets like 
Wordsworth could ever turn a profit in the genre, but finding Monaldi “powerful and 
                                                   
 116 C.S. Wheeler, “Literary Intelligence,” The Dial: a Magazine for Literature, Philosophy, and 
Religion 3, no. 4 (April 1843): 544. 
 117 RHDS to SA, Jul. 19, 1841, DFP, MHS. 
 118 RHDS to CSH, May 24, 1841, DFP, MHS. Dana received compensation from Moxon—though he 
did not say how much, he reported Moxon “behaved like a gentleman”—and as there was no legal obligation 
he did not receive any royalties from the other cheaper publishers (Charles Wood of Davenport and J. 
Cunningham of London). Moxon offered Dana “half profits” for his next book, The Seamen’s Friend. Dana 
Jr., The Journal of Richard Henry Dana, Jr., 1:49–50. 
 119 Edward Moxon to RHDJ, Apr. 15, 1841, DFP, MHS. 
 120 Edward Moxon to RHDJ, Feb. 26, 1842, DFP, MHS. 
  
185 
beautiful,” he published it.121 However, he later confessed that sales of Monaldi faltered 
because “taste for tales of this kind in this country has entirely gone by.”122  
 
The Institutional Impulse and Emergence of an Intellectual Type 
 By 1840, a discernible group of Cautious Romantics had developed into an 
identifiable intellectual type and an historical network. Washington Allston, Richard 
Henry Dana Sr., Richard Henry Dana Jr., Gulian Verplanck, and Leonard Woods Jr. 
sought each other's feedback for their work, visited each other, and helped to promote 
each other's intellectual careers. Like their other friends James Marsh and Caleb Sprague 
Henry—discussed in later chapters—they combined a Romantic interiority and emphasis 
on the self with Trinitarian Christianity. When they turned within, their contemplation 
led them to recur to a redemptive God-man and revelation from a deep sense of loss or 
guilt. But they drew heavily on romanticist sources, and all of them appealed to either a 
higher Reason or to the imagination as avenues to truth. 
 While the Danas contributed to American letters, and Washington Allston 
became the preeminent painter of his generation, the Cautious Romantics also worked 
within institutions to influence American culture. Some, like Leonard Woods Jr., thought 
institutions possessed a “sacredness and majesty.”123 Embracing the religious psychology 
of the Cautious Romantics, Woods argued that institutions arose throughout history to 
combat the evil present within every human heart. Left unchecked, this evil resulted in 
savagery.124 Like his formative influences Edmund Burke, Friedrich Schlegel, and Joseph 
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de Maistre, Woods feared political radicalism. He saw the gradual, conservative reform 
of institutions as critical to maintaining social stability, but he insisted that he was not 
defending “the bigoted apotheosis of [institutional] abuses.”125 Unlike his European 
influences, Woods conceded institutional abuse was common in the Old World, but he 
worried that radicalism might also break out in America, not from the severity of abuses, 
but from a lack of ingrained respect for settled systems.126  
 In 1835, Woods became Professor of Biblical Literature at Bangor Theological 
Seminary, and in 1839 he began a twenty-seven-year career as President of Bowdoin 
College. He accepted the position when he was only thirty-one, and many of his friends 
worried that his musing, romantic tendencies unsuited him to such responsibility. But he 
surprised them, proving diplomatically adept and winsome as he helped to shepherd 
Bowdoin in the difficult years following the depression of 1837.127 A gifted teacher—he 
explicitly asked for more teaching responsibilities than his predecessors—Woods also 
pursued a pastoral approach to discipline.128 Though he loved order and authority in 
church and state, his authoritarianism was theoretical more than temperamental in his 
relationship with his students. “His temper unfitted him for severity in executing a law,” 
according to his friend Edwards Amasa Park, “still he was fond of having a law.”129 He 
also aimed to overcome sectarianism in hiring college faculty or requiring theology 
degrees of them, and perhaps injudiciously he did not ally himself closely with the 
Congregationalist establishment in Maine.130 He was not only winsome but also shrewd, 
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personally prosecuting a case for the estate of Bowdoin’s benefactor. The funds secured 
from the lawsuit allowed Bowdoin to erect an Oxford-style chapel, inspired by Woods’s 
visit to E.B. Pusey’s Christ Church College, Oxford, from which he returned with “ample 
notes.”131 It was at Bowdoin rather than with his pen that Woods left his greatest legacy. 
 While the Danas were less interested in educational institutions, they were as 
attracted to the Anglo-Catholic ritual and the Oxford Movement as was Leonard Woods 
Jr. Dana Sr. thought high-church ritual “shadowed forth spiritual things” translating the 
“formless, naked abstractions, and the troubling uncertainties” of revealed religion into 
concrete forms that appealed to the imagination and the feelings.132 “This should make 
us cautious,” he claimed, “how we venture to neglect any parts” of inherited liturgical 
ritual.133 Dana Jr. likewise reveled in the way Anglo-Catholic liturgy appealed to the 
feelings and united people across the nation in a sense of communion.134 In an 
increasingly ritualistic piety, he embraced fasting, reveled in Gregorian chant, and 
thought the church and sacraments objective manifestations of the Holy Spirit that 
helped to check overweening religious subjectivity.135  
 The Danas sought to incarnate their Anglo-Catholic sensibilities in institutional 
form. In September 1844, they helped to found Church of the Advent in Boston, much to 
the chagrin of their low-church Episcopal bishop. Dana Sr. served as the first senior 
warden of the church, with Dana Jr. a longstanding vestryman and delegate to larger 
Episcopal conventions. Church of the Advent employed a draped altar, gilded crosses 
and candlesticks, vested priests, altar rails, Gregorian chant, and it conspicuously 
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deemphasized the small wooden preaching lectern in favor of the altar.136 In short, it was 
more Catholic than any Episcopal church in America, emphasizing liturgy, music, and 
sacraments. The church also broke new ground in abolishing pew rents–still a common 
means of church support at the time, and especially common in Boston–to allow “the 
poor and needy” equal access to worship “free from unnecessary expense and all 
ungracious circumstances.”137 Despite the fact that their thoroughly Protestant Bishop 
Eastburn refused to visit the church and confirm new members on-site, Advent grew 
rapidly. They boasted 70 communicants within six months and well over 300 by the end 
of 1846 when they purchased a meetinghouse for 600.138 Advent’s innovations even 
attracted the Anglican press. Struck by the Gregorian chant, a reviewer for The Parish 
Choir in England asserted that Advent’s “singing is better than any I have ever heard on 
this side of the Atlantic.”139 It was this music and ritual that would attract the later 
Harriet Beecher Stowe as she likewise found her way from Romantic Christianity into 
institutional Anglo-Catholicism. 
 Few Americans were as committed to institutional development as Dana Sr.’s 
Episcopalian friend Gulian Verplanck. When holding political office, Verplanck always 
used his position to advance American institutions, and he frequently served in those 
institutions directly. While a New York assemblyman and chairman of the Committee on 
Science, Literature, and Schools, he successfully pressed for charters to establish the 
New York Mechanic and Scientific Institute and the Episcopalian General Theological 
Seminary.140 He also greatly increased funding to academies and common schools.141 In 
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later life, he served lengthy terms as president of the New York Commissioners of 
Emigration and as vice-chancellor of the State University of New York, which oversaw all 
the colleges and academies in the state.142 He was warden for two different Episcopal 
churches, including Trinity (Episcopal) Church in New York, and he also served as vice-
president of the American Academy of Fine Arts and vice-president of the New York 
Historical Society.143 These were just some of his numerous institutional appointments.  
 The institutions Verplanck supported were as wide-ranging as his intellectual 
interests and abilities, but he saw all of them as fundamentally educative and essential to 
the health of the nation.144 He saw himself carrying on an old, New England tradition “to 
make education go hand-in-hand with moral training and to consecrate learning with 
religious feeling.”145 Verplanck’s Pascalian dual nature—humankind’s simultaneous 
wretchedness and greatness—was evident in his education theory; he thought education 
a purgative dialectic between ignorance and knowledge. “The deep-felt sense . . . that 
man is but darkly and imperfectly wise, whilst nature is great, and its Creator infinite” 
inspired humility.146 This humility in turn produced the patient, careful study necessary 
for humankind’s most remarkable discoveries, both scientific and moral. Paradoxically, 
these discoveries then revealed humankind in its greatest splendor, producing “manly 
independence of judgment” and confidence for further inquiry (29). Ultimately study 
and education were spiritually purgative as well as intellectually illuminating. “There is 
no place left there for creeping things of darkness, for fear, for selfishness, for vanity, for 
false shame; for it rests on the deep and low foundation of an humble, and therefore true 
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estimation of himself” (30). It was on this “cautious and deliberate judgment that Truth 
and Reason must mainly depend for their general diffusion and reception” (30). 
 This general diffusion of Reason came through institutions. Colleges trained the 
well-instructed stewards of the scientific, moral, and aesthetic realms.147 Mechanics 
institutes insured ongoing education in all of these realms so that the average citizen 
could better understand their craft, their moral and political duties, and even “the 
mysteries of the heart”—the latter being illuminated by history, literature, poetry, and 
the fine arts.148 The church stood as “the natural depository and guardian of truth . . . 
expressing the united judgments of a vast number of men in different ages and 
nations.”149 And even artistic institutions, such as the American Academy of Fine Arts 
and the National Academy of Design, “[teach] man to feel his own capacity for purer and 
better delights than those of sense” and were therefore morally educative as they 
produced thoughts of excellence and harmony which inspired moral action.150  
 Even Washington Allston shared the institutional impulse, despite his reputation 
as a reclusive painter. He agreed with Verplanck that the artistic gift should benefit 
others, and he saw institutions as critical to disseminate the results of that talent to the 
wider public.151 “A work of Art always tells better . . . in a public Institution than in a 
private house,” he explained to a friend.152 In addition to his involvement with the British 
Institution and the Royal Academy, he exhibited every year but one at the Boston 
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Athenaeum from 1827 to 1843.153 He was an honorary member of New York’s National 
Academy of Design and exhibited there four times.154 Indeed, part of the impetus for his 
return to America was his hope that with the establishment of the American Academy of 
Fine Arts America was finally developing the institutional infrastructure necessary to 
foster his vocation.  
 To be sure, Allston’s Romantic epistemology and theory of genius approached the 
supercilious, and he took Verplanck’s aesthetic moralism to a fevered pitch. Since 
“Infinite Wisdom . . . ordained [art] for the evolution of the human spirit” and since the 
artist’s “intuitive Powers . . . [were] beyond, both the senses and the understanding,” 
Allston thought the artist should never court a popular reputation but strive instead for 
an enduring fame.155 For Allston, artists were spiritual revelators; like prophets they had 
a sworn duty to deliver their visions to a wider audience without heed for their 
audience’s preferences. These visions required institutions. But unlike prophets, artists 
required institutions to help form their genius as much as to disseminate its productions. 
His strongest advice to the young Thomas Cole was to attach himself to the English 
School so he could develop his landscapes by rubbing shoulders with “the living.”156 
Confessing his debt to institutional formation at the Royal Academy, Allston wistfully 
hoped that he would “have the satisfaction of founding an English School here [in 
America].”157 Though he never did found his own artistic school, his contributions and 
reputation provided important support to America’s nascent artistic institutions. 
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Conclusion 
 Whether through institutional involvement or literary and artistic production, the 
Cautious Romantics had begun to make a lasting impact on American culture. Dana Jr.’s 
transatlantic literary success was the most remarkable of many intellectual triumphs for 
the Cautious Romantics by 1840. Leonard Woods Jr. occupied the presidency of 
Bowdoin College, and Verplanck had made his influence felt in numerous arenas. 
Allston’s reputation, always strong on both sides of the Atlantic, garnered greater praise 
than previously with an exhibition of forty-five paintings in 1839. The exhibition 
attracted over 3,000 visitors, with over 2,000 season tickets and earned the 
impoverished painter $2500.158 Dana Sr. earned recognition in America with his literary 
lectures and poetry. Wordsworth himself praised Dana Sr.’s poetry, and William 
Whewell, the celebrated mathematician and Master of Trinity College, Cambridge also 
read Dana Sr.’s work.159 But the growth of this network in the 1830s owed a large debt to 
James Marsh who laid the philosophical groundwork to undergird the Cautious 
Romantic consciousness. They explicitly looked to him for this, and thus his story is 
taken up in Chapters Five, Six, and Seven. 
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Chapter 5: A Young Romantic: The Formation of the Early James Marsh 
 
 
Introduction: Coleridge’s American Disciple 
 In late 1834, Leonard Withington, an orthodox minister in Newbury, 
Massachusetts, surveyed the American philosophical landscape. Writing for the 
Christian Quarterly Spectator, a leading theological journal of orthodox Protestantism 
which Timothy Dwight and Lyman Beecher had founded in 1818, he bemoaned a 
growing preoccupation with metaphysics and epistemology among the young. He 
thought these philosophical disciplines suspect, as opposed to the concern with politics, 
ethics, and natural philosophy exemplified by Aristotle, because the more speculative 
aspects of philosophy labored under the limits of human language and had “so little to do 
with practical life.”1 If Aristotle exemplified well-directed thinking, Coleridge exemplified 
the muddiness and mysticism of the new metaphysics. According to Withington, 
Coleridge had “set half the sensitive youth, between eighteen and twenty-five, a raving” 
despite his “total want of intellectual sincerity” and his intentionally “show[ing] us his 
philosophy in fragments” to avoid accountability for a clearly false system.2 
 Withington spoke for many intellectuals who sensed that something had changed 
in American philosophy. The young he worried about had indeed become enamored of 
Coleridge and his refracted German idealism. Ruth Charlotte Dana corroborated 
Withington’s report as she wrote to her brother Richard Henry Dana Jr.: “There ‘seem’ to 
be many young men who came here because they read Coleridge to talk to Father.” She 
explained that what Withington alleged were ravings had made their way into generally 
educated American culture. “They say that in England, in general society there is very 
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little knowledge of [Coleridge] and of all the writers who we think and talk so much of 
are not nearly as much known as in this country.”3 
 Coleridge’s intellectual reputation grew substantially between 1829 and 1835 
thanks to James Marsh’s publication of Coleridge’s Aids to Reflection (1829). Between 
November of 1829 and February of 1830 Marsh’s edition sold all 1,500 copies of its 
initial printing with the publisher asking for a second edition to meet demand.4 Initially, 
the magazines and intellectual journals responded with relative silence, though two 
reviews encouraged American intellectuals to probe further and question their 
metaphysical and epistemological assumptions.5 But soon high profile intellectual 
journals such as the Christian Examiner and the North American Review were 
publishing substantial reviews of both Coleridge’s poetry and his philosophy, including a 
laudatory fifty-three page review of The Friend which expressed “admiration of the 
genius, character, and writings” of Coleridge which were “preparing the mind of the age 
for the reception of clearer, more scientific, and more spiritual views in religion.”6 The 
article was all the more surprising in that it appeared in the North American Review 
whose hostility to Coleridge in the 1820s could not have been greater. One enterprising 
publisher saw enough of a market to bring out a new edition of Coleridge’s Biographia 
Literaria, and dozens of journals and magazines noticed Coleridge’s death, anecdotes of 
his life, aspects of his thought, and his posthumously published Table Talk.7 
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 This general diffusion of Coleridge’s ideas began to spawn innovators beyond the 
Cautious Romantics. In 1834, at the same moment Withington published his rant and 
Ruth Charlotte recorded her observation, Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote to his brother 
Edward, ecstatic about the new distinction between “Reason” and “Understanding” that 
he had found in Coleridge’s Aids to Reflection.8 According to the biographer of Emerson, 
Coleridge’s Aids provided Emerson with a “catalytic distinction” as he prepared to 
articulate his now canonical work Nature, which Emerson began writing within a year.9 
More than any other work, Nature served as a manifesto for Transcendentalism. 
Emerson and the Transcendentalists embraced the Reason-versus-Understanding 
distinction their entire lives, but the epistemic distinction sprang from the specific 
lineage to which Allston, Dana Sr., and other Cautious Romantics had long been 
attentive.10 It was the Kantian language that Coleridge had co-opted and communicated 
back to Allston some thirty years earlier. But Allston wielded brush and canvas, a more 
nebulous intellectual medium. The philosophical heavy lifting came from James Marsh, 
who published American editions of Coleridge’s Aids to Reflection (1829) and The Friend 
(1831) with the mistaken belief that these would philosophically reconstitute the more 
orthodox forms of Christianity in America. 
 This chapter seeks to articulate the development of Marsh’s early thought and set 
the stage for the full explanation of his influence in American history taken up in 
Chapters Six and Seven. Marsh was a philosophical innovator, an educational pioneer, 
and a social conservative. Like Emerson he wrestled with the implications of this new 
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Romantic view of the mind; unlike Emerson and Bancroft, Marsh questioned the 
connection that romantically inclined liberals drew between Reason and democracy—
though Emerson was not always as sanguine as Bancroft. Like Dana and Allston, Marsh’s 
personal relationships—particularly that with his wife—were inextricably linked to his 
philosophy. Furthermore, his vocational struggle to find a place as an intellectual in a 
democratic society led him to combine Coleridge and Christianity in the hopes that it 
could unite his intensely introspective and intellectual style to the more pious spirituality 
of those around him.  
 Understanding Marsh’s life and thought clarifies his importance to American 
intellectual history and rectifies the concern that Marsh has been unjustly neglected.11 
Marsh was the philosophical spokesman for the Cautious Romantics, and in addition to 
inadvertently sparking the Transcendentalist movement, his vocation in higher 
education served to further disseminate his philosophy throughout American culture via 
his formal students George Allen, Henry Jarvis Raymond, William G.T. Shedd, and his 
informal students, the Dana children.   
 In the accepted intellectual narrative of the American nineteenth century, Marsh 
plays a simple role. Most scholars see him as the innovative philosopher who injected 
Coleridge into the American theological discourse and unwittingly sparked the 
Transcendentalist movement; his relevance does not extend far beyond this isolated and 
limited status.12 To be sure, he has not been entirely neglected, and several scholars have 
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focused on articulating Marsh’s Coleridgean philosophy and its relationship to New 
England theology, a kind of straightforward intellectual discussion.13 A few studies move 
beyond this and discuss Marsh’s educational reforms at the university, providing more 
detailed context.14 In all of these discussions, Marsh’s personal life is noticeably 
discussed minimally if at all, and his connection to the other Cautious Romantics is lost. 
Moreover, his attention to the wider diffusion of his ideas through popular education 
disappears.  
 But what motivated James Marsh to publish and promote Coleridge and to enact 
difficult university reform? The previously mentioned accounts, in addition to ignoring 
Marsh’s connection to the network of intellectuals highlighted in this dissertation, also 
suggest that Marsh chose Coleridge for personal intellectual reasons and that Marsh 
enacted educational reforms because his new philosophy dictated it. Coleridge made 
sense of traditional religion in a new intellectual context for him, and therefore it made 
sense to build a university on Coleridgean principles. Marsh certainly found Coleridge 
philosophically meaningful and sought to reform the University of Vermont in 
accordance with Coleridgean principles, but Marsh’s influence was more extensive than 
has been acknowledged and his emotional motivations—fraught with the questions of 
love and vocation—were more complex as well.  
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 In his formative years Marsh struggled deeply with his relationship to the rest of 
society as an intellectual. This struggle was evident in his interactions with mentors, 
colleagues, and particularly his wife. Consequently, Marsh also struggled to find his 
vocation. He was a serious-minded theologian but a terrible preacher in an era when the 
most available vocation for an intellectual was still the clergy. In the end, Marsh found in 
Coleridge’s work a philosophy that not only answered his philosophical questions, real as 
they were, but also his personal existential concerns. Coleridge’s spiritual philosophy 
inspired his vocation to education and thereby reconciled him to society at large. It was 
through education that Marsh saw the chance to influence not only his students on the 
university level but all of society. His reforms at the University of Vermont and his 
commitment to his students carried Marsh’s influence into pre-university education as 
well. Moreover, his articulation of Coleridgean philosophy made him a key spokesman 
for the Cautious Romantics. 
 
Motivations: Intellectualism in Love and Life 
 In the autumn of 1820, Marsh set off from Dartmouth College to complete his 
theological training at Andover. In every respect, he was on top of the world and had just 
concluded two of the most rewarding years of his life. Personally, he enjoyed the 
confraternity of “several literary friends . . . in whose society he found the most constant 
excitement to intellectual activity.”15 He was recently engaged to Lucia Wheelock, the 
niece of Dartmouth’s president, and vocationally he enjoyed the admiration of his 
students who lavished on him a departing gift of several philosophical and literary 
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volumes.16 In high spirits, Marsh proposed to spend two months in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, and engage in the highest intellectual discourse to be found in America at 
the time. By this he hoped to flex his evangelical and philosophical muscles and “learn 
how to defend [his] religious principles with more enlarged views.”17 Coming from the 
bastion of Orthodoxy, the Trinitarian Marsh wanted to test his mettle against Cambridge 
Unitarianism “on more philosophical grounds, than . . . at Andover.”18 
 He was supposed to stay at Cambridge for two months, but his biographer, 
Joseph Torrey, reported that for some unknown reason he cut short his stay. Marsh’s 
premature return found him in feverish study at Andover, which suggests that the 
unknown reason for his shorter stay was the intellectual challenges he encountered in 
Cambridge. “The commencement here of a permanent system of labor impresses it upon 
me more strongly than I have ever felt it before, that I am engaging, and at my own risk, 
in the serious business of life,” he declared in his private journal. His intense application 
applied even to his diet, as like the later Isaac Hecker he sought to discipline his mind by 
controlling his body: “I have begun a very Pythagorical mode of living, and if I devour 
less beef than my fellows, I hope to devour more books.”19 This business of life proved 
more difficult at Andover than at Dartmouth, as Marsh wrestled with the philosophical 
implications of his beliefs and with his relationship to those around him, as his zealous 
intellectual temperament proved alienating. At Dartmouth Marsh had valued dialogue as 
an avenue for arriving at philosophical conclusions, but the questions he began to ask at 
Andover rendered close friendship increasingly difficult to come by. Marsh formed a club 
                                                   
 16 Letter of Student Appreciation to JM, Aug. 1820, James Marsh Collection, Special Collections, 
University of Vermont Library, Burlington, VT (hereafter referred to as JMC). 
 17 Marsh’s journal cited in JMR, 30. 
 18 Ibid. Throughout this dissertation I have capitalized references to members, ideas, or institutions 
formerly part of the “Orthodox” Calvinist position as this is how they were denominated at the time. Lower-
cased references to “orthodox” Christianity involves assent to the wider, conciliar doctrines of Trinity and 
Incarnation which the Unitarians rejected—this latter usage will also be clear in the text itself. 
 19 Marsh’s journal cited in JMR, 31.  
  
200 
at Andover “for the familiar discussion of subjects connected with [the members’] 
studies,” but by this point the intellectual stimulation he sought from his colleagues 
came in diminishing amounts.20 He later confessed to the Harvard professor George 
Ticknor, “I found myself compelled to begin again at the very foundation” during this 
time.21 
 Whether this lack of stimulation drove him to focus on his personal studies, or 
whether his personal studies alienated him from his peers, he often felt misunderstood 
by others who perceived him as purely intellectual in matters of religion (and most 
everything else as well). Of this deeply existential struggle his friend, Joseph Torrey, 
wrote: “Many seemed to consider him as a ‘mere scholar,’ a man given wholly to books 
and to speculative inquiries; one in whom the life of religion was smothered by his too 
much learning. Nothing gave him more pain than to find himself so misunderstood. But 
he saw no way of correcting the mistake, except by steadfastly pursuing his own 
course.”22  
 Resigned to answering his own questions, Marsh pushed himself in a personal 
scholarly program specifically designed to master a wide variety of ancient and modern 
thinking. Majorie Nicholson has pointed out that Marsh’s mature philosophy carried 
with it a complex matrix of influences, including New England theology, Cambridge 
Platonism, English and French Romanticism, and German idealism.23 When Marsh 
added to these sources his intense training in the classics, a particular love for Plato, and 
the biblical hermeneutical rigor of Andover, his literary repertoire was vast indeed.  
                                                   
 20 “At the club on Friday, I was rather surprised to find that though I had devoted but half a day to 
the subject, the Apostolic Fathers, my knowledge of them was as good as anyone’s. I do not make this record 
from vanity, but the fact is to me a proof of the superiority of my system of study.” Journal entry cited in 
JMR, 38. 
 21 JM to George Ticknor, Feb. 3, 1826, JDL, 48. 
 22 JMR, 32. 
 23 Majorie H. Nicolson, “James Marsh and the Vermont Transcendentalists,” The Philosophical 
Review Vol. 34, No. 1 (January 1925), 29. 
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 In particular, Marsh, though educated in what at the time was a backwoods 
Dartmouth College, hoped to articulate a more spiritually expansive Christianity that was 
still intellectually compelling. The sources of Marsh’s desire to reconstitute Christianity 
were threefold: to explain his own spiritual experiences (of both the evangelical and 
aesthetic variety), to provide a new intellectual framework for traditional Christian 
doctrines, and to reconcile himself as an introspective intellectual to those around him. 
Even in these early days, he worried that determinism and materialism lurked in the 
Scottish Common Sense realism that dominated American epistemology. 
 With these animating concerns, Marsh began to explore numerous Romantic 
authors. He found that poets such as Byron and Wordsworth provided a depth of 
spiritual feeling not seen in previous poetry. Like his later friend Richard Henry Dana 
Sr., Marsh explicitly eschewed Pope’s “cold and unfeeling [poetic] style” for the more 
liberated expression of the Romantic poets, and he found poetry to be a source of 
spiritual inspiration.24 “How vastly does everything of a religious nature swell in 
importance, when connected in our minds with a being of such capacities as Byron,” he 
insisted, “why should not the disciple of Christ feel as profoundly, and learn to express as 
energetically. . . . I love occasionally to hold communion with his spirit.”25 What 
impressed Marsh was not only Byron’s great power of expression—for which many 
Americans had developed a taste—but the deeper union of intellect and spirit, the fusion 
of the contemplative mind with a vigorous, active life that so characterized Byron’s 
legacy. “He has conceived a being in his imagination of stronger powers, of greater 
capacity for suffering and enjoying, than the race of mortals, and he has learned to live in 
                                                   
 24 JMR, 24. Quotation is his friend Torrey’s phrase to describe Marsh’s view. 
 25 JM to unknown, [1818-1819], JMR, 24-25. 
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him.”26 Byron sought both “to create, and in creating live / A being more intense” and 
Marsh found inspiration in this synthesis between creativity and action when he held 
communion with Byron’s spirit: “It gives me new vigor, and I seem in reality to live a 
being more intense.”27 The quest for dynamism as distinguished from enervating 
sentiment and a reclusive intellect was a quintessential feature of Romantic thinking.28 
Byron’s appeal to Marsh was emotional as well as intellectual; the vigorous life Byron 
exemplified was precisely the sort of life Marsh sought as he struggled to reconcile 
himself to those around him and later to find a vocation.  
 During this period, Marsh came across Madame de Staël’s De l’Allemagne (1813). 
According to his later student and friend George Allen, Marsh “experienced, in reading 
it, as he said, a portentous revelation of power within himself,” which led him to study 
other German authors and Coleridge.29 In 1819, Marsh began to delve into Coleridge’s 
Biographia Literaria (1817), which had been published in an American edition by the 
New York publisher Charles Wiley, who would soon take up Dana’s The Idle Man and 
Verplanck’s Essays on Revealed Religion.30 By 1821, Marsh was thoroughly studying 
Wordsworth and insisted that poetry “enlarges and strengthens the intellectual power.” 
He sought to make it his most privileged form of study, “to nurse [his] own faculties, to 
imbibe its spirit, to breathe its purity” but always “recurring constantly to the Gospel, the 
still purer fountain from which it derives its characteristic excellencies [sic].”31 Like the 
other Cautious Romantics, Marsh found poetry to be an important intellectual and 
spiritual medium. It not only adorned philosophy and theology, but informed it in ways 
                                                   
 26 Ibid. 
 27 Ibid. 
 28 Barzun, Classic, Romantic, and Modern, 78-95. 
 29 George Allen, “An Autobiographical Fragment. By the Late Prof. Geo. Allen, LL.D.,” The Penn 
Monthly 7 (August 1876): 652. 
 30 In a letter to Coleridge, Marsh dated his first encounter with Coleridge’s Biographia in 1819, see 
JM to STC, Mar. 23, 1829, JDL, 79. Duffy mentions Wiley as the American publisher, see JDL, 82, fn. 2. 
 31 JM to [unknown], [1821], JMR, 41-42. 
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unavailable to discursive prose. Nevertheless, like them, he cautiously tempered the 
Romantic enthusiasm for artistic revelation by “recurring constantly to the Gospel.” 
 In 1822—informed by Schlegel and de Staël—Marsh found a sophisticated 
literary-historical explanation for the spiritual interiority fostered by the poetry he was 
reading. Marsh characterized this internal, “restless spirit at last conscious of its own 
powers and expanding with conceptions of the boundless and infinite” as distinctive of a 
“romantic,” interior sensibility fostered by Christianity and now becoming ascendant in 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century.32 According to Marsh, Christianity had 
ushered in this interior sensibility by de-emphasizing earthly glories that the ancient 
poets had celebrated, emphasizing immortality and otherworldly retribution, and 
teaching European culture that the spiritual realm was more important than the visible 
world.33 Like Allston and later Harriet Beecher Stowe, Marsh described his own 
experience of this modern, Romantic consciousness by referencing the trope of Jacob’s 
Ladder: “Our views are no longer bounded, as those of the Grecian poets were, by ‘this 
goodly frame of earth’. . . . The two doors of nature are thrown open, and our spirits pass 
upward and downward to hold converse with other spirits.”34 His encounter with 
Romantic poetry and criticism had opened for him a new intellectual, spiritual, and 
emotional world that would guide his philosophy for the rest of his life. 
 The interior revelation of a power within himself and the appeal to poetry as both 
intellectually and spiritually revelatory were common experiences among the Cautious 
Romantics. Harriet Beecher Stowe, in particular, experienced an almost identical 
                                                   
 32 Marsh, “Ancient and Modern Poetry,” 98, 107. Marsh later reported to his friend Joseph Torrey 
who was studying in Paris: “It is exceedingly gratifying . . . to us who had learned to distinguish and admire 
the “Romantic” and Madame de Staël to learn that her school is carrying all the world after them.” JM to 
Joseph Torrey, Feb. 14, 1829, JDL, 69. 
 33 Marsh, “Ancient and Modern Poetry,” 109-111. 
 34  Marsh, “Ancient and Modern Poetry,” 108. 
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impulse to reconcile her Christianity with the poetic power found in Byron and Scott. 
The subjective, inward turn grounded Allston’s and Isaac Hecker’s notion of genius, as 
well as the conversion of Allston, Dana Sr., Hecker, Orestes Brownson and Sophia Ripley 
to orthodox Christianity. Moreover, the claim that art, poetry, and the feelings they 
inspired could enlarge and strengthen the intellect was embraced by nearly all of the 
Cautious Romantics. Dana Jr. found Leonard Woods Jr. a compelling teacher because he 
studied poetry as high philosophy. George Allen, Marsh’s student, later insisted that 
poetry could communicate truths about human nature which no metaphysical argument 
could, and that this in turn made it an indispensible theological tool. Henry Reed—
Allen’s friend and Wordsworth’s American editor—likewise contended that poetry 
possessed unique powers in preserving and communicating historical truth. But they all 
sought to unify these insights in more conservative ways: by appealing to traditional 
Christian doctrines, the church, and at times other institutions. 
 Ultimately, Marsh sought an ever-elusive principle that would bring “unity in all 
his knowledge,” but the diversity of his intellectual influences—far beyond the normal 
prescriptions at Andover—was forcing him to increasingly esoteric pursuits.35 The search 
for a unifying principle was a personal, philosophical project fraught with the danger of 
culminating in skepticism. In July of 1821, he wrote to his fiancée Lucia in response to 
her fervor over the most recent evangelical revival in Hanover. “I have, for some time, 
been in the habit of contemplating [the revival] with perhaps too much of the coolness of 
the speculative scholar,” Marsh wrote, again struggling with scholarly detachment 
instead of engaged, Byronic vigor. Following this confession, he began to unburden his 
soul to his future wife: 
                                                   
 35 JMR, 44. 
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The simple, unlearned Christian . . . knows nothing of the ten thousand distracting 
questions, the harrowing doubts and maddening skepticisms, that dry up the heart and 
seethe in the brain of the unfortunate student, who has ventured to pass the consecrated 
limit of his traditional faith, and look back upon it with the cool eye of critical investigation 
. . . wo to the daring and ill-starred adventurer who plunges into the metaphysic depths of 
controversial theology! . . . [He] must not only unravel the mysteries of “fate, free-will, 
foreknowledge absolute, &c., without getting lost in their mazes, but while floundering in 
an everlasting ‘hubbub wild’ of ancient learning crazed, and made to dance, like Epicurus’ 
atoms, to the ‘harmonious discord’ of some German metaphysical bagpipe, he must be 
careful to keep his balances nicely adjusted, and weigh with statistical accuracy the “hot, 
cold, moist and dry” of these “embryo atoms.” He must meet the theories of the philologist 
and the theories of the philosopher. He must silence, says one, every whisper of emotion, 
and let reason teach him. Listen to the heart, says another; it is the very sanctuary and the 
oracle of truth. . . . I see difficulty in every system, enough to confound the weakness of 
human reason.36 
 
Torrey dismissed the letter as “rather imaginative and playful,” scurrying to defend 
Marsh’s piety, but understood in light of Marsh’s retreat from Cambridge and the fact 
that many of his colleagues found him overly reclusive after his return; his intellectual 
agony about these matters seems genuine.37 His references across the Western 
intellectual tradition attested to the scope of his serious inquiries. His intellectual angst 
became poignantly clear in his invoking Milton’s “everlasting ‘hubbub wild’” where 
Chaos, Tumult, Confusion, and Discord reigned in the Abyss between Heaven, Hell, and 
Earth—a place where Marsh seemed to have found himself as he suggested to Lucia that 
his journey was “little less difficult than that of our great adversary, when he passed . . . 
‘Wide on the wasteful deep’.”38 Multiplying metaphors, he continued to compare his 
experience—similar to Coleridge’s “delving and difficulty” in 1804 and 1805—with 
Chateaubriand listening to the groans of Sodom and Gomorrah rising from the Dead Sea 
and to Dante arriving at paradise only after “first going through hell and purgatory.”39 
Marsh’s concluding this long diatribe with the fear that he must either silence emotion or 
abandon reason suggested how sincere his sentiments and cognitive dissonance really 
                                                   
 36 JM to LWM, July 1, 1821, JMR, 45-47. 
 37 Ibid. 
 38 John Milton, Paradise Lost, II.949-1006; JMR, 46. 
 39 JM to LWM, July 1, 1821, in JMR, 46-47. 
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were. Marsh had not lost his faith, he hastened to assure Lucia, but he wrestled to give a 
rational account of it that cohered with both his emotional needs to reconcile himself to 
others and his spiritual experiences reading Romantic authors. There was a frenetic 
power beneath the myriad of references to his intellectual influences; the boundaries 
between the intellectual, emotional, and spiritual realms for Marsh seemed to blend 
together in confusing ways. 
 There was certainly nothing particularly playful about Lucia’s pietistic responses. 
“I trust we shall have strength from heaven to enable us to live humble and obedient to 
Christ . . . notwithstanding we have such wicked hearts,” she wrote, reflecting on their 
relationship. In response to Marsh’s elaborate intellectual outpouring of his soul, she 
dismissed the possibility of doubt altogether. In between several paragraphs about 
“communion with God” and revivals, she managed to squeeze in one sentence addressing 
his intellectual angst. “I believe I understood what you meant,” she replied, “but I never 
thought there was the least expression of doubt of that faith which I always supposed you 
believed.”40 
 James and Lucia’s courtship seems to have been edifying and loving in many 
respects. In addition to his intellectual struggles, Marsh assured Lucia that he thought 
about her and loved her, and he looked forward to the “picture of [their] future felicity.” 
Lucia in turn expressed love and devotion in every letter, referring to James as her “best 
friend” as she looked forward to the happiness that awaited them in marriage.41 
However, as evidenced by the exchange about doubt, there was a tension in their 
relationship between his modus operandi as an intellectual and her inclination toward a 
more pietistic and evangelical religion. Like Emma Darwin, Charles Darwin’s pious wife, 
                                                   
 40 LWM to JM, July 17, 1821, JMC. 
 41 LWM to JM, July 17 and Oct. 9, 1821, JMC. Marsh’s quotation was quoted back to him in Lucia’s 
letter of July 17. 
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Lucia seemed to serve as a check on Marsh’s speculation, though of course Marsh seems 
to have genuinely desired to find a way to remain within the Christian fold.42 
 Early in their courtship Marsh had encouraged Lucia to practice his method of 
study by “reading systematically and connecting literature with history,” and he 
speculated that they might write letters to one another dissecting Shakespearean 
literature.43 If any such letters existed between them, they would stand in stark contrast 
to the tone and content of those preserved. Even when Marsh suggested their literary 
téte-a-téte, he worried twice in the letter that he was rambling on too much and 
“beginning to lecture.”44 It seems Lucia provided him with crucial emotional support 
given his reclusive tendencies, and yet he could only partially unburden his intellectual 
soul. At times she struggled to understand James’s studious tendencies just as his friends 
did. In the midst of the difficult year of 1821 at Andover, he was so engrossed in his 
books that he failed to visit her as promised. In response, she expressed her “feelings . . . 
of severe disappointment. I believe I understand you,” she wistfully declared, “this must 
be a delightful season to study and my only fear is that your body will not support such 
intense application.”45 
 The intense application to study that vexed their relationship would soon pay off 
for Marsh both personally and professionally. In July of 1822, he established himself 
with the Cambridge literati by publishing a sweeping and learned essay in the North 
American Review, which came to be known as “Ancient and Modern Poetry.” In this 
Schlegel-inspired article Marsh outlined the history of a “classic and romantic war,” 
                                                   
 42 Janet Browne, Charles Darwin: The Power of Place (New York: Knopf and Random House, 
2002), 66–68, 154–155. 
 43 JM to LWM, Nov. 5, 1820, JMC.  
 44 Ibid. Twice in this letter Marsh expresses his concern that he is rambling about intellectual 
matters not of interest to Lucia. “After reading the whole of the enclosed sheet and finding still more to come 
I know not what you will think of me,” he began, and at the end he worried, “I am beginning to lecture.” 
 45 LWM to JM, Oct. 9, 1821, JMC. 
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arguing that all literature historically sought for a “principle of unity” but that ancient 
literature derived its forms and meanings from a direct and unproblematic relationship 
to the external world, while modern literature—arising out of Christian theology and the 
acute imagination of northern European peoples—retreated into introspection to 
discover ultimate principles.46 The article was ostensibly a review of the Italian critic di 
Breme’s eight volumes on Italian literature that was written in part to help defend the 
French Romantic critic Madame de Staël from her Italian detractors. But Marsh 
launched into a long and learned discourse of his own, arguing the distinction between 
modern, Romantic consciousness and ancient consciousness represented both a 
development and loss. “Higher interests, and sublimer conceptions, and profounder 
feelings [were] awakened” in modern consciousness which “cherish[ed] a consciousness 
of those immortal powers” that set humans apart from the natural order, but this came 
at the expense of the unity between humans, nature, and art that existed in ancient 
Greece.47 Allying himself with de Staël and invoking Schlegel and Coleridge, he insisted 
that it made no sense to pursue “slavish imitation of the ancients” in poetry and art.48 
However, like Allston and Coleridge in Chapter One, Marsh advocated a cautious 
Romantic aesthetic that advocated the careful study of the past precisely so the 
independent artist could decide which forms to use, which forms to alter, and which 
forms to reject altogether. The final decision rested “in the mind of each individual,” but 
a respect for the past was also essential.49 
 Marsh’s own respect for the past was on full display in “Ancient and Modern 
Poetry.” Professionally, the most important feature of this article was the facility Marsh 
                                                   
 46 Marsh, “Ancient and Modern Poetry,” 98, 105–107. 
 47 Ibid., 106–107. 
 48 Ibid., 102. 
 49 Ibid., 103. 
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demonstrated with the length and breadth of the Western intellectual tradition. Homer, 
Plato, Aristotle, Aeschylus, Aristophanes, Herodotus, Horace, Cicero, Tacitus, the Bible, 
Scandinavian mythology, Origen, Philo, Cyprian, Gregory Nazianzen, Plotinus, Eriugena, 
Ambrose, Dante, Milton, Shakespeare, Gibbon, Bunyan, Grimm, Eichhorn, Klopstock, 
Byron, Coleridge, Schlegel, de Staël; Marsh invoked them all with a facility that 
impressed even the most learned of the American intellectual elite.50 It was this plethora 
of influences that would allow him to later perceive in Coleridge’s misty syncretism a 
new, spiritual philosophy he hoped could reinvigorate American thought.  
 George Ticknor, Harvard Professor of French and Spanish languages and a 
former student at the University of Göttigen, declared it the best article yet written for 
the North American Review.51 Edward Everett, chosen over Richard Henry Dana Sr. to 
edit the NAR, praised the article’s erudite analysis, and Marsh was now gracefully 
welcomed in Boston intellectual circles.52 Implying the importance of transatlantic 
formation and the limited circulation of Romantic sources in America, Everett thought 
Ticknor himself must have written the article and claimed that only someone who had 
been to Europe could command such wide-ranging and intimate knowledge of the 
sources employed.53  
 The point would prove a poignant one for Marsh as he suffered intellectually 
under the weight of modest means and the concomitant limitation on transatlantic 
                                                   
 50 Majorie Nicholson has claimed the article demonstrated “a breadth of reading in German 
literature which is unparalleled in the America of 1822.” Nicolson, “James Marsh and the Vermont 
Transcendentalists,” 33; by this time Marsh had mastered Italian, Spanish, German, Latin, Greek, and 
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travel, like Dana Sr. and the later Orestes Brownson. Marsh recognized a “reciprocal 
action of mind upon mind” that empowered “our transatlantic brethren” to higher 
intellectual attainment.54 In his later career, he felt himself laboring under the prejudice 
that no “good thing could come out of that Nazareth Burlington.”55 His yearning for 
transatlantic formation became clear when his friend Joseph Torrey was able to travel 
throughout Europe to both study and purchase books for the university, financed by his 
own substantial means. “I am glad . . . both for your sake and our own that you are 
enjoying the privileges and feeling the impulses of life and power intensified as they are 
in Paris. We hope to enjoy some of the pleasure and much of the benefit of the 
experience and knowledge which you are acquiring in the halls of the Sorbonne and 
breathing the “Spiritualism” of Cousin.”56 Marsh went on to reference de Staël and 
confessed an excitement that her “Romantic” school was now carrying the day in Paris. 
As he was about to contribute to this project in his own way at home, he yearned to 
experience the benefits of a more sophisticated education abroad. His emotional 
emphasis on the “life and power intensified” abroad, using the same language as he did 
to explain his encounter with Romantic authors, suggested an intellectual wanderlust 
lurking in his sense of self. 
 But for now, Marsh’s learned synthesis even allowed the editors to overlook the 
same Romantic flights of emotional revelry they had criticized in Dana Sr.’s writing. It 
was clear whose side of the literary-intellectual divide Marsh was on, but the article’s 
academic merit allowed Marsh to transcend the censure leveled at Dana’s less 
sophisticated fiction. His youthful experiences poked through when he spoke of “the 
calm of a summer’s noon . . . [where] mysterious expression . . . leads us to the 
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 55 JM to Leonard Marsh, Oct. 28, 1829, JDL, 96. 
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211 
indulgence of reverie. [When] to our imagination, as to our faith, what we see is shadow, 
and all beyond is substance.”57 The sentiment would appear again in Marsh’s most 
famous intellectual endeavor, the “Preliminary Essay” to Coleridge’s Aids to Reflection 
(1829). But while “Ancient and Modern Poetry” mapped out Marsh’s vast learning and 
helped to secure him a professional reputation, it ended on another personal note—this 
one more ominous. “Reason and philosophy gradually distinguished from each other the 
worlds of faith and imagination, before so intimately blended, and as our sober ancestors 
[such as Dante or Bunyan] turned all their poetry into religion, we are in danger of 
turning all our religion to poetry.”58 Marsh had not yet found his principle of unity that 
would unite his spirit and his intellect, his faith and his reason. 
 On the way to visit Ticknor and touch up some translations in his manuscript, 
Marsh visited his cousin Sarah, who had been an old friend in childhood. Writing to his 
brother Leonard of the event, he demonstrated a continuing sensitivity to the 
relationship between himself as an intellectual and others who were not so inclined. Of 
Sarah he declared: “She is all heart and soul—loves her husband, loves her children, and 
what is more prays for them all with a very ardent love for the religion which she would 
have them also enjoy. Such a sight is to me extremely interesting and I have never had 
higher notions of the happiness, which a minister of the gospel might [Marsh’s 
emphasis] enjoy with his parishioners than from conversing with her. I felt I am sure for 
once [my emphasis] that I would prefer it to any other which the world might afford.”59 
 The italicizing of might is Marsh’s emphasis and it is significant. In his 
relationship with Sarah, Marsh recognized and respected her ardent spirituality, which 
in his estimation led to a compelling life (a point he would make in his “Preliminary 
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 59 JM to Leonard Marsh, Apr. 27, 1822, JDL, 42-43. 
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Essay”). In the edifying exchange that he had with her, Marsh perceived that a close and 
mutually rewarding relationship was possible between an abstract thinker (many of 
whom tended to be ministers) like himself and a person of simpler faith. However, the 
use of “might” implies that Marsh perceived a great divide between intellectuals and 
non-intellectuals in society, and his use of the emotionally detached verb “interesting” 
juxtaposed with the emotionally charged “higher notions of happiness” communicated 
Marsh’s own psychological tension between the objective intellectual and warm-hearted 
minister. Nevertheless, Marsh appeared hopeful in the letter, suggesting that for once he 
found himself reconciled to those unlike himself in intellectual temperament, although 
he would not ultimately realize his vocation as a minister.  
 
A Reasonable Vocation for an Intellectual  
 Though Marsh had established himself with the publication of “Ancient and 
Modern Poetry,” the next few years proved difficult for him as he cast about for a 
vocation. He was not sure where he belonged, but he had grand visions of participating 
in the evangelical “cause of God. I hope I may yet do something for a cause so grand,” he 
declared, “I know not, and have for myself but little choice, in what way it may be, 
whether with my voice or my pen; but I could not die in peace without the consciousness 
of having attempted something.”60 Completing his studies at Andover in September 
1822, he wandered the country, pursuing various potential employments. He was 
rumored for possible positions at Harvard and at Princeton, he applied to edit the 
Christian Spectator at Jedidiah Morse’s encouragement, and he traveled as far south as 
Richmond serving briefly as a poorly paid tutor and preacher at Hampden-Sydney 
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College in southern Virginia.61 He returned north after only a few months, and then 
returned to Hampden-Sydney in late 1823, still without a permanent position.   
 This vocational crisis directly concerned his relationship with Lucia, as they could 
not marry until he was permanently settled. When the editorship of the Christian 
Spectator fell through in April of 1823, Marsh became frustrated and embarrassed. “The 
most trying thing to our pride, after all, is, to admit that we need consolation. The very 
idea of it, as of being pitied, is humiliating . . . especially when our fortune seems to 
depend chiefly upon ourselves,” Marsh wrote to Lucia.62 The stalwart Lucia remained 
encouraging: “Your frankness discovers qualities in yourself . . . which increases if 
possible the interest I before felt.” To allay his fears she insisted, “I care but little about 
it, I know happiness does not depend on riches or honor” and that if they had each other 
“it would make but little difference with me where I am placed.”63 It was an anxious time 
for many young men in America, particularly those of intellectual inclination, as they all 
sought to find their place within an increasingly dynamic political economy. They 
competed harder than ever to establish themselves in an increasingly complex market, 
while those of intellectual cast had to account for market demand as well as a broadly 
democratic zeitgeist.64 
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to Parents, Jan. 31, 1823, JMC.  Marsh became friends with Richard Cary Morse at Andover, the latter was a 
licentiate there. Richard was brother to Samuel F.B. Morse, Allston’s friend and pupil in London, and both 
were the sons of Jedidiah Morse (geographer and orthodox minister of the First Congregational Church, 
Charlestown, MA). 
 62 JM to LWM, [April 1823], JMR, 63-64. 
 63 LWM to JM, Apr. 3, 1823, JMC. 
 64 For a trenchant analysis of the antebellum American economy, the role of the intellectual, and the 
trying psychological toll the quest for vocation could take, see Lewis Perry, Boats Against the Current: 
American Culture Between Revolution and Modernity, 1820-1860 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1993), 189–197. Perry’s account provides depth to Joseph Torrey’s claim that many young men suffered from 
“anxieties and depressions” during this time of life, see JMR, 53. 
  
214 
 The obvious vocation for an intellectual such as Marsh was the ministry, and he 
initially had high hopes in this regard.65 In his letter to Leonard about cousin Sarah, 
Marsh had extolled the virtues of a minister who could use his philosophical gifts to 
engage parishioners properly attentive to spiritual reflection. While at Hampden-Sydney 
in 1823, Marsh was again drawn to the ministry as he was largely contracted to “preach 
to the people and the students for the winter.”66 His mentor, Dr. John Holt Rice, had 
been in very poor health, but shortly after Marsh’s arrival Rice rejoined his congregation, 
which moved Marsh deeply. “He alluded in the most impressive manner to his sickness, 
and in reference to the deep interest and earnest prayer of his people, said, I stand before 
you as one prayed back from the brink of eternity. The people were all in tears, and I was 
never more interested than at such an expression of feeling between a pastor and his 
people.”67 Rice was an intellectual in Marsh’s cast and an intellectual who had found 
meaningful work in the pulpit. “We have both been struck with the coincidence of our 
views and feelings on almost all the important subjects on which he have converse,” 
Marsh confessed.68 
 But Marsh could not become a minister as he struggled with the duties such a 
vocation required, particularly preaching. The old, hauntingly detached verb “interested” 
surfaced again as he analyzed Rice’s relationship to his congregation. As with cousin 
Sarah, Rice’s relationship with his congregation appealed to Marsh, and yet Marsh found 
himself beholding the emotional union between a people and their pastor as an outsider. 
Marsh yearned to preach “in the Virginia style extempore,” to break down the barriers 
                                                   
 65 “I am beginning to prepare myself for the active duties of a minister, and am ready to believe I 
shall find more pleasure in it than I have ever done in my studies.” JM to [unknown], Apr. 14, 1822, JMR, 
50. 
 66 JM to Parents, Jan. 31, 1823, JMC. 
 67 JMR, 57-58. Likely from Marsh’s Journal. See also JM to Parents, Jan. 23, 1823, JMC, which 
corroborates many of the expressions from the journal but with different words. 
 68 JMR, 58. 
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between himself as an intellectual and those around him by communicating through the 
imagination the life of the spirit he felt so keenly.69 The principle was deeper than home-
style aesthetics. In “Ancient and Modern Poetry” Marsh had rosily celebrated the Middle 
Ages, when intellectuals enjoyed a more constant and organic connection with the 
people. According to Marsh, the daily homilies, festivals, saint’s days, and Gothic 
architecture provided an organic cultural matrix of meaning and connection between all 
people. Now Marsh stated, quoting the historian Mendelsohn, “we learn and teach each 
other only by books. . . . The preacher does not converse with his church, he reads or 
declaims to them a written treatise. . . . All is dead letter, with none of the spirit of living 
intercourse. . . . In one word, we are literati, letter-men.”70 Again, Marsh’s emotional and 
vocational yearnings colored his history.  
 In February of 1823, Dr. Rice wrote to Marsh: “as to preaching you must not 
despair—Rome was not built in a day. Preach all you can and you will gradually come to 
preach with ease—My notion is that if a man have ideas he can express them, unless he 
have some impediment in his speech.”71 But the unsuccessful struggle to realize a 
vocation to the ministry left Marsh in despair. “I am sometimes almost resolved to give 
up this vain attempt to act in public, and devote myself to study, till an opportunity to be 
useful as a literary man shall present itself. I am satisfied that I shall never do any thing 
valuable in any other way.” Torrey explained that the act in public Marsh here referred to 
was in fact preaching. Although Marsh’s sermons were philosophically erudite, he could 
not muster “the unrestrained intercourse of feelings” necessary for pastoral care.72 It was 
                                                   
 69 JM to Parents, Jan. 31, 1823, JMC. 
 70 Marsh, “Ancient and Modern Poetry,” 124–127. 
 71 Dr. J.H. Rice to JM, Feb. 12, 1823, JMC. Marsh had by this point already preached at least three 
times and likely more, see JM to Parents, Jan. 31, 1823, JMC. 
 72 JMR, 61-62. 
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not that Marsh desired to be a minister above all other vocations, but options for literary 
work were limited and, moreover, he was drawn to the pastoral relationship. 
 Marsh eventually found resolution to his crisis through education. At precisely 
the same time Marsh struggled to find his vocation in Richmond, Thomas Jefferson was 
attempting to develop the common schools across Virginia with particular attention to 
the new state university. For Jefferson, “the success—nay, the salvation—of the Republic 
lay in education; education consisted of the diffusion of knowledge, the nurturance of 
virtue, and the cultivation of learning” through “some system ultimately tied to the 
polity.”73 The growing system of colleges, promoted in part to staff common schools with 
able instructors, helped to provide more opportunities for intellectuals unable to realize 
their vocation in the ministry or the very limited positions available at the established, 
elite colleges. Developing systems for education across the Republic was a complicated 
process, leading to a sustained debate to which Marsh would add his own voice, and the 
growing interest in education helped him find his niche as an intellectual in society. 
 In October of 1824, Marsh was finally offered a more permanent professorship at 
Hampden Sidney College and was able to provide for and marry Lucia. They remained at 
Hampden-Sydney for two years, and having finally found a vocation, Marsh found his 
confidence renewed. However, the “fairy land of our own green hills and greener 
meadows” of Vermont still haunted him, and he worried about “the dark stain of slavery” 
that infected the cultural life and intellectual potential of the South.74 “I would aim, if I 
could . . . [to] rouse all who have the capacity, to something of enthusiasm,” he insisted, 
                                                   
 73 Lawrence A. Cremin, American Education, the National Experience, 1783-1876 (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1980), 124–125. 
 74 JMR, 59, 69-70. See also JM to George Ticknor, May 6, 1825, JDL, 45-47. Marsh’s critique of 
Southern culture was partly shared by his student at Hampden-Sydney, Jesse Burton Harrison, to whom 
Marsh gave a love for Romantic literature and thinking. “Virginia had too many semi-educated lawyers,” 
Harrison complained, “too few ‘men of letters of the higher order; professional men, of high literary taste 
mingling with their professional feelings.” Quoted in Michael O’Brien, Conjectures of Order: Intellectual Life 
and the American South, 1810-1860 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 137. 
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“to wipe away the dark stain of slavery, and become, in the language of Milton, the 
soberest, wisest, and most christian people of these latter days.”75 But Marsh’s grandiose 
abolitionist sentiment, no matter how Miltonic, would not become a primary part of his 
consciousness. Instead, education would be the reform to which he would contribute. 
 
Conclusion 
 He did not have to wait long. In 1826, Marsh was offered the presidency at the 
University of Vermont in Burlington. The University had experienced difficult times 
since its founding, and the board of directors gave Marsh essential carte blanch to reform 
and establish the university in the minds of the community and the nation. His position 
as a university president reconciled Marsh to those around him and gave him a wide-
ranging reputation as a philosophical spokesman for a new kind of Coleridgean 
philosophical theology and an educational vision modeled on these principles. Carefully 
understanding that philosophical theology clarifies Marsh’s position in American 
intellectual history and is thus the subject of Chapter Six.
                                                   
 75 JMR, 70-71. 
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Chapter 6: James Marsh’s Romantic Epistemology: Kant, Coleridge, and 
Trinitarian Christianity 
Introduction 
 Part of the reason that James Marsh has been an unjustly neglected figure in 
American intellectual history is that both on the surface and even on a close reading 
Marsh’s intellectual program is difficult to unwind. His intellectual influences were 
voluminous, and his attempt to synthesize them was both herculean and quixotic. 
Understanding his eventual synthesis requires careful attention to such thinkers and 
movements as Kant, Common Sense realism, Christian Platonism, and various Romantic 
poets, particularly Coleridge. This chapter seeks to both explain Marsh’s philosophical 
theology—which followed Coleridge quite closely—and explain how Marsh hoped his new 
ideas might function in the American intellectual context. While tangled and 
complicated, Marsh’s ideas are crucial to understanding his reputation as an educational 
reformer, his intellectual influence as a spokesman for the Cautious Romantics, and his 
role in helping to spark Transcendentalism. 
  
Egalitarian Epistemology: Transplanting and Clarifying Coleridge  
 In “Ancient and Modern Poetry” Marsh extolled the virtues of introspection that 
he ascribed to the modern writers, but in particular the stamp of Coleridge loomed 
large.1 Marsh had written his anguished letter to Lucia at precisely the same time he had 
begun to delve into Coleridge’s Biographia Literaria. In Coleridge, Marsh found a 
philosophy that he thought intellectually vindicated not only his faith but also that of the 
                                                   
 1 Marsh paid homage to Coleridge’s distinction between object and subject and lifted a scene from 
The Rime of the Ancient Mariner to illustrate the times in which a deeper reality appears to our imagination 
from “behind the elements.” Marsh, “Ancient and Modern Poetry,” 103, 108. Also, Peter Carafiol has 
discovered that Marsh had begun to incorporate Coleridgian concepts from the Lyrical Ballads and some of 
his published letters. Peter Carafiol, Transcendent Reason, 57, 194. 
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non-intellectual, and he would make this point explicit in his later “Preliminary Essay” to 
Coleridge’s Aids to Reflection. His Coleridgeanism in turn provided for his vocation to 
education and thereby the rewarding relationships he always sought. By 1825, Coleridge 
was now stably ensconced on Highgate Hill in a quiet suburb outside of London. Under 
the careful care of the surgeon James Gillman, he had managed to control, if not totally 
eliminate, his opium addiction. In this more salubrious environment, Coleridge 
published Aids to Reflection (1825), which provided a public expression of his attempt to 
synthesize his Romantic epistemology with Christianity and a formal statement of the 
ideas he had imparted to Allston some twenty years earlier. 
 In 1829, Marsh published the Aids to Reflection with a lengthy “Preliminary 
Essay” of his own, also including his own substantial notes to the text. His goals were 
manifold and drew on his youthful personal experiences. He sought to vindicate the 
Christian doctrines of the Trinity and the incarnation of God in Christ against Unitarian 
assaults, to convince orthodox thinkers to embrace a radically new epistemology and a 
more “spiritual” religion, to reconcile intellectuals and non-intellectuals through 
religion, and to elucidate the verbose and circuitous Coleridge. Marsh’s American 
context prompted his emphasis on Trinitarianism and egalitarianism; while the 
principles could be found in Coleridge, Marsh fleshed them out much more clearly and 
coherently.2 Indeed, Marsh’s thought seemed to embrace and to communicate all of the 
major points in Coleridge’s philosophy much more succinctly and effectively—at least for 
American audiences. When Coleridge’s nephew and literary executor, Henry Nelson 
Coleridge, continued to release future editions of the Aids to Reflection, he found Marsh 
the most able commentator on either side of the Atlantic. “The Editor had intended to 
                                                   
 2 I have privileged Marsh and his arguments in what follows, but return to Coleridge in the places 
where Marsh’s emphases led back to him. 
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offer . . . the leading points of philosophy contained in [Aids to Reflection]. But he has 
been delighted to find the work already done to his hand, in a manner superior to 
anything he could have hoped to accomplish himself, by an affectionate disciple of 
Coleridge on the other side of the Atlantic.”3 Though Marsh would never travel abroad, 
his pen and mind were not without influence in Britain. 
 Marsh's initial appeal was egalitarian. On the very first page he addressed the 
work, “To all of every class who shall . . . peruse [this work] with the attention and 
thoughtfulness . . . on subjects, upon which every man is bound to reflect deeply and in 
earnest.”4 His argument took a double-edged approach. On the one hand, Marsh 
explicitly argued for a new epistemology that would represent nothing less than a 
revolution in current American views of the mind. With this new epistemology, Marsh 
hoped to vindicate the essential beliefs of Christianity. On the other hand, he constantly 
insisted that neither he nor Coleridge sought to “teach a speculative system of doctrines 
built upon established premises” but rather to pursue “the exercise of reflection”—by 
which Marsh meant, a slow and spiritual meditation on the deepest questions of human 
existence, or as he put it “to turn the mind continually back upon the premises 
themselves.”5 Engaging in this process revealed, he thought, the superficiality of both 
Lockean derived British empiricism generally, and Scottish Common Sense philosophy 
in particular. However, as we shall see, Marsh was selective in his argument; he never 
systematically refuted Thomas Reid or Dugald Stewart and instead chose to focus on the 
shortcomings of Locke and the later Scottish thinker Thomas Brown. While parts of 
Marsh’s philosophy largely cohered with Reid and Stewart, he thought the overemphasis 
                                                   
 3 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Aids to Reflection and Statesman’s Manual, ed. William G.T. Shedd, 
vol. 1, Complete Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1854), 66. 
 4 Marsh, “Preliminary Essay,” in Coleridge and Marsh, Aids to Reflection, vii. Hereafter Marsh’s 
essay will be cited as “Preliminary Essay” and Coleridge’s writings as Aids to Reflection. 
 5 Marsh, “Preliminary Essay,” viii. 
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on empiricism and Baconian induction vitiated Christian spirituality and rendered the 
traditional Christian paradoxes of the Trinity and the Incarnation, in Sydney Ahlstrom’s 
words, “lifeless and static.”6 In the Aids to Reflection, Marsh and Coleridge attempted to 
provide vindication for spiritual experience, the Trinity, and the Incarnation of God in 
Christ—topics that Scottish Common Sense philosophers understandably did not 
address. 
 Like his soon-to-be friends Dana Sr. and Leonard Woods Jr., Marsh invoked 
another Catholic thinker whom he thought ‘most clearly expressed his program. “‘We 
must retire inward,’ says St. Bernard, ‘if we would ascend upward’.”7 The emphasis on 
the interior self revealed Marsh’s Romantic consciousness, but the invocation of a 
medieval sage highlighted the cautious backward looking nature of that consciousness. 
Marsh thought the inward turn warranted because human beings were created in the 
image of God.8 In this assertion Marsh worked within the Christian tradition generally, 
but he sought to convince his Calvinist Trinitarian friends that if humankind retained 
the image of God then the inward turn might be trusted as an avenue to truth. The 
justification for religious belief thus came through the self. Invoking the language of 
unity in diversity already embraced by Allston and Coleridge, Marsh believed that one 
could “learn the true meaning of the whole and of all its parts, by retiring into their own 
minds and finding there the true point of observation for each” (xii). Not only could the 
inward turn lead one to traditional Christian faith, this faith, Marsh thought, could 
explain the fundamental insights of the Romantic Age: the need to reconcile unity and 
diversity, insatiable longing, and moments of spiritual or artistic inspiration.   
                                                   
 6 Sydney E. Ahlstrom, “The Scottish Philosophy and American Theology,” Church History 24, no. 3 
(1955): 269. 
 7 Marsh, “Preliminary Essay,” ix. 
 8 Marsh frequently uses this term. Marsh, “Preliminary Essay,” ix, xiv, xxxix. 
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 Marsh argued that the image of God manifested in three ways. The first was 
through the Reason, which Marsh joined Coleridge and Allston in equating with the 
Christian Platonist Divine Word present within each human being (xxv). Contrary to 
most orthodox Protestant writing, which invoked the capitalized “Word” in reference to 
the Bible, Marsh explicitly claimed there were “several manifestations of the one Divine 
Word;” internal Reason and external revelation were equal manifestations of it (xv).9 
Marsh insisted, “The substantial being, and the living energy, of that Word, which is not 
only the light but the life of men, is either misapprehended or denied by all parties.” 
(xxvii). While reading Coleridge and de Staël in his early extracurricular studies, Marsh 
had begun to consult Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason while simultaneously making, 
according to Torrey, “a copious analysis of each [Platonic] dialogue.”10 Through 
Coleridge and Plato, Marsh became attracted to the Cambridge Platonists as 
exemplifying not only the intellectual, but also the inwardly “spiritual” religion he 
sought. To explain Coleridge’s definition of Reason, Marsh cited the Cambridge Platonist 
Henry More who claimed that Christ “is the eternal Logos, the all-comprehending 
wisdom and reason of God, wherein he sees through the nature and ideas of all things.”11 
It was in this sense that humankind was made in the image of God: they possessed 
Reason which was not only a gift from God but in a real sense a part of God himself. Both 
Marsh and Coleridge emphasized these several manifestations of the Word as an 
important part of their Trinitarian apologetic, discussed later. 
 According to Marsh, two other features rounded out the image of God. The 
second part of God’s image within human beings was conscience, which guided humans 
                                                   
 9 “Revelation” here meant both the Word as Scripture, but also “our blessed Saviour [who] is 
himself the essential Form and the living Word.” Marsh, “Preliminary Essay,” xxiv. 
 10 JMR, 43. 
 11 Marsh Note. Coleridge and Marsh, Aids to Reflection, 320. 
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in moral questions. In the “Preliminary Essay,” Marsh did not address the question of 
whether and to what extent conscience could be trusted, but elsewhere he held that “all 
men have the same law of conscience.”12 He joined the prevailing Common Sense 
zeitgeist in trusting in conscience’s reliability.13 The third aspect of God’s image was free 
will, a principle Marsh used to critique both the Orthodox and Unitarians at length. 
 
Scottish Common Sense 
 Marsh’s relative silence on conscience demonstrated the contours of his 
agreement and disagreement with Scottish Common Sense. He never questioned the 
prevalent belief in the reliability of conscience, but instead sought to press the 
mysterious problem of human free will to establish new, allegedly rational, grounds for 
faith. Focusing on morality made some sense. For Americans one of the primary 
attractions to Scottish Common Sense philosophy was its moral clarity and political 
suitability, especially as Scottish thought initially gained traction in the late-eighteenth 
century. The Edinburgh-trained Princeton president John Witherspoon, the first and 
most important disseminator of Scottish Common Sense in America, explicitly denied 
importing anything from Thomas Reid, the most comprehensive epistemologist of the 
Scotch school. Witherspoon’s lectures avoided all mention of Reid. Instead, Witherspoon 
relied primarily on the earlier Francis Hutcheson, whose concern was moral philosophy 
and establishing the reliability of human moral sense.14 From 1768 to 1775, Witherspoon 
personally trained 30% of all college-educated clergyman from those years (not just 
Presbyterians), thus the disseminating Scotch thinking inflected strongly toward moral 
                                                   
 12 James Marsh, “Discourse on Conscience,” JMR, 406. 
 13 Coleridge likewise trusted conscience, joining Joseph Butler in equating it with the image of God 
(“conscience is the candle of the Lord”).  Hedley, Coleridge, Philosophy, and Religion, 177–178. 
 14 Noll, America’s God, 105–106, 110. 
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philosophy.15 A ubiquitous common sense simultaneously justified established 
communal moral and religious truths but did so in a rapidly changing political climate 
that emphasized the trustworthiness of the common man in political and moral matters. 
In the hope of creating a stable republic with the volatile, egalitarian logic of the 
Declaration of Independence, which inspired increasingly widespread popular political 
power, Common Sense philosophy relished well.16  
 But though moral philosophy was the strongest motivation for the wide adoption 
of Scottish Common Sense, by the time Marsh published Aids to Reflection Thomas Reid 
and Dugald Stewart’s complete epistemology had gained a strong purchase on the 
American mind. Two separate publishers from 1813-1815 and in 1822 issued Reid’s 
complete works in American editions, suggesting strong demand.17 In the 1820’s Stewart 
became standard—though not ubiquitous—reading in college courses on the philosophy 
of mind, and an American edition of his complete works debuted in 1829, simultaneous 
to the Aids to Reflection.18  
 As seen in Chapter One, David Hume had undermined the empirical realism at 
the heart of British philosophy by arguing that if all knowledge ultimately derived from 
discreet, individual sense perceptions—as Locke had essentially maintained—then much 
                                                   
 15 Ibid., 125. 
 16 Ibid., 113; D.H. Meyer has suggested that Americans adopted the approach of Scottish philosophy 
more than the philosophy in its entirety. It’s “resolute good sense, its avoidance of abstruse speculations, its 
straightforward moralizing . . . [provided] a public philosophy . . . [for] schoolroom and . . . the marketplace.” 
Donald Harvey Meyer, The Instructed Conscience: The Shaping of the American National Ethic 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1972), 42; Michael O’Brien points out that Southern 
intellectuals were primarily interested in political philosophy and showed little interest in epistemology and 
metaphysics, thus Scottish Common Sense was a “fractured tradition." O’Brien, Conjectures of Order, 1008–
1012; for an insightful discussion of the subtle use of Common Sense for political purposes in Thomas 
Paine’s work and moment see Sophia Rosenfeld, Common Sense: A Political History (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2011), 136–180, esp. 138–139, 145–147. 
 17 The publishers were Samuel Etheridge Jr. of Charlestown in 1813-1815 and E. Duyckinck, Collins, 
and Hannay, and R. and W.A. Bartow of New York in 1822. 
 18 Snow, The College Curriculum in the United States, 122, 126, 129. In 1820 the University of 
Pennsylvania still utilized “Locke’s Essays” for the “Science of the Mind” (139). The publisher of Stewart’s 
complete works was Hilliard and Brown of Cambridge. 
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of the supposed human knowledge about the external world, particularly its governing 
laws could not be justified. In particular, Hume argued that the law of causation, which 
grounded empirical science, could not be rationally explained. Thomas Reid responded 
that the mind possessed “first principles,” elsewhere called principles of common sense, 
which arose “from the constitution of our nature.”19 These were neither a product of 
reason nor of sensation, they were simply intuitive principles within the mind that 
structured the mind’s encounter with the world and with itself. Personal identity, 
causation, free will, space, time, the moral laws of conscience, mathematical axioms, the 
reliability of sensation, perception, and memory were all principles that no rational 
person could function without. Therefore, they must be reliable, intuitive principles.20 
Reid also maintained that the existence of the external world and God’s existence 
enjoyed this status as a first principle.21 In America, Reid’s system provided an adequate 
response to Hume and preserved numerous principles foundational to American 
theology. Scottish Common Sense was an epistemological framework all parties could 
agree on while they argued primarily about the interpretation of the Bible and the role of 
reason in interpreting revelation. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
 19 Thomas Reid, Inquiry into the Human Mind, WTR, 1:250. 
 20 Ibid., 1:195, 199, 234–235, 250, 255, 283, 415–422; Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual 
Powers of Man, WTR, 2:33–38, 294, 328, 331, 338, 353; Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of 
Man, WTR, 3:99–109, 135, 153, 159–174, 189–208; Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man, 
WTR, 3: 398; 4:215–218, 252–256. 
 21 Reid, Inquiry into the Human Mind, WTR, 1:255; Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers, WTR, 
3:153, 158. 
  
226 
Toward a New Epistemology 
 Marsh attacked the dominant epistemology, but he never articulated a point-by-
point critique of either Thomas Reid or Dugald Stewart, the two most comprehensive 
thinkers in the Scottish School. Instead, he lumped Locke, Thomas Brown, and the other 
Scottish writers together as members of a single philosophy that had “been received in 
full faith, as the only rational system” and as inextricably intertwined with all American 
theology.22 Marsh’s objection had several components. First, Scottish Common Sense 
failed to provide any justification for the traditional Christian doctrines of Trinity and 
Incarnation. Reid and Stewart understandably never touched the issue; they were 
philosophers attempting to combat Humean skepticism, not theologians interested in 
defending controversial doctrines. Not only that, their methodological appeal to common 
sense on esoteric questions such as free will or the existence of the external world 
worked against any attempt to explain the paradoxical Christian doctrines as rational. 
According to Marsh, the prevailing system was “at war with orthodox views of religion” 
and he claimed many Orthodox theology professors had admitted as much privately 
(xlv). Second, Scottish Common Sense vitiated “every thing distinctly spiritual” in 
Christianity (xlvii). It gave no account of or inducement to spiritual experience, and its 
overly rationalistic emphasis on Baconian induction in mental philosophy created an 
unsympathetic atmosphere to spiritual insight, whether of the religious or aesthetic 
variety. This latter complaint was the most common among those Americans who 
rejected British empiricism, whether Transcendentalists or otherwise. The general 
complaint about American spiritual malaise helps to explain why those such as Emerson, 
Allston, Dana Sr., and Marsh thought they were reacting most vigorously against the 
Common Sense zeitgeist, while scholars have found residual facets of Common Sense 
                                                   
 22 Marsh, “Preliminary Essay,” xlv. 
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thinking in their writings.23 They objected primarily to an overweening Baconian method 
and what it left out of the mind rather than to the distinct epistemological conclusions of 
Scottish Common Sense. They needed a more capacious conception of reason than 
Americans who appealed to the Scots in matters of philosophy tended to allow. 
 On the question of reason, Marsh introduced his most enduring distinction, 
which became the yeast throughout Romantic discourse in antebellum America—
particularly among the Transcendentalists. Marsh and Coleridge argued for a 
fundamental distinction in the human mind between Reason and Understanding. 
Coleridge, as we have seen in Chapter One, leaped at this distinction between the two 
that Kant introduced. But why was this distinction necessary? For Kant the distinction 
served, among other things, to give an account of the relationship between causation and 
human free will. Kant’s distinction between phenomenal perception of the world—
organized as it was by the categories of the understanding—and his postulating a 
noumenal world of things in themselves to which humans did not have direct access, 
allowed him to eventually give an intriguing response to the most bedeviling problem in 
philosophy, namely the free will problem.24 If causation was a category of the 
understanding, and may or may not exist in the way we conceive of it in the noumenal 
world, then free will might in fact be at play despite the understanding’s inability to 
properly perceive or articulate free will since the understanding always insisted on 
organizing all experience and perception as cause-and-effect.25 On the other hand, 
                                                   
 23 Hunter, “America’s First Romantics”; Merrell R. Davis, “Emerson’s ‘Reason’ and the Scottish 
Philosophers,” The New England Quarterly 17, no. 2 (June 1, 1944): 209–228. 
 24 I have not capitalized the terms ‘reason’ and ‘understanding’ in Kant’s case to distinguish his 
more careful epistemology from the Romantic uses to which Marsh and Coleridge adapted it. 
 25 Robert Merrihew Adams and Immanuel Kant, “Introduction,” in Religion Within the Boundaries 
of Mere Reason, trans. Allen Wood and George Di Giovanni, 10th reprint, Cambridge Texts in the History of 
Philosophy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), ix–x. 
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practical (moral) reason established free will as unquestionable, despite the 
Understanding’s inability to comprehend it. 
 This was not very different from Scottish Common Sense, which maintained that 
causation and free will were both common sense, intuitive principles in the mind. On the 
precise status of these intuitive principles, Reid had been less clear than he might have 
been. He was more interested in laying out a substantial list of first principles than in 
carefully explaining their relationship to one another. For Reid, causation was a 
“metaphysical first principle” while free will was a “contingent first principle”; there were 
“physical laws of nature” and “moral laws of nature.”26 The latter applied to rational 
agents only. But elsewhere, Reid seemed to suggest that the idea of causation arose from 
a more fundamental sense of our own free will as causative agents; thus it was not clear 
whether the metaphysical principle of causation was actually derived from the more 
fundamental contingent first principle of free will.27 He also maintained that the belief 
that no one should be blamed for an action if they had not the power to prevent it was a 
“moral first principle,” but he did not explain whether this moral first principle could 
also be derived from the contingent first principle of free will.28 Reid’s first principles 
were an effective response to Hume, especially for American intellectuals, but his 
frequent positing of different kinds of first principles led Kant to accuse proponents of 
Scottish Common Sense of being unable to justify their list of first principles or explain 
their relationship in the human constitution.29 The Scots, particularly Stewart and 
Thomas Brown, responded by labeling Kant an unoriginal jargon monger, though behind 
                                                   
 26 Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers, WTR, 3:170–172, 191, 194–208; Reid, Essays on the 
Active Powers, WTR, 4:284. 
 27 Reid, Essays on the Active Powers, WTR, 3:386–390. 
 28  Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers, WTR, 3:191. 
 29 Michel Malherbe, “The Impact on Europe,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Scottish 
Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 310–311. 
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the scenes Stewart seemed to take Kant’s criticisms of Reid seriously.30 Though in the 
end the Scots had a great deal in common with Kant, a strong language barrier—Kant did 
not read English and Stewart did not read German—and national chauvinism conspired 
to forestall much productive engagement until the later Scots James Mackintosh and 
William Hamilton began to rectify the situation.31 
 But the key to understanding what Marsh thought he was doing lay in the 
American historical context. Between 1827 and 1829, four important texts emerged that 
suggested that the union between American theology and Common Sense ran into 
trouble, at least on the free will problem. These texts were Thomas Upham’s Elements of 
Intellectual Philosophy (1827), Levi Hedge’s condensed edition of Thomas Brown’s A 
Treatise on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (1827), Nathaniel William Taylor’s 
Concio ad Clerum (1828), and Dugald Stewart’s Philosophy on the Active and Moral 
Powers of Man (1828).32 The importance of these texts will become clear in the following 
discussion.  
 The Orthodox Congregationalists and Presbyterians had become vulnerable to 
charges by Unitarians that their doctrines of depravity and arbitrary election 
undermined what William Ellery Channing called “the moral perfection of God.”33 A God 
who knew full well that humanity would be corrupted by Adam’s sin, chose to create, and 
then still held people accountable to a standard they had no way of fulfilling could not be 
just. On the Calvinist system, God provided salvation to be sure, but only for an elect, 
                                                   
 30 Emanuele Levi Mortera, “Stewart, Kant, and the Reworking of Common Sense,” History of 
European Ideas 38, no. 1 (2012): 125–126, 135; Jonathan Friday, “Dugald Stewart on Reid, Kant and the 
Refutation of Idealism,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 13, no. 2 (2005): 275–285. 
 31 Malherbe, “The Impact on Europe,” 299–301; Levi Mortera, “Stewart, Kant, and the Reworking 
of Common Sense,” 126, 135; for a helpful comparison which sees both Kant and Common Sense as very 
similar, see Karl Ameriks, “A Commonsense Kant?,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American 
Philosophical Association 79, no. 2 (November 1, 2005): esp. 23–30. 
 32 Stewart’s work appeared in both Edinburgh and Boston editions in 1828. 
 33 Channing, “Unitarian Christianity: Discourse at the Ordination of the Rev. Jared Sparks,” 82. 
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seemingly arbitrary number. For emphasis, Channing pressed home the effects of this 
system: “It tends to discourage the timid, to give excuses to the bad, to feed the vanity of 
the fanatical, and to offer shelter to the bad feelings of the malignant . . . shocking as it 
does the fundamental principles of morality, and . . . exhibiting a severe and partial 
Deity.”34   
 In the 1820s, Nathaniel William Taylor began to articulate an alternative 
Orthodox position that culminated in his Concio ad Clerum (1828). Taylor insisted that 
human beings had thorough free will, but that they always chose not to exercise it 
perfectly and thus incurred God’s wrath. Human nature was corrupt, but not to the point 
of determining sinful human actions. “I do not mean that their nature is itself sinful, nor 
that their nature is the physical or efficient cause of their sinning; but I mean that their 
nature is the occasion, or reason of their sinning,” insisted Taylor.35 As a theologian, the 
bulk of Taylor’s argument revolved around scriptural interpretation, but he appealed to 
Common Sense three times.36 First, he pointed out that our assignment of good or blame 
in everyday life is always assigned to a “state of mind” which prompts an evil action—the 
act of killing only becomes murder “when the circumstances and manner of the action 
evince a selfish or malicious purpose.”37 Even when humans claim a person has a 
disposition to evil, “this state of mind itself and not any previous thing as the cause of it, 
is the wicked heart.”38 Taylor’s second appeal to common sense asked people to look 
within themselves, to examine human consciousness; here he claimed one discovered 
“they are conscious that in all sin, they do freely and voluntarily set their hearts, their 
                                                   
 34 Ibid., 87. 
 35 Nathaniel William Taylor, Concio Ad Clerum: A Sermon Delivered in the Chapel of Yale College, 
September 10, 1828 (New Haven: A.H. Maltby and H. Hallock, 1842), 14–15. 
 36 Taylor invoked “Common Sense” when he initiated the appeal, indicating his adherence to this 
philosophical tradition, but he did not capitalize the term later as is seen in the following discussion. Ibid., 
11. 
 37 Taylor, Concio Ad Clerum, 11. 
 38 Ibid., 13. 
  
231 
supreme affections on the world.”39 Finally, Taylor appealed to common sense in the 
other direction, to establish the fact that all human beings in fact sinned: “I appeal to 
facts . . . what is the moral history of man since the first apostasy?”40 Thus, common 
sense established not only that human free will existed but also that all humans in fact 
sinned. 
 Marsh lauded the new developments in theology, as he thought them likely “to 
shake the authority of Edwards among [the Orthodox].”41 But while he would have 
agreed with some of Taylor’s scriptural inferences, he thought that Taylor’s use of 
Common Sense was a losing strategy. There would be no way to justify the orthodox 
Christian doctrines of Trinity and Incarnation as rational in any system that 
methodologically privileged appeals to common sense as the bellwether of reason. 
Moreover, Taylor was too committed to the Edwardsian tradition of Bellamy and 
Hopkins, citing Edwards more than any other theologian in defense of his doctrine of 
salvation, followed closely by Joseph Bellamy and Timothy Dwight.42 Coleridge and 
Marsh had no interest in fidelity to the traditional American authority of Edwards. 
Coleridge mercilessly attacked Edwards’ determinism, labeling it worse than even Luther 
and Calvin because of Edwards’ cool, single-minded commitment to determinism.43 
Moreover, in 1828 Dugald Stewart finally provided a sustained discussion of free will in 
an appendix to his Philosophy on the Active and Moral Powers of Man (1828), after 
putting off the project for most of his career. In the appendix, Stewart dismissed 
Edwards as the most able necessitarian in recent memory but nevertheless guilty of “the 
                                                   
 39 Ibid., 20. 
 40 Ibid., 21. 
 41 JM to STC, Mar. 23, 1829, JDL, 80. 
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most dangerous errors of Hobbes and his disciples.”44 Stewart’s clear assault upon 
Edwards, delivered in the same year as Taylor’s Concio ad Clerum, suggested that 
Orthodoxy’s attempt to ground its theology on Common Sense philosophy was unstable. 
Since Marsh was not dogmatically committed to all facets of the Orthodox tradition, he 
might have embraced Stewart’s insistence on free will and moved on. But Marsh seems 
to have worried not only that Common Sense provided no account of or inducement to 
spiritual experience or a framework for assenting to the doctrines of the Trinity and 
Incarnation, he also worried that Common Sense as an intellectual tradition was wearing 
thin, evidenced by its recent and highly-lauded scion, Thomas Brown. 
 
The Problem of Thomas Brown 
 But Marsh’s primary target was the Unitarians as he sought to turn the discussion 
of free will back on them. His strategy was to embrace the Unitarian moral critique of 
Calvinist determinism so as to wield it against them and attempt to vindicate the other 
orthodox doctrines they attacked. It was this synthesis that contributed to Marsh’s 
ecumenical sensibilities discussed later. To be sure, Marsh conceded, the Unitarians 
asserted that free will existed, but they could give no consistent account of it. The 
precipitating issue for Marsh was the surging popularity of Thomas Brown, a scion of 
Common Sense who harbored Humean skeptical sympathies about religion, leaned 
heavily toward determinism on questions of causation, subtly attacked Stewart by 
attacking Reid, and according to both contemporary and later critics was a proto-
Comtean positivist.45  
                                                   
 44 Dugald Stewart, The Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man, vol. 5, The Works of 
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 In 1827, two of the first American textbooks on the philosophy of mind appeared, 
both of which praised Brown and utilized him extensively. The Unitarian Levi Hedge 
edited and released Brown’s Philosophy of the Human Mind in two volumes to be used 
“as a textbook in seminaries of education” for which purpose, Hedge insisted, “it 
possesses on many accounts, pre-eminent claims.”46 Till that point, Hedge’s Elements of 
Logick (1816) had provided “the definitive presentation of the Scottish theory of 
knowledge" for the Unitarians.47 Brown’s appeal was not limited to the Unitarians, 
though in adopting him as the primary textbook on the philosophy of mind they seemed 
most favorable to him. Among the Orthodox, Thomas Cogswell Upham—a professor at 
Bowdoin College—published Elements of Intellectual Philosophy (1827), which drew on 
Locke, Stewart and Brown. Of Brown, Upham declared: “Unhappily for the science [of 
intellectual philosophy] he was cut off from life before he was permitted to complete and 
give to the world in his own name his analysis of the mind. Had he lived, hardly too 
much could have been expected.”48  
 Marsh wondered how American philosophy, particularly the Unitarians, could 
embrace Thomas Brown so heartily. According to Marsh, Brown maintained “the same 
law of cause and effect is the law of the universe” and that these laws applied equally to 
“the moral . . . no less than to the properly natural powers and agencies of our being.” 
Thus, Marsh concluded, Brown’s system still maintained that “the acts of the free-will 
are pre-determined by a cause out of the will, according to the same law of cause and 
effect. . . . The notion of a power in the will to act freely, is therefore nothing more than 
                                                                                                                                                       
causation was similar to Hume’s skepticism about the matter, but as will become clear in the following 
discussion, Brown seemed more inclined toward determinism than skepticism on the question. 
 46 Thomas Brown, A Treatise on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, ed. Levi Hedge, 1st American 
(Cambridge: Hilliard and Brown, 1827), v–vi. 
 47 Howe, The Unitarian Conscience, 33. 
 48 Thomas Cogswell Upham, Elements of Intellectual Philosophy: Designed as a Textbook 
(Portland, ME: W. Hyde, 1827), 200. 
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an inherent capacity of being acted upon, agreeably to its nature, and according to a 
fixed law, by motives which are present in the understanding.”49 Writing to Coleridge, 
Marsh thus concluded, “the Unitarians, while they reject Edwards and treat him with 
severity for his Calvinism . . . give currency to Brown for views that would seem to lead to 
what is most objectionable in the work on the Freedom of the Will.”50 For Marsh, either 
the Unitarians were closet necessitarians or they were glibly unaware of the problem. 
 But was this characterization fair? Apparently referencing Hedge and Upham, 
Marsh declared: “I feel authorized to take this statement partly from Brown’s 
philosophy, because that work has been decidedly approved by our highest theological 
authorities.”51 Hedge’s earlier Elements of Logick gave no philosophical account or even 
hint about how human free will might function, and Hedge’s edition of Philosophy of the 
Human Mind gave no further illumination.   
 In the crucial section on “Power, Cause, and Effect,” Brown argued that “Power is 
not any thing that can exist separately from a substance, but is merely the substance 
itself, considered in relation to another substance,” that “there are in nature, only 
substances; and all the substances in nature, are every thing that truly exists in nature.”52 
Furthermore, these substances could only exist in time and thus “the invariable 
antecedent being the cause, the invariable consequent the effect; and the antecedent and 
consequent being all that are present in any phenomenon” (43). Again and again, Brown 
critiqued any attempt to assert supposed “mysterious” powers between the inviolable 
chain of causation for this would only be another link in the chain (43-44).   
                                                   
 49 Marsh, “Preliminary Essay,” xxx. 
 50 JM to STC, Mar. 23, 1829, JDL, 80. 
 51 Marsh, “Preliminary Essay,” xxx. 
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 But perhaps human beings were not the same as the substances in nature that 
Brown’s logic applied to? Not so, it would seem: “To me, indeed, it appears so very 
obvious a truth, that the substances which exist in nature,—the world, its living 
inhabitants, and the adorable Being who created them,—are all the real existences in 
nature, and that, in the various changes which occur, therefore can as little be any 
powers or susceptibilities different from the antecedents and consequents themselves” 
(44). Brown argued that people ascribed “power” to substances outside of the chain of 
causation because their senses could not perceive the full complexity of the chain of 
cause and effect. Humans therefore were wont to posit uncaused causes, or powers, 
“supposed by us to be something mysterious,” that did not themselves originate within 
the laws of cause and effect throughout time (46). The only discussion Brown gave of a 
will outside the chain of causation was God’s, but Brown gave no thorough account of 
how human will might be free of the law of cause and effect. In his final edition of 
Inquiry into the Relation of Cause and Effect (1818), Brown avoided the words “free,” 
“liberty,” and “power,” criticized Reid’s claim that one could will against one’s desires, 
and seemed to sink all notions of human agency into internal desires without explaining 
where these desires came from and how in the end they differed from mechanical 
causation.53  
 Indeed, Marsh had found a chink in the Unitarian philosophical armor. As Daniel 
Walker Howe has observed, “The student who seeks for a comprehensive Harvard 
Unitarian refutation of Edwards . . . is disappointed. In fact, antebellum Harvard 
moralists devoted remarkably little energy to the issue of free will, either as a logical or a 
psychological problem. . . . So they were content to accept the freedom of the will . . . as a 
                                                   
 53 Thomas Brown, Inquiry into the Relation of Cause and Effect, 4th ed. (London: H. G. Bohn, 
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principle of common sense, and declare that it required no proof.”54 Like Common 
Sense, the scheme Marsh proposed believed in the intuitive truth of free will and 
causation, but by relying on the Kantian terminology of reason versus understanding and 
making them different functions of the mind, Marsh hoped to redraw the lines of 
intellectual discourse and push the Unitarians to reconsider their own definition of 
reason. He wondered why a movement that constantly invoked “reason” against the 
Orthodox Calvinists could not only fail to develop a nuanced response to Brown’s 
determinism when adopting him but also fail to even read Kant’s and Coleridge’s 
different responses to the problem. The emigrant professor of German literature at 
Harvard, Charles Follen, patiently explained to Marsh that it would take some doing to 
supplant “the genteel and palatable philosophy of Brown.”55   
 Marsh’s Reason-versus-Understanding distinction certainly differed from the 
numerous first principles and categories of first principles posited by Scottish Common 
Sense, but Marsh never bothered to carefully explain how Reid’s and Stewart’s intuitive 
principles differed from or cohered with his new epistemology. He seemed more 
frustrated with Unitarian’s smug confidence in their own reasonability than with Reid 
and Stewart themselves. Marsh’s distinctions had the potential for great difference. For 
Marsh, the intuitive principles of the Understanding differed only in degree from the 
way animals perceived and interacted with the world, whereas those arising from Reason 
differed in kind (xxxix-xliii). The Understanding could “abstract and generalize, and 
fore-cast events, and the consequences of our actions, and compare motives,” and among 
other things it provided human beings with the intuitive law of causation (xxxiii, xl). On 
the other hand, Reason distinguished human beings from brutes by revealing necessary 
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mathematical truths, the moral law of conscience, self-consciousness, and the ideas of 
the soul, free will, immortality, God, and a spiritual realm fundamentally different from 
the physical world (xlii). But Marsh never provided a comprehensive system of first 
principles like Scottish Common Sense, nor did he explain which ones belonged in 
Reason and which ones belonged in the Understanding. As Marsh’s “Preliminary Essay” 
was not a comprehensive philosophical treatise, he seemed more concerned with 
reinventing the intellectual discourse about reason to ward off Unitarian assaults and 
pave the way for a more thorough and more “spiritual” philosophy that he hoped to 
articulate later. In 1829, he took his friend Ebenezer Tracy’s advice, which Marsh quoted 
in the “Preliminary Essay” itself: “If you can once get the attention of thinking men fixed 
on this distinction between the reason and the understanding you will have done enough 
to reward the labor of a life.”56 But the key to establishing this distinction was still the 
free will problem. Like Kant, and unlike Reid, Marsh wanted to make free will not just a 
first principle of the mind, but a higher first principle of seminal intellectual, spiritual, 
and emotional importance. 
 
Kant and Practical Reason 
 Marsh may have obtained his insight into free will directly from Kant, who 
worked out the idea in his Critique of Practical Reason (1788), or Marsh may have just 
more clearly articulated it from the complicated argument set up by Coleridge.57 What is 
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clear is that Marsh seized upon the free will problem as his primary argument for 
asserting that a distinction between the Understanding and the Reason was necessary in 
the first place. “The key to [Coleridge’s] system will be found in the distinctions, which 
he makes and illustrates between nature and free-will, and between the understanding 
and reason.”58 As we have seen, Reid had already made the distinction between nature 
and free will, but Marsh sought to exploit the distinction to explain how certain religious 
doctrines might be rational and yet unexplainable. His primary target was the 
Unitarians, whose emphasis on reason had undermined not only the Orthodox case for 
the Trinity and the Incarnation, but also spiritual experience. 
 If Thomas Brown continually railed against mysterious powers and forces, 
Coleridge and Marsh joined Kant in arguing that free will must exist—that reason 
mandated it. Kant distinguished not only between reason and understanding, but also 
between two types of reason, theoretical reason and practical reason.59 Theoretical 
reason (which became speculative when its results could not be empirically verified) was 
involved in the construction of more elaborate ideas and theories than those furnished 
by the understanding’s twelve categories (including concepts such as causation, 
substance, unity, plurality, etc.). Theoretical reason organized the categories of the 
understanding when constructing scientific theories, but though not directly receiving 
sense data, theoretical reason required a return to sensuous impressions for empirical 
verification.60 The understanding and the theoretical reason, functioning together, were 
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what philosophers generally call ‘reason’—the ability to organize, interpret, and construct 
arguments based upon evidence. But Kant went further, provoked by Hume and the 
problems of causation and free will. As we have seen in Chapter One, Kant, like Common 
Sense philosophers, insisted that science could trust its fundamental reliance on the law 
of cause and effect because this law was an embedded category of the understanding, of 
the mind itself. The mind imposed order on sense impressions derived from the natural 
world, and causation was one of its most important and thoroughly reliable categories. 
However, Kant also maintained that since causation existed in the mind itself, the mind 
never had full access to things in themselves (or as he termed it the noumenal world) but 
only to its organized perceptions (phenomena) of the world. 
 In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) and the Critique of 
Practical Reason (1788), Kant used his complicated epistemology from the Critique of 
Pure Reason (1781) to explain how reason accounted for the seeming contradiction 
between natural causation and human free will.61 Kant agreed with the vast majority of 
philosophers that reason and conscience provided a reliable guide to ethical action, but 
he criticized other moral philosophers who “maintain[ed] the mechanism of the will in 
deeds, but its freedom in words.”62 He insisted that reason, when applied to morality 
(practical reason), unyieldingly mandated freedom of the will—this conclusion was as 
sure as any other conclusion that reason could form.63 But how could free will be 
reconciled with the seeming ironclad law of cause and effect? Kant had already argued 
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that causation, and indeed time and space itself, were categories imposed on reality by 
the understanding and were not necessarily properties of objects and relations in the 
noumenal world (things in themselves).64 Thus, time, space, and causation could be 
compatible with free will functioning in the noumenal world, while phenomenal 
perception and the understanding’s ability to articulate this compatibility would always 
be undermined by the constraints of time, space, and causation.  
 Again, there were great affinities with Reid and Stewart, who essentially 
maintained that causation was a first principle that applied to the external world while 
free will was a first principle that applied to the mind.65 But as previously mentioned, 
Reid also seemed to suggest that the idea of causation itself was actually derived from 
our more fundamental belief in free will, and he ultimately claimed that “when I attempt 
to comprehend the manner in which an efficient cause operates, either upon body or 
upon mind, there is a darkness which my faculties are not able to penetrate.”66 Kant 
thought his system gave a more thorough explanation of the darkness Reid experienced. 
For Kant, the mind was both part of the phenomenal and the noumenal world; a person 
“must represent and think of himself in this twofold way.”67 Kant insisted the “pure 
reason independent of sensibility, gives the [moral] law,” which necessarily entailed free 
will, and that in this realization one “is his proper self” whereas in all other, non-moral 
matters “he is only the appearance of himself” or a phenomenon.68 On Kant’s view, Reid 
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experienced darkness in explaining free will because the categories of the understanding, 
which could only yield knowledge when combined with sense data, were attempting to 
explain a higher principle of moral reason and the noumenal self. The key difference 
between Kant and Reid was that Kant’s system privileged morality and therefore free will 
at all costs, rendering free will a first principle above those that regulated conception of 
the material world. It was this emphasis on free will as a higher principle that attracted 
Marsh and Coleridge, who attempted to use it to establish the rationality of spiritual 
language and experience. 
 Kant’s explanation came at a steep price, namely the inaccessibility of the 
noumenal world and a psychologically divided self. But Kant dared his opponents to give 
a more consistent account. “I do not see how those who insist on regarding time and 
space as determinations belonging to the existence of things in themselves would avoid 
fatalism of actions.”69 Kant’s psychological terror at the idea of determinism and his 
obsession with the free will problem has led Isaiah Berlin to aptly label him a “restrained 
romantic.” He was restrained in his rationalistic contempt for vagueness, mysticism, or 
enthusiasm, but Romantic in his obsessive need to liberate free will at all costs.70 While 
Locke, Stewart, and Reid ultimately threw up their hands and appealed to God as the 
ground of free will, Kant’s obsession led him to take one more step and jettison the 
mind’s access to the noumenal world in order to give free will a fully separate realm in 
                                                   
  69 Kant, “Critique of Practical Reason,” 5:101; 221; Kant’s critique about space and time was 
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which to operate.71 The intensity of Kant’s obsession is evident in that he ultimately 
ended up where Reid and Stewart did, asserting that “[God] is the cause of the existence 
of the acting beings (as noumena),” despite Kant’s dispensing with the mind’s access to 
things in themselves.72 Kant’s explanation proved an intriguing and innovative response 
to the most bedeviling problem in the history of human thought from the Stoic 
Chryssipus of the third century BCE, to the ninth-century courts of Charles the Bald and 
the sixteenth-century halls of Salamanca, through to twenty-first century philosophy.73 
The free will problem posed a particular challenge for the Enlightenment, which sought 
to establish reason’s reliability in both the scientific and moral worlds. 
 
Applying and Modifying Kant 
 Marsh shared Kant’s Romantic, emotional obsession with the question of the 
human will. His tortured letter to Lucia about skepticism explicitly highlighted the free 
will problem. Part of the reason Marsh blanched at the American receptivity to Thomas 
Brown was that Brown had prompted much of Marsh’s skepticism and flight to Kant and 
Romantic sources in the first place. As for Kant, the issue for Marsh seemed to be 
emotional as well as intellectual. During his early studies, Marsh worried, “I find myself 
too strongly inclined to admit [Brown’s] theory, independently of the reasoning by which 
it is supported, from the simplicity which it introduces into all our speculations on the 
                                                   
 71 Reid, Essays on the Active Powers, WTR, 3:406; Stewart, The Philosophy of the Active and 
Moral Powers of Man in The Works of Dugald Stewart, 1829, 5:577, 589. 
 72 Kant, “Critique of Practical Reason,” 5:102; 222. 
 73 On these various movements and complex philosophical problems see Susanne Bobzien, 
Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998); Jaroslav Pelikan, The 
Growth of Medieval Theology (600-1300) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 80–95; Luis de 
Molina and Alfred Freddoso, On Divine Foreknowledge: Part IV of the Concordia (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1988); on the state of the thorny problem in contemporary analytic philosophy see Peter 
van Inwagen's aptly titled concession, Peter van Inwagen, “Free Will Remains a Mystery: The Eighth 
Philosophical Perspectives Lecture,” Noûs 34 (January 1, 2000): 1–19. 
  
243 
phenomena and powers of nature.”74 For Marsh, Kant’s reason-versus-understanding 
distinction provided a helpful response to the problem.  
 Coleridge and Marsh seized upon Kant’s dogged focus on morality, or more 
precisely reason applied to morality. Frustrated by the attempt to defend Christianity 
with so-called external evidences—“books of natural theology, physico-theology, 
demonstration of God from Nature”—they were convinced this was a losing strategy.75 In 
turgid diction choked with emotion, Coleridge worried that the focus on so-called 
external evidences and design in nature could only establish pantheism (or perhaps 
deism) and could never establish the personality of God or the attributes ascribed to him 
by Christian theology. “I speak feelingly,” Coleridge confessed, “for I speak of that which 
for a brief period was my own state” (244). Summing up the entire Aids to Reflection, 
Coleridge took clear aim at the ringleader of this apologetic strategy, William Paley, 
whom he vehemently christened “the tutelary genius of modern idolatry.”76 It was not 
that parts of Paley’s scheme could not be amenable to Christianity, but the excessive 
reliance on it produced intellectual “Flat Fish . . . that have both eyes on the same side, 
[and] never see but half the subject at one time” (244). They could not turn within the 
self, which was, according to Coleridge, the only place the distinctive doctrines of 
Christianity could be perceived. Christianity required “self-knowledge of [one’s] need of 
it”; this had been Coleridge’s experience and he insisted that one of the great purposes of 
Christianity had been “to rouse and emancipate the Soul from this debasing Slavery to 
the outward Senses” (246). 
 Marsh concurred with the critique of Paley and external evidences, though he 
wisely kept his emotions out of his “Preliminary Essay” and worded his dissent from the 
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prevailing American apologetics more carefully. Like Guilian Verplanck’s emphasis on 
the subjective needs of the soul in Chapter Four, Marsh averred: “Nor am I disposed in 
compliance with popular opinion to limit the application of [rational, philosophical 
religion], as is usually done, to the mere external evidences of revelation.”77 Marsh went 
on to calmly explain himself in a later, lengthy note as he engaged Paley’s argument 
more systematically than Coleridge. Paley had argued that one could infer God’s 
personality from his ability to contrive and design the world. “That, which can contrive, 
which can design, must be a person,” Paley insisted.78 Marsh responded that animals 
exhibit the qualities of contrivance and design in their own way, that these were 
functions of the Understanding. According to Marsh, Paley’s argument only established a 
first cause that was powerful and intelligent, but not necessarily good, perfect, or 
personal. These attributes of God could only be discovered in “our moral being . . . far 
deeper, than those convictions of the mere understanding” (294). 
 The difference in tone highlighted the different contexts in which Coleridge and 
Marsh wrote and the difference in their personalities. Marsh embraced nearly all of 
Coleridge’s philosophical positions; there is surprisingly little disagreement of any kind 
with Coleridge in Marsh’s “Preliminary Essay” and lengthy explanatory notes. Marsh 
even seemed attentive to Coleridge’s more obscure and lofty Christian Platonism 
(discussed later). Moreover, especially in his early years, Marsh personally had enjoyed 
nearly identical flights of spiritual experience to Coleridge, which is what led Marsh to 
search Romantic authors for further religious insight. But Marsh was ever the patient 
philosopher-educator. By temperament and contextual need, he avoided the tone of the 
inspired, or perhaps raving, poet-seer. He knew full well that New England theology 
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required a gradual introduction to the inward, spiritual philosophy that he thought 
existed in both seventeenth-century theologians such as the Cambridge Platonists and 
the newly ascendant Romantic writers. 
 
Aids to Reflection and the Free Will Problem 
 The reader encountering the Aids to Reflection for the first time cannot help but 
be overwhelmed, and yet the record shows this text enjoyed wide-ranging attention in 
the 1830s and 1840s, especially among the young. Coleridge delivered his ideas in the 
form of some three hundred aphorisms; while it may have aided reflection, it did not aid 
clarity. Some aphorisms came from other Anglican divines such as Archbishop Leighton, 
Jeremy Taylor, and Henry More, to which Coleridge often appended elaborate 
comments. Furthermore, at first glance it is difficult to determine whether Marsh and 
Coleridge sought to provide “A PHILOSOPHICAL STATEMENT AND VINDICATION 
OF THE DISTINCTIVELY SPIRITUAL AND PECULIAR DOCTRINES OF THE 
CHRISTIAN SYSTEM” or whether “the scheme of Christianity, [is] not discoverable by 
reason.”79 
 In Aids to Reflection, Marsh and Coleridge followed Kant more closely than is 
often assumed. They embraced a similar distinction between speculative reason and 
practical reason, and the oft-repeated claim that Coleridge simply took the distinction 
between Reason and Understanding and gave Reason powers that Kant denied it is 
misleading. They followed Kant in asserting that practical reason discovered, in Marsh’s 
words, “abiding laws of truth in duty, as revealed in our reason and conscience.”80 They 
agreed with Kant that theoretical reason—called “speculative” when not properly used—
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could not have knowledge of God, immortality, and other concepts entirely divorced 
from and unable to be verified by the senses. Most importantly, they directly imported 
Kant’s argument that the law of cause and effect was a category of the understanding, 
whereas practical reason demonstrated the necessary existence of a free will. “Turn the 
matter as we will,” insisted Marsh, “so long as we refuse to admit the existence in the will 
of a power capable of rising above this law [of cause and effect], and controlling its 
operation by an act of absolute self-determination, so long we shall be involved in 
perplexities both in morals and religion.”81  
 Marsh thought that distinguishing between Reason and Understanding provided 
a clear distinction and most importantly a new language to speak about how free will 
simultaneously violated the mind’s intuitive belief in causation but did not violate 
Reason. “Admitting the power to originate an act or state of mind may be beyond the 
capacity of our understandings to comprehend, it is still not contradictory to reason; and 
that I find it more easy to believe the existence of that, which is simply incomprehensible 
to my understanding, than of that which involves an absurdity for my reason” (xxxiii). 
Marsh’s position clearly differed from Edwards, Brown, and any Americans inclined to 
admit their systems. The claim employed Kantian terminology, but was philosophically 
consistent with Reid’s and Stewart’s claim that both causation and free will were 
intuitive properties of the mind. In fact, the way Marsh drew the distinction, he could 
accommodate a great deal of Reid’s and Stewart’s systems; Reid after all had labeled all 
the intellectual powers “the understanding.”82 But Marsh hoped that if he could get 
Americans to conceive in his new idiom—that beliefs might violate the Understanding 
without becoming irrational or contrary to Reason—then he might be able to blunt 
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attacks on alleged irrational Christian doctrines. He sought to innovate a new 
epistemological language to largely forestall the liberal religious innovations already 
underway in Unitarianism.  
 Marsh’s gambit hinged on the term “reason.” He knew full well that orthodox 
Christianity had been abused by this word, and he sought to press Americans to re-
evaluate what they meant by the term. In Scottish philosophy the term was used in 
multiple senses: as a discursive faculty for making logical arguments, as a moral-
intellectual faculty which included but was also distinct from conscience, and as the sum-
total of logical reasoning and conscience combined with all the numerous first principles 
of common sense.83 Marsh thought that the free will problem demonstrated that certain 
truths could be rational but beyond the Understanding and not fully articulable by the 
Understanding.84 Thus, he insisted that the Unitarians, despite their celebration of 
reason, needed a much more robust epistemology to undergird their morality.  
 In Kant’s morality, practical reason uncovered an inexorable moral law, which 
could not be “lenient (indulgent) and thus conformed to our convenience.”85 Coleridge 
agreed with this demanding characterization of the moral law, but he accused Kant of 
being a “miserable psychologist.”86 While Kant exclaimed “Duty! Sublime and mighty 
name” and optimistically invited his readers to “an endless progress from lower to higher 
stages of moral perfection,” Coleridge thought Kant’s abstractions had led him away 
from the darker conclusions mandated both by human history and a thorough 
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examination of the self.87 While he followed Kant through the moral law, to the reality of 
free will, he insisted there were “three ultimate Facts,” not two:   
namely, the Reality of the LAW OF CONSCIENCE; the existence of a RESPONSIBLE WILL, as the 
subject of that law; and lastly, the existence of Evil—of Evil essentially such, not by accident of 
outward circumstances, not derived from its physical consequences, nor from any cause out of 
itself. The first is a Fact of Consciousness; the second a Fact of Reason necessarily concluded from 
the first; and the third a Fact of History interpreted by both. . . . I profess a deep conviction that 
Man was and is a fallen Creature, not by accidents of bodily constitution or any other cause, which 
human Wisdom in a course of ages might be supposed capable of removing; but as diseased in his 
Will. . . . Thus at each of these two opposite Roads (the philosophy of Hobbes and that of 
Shaftesbury), I have placed a directing Post.88 
 
 But though Coleridge’s trajectory led toward the Christian fallen will, he followed 
Kant by insisting that since practical Reason revealed free will, free will stood on a sure 
foundation even if the Understanding (or speculative reason) could not demonstrate it. 
Thus he and Marsh also sought to distinguish themselves thoroughly from Christian 
groups who overemphasized the depravity of the will and the untrustworthiness of 
human reason. “I proceed therefore to preclude the opinion of those likewise who indeed 
agree with me as to the moral Responsibility of Man in opposition to Hobbes and the 
Anti-moralists, and that He was a fallen Creature, essentially diseased, in opposition to 
Shaftesbury and the Misinterpreters of Plato,” explained Coleridge.89 But he and Marsh 
also rejected those who “exaggerate[ed] the diseased weakness of the Will into an 
absolute privation of all Freedom, thereby making moral responsibility, not a mystery 
above comprehension, but a direct contradiction, of which we do distinctly comprehend 
the absurdity” (91). In other words, Coleridge and Marsh conceded an important part of 
the Unitarian critique of Orthodoxy. Coleridge blamed Jonathan Edwards for solidifying 
this logical but stringent Calvinist determinism more than Luther or even Calvin—a 
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backhanded tip of the hat to the backwoods philosopher’s great but misdirected 
intellect.90  
 In general then, the position of Coleridge—and indeed the American Cautious 
Romantics—was what one interpreter has called “moderate Augustinianism.”91 
Throughout their writings one observes a constant celebration of the grandeur and 
beauty, not only of nature but also of human Reason and artistic creativity. Yet, at the 
same time they conjured laments to rival Job, bemoaning the capacity of human beings 
for evil and the irrational—which they viewed as linked. For romantically informed 
Christians like Coleridge, Allston, the Danas, and others, a cosmic war existed in the 
human mind. There was plenty of evil and guilt to go around, but there was also great 
goodness, great artistic insight, and great beauty to be found in the human soul as it 
was.92 
 
Farewell to Kant 
 Coleridge and Marsh walked with Kant deep into the tangled forest of the human 
moral mind. But Kant’s argument for free will drew its strength not simply from the 
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distinction between reason and understanding, but from the logical conclusions of this 
epistemology. Kant had already worked these out in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781), 
and thus he doggedly insisted that the mind was divorced from the noumenal world and 
could not know things in themselves (except for the noumenal self engaged in free moral 
action). Practical reason established free will against its doubters and the understanding 
secured causation against skeptics like Hume, but the only sure way to liberate free will 
was to maintain that it functioned in the noumenal world but not in a way consistent 
with phenomenal understanding. 
 Marsh and Coleridge agreed with this argument as it applied to free will, but as 
Romantics they were disinclined to fully divorce the mind from spiritual encounters with 
nature, which Kant’s granting access only to phenomena and not things in themselves 
clearly curtailed.93 As already explored in Chapter One, the union between the poet and 
nature dominated Romantic aesthetic theory, and Coleridge thought he had experienced 
moments of perceptive unity with nature.94 Marsh likewise experienced a revelation of 
power within himself reading Romantic authors, and came to associate that power, as we 
shall see, with the Holy Spirit and as “one with the power and life of nature.”95 Thus, 
Marsh and Coleridge chose to inflect Kant’s argument in a different direction, which 
differed in important ways from Kant. Rather than insisting on the mind’s inability to 
access things in themselves, Marsh and Coleridge began to emphasize the principle of 
mystery. “A truth may be mysterious . . . ,” Marsh insisted, “But though we may believe 
what ‘passeth all understanding,’ we cannot believe what is absurd, or contradictory to 
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reason.”96 Free will existed, but when the Understanding attempted to comprehend it, it 
became lost in mystery. Free will was mysterious, but this did not mean it contradicted 
Reason, in fact Reason revealed it. Reason might bring one to a belief that violated the 
Understanding. In their emphasis on mystery they abandoned Kant; the entire point of 
Kant’s critical philosophy had been to establish an epistemology without such appeals.  
 The emphasis on mystery could obviously get out of control, but Marsh and 
Coleridge’s argument remained committed to the practical (moral) Reason. One could 
not rationally invoke mystery willy-nilly to justify alleged religious perceptions and 
experiences; one must have a compelling moral reason for doing so.97 According to 
Coleridge, “Where the evidence of the Senses fails us, and beyond the precincts of 
sensible experience, there is no Reality attributable to any Notion, but what is given to it 
by Revelation, or the Law of Conscience, or the necessary interests of Morality.”98 Thus, 
they insisted that a careful pursuit of practical (moral) Reason not only revealed a 
supersensible world as Kant granted (free will, immortality, and God), but they also 
thought it rendered the peculiar doctrines of Christian revelation rational. 
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“Spiritual and Peculiar Doctrines of the Christian System” 
 There were several doctrines that Coleridge and Marsh sought to vindicate, but 
their first step following their insistence on practical (moral) Reason involved the felt 
need of a Savior to rectify the hopeless situation of humankind vis-à-vis Kant’s 
intractable moral law. Kant offered a quick and dubious outlet for the moral angst he 
knew his system imposed; he argued that practical reason authorized belief in 
immortality wherein the soul continually became more perfect in its adherence to the 
moral law. Coleridge thought this concession to human frailty insufficient and thought 
that practical Reason authorized a much more psychologically satisfying answer to the 
spiritual problem of the fallen will: 
From what you know of yourself; of your own heart and Strength; and from what History and 
personal Experience have led you to conclude of mankind generally; dare you trust to it? Dare you 
trust to it? To it, and to it alone? If so, well! It is at your own risk. I judge you not. Before Him, who 
cannot be mocked, you stand or fall. But if not, if you have had too good reason to know, that your 
heart is deceitful and your strength weakness: if you are disposed to exclaim with Paul—the Law 
indeed is holy, just, good, spiritual; but I am carnal, sold under sin: for that which I do, I allow not, 
and what I would, that I do not!—in this case, there is a voice that says, Come unto me : and I will 
give you rest. This is the voice of Christ. . . .99 
 
Redemption through Christ was the first mystery authorized by the practical Reason, but 
this inevitably led to two others: the divinity of Jesus and the Trinity.100 This was the 
point at which revelation began to aid practical Reason, but they cooperated together.   
 Practical Reason guided one to a felt need of a saving God; revelation told of a 
Savior who could meet the requirements of practical Reason, namely perfect adherence 
to the moral law. Kant argued that indeed the human ideal represented in the historical 
Jesus “resides in our morally-legislative reason,” but he thought the idea of imputed 
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righteousness through Christ violated the moral law’s rigor.101 Kant even thought the 
language of John 1—the most thoroughly Christian Platonist, Trinitarian passage in the 
Christian scriptures—fully appropriate to the glory of the ideal human living in full 
accord with the moral law: “This human being, alone pleasing to God, ‘is in him from all 
eternity’; the idea of him proceeds from God’s being; he is not, therefore, a created thing 
but God’s only-begotten Son, ‘the Word’ (the Fiat!) through which all other things are, 
and without whom nothing that is made would exist . . . only in him and through the 
adoption of his dispositions can we hope ‘to become children of God’.”102 Coleridge and 
Marsh took this concession, and replaced it with their own question: what if John’s 
revelation was true? If practical Reason took one to the felt need of a saving God, could it 
be reasonable to equate these whispers with Reason and with Christ himself (the divine 
Logos), as Christian Platonism always maintained?   
 Coleridge’s and Marsh’s belief in John’s revelation about Christ was different 
than a straightforward, orthodox belief in the revelation of the Bible, though in the end it 
seemed to invoke a Platonic mysticism. Nevertheless, Coleridge and Marsh suggested 
Christian Platonism might be a palatable tradition from which to address skepticism. 
Hume’s radical empiricism had frustrated Scottish thinkers, Kant, and everyone else not 
only because it undermined causation but also because Hume’s view threatened to make 
all science purely nominal and instrumental.103 All of the alleged laws of nature 
discovered by Galileo, Kepler, and Newton might be inferences based on limited 
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evidence and might not apply to nature itself. Scientific laws were useful, but possibly 
untrue. While nominalism need not undermine scientific experiment per se, it certainly 
shocked Hume’s contemporaries who generally assumed a correspondence between 
nature’s scientific laws and human reason.  
 One of the common strategies among Scottish Common Sense was to appeal to 
God as the guarantor of scientific realism; God had created the laws of nature and the 
mind to cohere.104 Like Common Sense, Coleridge explicitly invoked God as the link 
between the mind and the natural world. But he drew on a long Platonic tradition that 
had named and defined the link between the human mind and the world as a particular 
metaphysical principle: the Divine Word or Logos. The Logos was both the governing 
principle of the universe and the governing principle in human Reason, guaranteeing 
their correspondence.105 Animated by the proem to John’s gospel, which declared that 
“in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God . . . 
and the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us,” Christianity had begun to equate 
the Logos with Christ himself, crystalizing the equation in the conciliar creeds of the 
fourth century.106 For Coleridge, the Logos had proved a fecund idea during his 
agonizing in 1804 and 1805 as he attempted to unify artistic insight, philosophical 
reason, religious experience, and his own sense of human guilt and moral shortcoming 
under one organizing principle. For Coleridge, the god-like capacities in artistic 
inspiration, the equally god-like capacity of human Reason to understand the world 
through science, the sense of wonder created as these investigations proceeded further, 
and the ultimate reconciliation with God despite his own moral shortcomings, all of 
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these were the work of God’s Logos.107 Coleridge’s fascination with the Logos was 
particularly apparent in his notebooks just prior to meeting Allston in Rome, which 
coincided with Coleridge’s own Trinitarian conversion. 
 Aids to Reflection was the closest Coleridge ever came to articulating his mature 
philosophy based on the Logos, and the doctrine of the Trinity was, according to one 
scholar of his work, the book’s “hidden agenda.”108 In Aids Coleridge argued that moral 
Reason—pursued through rigorous self-examination—led one to feel the need of a saving 
God to meet the demands of the moral law. What made the peculiar Christian doctrines 
of the Incarnation and the Trinity palatable and even rational for Coleridge was the fact 
that on a Christian Platonist reading God’s saving act could be associated with the 
intelligible structure of the universe itself. “The Order, Beauty, and sustaining Law of 
visible natures” was “the Eternal Word,” and this Word became manifested in Christ to 
suffer, die, and redeem humanity.109 Christ the Eternal Word, by assuming physical form 
as a man, became a cosmic reconciler who restored not only humankind’s relationship 
with God but also its relationship to itself (reconciling the will with human reason) and 
with the cosmos (reconciling subject and object).110 As Allston had put it during his own 
Trinitarian conversion, “the Infinite, uncraving Mind” of God had become “palpable in 
flesh . . . a second Adam.”111 
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 For Coleridge, Trinitarian thought provided a more meaningful framework for 
how God created and sustained the world, beliefs that Unitarians held as well.112 God 
created the world through speech, a primordial Word, which remained the governing 
structure of the universe, and humans participated in the divine Word by virtue of both 
Reason and language—unique gifts of the human species.113 The practical Reason 
revealed a need for redemption, and Coleridge thought that the Incarnation of God’s 
Word in Christ was as compelling a doctrine as any for how that redemption might be 
accomplished. He was quick to add that while pure practical Reason allowed one to catch 
glimpses of the idea of the Incarnation and the Trinity, scriptural revelation was 
necessary to understand the doctrines in their full forms. One could not demand belief in 
the Trinity “by mere force of reasoning, independently of any positive Revelation,” and 
Coleridge conceded that he could not persuade the deist by pure force of argument to 
embrace Trinitarianism.114 On the other hand, Coleridge thought that consistent pursuit 
of practical Reason had shown that the doctrines of Incarnation and Trinity could be 
“cogitable [sic], that the soul can present the idea to itself,” and that they were thus not 
absurd or contrary to Reason (120). The Trinity was not, as an Orthodox spokesman 
Samuel Stanhope Smith had maintained, “a doctrine purely of revelation . . . on which 
reason is utterly incompetent to judge, and could, therefore, only mislead.”115 Moreover, 
for those Unitarians who accepted the Bible as revelation, Coleridge sought to hold their 
feet to the fire: “the case is quite different with a Christian, who accepts the Scriptures as 
the word of God, yet refuses his assent to the plainest declarations of these Scriptures, 
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and explains away the most express texts into metaphor and hyperbole, because the 
literal and obvious interpretation is (according to his notions) absurd and contrary to 
reason.”116 In other words, Coleridge thought Unitarians, who claimed to believe the 
Bible, were forced to explain away too many passages that supported Christ’s divinity 
and the Trinity (though he conveniently failed to point to specific texts at this point). 
 Marsh saw the hidden Trinitarian agenda in the Aids to Reflection, despite its 
translucent, aphoristic style. Shortly after publishing Aids, he wrote to Coleridge eagerly 
asking for more on the Trinity.117 Marsh had fully embraced the Platonist Word, which 
explains why he insisted multiple times in his “Preliminary Essay” that there were 
“several manifestations” of the Divine Word, that the Bible was only one of these, and 
that all of the warring theological parties in New England did not understand “the 
substantial being, and the living energy, of that Word.”118 By the third page of his 
introduction to Aids, Marsh was already attempting a lengthy explanation of this 
Platonic Trinitarianism, and he fully agreed with Coleridge that the Word was God’s 
governing principle in the universe.  
 Marsh’s presentation had the virtue of being much clearer than Coleridge’s 
aphoristic style, however unconvincing it might be to those without taste for his 
Christian Platonism. Marsh explained that the Word was “the inward power or principle, 
which in all organized bodies modifies the living agency, appoints the measure of its 
working, and determines the specific form of its development in each several kind.”119 
God’s Word was the creating and governing principle in the cosmos, it established the 
formal structures for everything that existed. Marsh then explained that God’s Spirit was 
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the force present within organic bodies. It was “the actuating power of life” that 
animated living processes—and in the case of human beings, the will—in accordance 
with Reason, the Word, which governed the form of their development (252). In short, 
Marsh thought that Trinitarianism gave a more dynamic account of how God continually 
governed, sustained, and renewed the world, and yet was not fully subsumed in its 
material structure. 
 But why would Marsh think such esoteric speculation might work? The answer is 
not entirely clear. While Logos theology had allowed ancient Christianity to claim the 
status of a philosophy and not just a revelation, in 1829 the Unitarians strongly objected 
to the Platonic accretions they insisted had infected clear-headed Christian 
interpretation of the Bible.120 But taken in historical context, Marsh’s appeal was more 
than simply asserting an abhorrent philosophy to make the Unitarians howl. None other 
than Dugald Stewart had appealed to the Cambridge Platonists’ views of reason and 
suggested they had anticipated everything worthwhile in Kant about the mind’s intuitive 
power in interpreting reality.121 Stewart even tipped his hat to their Platonism: “They 
were deeply conversant with the Platonic Philosophy, and applied it with great success in 
combating the Materialists and the Necessitarians of their times.”122 He praised Ralph 
Cudworth precisely for maintaining that “the mind, which hath a participation of the 
divine wisdom . . . exert[ed] its own inward activity” in its reliable discovery of 
knowledge, whether a priori, scientific, or moral.123 But for Cudworth, such references to 
“the divine wisdom” were synonymous with “an eternal Word [the Logos] and wisdom . . 
                                                   
 120 Pierre Hadot, What Is Ancient Philosophy?, trans. Michael Chase (Cambridge: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2002), 237–240. 
 121 Levi Mortera, “Stewart, Kant, and the Reworking of Common Sense,” 139–140. 
 122 Dugald Stewart, Dissertation Exhibiting a General View of the Progress of Metaphysical, 
Ethical and Political Philosophy, Since the Revival of Letters in Europe, vol. 6, The Works of Dugald Stewart 
(Cambridge, MA: Hilliard and Brown, 1829), 201. 
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. the second hypostasis of the Divine Triad, and the first begotten Son or offspring of God 
the Father.”124 Though Stewart rejected Cudworth’s mystical Platonism, there was no 
avoiding how intricately Cudworth’s view of reason was bound up with it.  
 Part of Marsh’s plea was that both the Unitarians and Orthodox reconsider “those 
profound thinkers and unrivaled masters of language, the great English Philosophers 
and Divines of the 17th Century.”125 In his publishing ventures following Aids, Marsh 
hoped to release at least five edited volumes of his favorite seventeenth-century English 
divines. The first and only volume Marsh released included John Howe’s The 
Blessedness of the Righteous, which drew heavily on Plato and Neo-Platonic sources to 
argue for the supremacy of the spiritual life over the carnal.126 Marsh hoped that if 
American intellectuals accepted the distinction between Reason and Understanding, 
then a re-reading of Christian Platonism might rekindle a spiritual fire, which might in 
turn help the Unitarians overcome their objections to the Trinity and Incarnation.  
 The prospect was not rosy, but neither was it entirely groundless. There were 
great affinities between Cambridge Platonism and New England Unitarianism on many 
crucial issues besides the Trinity. Both groups believed in the correspondence between 
human and divine reason, both held to ethical rationalism based on this correspondence, 
and both emphasized the gradual perfection of the soul through virtue.127 But Marsh’s 
strategy proved an ill-advised gamble. The Transcendentalists who eventually attended 
to Marsh’s and Coleridge’s appeal saw seventeenth-century England only as a way 
                                                   
 124 Ralph Cudworth, True Intellectual System of the Universe, ed. Thomas Birch, vol. 3 (Oxford: 
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station to the idealism of Plato and Plotinus without the Trinitarian and biblical baggage. 
Emerson explicitly stated in his journals that Cudworth served only to point the way to 
Plato himself, and Bronson Alcott, while reveling in the Aids to Reflection, embarked on 
a lifelong project of finding in historic Neo-Platonic and Christian mysticism the seeds of 
a universal, non-sectarian piety.128  
 
The Horizon of Reason, Faith and Spiritual Experience 
 In retrospect, Marsh’s and Coleridge’s attempt to engage the free will problem 
and the Christian Trinity appears quixotic. Did they really think they could explain such 
paradoxical issues? Their answer seems to have been equivocal as they sought to make 
the leap of faith a step of faith—a step they insisted could justly be called rational. 
Ultimately they would agree with Pascal: “Reason’s last step is the recognition that there 
are an infinite number of things which are beyond it. It is merely feeble if it does not go 
as far as to realize that.”129 But they thought that by co-opting Kant’s practical reason and 
his distinction between Reason and Understanding they could partially explain Reason’s 
last step. They argued that practical Reason led to a crucial juncture where one either 
had faith in his own ability to live up to the demands of the internal moral law or one 
placed his faith in the historical Christ (who also revealed the Trinity) to provide 
supernatural aid and redemption.130 This was what Marsh meant when he insisted that 
Christianity comported with “the conscious wants of our inward being—the 
requirements of our own reason and consciences.”131 They were willing to concede that at 
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this point the language of faith became appropriate, but they thought that the careful 
journey through the human moral mind rendered faith in the Christian doctrines of the 
Trinity and the incarnation of God in Christ rational. 
 Ultimately their arguments could not be fully disentangled from the aphoristic 
style of the Aids to Reflection, which fused Platonist and Romantic themes. Their 
program was Romantic in its continual emphasis on the inward turn to the self, its 
obsession with free will, and its reliance on symbols derived from nature and Platonist in 
its program of a gradual, contemplative re-ascent of the soul to union with God. In 
essence, they were attempting both to give an account of their own spiritual experience 
and to prompt that experience in others. Marsh knew Coleridge, though he had never 
met or spoken with him. In his early days at Dartmouth College and Andover, Marsh had 
thought that “the disciple of Christ [could] feel as profoundly” and live every bit as 
intensely as Byron and Wordsworth.132 In his article “Ancient and Modern Poetry,” 
Marsh’s emotional attachment to Romantic spiritual experience poked through when he 
spoke of a “restless spirit at last conscious of its own powers and expanding with 
conceptions of the boundless and infinite.”133 He had claimed that reading Madame de 
Staël he had become conscious of a power within himself, and he trusted this power not 
in a fully unbridled way—his Christianity mitigated this—but as a guide to the threshold 
of faith. 
 To ultimately explain the relationship between Reason and faith, Marsh quoted 
not from the Aids to Reflection but from Coleridge’s Biographia Literaria (1817), which 
Marsh had begun reading with Byron and Wordsworth in 1819.  “The scheme of 
Christianity, though not discoverable by reason, is yet in accordance with it—that link 
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follows link by necessary consequence—that religion passes out of the ken of reason only 
where the eye of reason has reached its own horizon—and that faith is then but its 
continuation.”134 The horizon of Reason was a critical symbol for Marsh and Coleridge as 
they sought to draw heaven and earth together and restore the harmony between the 
mind, nature, and God that even Kant could not allow. Coleridge used the symbol of 
dawn to explain the relationship between Reason and faith. Reason was an eye scanning 
the horizon and perceiving the light of a dawning sun, but as yet not seeing that sun. It 
could clearly see light and could infer a source with certain attributes, but it could not see 
the sun until the sun itself broke the horizon, allowing the eye to clearly perceive the sun 
by its own light.135   
 Though a Romantic turn to wonder and the spiritual experience of the subjective 
self, there was still a Kantian residue in Coleridge’s revelry. Concluding the Critique of 
Practical Reason (1788), Kant declared, “Two things fill the mind with ever new and 
increasing admiration and reverence . . . the starry heavens above me and the moral 
law within me.”136 But though Kant concluded his investigation into practical reason this 
way and his friends placed this declaration on his tombstone, Kant thought this wonder 
just the starting point for continuing to pursue practical reason by “adopt[ing] a 
procedure similar to that of chemistry,” continually weighing and testing moral 
conclusions.137 Coleridge and Marsh thought the inquiry had gone far enough, that the 
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careful pursuit of practical Reason authorized spiritual conversion as Reason realized its 
own horizon when trying to account for and rectify moral evil, particularly in the 
individual soul.   
 
Conclusion 
 Marsh’s Coleridgeanism was extremely ambitious. It attempted to ground the 
revealed doctrines of Christianity on an inward turn to the Romantic self. As with many 
Cautious Romantic impulses—such as Allston’s view of the liberated, individual artist 
who nevertheless partially looked to the past—Marsh’s project also cautiously attempted 
to control the inward turn by reference to the past. Thus, he attempted to employ 
Christian Platonism to explain his new view of a higher, spiritual Reason, and even more 
ambitiously attempted to explain how paradoxical Christian doctrines could still be 
called “rational.” Both cleverly and perhaps a bit unfairly, he thought that by 
emphasizing the perennial free will problem he could set in motion an argument that 
could undermine traditional definitions of “reason.” He sought to expand this definition 
just enough to authorize cautious assent to a limited number of Christian paradoxes and 
to account for and perhaps prompt spiritual experience. Historically, Marsh was not 
nearly as successful on the first count as he was on the second. 
 While Marsh’s vindication of traditional Christian doctrines could not ultimately 
persuade Unitarians of the Trinity or Christ’s divinity, the ideas that he and Coleridge 
outlined in the Aids to Reflection were not ephemeral. They introduced a new spiritual 
vitality into American religion, evidenced by the hundreds of copies disappearing off of 
booksellers’ shelves and by the eventual attention that intellectual journals began to pay 
to Coleridge. Moreover, with the publication of Aids, Marsh established himself as the 
  
264 
philosopher of the growing network of Cautious Romantics, who saw him as an 
important champion of their own position. Perhaps most importantly, Coleridge’s 
epistemology and Trinitarianism helped Marsh to reconcile himself both to a vocation 
and to those around them. Thus, Marsh’s public influence and its link to his philosophy 
are taken up in Chapter Seven.
  
265 
 
Chapter 7: Educational Reformer and the Philosopher of a Network 
 
Introduction  
 Marsh’s philosophy was not just an attempt to explain paradoxical Christian 
doctrines or Romantic spiritual experiences to himself, important as that was for him 
intellectually and emotionally. It was also an attempt to reconcile himself to those 
around him and to find a vocation suitable to his extremely reflective interests. Marsh 
found his answers to these questions through education, and as a university president 
and professor of moral and intellectual philosophy he sought to apply his philosophy to 
his educational views. He balanced his Romantic emphasis on the revelatory power of 
the inward self with a cautious invocation of the value of educational institutions to help 
guide the self’s development. Politically Marsh was conservative and feared disorder in 
all its forms, but his educational vision was largely progressive as it expanded the 
curriculum, sought greater access and flexible requirements for individual students, and 
emphasized organic development of the individual mind. 
 But Marsh’s public influence was not just limited to his educational reforms. He 
also became an important philosophical spokesman for numerous other Cautious 
Romantics who had in various ways anticipated or embraced his philosophy. Allston, the 
Danas, Guilian Verplanck, Leonard Woods Jr., and Caleb Sprague Henry all found him 
an important and effective expositor, and Marsh also had an important influence on 
several students, including Henry Jarvis Raymond, William G.T. Shedd, and George 
Allen. Thus, this chapter charts Marsh’s philosophical influence as an educational 
reformer and the philosopher of a network. Marsh’s attempt to articulate a new 
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Romantic epistemology, explore its egalitarian aspects, defend Trinitarianism, and guide 
his new epistemology through institutions all place him at the center of Cautious 
Romanticism, both chronologically and conceptually. 
   
An Egalitarian Trinity 
 Marsh emphasized Trinitarianism not only because he thought it philosophically 
meaningful but also because he found it emotionally meaningful. Marsh’s adoption of 
Coleridge had been partially motivated by his search for an egalitarian epistemology 
that would reconcile him as a reclusive intellectual to those around him. To be sure, 
Scottish Common Sense employed a consistent appeal to egalitarianism epistemology, 
but while Reid had granted common sense knowledge of the external world and moral 
truths to everyone, he also asserted that “in the greatest part of mankind, no other 
degree of reason is to be found.”1 Marsh, echoing a complaint made later by Orestes 
Brownson, thought that for all its egalitarianism Common Sense did not really account 
for or respect the spiritual insights and experiences of common people. For Marsh, 
speaking of Reason as a higher, spiritual faculty, and distinguishing it from the 
Understanding helped to rectify the gap between the intellectual and non-intellectual. 
Marsh thought that the belief in God as Trinity—the emphasis on Christ the Word as 
Reason, and the gifts of the Spirit—could undergird a respect for a diversity of gifts, 
spiritual insights, and life situations. 
That religion, of which our blessed Saviour is himself the essential Form and the living 
Word, and to which he imparts the actuating Spirit, has a principle of unity and 
consistency in itself, distinct from the unity and consistency of our theoretical views. . . . 
How often do we see and acknowledge the power of religion, and the growth of a spiritual 
life, in the minds but little gifted with speculative knowledge, and little versed in the forms 
of logic or philosophy . . . amidst all the diversities of condition, of talents, of education, 
and natural disposition . . . ’There are diversities of gifts but the same spirit.’2   
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Marsh’s attraction to Coleridgean Reason was in part an attempt to vindicate those who 
were “truly religious, and essentially . . . believer[s] at heart, while [their] understanding 
is sadly bewildered with the attempt to comprehend and express philosophically, what 
yet [they] feel . . . and know . . . spiritually.”3 He equated speculative philosophy and 
theology with the “finite strivings of the understanding to comprehend” a deeper 
principle, which Reason apprehended.  This principle insisted that the inward turn 
would lead to a compelling life and that this sort of life was the surest bellwether of truth, 
even if the non-intellectual could not articulate an argument for that life.  
 In this way Marsh reconciled himself to the non-intellectual. When Marsh 
retreated into his study for hours at a time, he was not smothering the life of religion as 
some of his friends thought; he was engaging in the reflective habits conducive to 
Reason. Conversely, Reason was not to be equated only with the esoteric intellectual, 
who could wield the complex philosophical arguments of the Understanding. Rather, 
Reason was an intuitive, spiritual principle available to all; Reason and not the 
Understanding manifested itself in the diversity of gifts and the compelling spiritual life 
Marsh observed in others less academically inclined than himself. For Marsh, study was 
a spiritual process; the path to God for the intellectual thus lay through the bedeviling 
questions of the Understanding. But this was the avenue by which the intellectual 
engaged his Reason, and since Reason was a higher faculty that encompassed all of 
human experience, all people could engage Reason. Aids to Reflection, with its emphasis 
on aphorisms, was meant to stimulate this process, whatever intellectual tools the reader 
brought to the text.  
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Universities, Institutions, and the Republic 
 This appreciation for diverse gifts and situations guided Marsh’s approach to 
educational reform as president of the University of Vermont (UVM), a position that he 
took in October 1826. He insisted that the UVM governors recognize that “the pursuits of 
life [were] so various” in their community that higher education must become more 
flexible in the content, methods, and access. The new university should not just seek to 
“impart a stock of knowledge” and should not just cultivate the minds of young men 
bound for “learned professions,” but it should aim to “give a full development of all the 
capacities of the mind” and thereby “hold out encouragement and furnish means for 
improvement to all just so far as they have the power to avail themselves.”4 In keeping 
with his mental philosophy, he advocated reforming pedagogy from an over-reliance on 
textbooks and recitations to a “free and familiar discussion” between professors and 
students where students could try their intellectual powers and thus professors could 
more carefully discern their specific progress and abilities (60). He also insisted on 
allowing less privileged students access to part-time education to fit with the demands of 
work, bemoaning the fact that many were “discouraged from attempting even a partial 
education” (64-65). He developed a flexible system for conferring degrees and 
certificates on these students based on their attainments (66). Finally, he sought to 
“render the mode of government more entirely parental,” and resort to “exclusively . . . 
moral and social influence” rather than the systems of strict discipline common among 
universities (64).   
 Between 1826 and 1833, Marsh served as president at UVM and implemented 
nearly all of these reforms. His arguments became more, not less, pointed over this 
period of time. In 1831, he publicly pressed home his argument for grouping students by 
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attainment rather than class and for allowing part-time and working students access. 
The contrary method of insisting that students enroll full-time and always progress with 
their class “is virtually shutting the doors of the halls of learning against a large 
portion of our most valuable young men. . . . Doubtless it may be legally right for an 
institution to impose such conditions on its members as will make it a college for the rich 
only, but whether it will be performing in the highest degree its duty towards society at 
large, may be questioned.”5 Though not entirely destitute, Marsh’s means were modest.6 
While he could often criticize working-class parents disinclined toward education with 
Whiggish verve, he also reserved criticism for the wealthy when they undermined the 
public good by refusing to support enhanced access to universities or common schools.  
 In contrast to Richard Henry Dana Jr.’s experience at Harvard, Marsh sought to 
build an entire university staffed with professors like Leonard Woods Jr.—capacious in 
their intellectual interests, inexhaustible in their good will toward students, and 
Romantic in philosophy and temperament. Dana Sr. was thrilled to find not only a 
philosopher to articulate his own Christian Romantic views but also an educator who 
actively promoted a system of education that Dana had advocated in the North American 
Review a decade earlier. “Had I a dozen boys,” Dana declared as he sent his son Edmund 
to study with Marsh, “I would put them under the Burlington Faculty if I could.”7 Some 
of Marsh’s motivations came from his personal experience and biases: he found Andover 
professors “ungentlemanlike” and coldly removed from students, southern students 
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insufficiently serious and motivated, and Harvard philosophical theology and method 
wanting.8 Moreover, Marsh hoped that by employing his more familiar teaching methods 
and “parental” structures of discipline, he could realize through education the pastoral 
relationships to which he had always been drawn. Marsh explained that his more 
familiar system of discipline was explicitly meant to foster “the independent spirit and 
love of study for its own sake.”9 In all of these reforms, Marsh sought to develop UVM in 
accordance with Coleridgean epistemology—to allow greater access to those less 
privileged and greater flexibility to those at various stages of mental cultivation. Many of 
these reforms his friend George Ticknor had unsuccessfully attempted to institute at 
Harvard, and Marsh’s attempt to institute a new American epistemology and reform 
education accordingly gave him dual purchase on the American intellect.10  
 Marsh’s educational vision established his intellectual reputation well beyond 
simply publishing Coleridge. In early 1829, several months before publishing Aids to 
Reflection (1829), Marsh published An Exposition of the System of Instruction and 
Discipline Pursued in the University of Vermont (1829, 1831), which argued carefully for 
the reforms outlined above. Ticknor was glad to have his similar views on educational 
reform put before the broader public.11 Francis Wayland, president of Brown University, 
thought Marsh’s views “the best thing on college education that I had seen.”12 Marsh’s 
reputation extended into New York, where Gulian Verplanck informed him that 
Columbia College had conferred on Marsh an honorary degree. Marsh was also asked to 
provide insights from his own reforms—particularly on discipline and governance—as 
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part of the committee that helped to launch the University of the City of New York (New 
York University).13 Within two years, Marsh’s publisher called for a second edition of The 
System of Instruction to respond to “the high approbation of it expressed by men of the 
first scholars and teachers in our country.”14 
 
A Fundamental Tension: Coleridgean Epistemology and Educational 
Guidance 
 Marsh’s educational reforms were at once conservative and progressive.  His 
emphasis on the individual needs of specific selves—in the form of part time schooling, 
flexible curriculum, freer discourse with professors, and more parental discipline—
mirrored his philosophical emphasis on the inward turn. All of these reforms sought to 
graft what Marsh called the “branches” of knowledge onto the trunks of individuals’ 
unique abilities, attainments, and life circumstances.15 Like Dana’s critique of 
mechanical education in 1818, Marsh emphasized education as an organic process not 
“to shape and fit the powers of the mind to this or that outward condition in the 
mechanism of civil society, but, by means corresponding to their inherent nature, to 
excite, to encourage, and affectionately free and perfect development of those powers 
themselves.”16 Marsh experienced this revelation of power within himself when studying 
Romantic authors, and he saw the process of study as a personal, spiritual process. Just 
as he had pursued his own course of intellectual development, much of it independent of 
                                                   
 13 GCV to JM, Oct. 14, 1830, JDL, 112; JM to James M. Mathews, Nov. 5, 1830, JDL, 113-115. Caleb 
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 16 Marsh, “Necessary Agency of Religious Truth,” JMR, 589. 
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the college curriculum, he sought to give students a similar, partially self-directed 
experience.17 Romantic literature, not just theology or philosophy, had been part of this 
self-directed experience; he thus insisted that modern literature, particularly English 
literature, be an important part of the college curriculum.18 Marsh emphasized the high 
ideal of self-culture but sought creative ways to allow greater and more flexible access to 
it and thereby mitigate its elitist aspects. 
 Marsh’s educational vision relied directly on the two-fold division in the mind, 
which he and Coleridge constructed out of Kant. According to Marsh, the educational 
vision that emphasized training individuals for specific occupations, whether trades or 
the professions, was based only on the Understanding. For Marsh as for Emerson, the 
Understanding was the faculty of getting along in the world, conducting business, and 
providing for bodily wants through “the occupations of society.”19 Napoleon for example 
possessed a highly cultivated Understanding in his shrewd political gifts and his ability 
to command others. But Marsh insisted that the point of education was “the awakening 
of those energies by which our humanity is allied to eternity and to God.”20 This was 
Reason. It was a higher power that should inform all others and required one who had 
“turned his thoughts to knowledge of himself; who has communed with his own heart 
and cherished the powers of reason and self-consciousness.”21 Marsh insisted that this 
means of looking into the self and seeking spiritual light through education could not be 
separated from “other objects and means of intellectual culture,” and an education based 
on Reason would engage “all our powers of knowledge and all the products of 
                                                   
 17 JM to George Ticknor, Feb. 3, 1826, JDL, 48. 
 18 Not only did Marsh push this agenda at UVM, he also did so as a member of a panel convened to 
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intelligence.”22 His reform of the curriculum to include reading modern literature, and in 
particular the Aids to Reflection itself, sought to realize this ideal. 
  But through it all, Marsh exhibited a strongly conservative streak as well. 
Although his method was informed by Romantic literature and self-introspection, his 
Christian Platonism suffused his educational vision. He insisted that Reason, the divine 
Word, must superintend the process of self-development and self-culture.23 His 
Christian Trinitarianism and his Platonic belief in the gradual return of the soul to God—
from the realm of the senses and the manifold of the Understanding, through the moral 
realm, to the realm of the spiritual and the divine—permeated his educational 
organicism.24 Just as the Logos governed and organized the rational structure of the 
universe and correlative human Reason, so orthodox Christianity structured the 
educational process of individual self-development. Coleridge explicitly designed Aids to 
Reflection to guide the mind in this way, and Marsh sought through his reforms to 
realize Coleridge’s spiritual ideal in an institution. Despite the Romantic emphasis on 
developing “all the capacities of the mind” and on professors’ role as spiritual guides 
rather than didactic autocrats, Marsh had authorized a new view of the mind to forestall 
                                                   
 22 Ibid., JMR, 599. 
 23 “To exclude the light and truth of the divine Word from the minds of those whom we profess to 
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religious innovation rather than foster it. He insisted on a pastoral approach to 
education, but this liberal educational method aimed to guide the Romantic mind in the 
directions that Marsh found most salubrious.  
 In truth there emerged a tension between guidance and control throughout 
Marsh’s career. In an early, ambitious address he briefly formulated an idea of a clerisy, 
which Coleridge would later make famous in On the Constitution of Church and State 
(1830). According to Marsh, as a more liberal educational vision spread throughout the 
Republic, then “may we hope to have our philosophers . . . the ventriloquists of human 
reason . . . [who by] the living and productive energy of the ideas which they promulgate, 
shall impart wisdom to our teachers, and give laws to our legislators, thereby exerting a 
controlling power over the minds of their countrymen.”25 For Marsh, the intellectual 
might serve as an enlightening seer to the entire Republic, working through educational 
systems to guide the rest of the nation.26  
 This impulse to control would rear its head when Marsh was confronted with 
disorderly scenarios, such as Vermonters aiding and harboring Canadian rebels in 1837 
or revivalist preachers who subverted local clerical authority. But Marsh’s concern to 
reconcile the intellectual and non-intellectual and his emphasis on a familiar, pastoral 
relationship with his students was also genuine. As we shall see, throughout his entire 
life and career, his students spoke of him as a gentle, caring, and profound instructor 
who guided their thinking rather than controlling it. 
 
 
                                                   
 25 Marsh, “Inaugural Address,” JMR, 582-583. 
 26 In the context of the speech, Marsh was working out a particular Romantic trope, elaborating the 
idea of the controlling philosopher as similar to the inspired, artistic genius who “shall mould the elements 
thus collected into the bright imperishable forms of their own creative imagination . . . by that magic power 
which language imparts to the genius of the poet.” Ibid., 582.  
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A Broader Vision: Marsh and Popular Education 
 The organic process was not just limited to the individual or the University of 
Vermont. Through his role as a collegiate educator, Marsh sought to reform all of society, 
though with a particular emphasis on his own regional community of northern Vermont. 
In his addresses at the university, Marsh constantly reminded his students that they 
were members of a community.27 Echoing a concern of the later Orestes Brownson, 
Marsh insisted that “the soul is embosomed in the human world,” and it existed 
fundamentally in communion with others.28 But just as Reason mediated between the 
senses and the spirit and Christ as Word mediated between the human and the divine, 
the union of the individual and the community required mediation. Marsh’s 
Romanticism sought institutional forms.  
 1829 was Marsh’s intellectual annus mirabilis, as he released both his 
“Preliminary Essay” and his Exposition on UVM education—both of which firmly 
established him within the American intellectual consciousness. But there was a third 
leg, both to Marsh’s vision and his intellectual reputation, and this has been almost 
entirely overlooked by previous scholarship. Between January 16 and April 17, 1829, 
while preparing the “Preliminary Essay” and his Exposition, Marsh published nine 
articles in the Vermont Chronicle that sought to extend his views on education to the 
larger community. Aptly dubbing himself “Philopolis,” he articulated a vision for 
“popular education” every bit as Romantic as his views of the mind or the university. 
 Though Marsh was most at home in the university setting, and was thus 
passionately committed to its reform, the end goal in all of his thinking was the 
development of a society composed of reflective individuals. In “Popular Education,” 
                                                   
 27 Marsh, “Necessary Agency of Religious Truth,” JMR, 586. 
 28 Marsh, “Man’s Need of Christ,” JMR, 516. For the central role the idea of “communion” played in 
Orestes Brownson’s conversion to Catholicism see Chapter Nine. 
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Marsh began by recapitulating his theoretical views. Even popular education could not 
be “any mechanical process of adding or attaching a certain quality of knowledge to the 
mind,” it must consist “in the organic development of the mind itself.” The best kind of 
education sought to develop the whole human, “our understandings, our moral 
principles and our religious and spiritual affections.”29 Marsh was no radical and 
believed the kinds of moral and religious principles that should be reached would be 
Trinitarian Christianity. But he also insisted that moral and religious principles could not 
be inculcated by “the restraints of existing institutions and prejudices, and the tyranny of 
power.”30 Whatever development occurred, whether individual or social, it had to come 
from within and could not be forced upon it from without. 
 There was also a kind of Romantic pleasure in this guided process of cultivation, 
which belies the idea that Marsh simply hoped to control the process or enforce only his 
own views. Rather he hoped to give all people the occasion for the intellectual and 
spiritual pleasures that he had personally enjoyed. He looked for “a waking up of the 
dormant energies of reason and intellect, an intensity of action in the popular mind, that 
shall give our social life ‘a being more intense,’ and diffuse, through all classes of society, 
a kind and degree of moral and intellectual enjoyment hitherto known only by the few.”31 
This Byron-inspired claim had a dual purpose, as Marsh applied the early passages in 
Byron that had inspired his own personal quest to his educational vision for all. In Child 
Harold’s Pilgrimage (1816), Byron had spoken of:  
He, who grown aged in this world of woe, 
In deeds, not years, piercing the depths of life… 
Of silent, sharp endurance: he can tell 
Why thought seeks refuge in lone caves.   
 
                                                   
 29 James Marsh (Philopolis), “Popular Education,” Vermont Chronicle, January 16, 1829, 2. Typed 
copies in File 6.11, JMC (page numbers refer to these copies). 
 30 James Marsh (Philopolis), “Popular Education,” Vermont Chronicle, January 23, 1829, 4. 
 31 James Marsh, “Inauguration Address: November 28, 1826,” 1826, JMR, 575. 
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Byron insisted that this poet deep of feeling and experience must not succumb to “airy 
images” or the “soul’s haunted cell” but required vigorous and directed action: 
’Tis to create, and in creating live 
A being more intense, that we endow 
With form our fancy, gaining as we give 
The life we image, even as I do now.32   
 
As Byron’s “being more intense” had inspired Marsh in his own early adoption of 
Romantic philosophy and in his own quest for a vocation, he now hoped to foster 
“intensity of action in the popular mind” and thereby inspire a community unwearied by 
its deeds or years but constantly refining and reinventing its institutional forms in 
accordance with the inner needs of the spirit.  
 These were the three entities that Marsh emphasized again and again in his 
articles on “Popular Education”: individuals, communities, and institutions. He insisted 
that the proper unfolding of Reason and the organic development of the mind “apply to 
communities and nations with no less propriety, than to individuals,” and that “a people 
thus educated [in accordance with Reason and organic method] are always competent to 
adapt their institutions to their character and wants.”33 In this way, Marsh sought to 
overcome the enervated isolation of the disengaged poet or intellectual—a fate suffered, 
at times, by his friend Richard Henry Dana Sr.—and to realize the Byronic cult of action 
within the context of American, republican institutions. 
 Despite his desire to guide the mind of the community, Marsh was also 
surprisingly attentive to the dynamics of power and control; he sought to navigate 
carefully between excessive compulsion in his educational vision and disengaged laxity 
as a community leader. He consistently bemoaned the “cumbrous and Gothic edifices” of 
Europe “which, though they accommodate the few, discommode and oppress the many 
                                                   
 32 George Gordon, Lord Byron, Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage: Canto the Third (London: John 
Murray, 1816), III.V–VI; 5–6. 
 33 James Marsh (Philopolis), “Popular Education,” Vermont Chronicle, January 16, 1829, 2. 
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and thus obstruct the general improvement of the whole.”34 Marsh’s attention to power 
dynamics was most clearly seen in his careful reasoning about compulsory school 
attendance. “It would be easy to form systems and devise plans of education, that should 
bring every child . . . under the discipline of a thorough course of elementary and useful 
instruction, as is done among the subjects of the king of Prussia. . . . But then, the very 
existence and exercise of that power, however beneficial in the particular application of it 
. . . would repress the developments of the popular mind, and transform our free citizens 
into a subject peasantry.” Instead, Marsh thought, all reforms must proceed “on the 
views which are taken of them by all classes of the community.”35 And yet, Marsh argued, 
state compulsory education could be enforced as a logical correlative to taxing those who 
did not derive direct benefit from public education. In his educational reforms at UVM, 
Marsh castigated those who would make “a college for the rich only”; likewise, in 
“Popular Education,” Marsh criticized wealthy persons who did not want their taxes 
going to educate their neighbors. However, Marsh insisted, that if the law could compel 
these citizens to pay taxes for the public good, then it could also expect all children to 
attend school for the public good.36 His organic view of society mandated that republican 
liberty—which he frequently celebrated—be moderated by mutual obligation and civic 
virtue. 
 His views on education were at once both liberal and conservative. He joined the 
broad liberal tradition in emphasizing education as the great leveling force in a 
democratic society, which must be heavily supported to rectify the inequalities of birth, 
                                                   
 34 James Marsh (Philopolis), “Popular Education,” Vermont Chronicle, February 27, 1829, 14. In 
some of Marsh’s other writing he celebrated the role Gothic forms played in the Middle Ages in fostering the 
imagination of the people, but here he seems attentive to both the positive, liberating role of the Gothic 
aesthetic and the concern that any aesthetic could be co-opted by hierarchical societies to reinforce harmful 
power structures. 
 35 James Marsh (Philopolis), “Popular Education,” Vermont Chronicle, March 13, 1829, 18. 
 36 James Marsh (Philopolis), “Popular Education,” Vermont Chronicle, March 20, 1829, 20-22. 
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parenting, and other opportunities.37 On the other hand, as a conservative Marsh 
emphasized the need for education to ensure social order and stability and the need for 
religion and the clergy to be intimately involved in its application.38 Moreover, he 
tended, like many Whiggish types, to worry about the inattention to education displayed 
by “foreigners and Roman Catholics.”39  
 Marsh’s educational vision also grew from the explicit Romantic concern about 
the dehumanizing effects of industrialization. One of the main reasons Marsh worried so 
much about derelict parents was that he feared that as manufacturing jobs increased 
without government regulation of child labor, “children of every age can be made 
subservient to the cupidity of their parents or others.”40 Citing European authorities, 
Marsh worried that the successful republican experiment in North America might 
crumble under the weight of population density and an industrial economy. Marsh, like 
Jefferson, saw America as a land where freedom had provided for great gains in the 
                                                   
 37 Marsh explicitly made the case that compelling education would only affect those children who 
most needed education to rectify defects in parental guidance, James Marsh (Philopolis), “Popular 
Education,” Vermont Chronicle, March 20, 1829, 22. Two of the greatest thinkers in the liberal tradition, 
John Stuart Mill and John Rawls, held out strong and universal education as crucial to democratic society. 
“Great improvements in education (among the first of which I reckon dissevering it from bad religion) is the 
only thing to which I should look for permanent good." J.S. Mill to Edward Herford, Jan. 1850 in John 
Stuart Mill, The Letters of John Stuart Mill: Vol. I, ed. Hugh S.R. Elliot (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 
1910), 153. Rawls argued that education could function to directly redress inequality of birth or 
circumstance, to indirectly enable talented individuals to redress inequality through their ability and 
training, and finally to enable “a person to enjoy the culture of his society and take part in its affairs, [and 
thus obtain] a secure sense of his own worth.” John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Revised. (Cambridge: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), 86–87. Marsh would have wholeheartedly embraced all 
three of Rawls’ goals, but he would have objected strongly to Mill’s (and Rawls’s elsewhere) disentangling 
education from religion. 
 38 “Our great, I might say our only business, as a community, is to promote the education of the 
community [so that] our political, civil, and religious institutions are freed from all possibility of danger . . . 
they can be secured in no other way,” James Marsh (Philopolis), “Popular Education,” Vermont Chronicle, 
February 27, 1829, 15. In his fourth article, Marsh argued that while political and financial support were 
essential to education, proper religious principles and feeling—those he had outlined in his “Preliminary 
Essay” and views on university instruction—was the only way to positively secure the enduring support of the 
public for education. James Marsh (Philopolis), “Popular Education,” Vermont Chronicle, February 20, 
1829, 10-12. He also advocated that clergy help directly with implementing reforms he proposed on that 
ground as the state could not afford to adequately compensate independent inspectors, James Marsh 
(Philopolis), “Popular Education,” Vermont Chronicle, March 13, 1829, 17-19. 
 39 James Marsh (Philopolis), “Popular Education,” Vermont Chronicle, March 20, 1829, 22 and 
April 3, 1829, 23. 
 40 James Marsh (Philopolis), “Popular Education,” Vermont Chronicle, March 20, 1829, 22. 
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diffusion of Reason to the common man, and he celebrated both the Puritan religious 
errand into the wilderness and the Revolutionary yeoman farmer and frontiersmen of 
previous ages. He fused his Coleridgean paradigm with the myths of James Fenimore 
Cooper, praising those whose “understanding and reason were perpetually called into 
exercise . . . by adventuring into the unbroken forests . . . without the aid of book or 
precedent.”41   
 But Marsh thought this rough-and-ready enlightenment fast disappearing as the 
American market economy began to demand increasing efficiency and specialization. He 
insisted that “the subdivision of labour, the multiplication of manufacturing 
establishments . . . and the confinement of the laboring population each to his narrow 
and almost mechanical routine of daily labour, forever repeated and forever the same, 
must unavoidably have a still greater influence to limit their opportunities of observation 
and experience, and tend to bring their minds, their powers of invention and of 
judgment within a compass as narrow as their employments.”42 Education, Marsh 
thought, was the only method for enabling the mental cultivation essential for further 
opportunity and for an enlightened citizenry.43 In this way, he articulated an educational 
vision at once pursuant to the highest ideals of the Republic and also in keeping with his 
                                                   
 41 James Marsh (Philopolis), “Popular Education,” Vermont Chronicle, February 6, 1829, 8.   
 42 James Marsh (Philopolis), “Popular Education,” Vermont Chronicle, February 6, 1829, 8-9.   
 43 My interpretation of Marsh runs contrary to that of Lewis Feuer in certain respects. Feuer saw 
Marsh as a reactionary conservative whose formative influences were the battle between Federalists and 
Republicans for control of Dartmouth College, certain residual feelings of Calvinist guilt, and even sexual 
repression. Though the overall thrust of Feuer in painting Marsh as a political conservative is correct, 
Marsh’s motivations for his comprehensive views were, as I have shown, much more motivated by his 
concern for personal intellectual vindication vis-à-vis Coleridge and by his existential vocational struggles as 
an intellectual. As Feuer privileges a narrow reading of Marsh’s motivations, he overlooks some key nuances 
in Marsh’s political position—such as his praise of the Revolutionary frontiersman—that make it more 
difficult to qualify Marsh as simply a Federalist curmudgeon. Furthermore, Marsh was equally critical of 
those “sons” of that generation “growing up, and inheriting the labours of their fathers, untried by their 
hardships, and undisciplined by their experience” as he was of the laboring classes forced to work in 
manufacturing jobs, see James Marsh (Philopolis), “Popular Education,” Vermont Chronicle, February 6, 
1829, 8 and Lewis S. Feuer, “James Marsh and the Conservative Transcendentalist Philosophy: A Political 
Interpretation,” The New England Quarterly 31, no. 1 (March 1958): 3–31. 
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Coleridgean epistemology. Just as in Marsh’s vision of university education, he insisted 
that popular education needed to be guided by Reason and not just the mechanical 
requirements of the Understanding. Coleridge’s epistemology made sense of both 
Marsh’s personal experience and the personal experiences of non-intellectuals, but it was 
through education that Marsh saw the full import of his views realized in a social and 
democratic way. 
 
Educational Influence 
 Marsh’s legacy as a Romantic educational reformer cannot be measured by any 
mechanical metric. Despite his numerous reforms and a national reputation, UVM 
struggled under the limitations of geographical isolation and very limited financial 
resources. Although a recent book-buying tour in Europe had boosted the library’s 
holdings and the university boasted a medical school, in 1833 the university employed 
only six professors and instructed some 44 students including fourteen medical 
students.44 But the small and relatively provincial nature in some ways actually served to 
enhance Marsh’s influence. As a president of a small and struggling university, Marsh 
was permitted to enact the reforms he thought necessary, and these reforms helped give 
him his reputation. Furthermore, the small student body enhanced Marsh’s pedagogical 
influence and his more pastoral approach to education. Looking at UVM’s low 
enrollments, one is amazed to find several important graduates all attesting in the 
highest praise possible to Marsh’s intellectual influence.   
                                                   
 44 “View of American Colleges, 1833,” The American Quarterly Register 5, no. 4 (May 1833): 332–
333. This table did not include the two additional medical professors in its tabulation. While the student 
numbers at the college seemed to have remained stable, if small, the medical student numbers dropped 
significantly as Marsh reported a medical class of 40 in 1829, JM to Joseph Torrey, Feb. 14, 1829, JDL, 69. 
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 One such graduate was Henry Jarvis Raymond (UVM 1840), who thought Marsh 
“a lovely man . . . [possessing a] wonderful, holy charm which revealed itself as clearly at 
the first interview as at the hundredth.”45 Raymond founded and edited the New York 
Times from 1851 until his death in 1869. A prominent journalist and political figure, he 
would exert a large influence in the founding of the Republican Party and Lincoln’s 
career and legacy.46 Of Raymond, Richard Henry Dana Jr. remembered: “[He] was one 
of that noble breed of youth who owed so much to James Marsh, and were so proud to 
acknowledge him as their master in metaphysics, or better all [psychological] studies, 
nearly all of whom have distinguished themselves.”47 Raymond’s and Dana’s account 
revealed how much Marsh had reconciled himself to those around him. 
 During his early years, Raymond promoted the Cautious Romantic cause. While 
writing for the young Horace Greeley’s New-Yorker, Raymond praised both Richard 
Henry Dana Sr.’s Poems and Prose Writings (1833) and James Gillman’s Life of Samuel 
Taylor Coleridge (1838). While at times Raymond engaged in pathetic puff—he called 
Dana’s “The Buccaneer” “the greatest American poem yet written”—Raymond also 
rightly pointed out that William Cullen Bryant’s diction was superior to Dana’s.48 But 
Raymond’s philosophical eye, clearly influenced by Marsh’s Romantic Platonism, was 
more interesting. Evaluating Dana’s poem “The Little Beach Bird,” where Dana 
identified the haunting sounds of the sea and the dim, weak cry of a bird with “One spirit 
. . . The Mystery—the Word,” Raymond explained that Dana rightly looked on nature 
“not as the mere workmanship of God, but as springing directly from Him—as the 
                                                   
 45 HJR to RHDS, n.d. [1842], Folder 1.3, Henry Jarvis Raymond Papers, New York Public Library, 
New York, NY (hereafter HJRP, NYPL). 
 46 For a thorough account of Raymond’s politics and political contributions, see Francis Brown, 
Raymond of the Times (New York: Norton, 1951). 
 47 RHDJ to Mrs. HJR, Nov. 10, 1870, Folder 1.3, HJRP, NYPL. RHDJ’s view is born out in HJR’s 
“The Attractions and the Utilities of Literature,” Articles and Addresses, Folder 1.25, HJRP, NYPL. 
 48 Henry J. Raymond, “Dana’s Poems and Prose Writing,” The New-Yorker 4, no. 16–18 (January 6, 
1838): 658-660. 
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expression of the Divine mind.” He thought Dana attentive to “the mysterious and awe-
inspiring movements” of both “Universal Nature” and the “sublime and awful mysteries 
of the soul.” To Raymond, Dana exemplified the Wordsworthian and Coleridgean ideal of 
the poet fused in a dynamic and mutually illuminative encounter with nature, where the 
poet “can look beyond the external in Nature, and bring forth her deepest and most 
hidden stores of beauty and goodness.”49 Raymond even went so far as to engage in 
polemics with other reviewers who criticized Dana’s lack of popular appeal.50 When it 
came to Coleridge, Raymond cleverly hid behind strong criticism of Coleridge’s friend 
and biographer James Gillman to laud Coleridge himself in no uncertain terms. Of 
Gilman, Raymond declared, “his intellect was evidently not sufficiently powerful and 
comprehensive to master and grasp a character like that of Coleridge.”51 On the other 
hand, Raymond seemed to agree with Thomas DeQuincey’s assertion that Coleridge 
possessed the “largest and most spacious intellect that has ever yet existed among men,” 
taking pains to point out that DeQuincey was in many ways disillusioned with Coleridge 
and thus his remark could not have come from mere friendship.52 Raymond continued to 
laud Coleridge throughout his two-part review.53 
 Besides Raymond, Marsh inspired other important students. William G.T. Shedd 
(UVM 1839) went on to a distinguished career at Andover and Union Theological 
Seminaries and from 1852 to 1854 completed Marsh’s hope to publish the authoritative 
                                                   
 49 Henry J. Raymond, “Dana’s Poems and Prose Writings,” The New-Yorker, 4, no. 26–27 (March 
17, 1838): 818. 
 50 Henry J. Raymond, “Richard H. Dana,” The New-Yorker, 5, no. 18 (July 21, 1838): 273–274. 
 51 Henry J. Raymond, “Review: The Life of S. T. Coleridge: By James Gillman,” The New-Yorker, 8, 
no. 18 (January 18, 1840): 274. 
 52 Henry J. Raymond, “Review: The Life of S. T. Coleridge: By James Gillman,” The New-Yorker, 8, 
no. 18 (January 18, 1840): 273. 
 53 Henry J. Raymond, “Review: The Life of S. T. Coleridge: By James Gillman,” The New-Yorker, 8, 
no. 18 (January 18, 1840): 273-274; Henry J. Raymond, “Review: The Life of S. T. Coleridge: By James 
Gillman,” The New-Yorker, 8, no. 19 (January 25, 1840): 289-290. 
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American edition of The Complete Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge.54 George Allen 
(UVM 1826/7), who is treated more extensively in Chapter Ten, topped them all in 
praise: “I have never in my life felt so much reverence and affection for any teacher as for 
this great and amiable man. . . . It was he who introduced me to the knowledge of 
Coleridge and Wordsworth, of Milton’s prose works, and of the best English authors.”55 
Allen assisted Marsh in publishing Aids to Reflection in 1828 and 1829, and he went on 
to become the chair of Greek language and literature at the University of Pennsylvania, 
where he aided another Cautious Romantic, Henry Hope Reed, in editing his lectures on 
English literature. In 1847 Allen converted to Catholicism and carried on a 
correspondence with Orestes Brownson throughout the 1850s, but despite the difference 
that later emerged between Allen’s and Marsh’s religious views, Allen remained during 
Marsh’s life “the zealous friend and champion of his revered teacher. He treasured every 
scrap of his utterances, copied his great sermons, and carried on a correspondence with 
him till Marsh’s death.”56 
 As to popular education, in 1923 Emit Duncan Grizzell conducted a thorough 
study of The Origin and Development of the High School in New England Before 1865. 
In it he concluded that by 1865, “Burlington high school probably represented the best 
development in public secondary education in Vermont [as] the University of Vermont . . 
. supplied the institution throughout its long career with college trained men as 
principals and teachers, and provided an atmosphere of culture that fostered a 
progressive educational spirit.”57 Despite being geographically distant from the 
progressive educational reforms of Massachusetts, despite very limited access to funds 
                                                   
 54 JM to RHDS, Aug. 21, 1832, JDL, 140 
 55 Allen, “An Autobiographical Fragment. By the Late Prof. Geo. Allen, LL.D.,” 652. 
 56 Robert Ellis Thompson, “Professor George Allen, LL.D.,” The Penn Monthly 7 (July 1876): 564. 
 57 Emit Duncan Grizzell, Origin and Development of the High School in New England Before 1865 
(New York: Macmillan, 1923), 238. 
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that more prosperous states enjoyed, and despite the fact that many southern Vermont 
towns predated Burlington in the development of popular education, by the middle of 
the nineteenth century Marsh’s vision for his regional community had been realized.58  
 But in addition to his vision for Burlington and the larger American society, 
Marsh had become the kind of person he wanted to be. As a wistful Richard Henry Dana 
Jr. remembered in 1849 as he walked through the Burlington campus palpably devoid of 
Marsh’s presence, Marsh was a “profound philosopher and a child-like man.”59 He was 
no longer the alienated intellectual, the self-doubting minister, or a second-tier intellect; 
he was reconciled to his own intellectual questions but more importantly to those around 
him. Though Marsh died in 1842, the reforms he set in place and the Coleridgean 
principles he embraced continued at UVM throughout the nineteenth century.  
 
The Philosopher of a Movement  
 The impact of Aids to Reflection and particularly Marsh’s careful explanation of it 
helped to inspire a new generation of religious intellectuals in America, but he also spoke 
for the quickly coalescing group of Cautious Romantics who had begun to think, paint, 
teach, and write in the spirit that Marsh sought to foster. Guilian Verplanck wrote 
excitedly from New York that Marsh’s preface and notes gave him “very great 
gratification.” Verplanck confessed, “He is an author to whom I owe much in the 
formation of my opinions. . . . You have a double claim upon the thanks of the American 
public as well for making known to them so excellent a work, as for adding to its value 
and utility by your own exposition of his object and meaning.”60 Richard Henry Dana Sr. 
                                                   
 58 Marsh was forthright about the resource limitations Vermont faced versus other states, see 
Marsh, “Inaugural Address,” JMR, 578. 
 59 Dana Jr., The Journal of Richard Henry Dana, Jr., 1:376. 
 60 GCV to JM, Oct. 14, 1830, JDL, 112-113. 
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likewise encouraged Marsh that both he and Leonard Woods Jr. stood on the side of “a 
deeper and more spiritual philosophy” and that they “agreed . . . as to the good that has 
been done by your republishing Coleridge.”61 Marsh responded that he hoped Dana Sr. 
would continue, despite ill health, “to do much in what you consider your more 
appropriate sphere” of poetry and literary criticism and that Marsh’s allies at UVM 
“intimately . . . associated [Dana] with the advocates of a living and spiritual 
philosophy.”62 Reflecting back on Marsh’s career, the aged and infirm Washington 
Allston wrote, “I rejoice that my great friend, Coleridge, has in him a commentator so 
every way worthy of his extraordinary powers.”63 William Cullen Bryant, the erstwhile 
cultural ally of Dana Sr. and Verplanck, demonstrated his religious distance from the 
Cautious Romantics. “The metaphysics of Coleridge have always appeared to us not a 
little misty,” he asserted. Bryant admired Coleridge’s poetry and command of language, 
but moving from worry to bewilderment, Bryant declared: “in some parts of his 
speculation, we confess our inability to discover anything like meaning.”64 
 The intellectuals who coalesced around this so-called living and spiritual 
philosophy, while orthodox in their insistence on the Trinity of God and the incarnation 
of God in Christ, represented a sharp break with the several parties that had carried the 
banner of orthodoxy in America. Marsh had two goals in publishing Coleridge; to ground 
traditional Christianity on different philosophical and more spiritual principles and to 
convince the Unitarians that they need not abandon the Trinity and Incarnation simply 
because these doctrines were beyond the ken of speculative reason. However, he neither 
hoped to found nor to inspire a new sect. 
                                                   
 61 RHDS to JM, Jul. 14, 1832, JDL, 137. 
 62 JM to RHDS, Aug. 21, 1832, JDL, 140. 
 63 WA to John Wheeler, July 10, 1842, CWA, 492. 
 64 William Cullen Bryant, “Review of Aids to Reflection,” New York Evening Post, Feb. 12, 1831 
cited in Muller, William Cullen Bryant, 97. 
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 Indeed, another factor that made Marsh a spokesman for the Cautious Romantics 
was his ecumenism, which emphasized basic historical Christian doctrines at the 
expense of orthodox denominational particularities. At Hampden-Sydney, Marsh had 
insisted on “a school as free as possible from sectarian feelings, with liberal plans, and 
primitive zeal and devotion.”65 When at UVM, Marsh enthusiastically hired Dr. Benjamin 
Lincoln as a professor at the medical school, despite Lincoln’s open pantheism and 
attendance at the Unitarian society.66 When Marsh first took over as president of UVM, 
he actively tried to court an Episcopalian professor to diversify the faculty, though he 
met with resistance as the Episcopalians at the time sought to build up their own 
institutions.67 Marsh’s ecumenical approach sought to emphasize the timeless Christian 
doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation at the expense of the more Reformed 
doctrines of election and depravity. 
 Marsh remained a Congregationalist throughout his life, but he was far from 
sectarian in his commitment to that denomination. Many of his closest intellectual 
friends were Episcopalians, and Marsh claimed that his purchase on the American mind 
came from his “catholicity” in all theological matters, except the doctrines he pressed 
against the Unitarians.68 In a letter to Coleridge’s son-in-law, Henry Nelson Coleridge, 
Marsh claimed that he believed his “general principles of Church government & on the 
Church” to be nearer to those of Coleridge than to Anglo-Catholic Episcopalian 
sectarians.69 In the context, these general principles involved the balance between social 
order and the development of the individual mind, which Henry Nelson explained 
                                                   
 65 JMR, 71. 
 66 Marsh characterized Lincoln as “too acute, too fearless, too ingenuous to stop at Unitarianism” 
and confessed “I love and admire the man for his perfect simplicity and frankness in the confession of these 
opinions as in everything else.” JM to RHDS, Aug. 21, 1832, JDL, 69, 140.  
 67 Ebenezer C. Tracy to JM, Dec. 24, 1826, JDL, 56-57. 
 68 JM to Henry Nelson Coleridge, Jan. 20, 1840, JDL, 223-224. 
 69 JM to Henry Nelson Coleridge, July 16, 1840, JDL, 232. 
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grounded Coleridge’s own ecclesiology.70 When the order provided by the 
Congregationalist establishment was threatened, Marsh could weigh in with a 
vengeance, as he did when he denounced the subversion of settled clerical authority by 
Charles Finney and other traveling revivalists. In a lengthy letter, Marsh fumed against 
the “bare faced quackery” and “sheer jacobinical radicalism” of revivalism in emotional 
language far out of proportion to the actual threat, suggesting that Marsh’s real concern 
was that the institutional structure of Congregationalism could not provide sufficient 
spiritual authority.71 But on doctrinal matters—barring the Trinity and Incarnation—
Marsh insisted he took no interest in theological controversy and insisted that “all our 
Theological controversies . . . abound in every denomination the want of a higher stand-
point.”72 This quest for institutional authority while simultaneously invoking a more 
“spiritual” religion made Marsh of a mind with the other Cautious Romantics, both 
Episcopalian and Catholic.73 If the inward, spiritual turn revealed aspects of the self that 
the self could not embrace, one answer to the problem could be a turn to churches that 
offered greater ecclesial authority. As John Henry Newman would say of Coleridge, he 
“instilled a higher philosophy into inquiring minds. . . . In this way he made trial of his 
age, and succeeded in interesting its genius in the cause of Catholic truth.”74 While 
aspects of both Marsh’s and Coleridge’s theology could be liberal, their social and 
ecclesial orientation was undoubtedly conservative, and they partially exhibited a 
cautious, conservative Romantic temperament that would fully flourish in the Catholic 
conversions of Orestes Brownson, Isaac Hecker, Sophia Dana Ripley, and George Allen. 
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 While Marsh sought to emphasize the Trinity and Incarnation along with his new 
epistemology, he knew that the Protestants whom he sought as allies would demand a 
strictly proper theology of Original Sin and Christ’s atonement. Thus he attempted to 
“forewarn them, that [on these doctrines] it will require much study in connexion with 
the other parts of the work . . . [to] fully appreciate the merit of what may be peculiar in 
his mode of treating those subjects.”75 Marsh had been primed for this concern earlier in 
1829. Moses Stuart and Nathaniel Taylor, the two subtlest and most moderate of the 
Orthodox party, had rejected Marsh’s attempt to introduce Coleridge’s views on the 
atonement in Marsh’s thirty-eight page, “Review of Stuart on the Epistle to the 
Hebrews.” The article appeared in Taylor’s Christian Spectator with Taylor deleting the 
reference to Coleridge and writing four paragraphs of his own reasserting the orthodox 
position that Christ’s objective atonement satisfied God’s moral government.76 Taylor 
and the others accused Coleridge of a subjectivist approach overemphasizing the role 
that Christ’s death played in changing the heart of individuals as opposed to its 
objectively satisfying God’s vindictive demands. When Marsh released the Aids to 
Reflection, Leonard Woods Sr. and Charles Hodge both distanced themselves, 
complaining about Coleridge’s abstruseness and worrying mostly about his departure 
from their orthodoxy on the atonement of Christ.77 
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 Thus, Marsh found himself betwixt the warring theological parties he sought to 
unify, but Marsh faced a bigger problem. The entire thrust of Coleridge’s and Marsh’s 
argument demanded careful attention to philosophical arguments for an alien 
epistemology, but this attention required patience with Coleridge’s penchant for 
metaphor, symbol, and an obsessive spiritual interiority. This was in many ways an 
intellectually mixed marriage that could not hope for much support from either the 
Orthodox or Unitarian establishment. Leading professors at Harvard, Yale, and 
Princeton constituted an intellectual elite whose modus operandi was, by Marsh’s 
definition, oriented toward the Understanding and was thus in danger of losing its 
spiritual vitality. John Holt Rice, now an Orthodox Professor at Union Seminary and no 
friend of philosophical innovation, worried greatly that Orthodox thinkers had become 
too arid in their intellectual systems. “[L]ong formed on the model of metaphysics,” they 
could no longer “feel the vis fulmines and breathe the heavenly aura of divine truth.”78 
This energy of lightning and the breath of the Spirit was precisely what Coleridge and 
Marsh hoped the Aids would foster, and a similar accusation animated the 
Transcendentalist revolt against the Unitarian establishment that Emerson excoriated in 
The Divinity School Address (1838) and Orestes Brownson claimed “never spoke to the 
heart, [or] to the soul.”79 
 Marsh’s timing was well-calculated to appeal to the young. His argument seemed 
to be a breath of fresh air, both in its new approach to the free will problem and in its 
emphasis on a spiritual vis fulmines, but he found few allies among establishment 
figures. Aids to Reflection appeared one year after Nathaniel W. Taylor had published 
the most cogent and influential attempt in America to respond to Unitarian critiques vis-
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à-vis the moral inadequacy of Orthodox theology. But the young people whom Leonard 
Withington lambasted for knocking on Richard Henry Dana Sr.’s door to discuss 
Coleridge found in Marsh’s response to the Unitarians a more hopeful prospect for the 
reinvention of American religion in both philosophical and spiritual terms. 
 It is not clear how much initial impact Aids to Reflection had on establishment 
Unitarians. Prior to 1833 the Christian Examiner remained silent on Marsh, a silence 
that was broken by the transcendentalist-sympathizing Unitarian Frederic Henry Hedge, 
who praised Marsh’s philosophical originality but did not elaborate.80 In 1830 something 
provoked a friend of Andrews Norton—likely William Ware—to earnestly urge Norton to 
update an earlier, sixty-page article on the Trinity.81 The result was a five-hundred page 
Statement of Reasons for Not Believing the Doctrines of the Trinitarians: Concerning 
the Nature of God and the Person of Christ (1833), which was the most comprehensive 
Unitarian refutation of the Trinity and Incarnation in the nineteenth century.82 Norton 
did not say what provoked he or Ware in 1830, but given the popularity of Aids to 
Reflection it seems likely that Marsh’s argument played some role. Precisely how much 
of a role is impossible to ascertain. The Trinitarian press was not silent on the Trinity in 
1829 and 1830. While The Christian Spectator had little to say, the Biblical Repertory 
and particular The Spirit of the Pilgrims provided enough articles to provoke the 
irascible Norton. 
 
Cautious Romantic Network 
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 In the early 1830s, the Cautious Romantics for whom Marsh spoke began to seek 
a stable outlet for their views to help carve out their space from the existing parties. The 
Unitarians spoke through the Christian Examiner, the Taylor-Yale school through the 
Christian Spectator, Charles Hodge and Princeton made use of the Biblical Repertory 
and Theological Review, and Lyman Beecher wrote extensively for The Spirit of the 
Pilgrims in Boston to support his evangelical agenda (though at this time Enoch Pond 
was the official editor).83 In 1829, Marsh was unaware of those who might share his 
views. His friend, Ebenezer Tracy, encouraged him to seek out Dana Sr., who wrote 
occasionally for Beecher’s Spirit of the Pilgrims and was the only intellectual among the 
Boston Trinitarians who “professes to be at all acquainted with the merits of 
Coleridge.”84 It is not clear whether Marsh pursued this connection immediately, but by 
1832 Marsh, Dana Sr., Leonard Woods Jr., and Caleb Sprague Henry were all actively 
visiting and exchanging letters with each other, seeking to found a journal to express 
their views. Henry wrote to Marsh of “the great cause which we have at heart,” Woods 
Jr. of “the ends we have in view,” and Dana Sr. of “the plan proposed by some of us.”85 
Initially, they hoped to enact a silent coup and seize control of The Spirit of the Pilgrims 
and make Woods Jr. the editor. “At the close of the year, if the skirmishing here should 
not grow into a pitched battle, and the work seized by one of the hostile parties, it may be 
made what we wish to make it,” Dana Sr. reported to Marsh. “I do not know of any man 
who could come into the editorship of our Periodical, to the furtherance of our views, 
with less suspicion and opposition, than Mr. Woods.”86   
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 But the Cautious Romantics were hampered in two related ways: their 
ecumenical religious temperament and their Romantic intellectual temperament.  In all 
of these letters, the Cautious Romantics resolutely insisted that whatever their journal, it 
“could not take a controversial form” or be “devoted to any special system or sect.”87 This 
was not an overwhelming demand, though many of the successful intellectual journals at 
this point tended to speak for a specific group (as seen by Stuart’s and Taylor’s editing of 
Marsh’s article in the Christian Spectator). More challenging was their resolute desire to 
transcend the limitations of intellectual genre, just as Romantic epistemology sought to 
substantially broaden the definition of reason. Henry thought the work should “embrace 
all the general subjects of Learning, Literature, and History, etc, presenting 
comprehensive views and able discussions,” and Dana Sr. sought to “infuse the spirit of a 
more inward philosophy, influencing theology and all our views of man, nature, 
literature, and the arts.”88 But as Ebenezer Tracy explained to Marsh, “The Quarterlys 
avoid theological discussions. . . . Our theological journals, on the contrary, are all party 
publication . . . [and] The Literary Magazines—for there are works so called—are pretty 
much in the same predicament with the Reviews [Quarterlys].”89 Because their 
Romanticism was so resolutely theological, they could not like some other journals focus 
on aesthetics and philosophy. But neither could they leave poetry and literature to other 
interpreters with whom they disagreed. 
 In the end, no periodical was forthcoming. In 1835, Leonard Woods Jr. took a 
professorship at Bangor Theological Seminary in Maine, and shortly thereafter became 
President of Bowdoin College. Marsh was largely preoccupied with his university 
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responsibilities, and Dana Sr. contented himself with publishing his collected Poems and 
Prose Writings (1833) and beginning to spread their ideas by lecturing on English 
literature. Henry eventually managed to found and edit the New York Review from 1837 
to 1840, but this journal was explicitly Episcopalian.  
 
Conclusion 
 In the summer of 1842, James Marsh died at the age of forty-eight. Never 
physically strong, he succumbed to consumption, uttering a phrase made famous by the 
later fiery general Stonewall Jackson. “It is as I could have wished,” Marsh declared, “to 
die upon the Sabbath day.”90 His friend John Wheeler, now president of UVM, wrote to 
Allston to request a portrait of the dead philosopher, as Marsh had visited Allston several 
times in Boston.91 The aging and ailing Allston demurred, but with characteristic 
graciousness he praised Marsh’s penetrating mind and elevated personal attributes. 
Perhaps anticipating his own death one year later, he remarked, “I could well believe of 
him (could it be asserted of anyone) that he had heard in that hour, even in the body, the 
recognition of Him to whom he had consecrated his life.”92 Both Henry Jarvis Raymond 
and Edmund T. Dana—now fast friends and graduated from UVM—implored Dana Sr. 
multiple times to give an address at UVM on Marsh’s thought and life, a prospect to 
which Richard Henry Dana Jr. and Allston added their hearty assent.93 But Dana Sr., 
who had always attested to his lack of philosophical training, felt himself inadequate to 
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the task.94 He had looked to Marsh as his philosophical spokesman, and apparently 
could not reverse roles. 
 Marsh had chosen the life of the scholar, not the poet, making his death at forty-
eight early and poignant, if not so gripping as that of Shelley or Keats. As Wheeler 
opined, “He seems like a sun struck, in his meridian, from the Heavens.”95 Marsh had 
hoped to produce a great work of synthesis building on his previous insights, but as 
death approached he conceded, “The truth will prevail. God does not need my puny arm 
to aid it.”96 Whether God superintended the process or not, the truth that Marsh taught 
was now in the hands of his students, his like-minded friends, and an entire generation 
of new intellectuals—not the least of whom were the American Transcendentalists.
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Chapter 8: New Horizons and New Influences: The Transcendentalist 
Awakening and the Influence of Victor Cousin and Caleb Sprague Henry 
 
 
Introduction 
 Coleridge, Allston, Dana Sr., Marsh and their other intellectual confederates had 
their sights fixed squarely on the past and the challenge posed to orthodox Christian 
faith by the Enlightenment. This challenge manifested most strongly in America when 
Unitarians rejected the doctrines of Trinity and Christ’s literal incarnation on the 
grounds of reason. The early Cautious Romantics had all come to cherish these 
doctrines—in many cases for personal reasons—and they perceived rightly that the 
definition of reason defined the intellectual battleground. Thus they sought to expand 
the definition of reason in the hope of making faith its rational extension rather than its 
antithesis. 
 But as they came to see, their method could undermine the ends they had in 
mind. By expanding the definition of reason to include artistic perception and personal 
spiritual insight, the Cautious Romantics constructed a vocabulary and religious 
temperament that could liberate the individual in unforeseen ways when embraced and 
promoted by more optimistic and liberal thinkers. The Transcendentalists were just such 
thinkers, and their Cautious Romantic predecessors seem to have only partially 
understood the potential danger to their own orthodox aims. The Cautious Romantics 
thus became frustrated and at times outraged as many of their ideas helped to spark the 
Transcendentalist movement. This chapter charts that response, while also carefully 
attending to the affinities between the Transcendentalists and the Cautious Romantics 
that caused the religious establishment—whether Orthodox or Unitarian—to perceive 
them all as anathema.  
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 One of these affinities was the excitement over the philosophy of the Frenchman 
Victor Cousin. By the mid-1830s, when Transcendentalism emerged as an intellectual 
movement, other influences besides Coleridge became prevalent. In particular, the 
capacious and shrewd Cousin enjoyed immense popularity as he purveyed a new system 
he termed “Eclecticism.” Eclecticism purported to synthesize the epistemological 
insights of Scottish Common Sense philosophy with German idealism—particularly Kant 
and Schelling—uniting these insights in a new spiritual philosophy that simultaneously 
affirmed reason but also authorized religious faith and spiritual experience. In hindsight, 
Cousin’s philosophy was not substantially different from the epistemological 
intuitionism of Scottish Common Sense and his occasional assertions that German 
idealism was deeper than the Scots remained somewhat oblique. But his use of a new 
epistemological language placed him in the company of Coleridge and an alternative 
intellectual tradition, at least in the mind of his American disciples.  
 Cousin’s two most important disciples were Caleb Sprague Henry and George 
Ripley. The generally orthodox Episcopalian Henry translated and elaborated Cousin 
hoping to foster a new kind of Romantic Trinitarianism, but George Ripley continued to 
develop Cousinian thought in a transcendentalist direction. As we shall see, both were in 
some cases justified, for Cousin was notoriously coy about his precise religious 
convictions. Thus, in addition to articulating the historical and intellectual relationship 
between the Cautious Romantics and the Transcendentalists, this chapter further 
explains that relationship by attending to Henry’s and Ripley’s respective appropriation 
of another important Romantic influence. 
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Transcendental Awakening 
 Transcendentalism eschewed creeds, prompting the question of whether the term 
or movement provided any meaningful coherence. Nevertheless, the relationships, 
questions, and intellectual contributions of Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry David 
Thoreau, Margaret Fuller, Frederic Henry Hedge, George and Sophia Ripley, Orestes 
Brownson, Elizabeth Palmer Peabody, Theodore Parker, and James Freeman Clarke 
remain undeniable. The one principle that united the Transcendentalists more than any 
other was the belief in a higher Reason—an animating spiritual principle possessed by 
all, elsewhere called “Spirit,” “Mind,” or “Soul,” that grounded truth and inspired art.1 
While the Cautious Romantics thought the Romantic redefinition of Reason could 
reinvigorate orthodox Christianity, the Transcendentalists argued that Reason 
authorized either a radical recreation of religious institutions or more often a complete 
break from the encrusted forms of the Christian past. 
 Ralph Waldo Emerson spoke vociferously for the latter position, but as of 1830 
he remained within the Unitarian fold. In January, he responded to a query from the 
family about his winter reading. “Did not somebody ask me what books I read?” he asked 
his brothers, “Coleridge’s Friend—with great interest; Coleridge’s “Aids to [R]eflection” 
with yet deeper,” he replied.2 References and quotations from the Aids to Reflection 
began to litter Emerson’s notebooks in the last three months of 1829, coinciding with the 
release of Marsh’s edition.3 Throughout the early 1830s, the distinction between Reason 
and Understanding that Marsh highlighted in Aids became the animating principle in 
Emerson’s thought. By 1834 Emerson’s distinction between Reason and Understanding 
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had solidified, as he marched toward his intellectual debut with Nature (1836). “Reason 
is the highest faculty of the soul,” he wrote again to his brother Edward, “it never 
reasons, never proves, it simply perceives; it is vision. The Understanding toils all the 
time, compares, contrives, adds, argues. . . . Beasts have some understanding but no 
Reason.”4 Attempting to fully define his distinction, Emerson continued to explain that 
the Understanding was the faculty of business, of extracting a physical existence from 
nature and society. It was “that wrinkled calculator the steward of our house to whom is 
committed the support of our animal life.”5 Because it provided for basic, material life, 
the Understanding incessantly sought to usurp humankind’s higher spiritual birthright, 
Reason. To Reason belonged “Religion Poetry [and] Honor”; to the Understanding “the 
whole concern of dinners of tailors of gigs of balls whereof men make such account.”6 
Moreover, like Marsh, Emerson insisted that the Reason versus Understanding 
distinction authorized a critical egalitarian insight: “Reason is potentially perfect in every 
man—Understanding in very different degrees of strength.”7 Emerson concluded that 
this distinction was the key to existence, and he looked forward to demonstrating “the 
manifold applications of the distinction to Literature to the Church to Life.”8  
 True to his word, Emerson applied the distinction to life, literature, and the 
church in his first three public salvos that announced the advent of Transcendentalism. 
In Nature (1836), Emerson applied the distinction to life, insisting that “the unrenewed 
understanding” erroneously identified humans entirely with material nature, while 
“Reason mars this faith” inaugurating “[t]he best moments of life” and the “delicious 
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awakenings of the higher powers.”9 These powers distinguished humankind from nature. 
In The American Scholar (1837), Emerson pleaded with a stagnant intellectual America 
beholden to the Understanding: “In yourself slumbers the whole of Reason.” Once his 
audience acknowledged Reason, Emerson declared, “A nation of men will for the first 
time exist, because each believe himself inspired by the Divine Soul which also inspires 
all men.”10 The nation would then throw off its indolent intellectual torpor, where young 
men clamored only for careers, and individuals would embrace their intellectual and 
artistic insights and thereby fire the life of the national mind. Beginning with life and 
moving to literature, Emerson then applied the Reason versus Understanding distinction 
to religion in what proved his most daring and controversial work of the 1830s, The 
Divinity School Address (1838). He asserted that while Christ embraced Reason, 
revealing to humankind its own divine nature, all historical and institutional Christianity 
proceeded from the Understanding’s attempt to codify Reason’s insights in rituals and 
doctrines. “The idioms of [Christ’s] language, and the figures of his rhetoric, have 
usurped the place of his truth,” Emerson explained, “and churches are not built on his 
principles, but on tropes.”11 Just as Emerson left the Unitarian ministry when he found 
the rituals of church and communion failed to meet his spiritual needs, so every person 
needed to look within and follow Reason wherever it might lead.12 In religion, Emerson 
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insisted, “There is no doctrine of the Reason which will bear to be taught by the 
Understanding.”13 
 But although Emerson was perhaps most forceful in his articulation of the 
Reason-versus-Understanding distinction and in his fervent iconoclasm spoke most 
clearly for a new intellectual moment, other Transcendentalists also enjoyed inspiration 
from Coleridge, Marsh, and the new idea of Reason. The term “transcendentalism” itself, 
which came to define the distinctly American movement, owed a debt to Coleridge. 
Elizabeth Palmer Peabody told Orestes Brownson that Coleridge’s The Friend—which  
Marsh edited and published in 1831, but which Emerson had already read in 1829—had 
been her seminal influence and that the text was the only place she had ever read the 
term “transcendentalism” prior to the emergence of the American movement.14 In 1833, 
Frederic Henry Hedge first used the term “transcendental” systematically and 
sympathetically in the Unitarian Christian Examiner in a review of Coleridge and 
summary of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling. More than any other single work, Hedge’s 
article announced the advent of Transcendentalism prior to the 1836 meeting of the 
Transcendental Club and Emerson’s delivery of Nature.15 Emerson, in the midst of 
working through his own application of Coleridge in 1833, declared Hedge’s article “a 
living leaping Logos.”16 
 Emerson’s Platonic complement proved accurate. Hedge’s article not only named 
a new intellectual movement and voiced its affinity with Coleridge and German idealism, 
but it also distinguished the new movement from the Trinitarian aims of Coleridge and 
his American sympathizers. Hedge praised Coleridge’s capacious mind, his originality, 
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his description, and his ability to provoke the highest insights in his readers. He also 
lauded Marsh’s “valuable dissertation” which “evinced a philosophical talent of his own” 
and did much to illuminate Coleridge’s philosophy.17 However, Hedge thought Coleridge 
lacked the ability to unify his insights into an organic whole, a defect in Coleridge’s 
poetry, scholarship, and literary criticism as well as his religious writings. In particular, 
he lamented that Coleridge had not provided either systematic translations or 
interpretations of Kant for English audiences given Coleridge’s “complete knowledge of 
the subject” (118). Hedge had read Kant in German, and it is surprising he did not indict 
Coleridge for entirely misinterpreting Kant as he might have done. Instead, Hedge seems 
to have believed that Coleridge largely understood German idealism.  
 But Hedge rejected out of hand Coleridge’s attempt to use Kant’s practical reason 
on behalf of Trinitarianism. Kant’s Copernican revolution in epistemology could not be 
steered back toward outmoded doctrines and institutional forms (124). He insisted there 
was nothing essential in Coleridge’s view of the Trinity that could not be squared with 
Unitarianism (127). Hedge balked at Coleridge’s appeal to “mystery,” which “means, in 
reality, nothing” (127). But Hedge provided little direct engagement with Coleridge and 
Marsh’s religious arguments in Aids to Reflection. He questioned Coleridge’s 
Trinitarianism only on the grounds that Coleridge’s doctrine of the atonement 
emphasized the subjective effects of Christ’s suffering. In a brief, unexplained accusation 
he asserted that Coleridge “was not qualified in the point of biblical learning for an 
undertaking like this.”18 Hedge’s hasty dismissal was surprising given his regard for “the 
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categories established by Kant[,] the moral liberty proclaimed by him as it had never 
been proclaimed by any before,” and Hedge’s regard for Marsh’s essay, which explicitly 
highlighted the free will problem (126). Indeed, both Emerson and Coleridge would have 
been surprised to learn that Coleridge’s Trinitarianism comported essentially with 
Unitarianism. Five months later, in August 1833, Coleridge harangued Emerson for over 
an hour on the difference between their religious views of God when Emerson visited 
him at Highgate, and Coleridge lamented William Ellery Channing’s continued 
Unitarianism in no uncertain terms.19 Not surprisingly, Emerson remained unconvinced. 
Hedge’s article, which rejected Coleridge’s religion and embraced him only as a signpost 
to the German idealism of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling, articulated the consistent 
Transcendentalist response to the Cautious Romantics’ hopes to reinvigorate orthodox 
Christianity. For the Transcendentalists, the road upward still led inward, but the 
discoveries of Reason could and should pass beyond the strictures of codified, historical 
revelation. 
 Margaret Fuller also drew inspiration from Coleridge and his distinction between 
Reason and Understanding, though she was not much interested in James Marsh’s 
religious apologetic. She explained that whatever truth the peculiarities of Christian 
                                                                                                                                                       
atonement (sacrificial offerings, reconciliation between persons, ransom from slavery, and satisfying a debt 
to a creditor) and thus no single metaphor could explain the redemptive act from God’s point of view. 
However, Coleridge concluded the section with an orthodox, Trinitarian confession to underscore that his 
remarks should not be taken to mean the atonement was merely a subjective experience of individuals: 
“Respecting the Redemptive Act itself, and the Divine Agent, we know from revelation that he ‘was made a 
quickening (Zoopoioun, life-making) Spirit:’ and that in order to this it was necessary that God should be 
manifested in the flesh, that the eternal Word, through whom and by whom the world (kosmos, the order, 
beauty, and sustaining law of visible natures) was and is, should be made flesh, assume our humanity 
personally, fulfill [sic] all righteousness, and so suffer and so die for us, as in dying to conquer Death for as 
many as should receive him. More than this, the mode, the possibility, we are not competent to know. It is, 
as hath been already observed concerning the primal Act of Apostasy, a mystery by the necessity of the 
subject—a mystery, which at all events it will be time enough for us to seek and expect to understand, when 
we understand the mystery of our Natural life, and its conjunction with mind and will and personal 
identity.” Samuel Taylor Coleridge and James Marsh, Aids to Reflection: With a Preliminary Essay, 1st 
American (Burlington: Chauncy Goodrich, 1829), 194-195. 
 19 Gilman and et al., The Journals and Miscellaneous Notebooks of Ralph Waldo Emerson, 4:407–
412. 
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revelation held, they were “not . . . suited to me at present,” and she later confessed an 
aversion to metaphysics while asking her friend James Freeman Clarke to rectify the 
deficiency.20 Nevertheless, she read Coleridge carefully for his literary and critical 
insights as she searched, in her own way, for an “all-comprehending, eternally 
conscious” philosophy to serve as the foundation for her literary insights and aesthetic 
experiences. “How I sympathize with Coleridge,” she wrote to Clarke, citing Introductory 
Aphorism XIV in the Aids to Reflection where Coleridge explained that reason and 
reflection were necessary so that “the affections should be kept constant to an object 
which gives no employment to the understanding . . . [or] the senses.”21 Throughout the 
1830s, Fuller referenced Coleridge frequently, “ransack[ing] pretty thoroughly” his 
Literary Remains and continually reexamining The Friend for further insight.22 What 
she read convinced her, as she insisted to a shocked Theodore Parker, that Coleridge’s 
reputation would eventually eclipse the popular Thomas Carlyle as the more important 
Romantic thinker.23  
 Fuller used Coleridge’s concept of the Understanding in her first article for The 
Dial, the periodical that sought to give a focused intellectual medium, if not a unified 
voice, to Transcendentalism. She chose Washington Allston’s painting as her subject. In 
1839, Allston exhibited forty-five paintings, which awed an American audience of nearly 
3,500. 2,000 of these purchased season tickets to the exhibition and netted the 
                                                   
 20 MF to George T. Davis, Jan. 23, 1830 and MF to JFC, [Feb.] 11, [1836] in Robert N. Hudspeth, 
ed., The Letters of Margaret Fuller (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 6:161–163; 6:281. 
 21 MF to JFC, [ca. Sep. 1832] in ibid., 6:194. Fuller cites “vide ap. XIV” in sympathizing with 
Coleridge. Hudspeth says this “probably” refers to Introductory Aphorism XIV of Aids to Reflection, an 
interpretation quite justified by the evidence. The context establishes the reference to Coleridge, none of 
Coleridge’s other works in circulation were aphorisms, and Moral and Religious Aphorism XIV and Spiritual 
Aphorism XIV were explicit reflections on the Bible and Christ’s death expliclity—dogmatic religious topics 
which Fuller in the context of the letter was not interested in. 
 22 MF to RWE, May 30, 1837 in ibid., 1:297. “With the Friend I should never have done therefore 
must get it for mine one,” Fuller told Emerson. 
 23 Capper, Margaret Fuller, 2007, 2:58–59. 
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impoverished painter at least $2,500.24 “People do not now ask whether Mr. Allston 
works,” Dana Sr. crowed, “and he has now convinced them of his industry and genius.”25 
The admiring crowds even put the undemocratic Dana in an unusually charitable mood: 
“let me do justice to the people here. You would be struck with the number that go to see 
the pictures, and not to see folks, or to be seen.”26 Allston had inspired Fuller for several 
years, and she confessed to a friend that “the gallery has been a home.”27 But though in 
an earlier poem she had celebrated “the magic of [his] harmony,” blending colors “in the 
perfect finish of the Whole,” she now announced: “I can no longer be content merely to 
feel, but must judge these works.”28 She began the article worrying that the sudden 
appreciation for the arts in America might have arisen from a desire to imitate older 
nations (73). In a stark assertion that would have thrilled Dana Sr., Fuller declared:  
There is no poetical ground-work ready for the artist in our country and time. Good deeds 
appeal to the understanding. Our religion is that of the understanding. We have no old 
established faith, no hereditary romance, no such stuff as Catholicism, Chivalry afforded. 
What is most dignified in the Puritanic modes of thought is not favorable to beauty. The 
habits of an industrial community are not propitious to delicacy of sentiment.29   
 
According to Fuller, a cultural context informed only by the Understanding posed a grave 
threat to any artist, even Allston, who sought to be “spiritual and noble” (75). She tried to 
hedge her criticism, claiming that Allston’s work was not merely “sentimental and 
picturesque,” but she insisted that the vast majority of his paintings failed in their lofty 
aims. She leveled particular criticism at his attempts to communicate moments of 
wonder, poetic inspiration, or the sublime, and when he successfully produced beautiful 
and refined subjects it was “[a] graceful repose, with a fitness for moderate action” and 
                                                   
 24 RHDS to CSH, May 13, 1839; RHDS to WCB, June 12, 1839, DFP, MHS. 
 25 RHDS to SA, May 15, 1839, DFP, MHS. 
 26 RHDS to WCB, May 13, 1839, DFP, MHS. 
 27 MF to Charles K. Newcomb, May 29, 1839 in Hudspeth, The Letters of Margaret Fuller, 2:68. 
 28 MF to JFC, [Feb.] 11, [1836] in ibid., 6:280–282; Margaret Fuller, “A Record of Impressions: 
Produced by the Exhibition of Mr. Allston’s Pictures in the Summer of 1839,” The Dial: a Magazine for 
Literature, Philosophy, and Religion, 1, no. 1 (July 1840), 75. 
 29 Fuller, “A Record of Impressions: Produced by the Exhibition of Mr. Allston’s Pictures in the 
Summer of 1839,” 75. 
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enveloped in “[a] certain bland delicacy” (79). But Fuller exempted Allston’s landscapes, 
which she thought exhibited the highest Romantic ideal: “Nature and the soul combined; 
the former freed from slight crudities or blemishes, the latter from its merely human 
aspect” (82). Emerson had attributed both American cultural inauthenticity and 
American religious stagnation to a triumph of Understanding over Reason; Fuller 
suggested that Allston labored under a similar problem.30 
 
Parting of the Ways: Cautious Romantic Frustration 
 Fuller’s criticism provoked the normally charitable and magnanimous Allston to 
an outburst that ultimately characterized the Cautious Romantic response. “People have 
a right to their opinions, but they shouldn’t be so absurd as to expose their ignorance in 
the form of criticism,” Allston fumed to Dana Sr.31 Dana Sr., who reported the incident to 
William Cullen Bryant, did not say what in particular irked Allston, but among numerous 
other likely issues lay the fact that Fuller employed Romantic categories in criticizing 
him that Allston himself had helped Coleridge develop. According to Fuller, Allston’s 
Dead Man Restored to Life (1814), lacked not only execution but also demonstrated “a 
want of the artist’s judgment in the very choice of the subject.”32 Coleridge, on the other 
hand, thought that the painting exemplified the highest Romantic ideal of beauty, 
“Multeity in Unity.”33 The painting, insisted Coleridge, provided “variety of life, motion, 
and passion” of the actors’ individual wills but remained unified in the response of these 
                                                   
 30 For the historical context as well as an insightful interpretation of Fuller’s review of Allston see 
Capper, Margaret Fuller, 2007, 2:8–9. 
 31 RHDS to WCB, Sep. 23, 1840, DFP, MHS. 
 32 Fuller, “A Record of Impressions: Produced by the Exhibition of Mr. Allston’s Pictures in the 
Summer of 1839,” 76. 
 33 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, “On the Principles of Sound [Genial] Criticism Concering the Fine 
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individuals to the scene at hand and in their relationships to one another.34 When Fuller 
met Allston for the first time earlier in 1839, she reported that he “flamed up into a 
galaxy of Platonism” that was “not as beautiful as his smile of genius in saying it.”35 No 
doubt Allston now thought she had not listened closely enough. 
 The initial response of the Cautious Romantics, however, was not entirely hostile. 
Dana Sr. watched with bemused admiration of Emerson’s consistency as Emerson 
advised his church to give up communion observance and eventually left the ministry: 
“Some of E-s’ brethren say he is probably a little insane. I don’t believe he is any more 
insane than they, only a little more honest; but to be honest beyond the world’s rule is to 
be mad.”36 Caleb Sprague Henry counted Emerson a friend in the early 1830s and knew 
James Freeman Clarke well enough for the latter to remark about Henry’s return to 
Cambridge to Fuller.37 Leonard Woods Jr. corresponded with and visited Margaret Fuller 
who proved intellectually friendly.38 As late as 1837, Richard Henry Dana Sr.’s son 
Edmund, who had been attending Emerson’s lectures, distributed from memory “scraps 
of Mr. Emerson’s transcendentalism” at the University of Vermont and raised “a number 
of liberal youth to the very pitch of curiosity.”39 Indeed, in 1835, Frederic Henry Hedge 
thought that he and George Ripley might establish a new journal of “spiritual 
philosophy,” which would include Henry, Dana Sr., and Marsh along with Emerson, 
                                                   
 34 Ibid., 22. 
 35 MF to RWE, Jan. 7, 1839 in Hudspeth, The Letters of Margaret Fuller, 2:32–33. 
 36 RHDS to CSH, June 17, 1832, DFP, MHS. 
 37 RHDS to CSH, June 17, 1832, DFP, MHS; MF to JFC, Aug. 7, 1832 in Hudspeth, The Letters of 
Margaret Fuller, 6:188. 
 38 Fuller reported receiving a “fine” philosophical letter from Woods Jr. which she read and 
meditated on several times. She worried with her friend George T. Davis that Woods might be too 
philosophical and not as sympathetic in views or conversation as they, but two years later when Woods 
called on Fuller she declared “most alas! I was not at home.” MF to George T. Davis, Dec. 29, 1829; MF to 
George T. Davis, Jan. 23, 1830; MF to JFC, [Aug. 24, 1832] in Ibid., 6:158, 161–163, 190–191. Woods called 
on Fuller on Aug. 20, 1832 according to RHDS to RHDJ, Aug. 20, 1832, DFP, MHS. 
 39 ETD to RHDS, Nov. 19, 1837; RHDS to ETC, Jan. 19, 1838, DFP, MHS. 
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James Freeman Clarke, and Thomas Carlyle for transatlantic heft.40 Emerson seemed 
amenable to the scheme, suggesting the journal be called The Transcendentalist, though 
no journal was forthcoming. Hedge’s outspoken opposition to the Trinitarian aims of the 
Coleridgeans likely undermined a potential alliance. Still, even in 1841, one of James 
Marsh’s prize students, George Allen, could write to his mentor that while the Dialists 
had “too much pretension” and “put too much water with their rum,” he still felt inclined 
to “side with Emerson,” as he was impressed by the latter’s herculean courage in the face 
of “those ignorant orthodoxists [who] behave so ruffianly towards him” and those 
“Unitarian friends [who] back him so like Sir John’s [Falstaff] followers.”41 
 Despite Allen’s admiration for Emerson, however, the other Cautious Romantics’ 
frustration reached a fevered pitch, seemingly prompted by Emerson’s Divinity School 
Address (1838) and enflamed by Theodore Parker’s Transient and Permanent in 
Christianity (1841). Watching from Boston, Richard Henry Dana Jr. disseminated copies 
of Emerson’s Address to Marsh (via his brother Ned, who now dutifully disowned 
Emerson), Woods Jr., and Henry, remarking wryly “I do not see that he has improved at 
all.”42 Dana Sr. sent Henry all the Boston reviews of Emerson and hoped Henry would 
“come out before long upon this subject.” Sensing the gravity of the situation, however, 
Dana added, “don’t, I pray you, do the work hastily.”43 When Parker released his 
Transient and Permanent in Christianity (1841), Henry wrote a “blow-up” of Parker’s 
discourse, which Dana similarly denounced as “blasphemous trash.”44 The objections to 
                                                   
 40 Hudspeth, The Letters of Margaret Fuller, 1:227, fn. 3. 
 41 GA to JM, Jan. 18, 1841, JDL, 251. The reference is to Shakespeare’s Henry IV where Sir John 
Falstaff’s friends Prince Henry and Poins plot a robbery with him only to abandon him and then rob him 
themselves, see Henry IV, Part I, Act I, Sc. ii. 
 42 ETD to RHDS, Aug. 2, 1838; RHDJ to RHDS, Aug. 23, 1838; ETD to RHDS, Nov. 20, 1838, DFP, 
MHS. 
 43 RHDS to CSH, Sep. 4, 1838, DFP, MHS. 
 44 RHDS to CSH, Oct. 26, 1841, DFP, MHS. Unfortunately, Henry’s letter to Dana has not been 
preserved and no review of Parker appears in the New York Review, which Henry edited at the time. 
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Emerson were clear enough. As Marsh forcefully complained to Dana Sr. in 1838, 
Emerson’s lectures were at best “some form of Pantheism” but more likely “nothing less 
than Epicurean Atheism” as he, according to Marsh, arrogantly abandoned the whole 
truth revealed in the traditional Christian interpretation of Christ’s life and work.45  
 The Cautious Romantics left a scant record explaining precisely what they 
objected to in Parker. Henry’s “blow-up” seemingly never appeared, Allston and Marsh 
were ill and in their twilight years by 1841, the Danas’ were literary intellectuals and 
lacked the theological and philosophical muscle to articulate a case against the 
formidable Parker, and the evidence on Leonard Woods Jr.’s opinions was non-existent. 
There was certainly plenty to irk them in Parker’s discourse. He attacked the Trinity as 
“the very Achilles heel of theological dogmas . . . [whose] subtleties cannot even be 
expressed in our tongue,” he attacked orthodox doctrines concerning Christ’s person and 
nature as transient disputes that distracted from Christ’s moral message, and he 
wondered about the institutional efficacy of the church, claiming that “since the fourth 
century the true Christian life has been out of the established Church, and not in it.”46 In 
short, he attacked numerous aspects of Christianity that the Cautious Romantics held 
sacred. 
 James Marsh, after a two-week visit to Boston with the Danas and Allston, 
managed a more balanced response when he wrote to his former student Henry Jarvis 
Raymond in New York about the Brook Farm experiment. “Those engaged at Boston 
[particularly Ripley] are men, so far as I know, of good spirit, and as well qualified to 
                                                   
 45 JM to RHDS, Mar. 8, 1838, JDL, 218. 
 46 Theodore Parker, A Discourse on the Transient and Permanent in Christianity (Boston: Printed 
for the Author, 1841), 11, 16–17. 
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realize such schemes as any men can be.”47 But Marsh thought that the serious-minded 
Ripley erred on a fundamental issue: “the grand error I take to be in the hope which he 
indulges, of finding men in this world sufficiently under the law of pure reason, or even 
sufficiently raised by divine grace above the selfishness of human nature, to live together 
on such terms as they propose.”48 Marsh’s tone became more dismissive when he turned 
to The Dial, whose individualism he thought betrayed the quest for intellectual unity via 
serious study and reflection: “They have many of the prettinesses of the German writers, 
but without their manly logic and strong systematizing tendency. They pretend to no 
system or unity, but each utters, it seems, the inspiration of the moment, assuming that 
it all comes from the universal heart, while ten to one it comes only from the stomach of 
the individual.”49 Marsh likely pilfered his gastric metaphor from a review of The Dial’s 
first issue, where the reviewer satirized Bronson Alcott’s aphoristic “Orphic Sayings” by 
christening them “Gastric Sayings.”50 Although Alcott’s tangled inspirations were an easy 
target, there was something less than charitable in Marsh’s attack. Whether Marsh 
admitted it or not, much of his own apologetic eventually resorted to a long tradition of 
Christian Platonist mysticism, and no Transcendentalist was more sympathetic to the 
history of Christian mysticism than Alcott.51 Despite their divergent aims, the two might 
have had a productive exchange, though by this point Marsh was in failing health. In any 
event, not all of the Transcendentalists’ efforts could so easily be attributed to the 
stomach. 
 
                                                   
 47 JM to HJR, Mar. 1, 1841 in Ronald Vale Wells, Three Christian Transcendentalists: James 
Marsh, Caleb Sprague Henry, Frederic Henry Hedge (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943), 166–
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 48 Ibid. 
 49 Ibid. 
 50 Capper, Margaret Fuller, 2007, 2:10. 
 51 For Alcott’s extensive book collecting and interest in the history of Christian Platonic mysticism, 
see Schmidt, Restless Souls, 43–46. 
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Expanding Influences: George Ripley and Victor Cousin 
 George Ripley was the Transcendentalist Marsh respected most. He thought him 
a well-intentioned man and respected his combination of moral and intellectual 
seriousness. A scion of Greenfield, Massachusetts—whence William Cullen Bryant had 
written his spy reports on Unitarianism—Ripley had been a pious Calvinist until 1824, 
but five years of study at Harvard and the writings of William Ellery Channing eventually 
convinced him to convert to Unitarianism.52 From 1826 until 1840 he served as the 
Unitarian minister of Boston’s Purchase Street Church, until he left with his wife Sophia 
to establish a lasting legacy as the leader of the Transcendentalist utopian commune, 
Brook Farm. A regular contributor to the Unitarian Christian Examiner and founding 
member of the Transcendental Club in 1836, Ripley emerged by the late 1830s as an 
outspoken champion of the Transcendentalist radicals against establishment 
Unitarianism. In particular, in a famous print war with Andrews Norton, Ripley insisted 
that Christ’s alleged miracles did not validate divine revelation, but rather that Christ 
exemplified religious truth in his life, teaching, and character. This truth was available to 
all through personal intuition and did not require miraculous proof to authorize its 
divine origin, as the conservative Unitarians insisted.53 
  Ripley lauded the new spirit that Coleridge injected into American philosophy. 
He thought him an “inspired poet” and an “enthusiastic prophet of a spiritual 
philosophy” desperately needed in an America concerned only with the practical affairs 
of business and the utilitarian concerns of material existence.54 But like Hedge, Ripley 
                                                   
 52 Charles Robert Crowe, George Ripley, Transcendentalist and Utopian Socialist (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 1967), 1–37. 
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insisted that Coleridge’s deficiencies as a system builder disqualified him from being “the 
practical architect” who could restore “the temple of faith.”55 Instead, he thought that the 
French philosopher, Victor Cousin, systematized Coleridge’s spiritual insights and 
suggestive poetic locutions. 
The objects at which Mr. Coleridge aims, it seems to me, are in a great measure 
accomplished by the philosophy of Cousin. This philosophy demolishes, by one of the most 
beautiful specimens of scientific analysis that is any where [sic] to be met with, the system 
of sensation, against which Mr. Coleridge utters such eloquent and pathetic denunciations. 
It establishes on a rock the truth of the everlasting sentiments of the human heart.56 
 
Ripley’s enthusiasm for Cousin rivaled Marsh’s for Coleridge, and Ripley subtly 
acknowledged this emotional reality when he all but apologized to Marsh for 
“exhibit[ing] a view of Coleridge in which I cannot hope for your sympathy.”57 Still, 
Ripley thought them both “brother-worker[s]” laboring for the same object, and Ripley 
looked for great aid from the UVM students who came through Marsh’s system.58 
 Victor Cousin’s ambition and claims knew no bounds. He proffered a new system, 
Eclecticism, that he claimed not only synthesized the insights of Scottish Common Sense 
and German idealism but the entire history of philosophy. Cousin had studied at the 
University of France with Pierre Paul Royer-Collard, professor of moral philosophy and 
the primary disseminator of Thomas Reid and Dugald Stewart in France. Cousin’s own 
dissemination of Scottish thought led Sir William Hamilton—chair of logic and 
metaphysics at the University of Edinburgh from 1836 to 1856—to dedicate his 
comprehensive edition of The Works of Thomas Reid (1846) to Cousin “through whom 
Scotland has been again united intellectually to her old political ally.”59 But Cousin’s 
coming of age also coincided with growing French interest in German philosophy as 
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Madame de Staël and others imported German idealism into France. From an early age, 
Cousin became fascinated by German idealism as he attempted to craft his own response 
to French sensualism. Hamilton might have understandably taken offense when Cousin 
declared somewhat condescendingly that “the Scotch school, after having gone through a 
wise and useful career, more wise and more useful than brilliant, enfeebled and 
exhausted since Reid, has just been almost totally extinguished in the person of the 
ingenious Dugald Stewart.”60 References to Kant littered Cousin’s Introduction to the 
History of Philosophy and Fichte made conspicuous appearances, while Reid and 
Stewart were limited to the aforementioned comment.61 Cousin found even more 
stimulation from Schelling and Hegel whom he declared “my masters and my friends, 
and the leaders of the philosophy of the present age.”62 Just as Hamilton praised 
Cousin’s promulgation of Scottish Common Sense, so Schelling declared him the most 
able Frenchman in disseminating German insights.63 
 Ripley’s claim that Cousin more rigorously accomplished Coleridge’s aims 
directly hinged on the Reason-versus-Understanding distinction, a distinction that was 
now winging its way throughout American intellectual discourse thanks to Marsh and 
Emerson. Cousin’s method involved a persistent, introspective analysis of the self. He 
insisted that “we need only enter within our consciousness,—to a considerable depth” 
and that by doing so one could affirm that “reason . . . from the bosom of consciousness 
extends to the Infinite and reaches at length the Being of beings.”64 Cousin divided 
reason into two parts: the spontaneous reason that could “know, without giving an 
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account of our knowledge to ourselves” and the reflective reason that could distinguish, 
analyze, and explain the elements of consciousness (73). But Cousin believed that 
spontaneous reason could really know everything that the reflective reason later 
discerned as knowledge; reflective reason was merely the tool of philosophers to 
articulate the intuitive insights possessed by all (74). In his notes to Cousin, Ripley 
explained that this was the Coleridgean Reason-versus-Understanding distinction in 
different and more promising form.65 For Ripley, Cousin’s system promised to explain 
the relationship between the Reason and Understanding in a more philosophically 
satisfactory way. Coleridge, on the other hand, appealed in the end either to the practical 
(moral) Reason beyond the speculative intellect or to the creative imagination that 
translated Reason’s ineffable insights into symbolic forms visible to the Understanding. 
 Cousin’s route to spontaneous, intuitive reason and reflective, intellective reason 
charted an initially similar course to Reid and Kant. Like Reid and Kant, Cousin objected 
to the passivity of the mind in Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689). 
However, unlike Reid, Cousin did not reject Locke’s notion of ideas; instead he asserted 
that Locke had not provided a full inventory of ideas before explaining the origin of ideas 
(which for Locke occurred through sensation of the natural world and reflection on the 
contents of one’s mind). Cousin praised Locke for focusing his entire inquiry on what 
Cousin called “psychology,” and what Locke called “understanding,” or in other words, 
epistemology. Since all knowledge and experience resided in the mind, both Cousin and 
Locke thought the mind must ground all philosophical inquiry.66 “It is I who am the 
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instrument with which I know every thing,” Cousin asserted.67 But Cousin insisted Locke 
placed the cart before the horse. A thorough epistemology required a complete 
“inventory of ideas” only then followed by an analysis of the origin of those ideas. Cousin 
accused Locke of loading the deck by presenting his complete theory of ideas in the first 
chapters of his Enquiry before providing an inventory of ideas and explaining their 
relationship to one another. Thus, Cousin insisted, “he will necessarily sacrifice all ideas 
which cannot be reduced to [his supposed] origin.”68 Cousin identified at least six 
important ideas—time, space, causation, personal identity, substance, and infinity—that 
could not be derived ultimately from sensation and reflection and which Locke 
misunderstood because he attempted to shoehorn them into his pre-formed 
epistemology. 
 Cousin followed Kant and the Scots in maintaining that time, space, causation, 
personal identity, and substance were all intuitive principles of reason that the mind 
imposed on reality to interpret sense data.69 On the question of time and space, he 
rigorously followed Kant’s resolute insistence that they could not be located in the 
external world. He called Kant the "last and most illustrious interpreter" of the 
intuitionists, presumably because Reid and Stewart were not always as clear about 
whether time and space were in some sense mind-independent.70 Cousin also insisted 
that the concept of infinity was an intuitive principle of reason, a point he attempted to 
exploit in his attempt to show how reason perceived God.71 Cousin placed all of these 
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intuitive principles in what he called the spontaneous reason, which all human beings 
possessed. The spontaneous reason provided sure, though sometimes inchoate, 
unrecognized knowledge of the world through its intuitive principles. On the other hand, 
reflective reason, the province of philosophers, could discriminate the principles of 
consciousness and make logical arguments about them. Cousin saw both as legitimate 
functions of reason.  
 Cousin attempted to use the idea of spontaneous reason to explain how reason 
could have knowledge of God. According to Cousin, the spontaneous reason intuitively 
yielded knowledge of a coherent self (personal identity or the me) and what he called 
nature (external world or the not-me). One could neither think nor act without at that 
very moment assuming a coherent self, and the moment one assumed a coherent self one 
also knew intuitively that something must exist beyond the self. A self without anything 
from which to distinguish itself was inconceivable. But in perceiving the self and the 
world, the mind automatically understood that the self and not-self were both subject to 
the law of causation and also finite. Again, Cousin insisted, as the spontaneous reason 
intuitively grasped and applied the concepts of causation and finitude, the mind 
intuitively perceived the necessity of “a superior cause, infinite and absolute,” which 
Cousin insisted was God.72 The idea of infinity arose in the mind simultaneously with 
finitude and the mind combined it with the intuitive recognition that the universe 
required a first cause. His position seemed a fusion between traditional cosmological and 
ontological arguments for God, but by making causation and infinity intuitive principles 
of the mind, Cousin thought he could explain why human beings were so inveterately 
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religious—seemingly drawn to worshipping God or gods.73 Normally, the cosmological 
and ontological arguments were the elaborate constructions of reflective philosophers—
numerous philosophers, including Reid, provided examples of the cosmological 
argument, Anselm and Descartes provided examples of the ontological argument—but 
Cousin’s position suggested that at any given moment most human beings were 
intuitively making these arguments to themselves at what he claimed was “a 
considerable depth” of consciousness.74 Thus, throughout the Cousinian corpus he made 
claims such as: “it is reason which composes the foundation of faith and of enthusiasm, 
heroism, of poetry and of religion,” and when anyone tried to separate faith, poetic 
inspiration, or reason, they were merely “plac[ing] one mode of reason above the other 
modes of the same reason.”75 
 Subsequent philosophers have not taken Cousin’s system seriously. The problem 
was that he attempted too hard to be all things to all men. In various places he attacked 
both Catholicism and Protestantism for rejecting reason and science, and then insisted 
that this system could peaceably coexist with French Catholicism.76 His commitment to 
reason made him unwilling to engage in more elaborate Romantic theories about art or 
the imagination and identify with those who did, and yet Stendahl reported that “the vast 
majority of well-bred youth have been converted to Romanticism by the eloquence of 
Monsieur Cousin.”77 But Cousin’s biggest problem was simply the inflated claims of 
Eclecticism itself. He claimed not only to synthesize Scottish Common Sense and 
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German idealism but also the entire history of philosophy! In its own time Eclecticism 
provided suggestive fragments of Scottish intuitionism, Kantian phenomenology, 
Fichtean egoism, and Schelling’s and Hegel’s attempt to realize the Absolute, but 
Cousin’s ideas were published in fragments or as unrefined lectures. Thus his 
explanations of complex philosophical problems strike the modern reader as either 
elliptical or pointing to other, higher authorities. 
 Part of Cousin’s appeal to such diverse American thinkers as George Ripley, 
Orestes Brownson, and Caleb Sprague Henry came from his playing coy on 
straightforward religious questions. At one point, Cousin seemed to affirm the Christian 
Trinity, while his personal religious convictions were obscure and most likely akin to a 
rational deism.78 Trinitarians from Marsh to French Catholic priests thought his system 
pantheistic, and one could also find passages to foster an optimistic, immanent religious 
humanism.79 In one section that Ripley translated for his American audience, Cousin 
summed up this latter posture: 
the Infinite . . . is revealed to us only in the Finite; it is revealed to man, in man and in 
nature; it does not destroy the real world, it throws light upon it; it does not transport us 
from the Finite into the Infinite, for that is impossible; but it imposes on us the law of 
living in the Finite, in order to seek and to represent the Infinite to the utmost of our 
power in that sphere, by the worship of the Beautiful, the practice of the Good, and the 
pursuit of the True; so that he who worships the Beautiful, practices the Good, pursues the 
True, is already in fact religious; for it is God whom he unconsciously obeys, even when he 
fails to perceive that the Beautiful, the True, and the Good have substantial cause beyond 
the limits of this world.80 
 
In this passage, Cousin emphasized the ongoing religious seeking involved in philosophy, 
art, and ethics, while deemphasizing external revelation and the strictures of religious 
dogmas and institutions. The Infinite could only be experienced in finite man and 
nature, and supernatural ascent to the Infinite was impossible. By the time Ripley 
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translated Cousin, he had already begun to believe in a universal “brotherhood of 
humanity” as opposed to any institutional church, and he had insisted that the Bible was 
not God’s direct revelation to contemporary humanity but a record of his past revelations 
to others.81 For Ripley, the most important religious authority was the divine in human 
nature, and the most important religious imperative became the pursuit of the good 
through radical social reform.82 As Ripley later explained to Theodore Parker when 
Parker attempted to court Ripley’s reconsideration of organized religion, even the liberal 
German theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher had failed to “locate his Infinite in the 
human soul . . . to acknowledge the God within us.”83 In a confession that seemed lifted 
from Cousin, Ripley continued: “the only religion which I believe in is the recognition of 
the Divine in man and nature. The Good, the Beautiful, and the True is the Holy Trinity 
which commands the conviction of my intellect and the admiration of my heart. . . . I can 
worship all True, Good, and Beautiful creatures as incarnations of the ineffable, 
inconceivable Godhead.”84 For Ripley, religion was the ongoing pursuit of the truth, 
morality, and beauty offered in the immanent rather than the transcendent realm. 
 While Ripley’s plaudits descended most heavily on Cousin, he sought fervently to 
expose American intellectuals to as many French and German sources as possible. As he 
reported to Marsh, he yearned to “give some idea of all parts of that enchanted circle in 
which the German mind has been revolving for the last seventy or eighty years.”85 To 
accomplish this aim, Ripley edited a fourteen volume series entitled Species of Foreign 
Standard Literature (1838-1842), which brought out English translations of the works 
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of Cousin, Theodore Jouffroy, Benjamin Constant, and the German theologian Wilhelm 
de Wette, as well as some of Goethe’s and Schiller’s minor poetry. Conspicuously absent 
were the more important thinkers Ripley told Marsh he had hoped to include in the 
series: Herder, Lessing, Jacobi, Fichte, Schelling, and Schleiermacher.86   
 Ripley’s affinity for Cousin was illustrative of the complicated relationship 
between the American Romantic temperament and Scottish Common Sense philosophy. 
By choosing to highlight Cousin, Ripley focused on one of France’s most important 
champions of the Scots’ intuitionist arguments against Hume. Both Cousin and Ripley 
thought the Scots had admirably inaugurated a new emphasis on psychology and the 
mind’s ability to interpret reality, but they also thought the Scots had not carefully 
probed the capacity of the self for intuition of God, spiritual experience, and the 
elaborate and suggestive metaphysics that seemed so effervescent in Germany.87 As 
Ripley put it, the German and German-inspired French philosophy was a “genial 
literature, to whose influence our spirits owe so much—which our elder sister, Britain, 
has failed to effect.”88 In other words, for the Transcendentalists and Cautious 
Romantics, post-sensualist French philosophy and post-Kantian German speculation 
promised not just a philosophy of mind to address skepticism; it also promised a more 
ambitious hope to reconcile faith and science, subject and object, and the entire history 
of human thought and experience in one systemic whole that could validate the life of the 
spirit as well as the mind. At the very least, it provided more suggestive intellectual 
horizons from which these Romantic questers could search for new ideas and insights. 
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A Cousinian Trinitarianism: Caleb Sprague Henry 
 
 Ripley was not the first to introduce Cousin to America. In this another Cautious 
Romantic, Caleb Sprague Henry, preempted him. Educated at Dartmouth and Andover, 
a few years behind Marsh, the twenty-six year-old Henry became the friend, 
correspondent, and intellectual ally of Dana Sr., Marsh, and Leonard Woods Jr. in 1832. 
From 1829 until 1835 he served as Congregational minister to churches in West 
Hartford, Connecticut and Greenfield, Massachusetts—George Ripley’s and William 
Cullen Bryant’s boyhood home—and in 1835 he converted to the Episcopal Church and 
transferred his orders.  
 Henry’s intellectual forums were eclectic, and he sometimes juggled the roles of 
literary editor, professor, and pastor simultaneously. In 1834 and 1835, he was the 
founding editor of the American Advocate for Peace, the mouthpiece for the pacifist 
intellectual cadre called the American Peace Society.89 From 1837 to 1840, he edited The 
New York Review, which the scholar of American magazines Frank Luther Mott has 
claimed “was not far inferior to the North American, while in variety and interest it 
outranked all the other reviews of the period.”90 From 1847 to 1850, he edited the 
Episcopalian denominational journal The Churchman, and he also served as parish 
rector to St. Clements in New York City. In his lifetime he authored fifteen books, 
numerous articles, and he edited some ten volumes on the Church Fathers, ancient 
history, the history of philosophy, Victor Cousin, and a four-volume American edition of 
Francois Guizot’s History of Civilization in Europe (1846). But Henry’s primary vocation 
lay in the university, and he occupied the chair of mental and moral philosophy at New 
York University from 1838 to 1852.  
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 Henry’s biographical record is scarce, as he left very little archival 
correspondence, but the record he did leave established him firmly as a member of the 
Cautious Romantic network. When Henry moved to New York in 1838, he received 
letters of introduction to Dana Sr.’s intellectual friends in New York City, particularly 
William Cullen Bryant, and when Henry resigned his chair in 1852, he lived with Richard 
Henry Dana Jr. for two years.91 When Dana Sr. began to lecture in New York, he stayed 
frequently with Henry, and the two of them kept up a substantial correspondence for the 
rest of their lives (with Leonard Woods Jr. often serving as courier).92 In the mid-1830s, 
Henry published several articles for Woods Jr.’s Literary and Theological Review, and 
when Henry edited The New York Review he published articles by George Allen and 
Henry Reed (discussed in later chapters). He was apparently close to Henry Reed, as he 
inserted a two-page eulogy to his fellow professor in one of his books, mourning Reed’s 
death effusively.93 Henry was also intimate enough with Allston to be granted a rarely 
allowed audience in Allston’s studio, and he referred to the painter as “my friend” and 
“that most amiable man and ornament of our country's art.”94 Henry plotted with Marsh 
to establish an intellectual journal conducive to their views, served as political editor to 
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the New York Times (edited by Marsh’s student, Henry Jarvis Raymond), and was not 
beneath angling for Marsh’s support in his early quest for a professorship.95 
 In 1834, Henry published Cousin’s Elements of Psychology—the latter’s lectures 
on the history of philosophy in the eighteenth century—which primarily attacked Locke. 
While Cousin’s thought had come to America two years earlier through Henning Gotfried 
Linberg’s translation of Cousin’s Introduction to the History of Philosophy (1832), 
Linberg provided only a brief preface whereas Henry provided a more lengthy 
introduction to explain Cousin’s thought, much as Marsh had done with Coleridge. In his 
“Introduction,” Henry attempted to explain Cousin’s system to American audiences. Like 
the later Ripley, Henry embraced Cousin’s distinction between an intuitive, spontaneous 
Reason and a discursive, reflective reason, and like Ripley, Henry thought Cousin’s 
distinction could be linked to Coleridge’s distinction between the Reason and 
Understanding.96 Like Cousin, Henry thought that the spontaneous Reason possessed 
intuitive knowledge. “Spontaneous reason . . . or briefly, spontaneity [provided] an 
instinctive perception of truth, an immediate intuition, and a pure affirmation,” while 
reflective reason—the province of the philosopher—discriminated and articulated these 
intuitive perceptions.97 
 But in addition to the distinction between spontaneous and reflective reason and 
Cousin’s argument for the existence of God, Henry thought Cousin’s theories helped to 
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validate the reasonability of the Christian Trinity. According to Cousin, reflective reason 
could distinguish but not disentangle the fundamental categories of the spontaneous 
reason, which often came in antipodes. The idea of finitude automatically entailed the 
idea of infinity, the idea of time entailed eternity, the idea of finite causation entailed a 
first or absolute cause, and the idea of unity entailed multiplicity.98 As just one example, 
Cousin explained this last fundamental binary: “Try, for instance, to take away unity, and 
variety, by itself, is no longer susceptible of addition; no longer comprehensible; on the 
other hand, endeavor to take away variety, and you have an immovable unity, and unity 
which does not manifest itself, which is not, by itself, even a thought” (123). Unity and 
diversity were fundamental, intertwined notions of reason, and all of the aforementioned 
binaries were fundamental to human thought. But there was a third element to reason: 
the integral relationship between the two antipodes. “Finally, take away the relation 
which intimately binds variety to unity, and you destroy that connexion between the two 
terms which a proposition requires” (123). Cousin insisted, therefore, that these ideas “in 
their triplicity and in their unity, they constitute the very foundation of human reason 
itself” (131). Cousin then suggested that if human reason itself depended upon the notion 
of three distinguished but inseparable principles, then the doctrine of the Christian 
Trinity was not as hopelessly contradictory as its opponents claimed. “What is the theory 
which I have just stated? It is the very foundation of the Christian religion. The God of 
the Christians is both threefold and one . . . ” (134). George Ripley had no interest in 
using Cousin to defend Trinitarianism, and he conveniently cut short his own translation 
of Cousin’s argument about the triplicity of reason at the paragraph where Cousin 
launched into his Trinitarian speculation.99 But the connection struck Henry. 
                                                   
 98 Cousin, Introduction to the History of Philosophy, 121–123. 
 99 Cousin, Jouffroy, and Constant, Philosophical Miscellanies, 1:266. 
  
325 
 It was this sort of thinking that led Henry to embrace Cousin, and he quoted the 
above passage with glee. “Now who could have been found thirty or forty years ago in 
Paris to give utterance to such sentiments in a course of public lectures on philosophy? 
Who would have come to hear them?” he asked an American audience.100 Henry leaped 
at Cousin’s potential argument for the Christian Trinity. He insisted along with Cousin 
that there were “three laws of thought” that governed the “unity of reason,” and he 
embraced the argument about unity, plurality, and “the relation between the two.”101 
Reason functioned by constantly seeking to reconcile differences and distinctions into a 
unified whole, and this quest for unity yielded further discovery of difference and variety. 
Thus Henry was drawn into that quintessentially Romantic obsession of unity and 
diversity seen in Allston, Coleridge, and Schelling: the constant wonderment at the two 
paradoxical principles and the way they functioned in science, art, and ultimately 
knowledge. Orestes Brownson would also attempt to use the idea in favor of 
Trinitarianism, and Henry seized on Cousin’s epistemological unity in diversity as an 
argument for the divine Trinity:  
The divine nature, therefore, as essentially intelligent, is essentially intelligible; for that 
which is true of reason as appearing in man, is true of reason taken absolutely. That which 
forms the foundation of our reason, forms the foundation of eternal reason: that is a 
triplicity which resolves itself into unity, and a unity which developes [sic] itself into 
triplicity.102 
 
For Henry, Reason discovered God, the fount of all Reason, and just as Reason consisted 
of three interrelated but inextricable laws of thought, so the divine nature consisted of 
three interrelated but inextricable persons.103 Building on this Trinitarian fervor, Henry 
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went on in speculative terms similar to Marsh and Coleridge. He equated Cousin’s 
spontaneous Reason with the Logos of Platonic thought and the Divine Word of John 1.   
The spontaneous reason is not individual nor personal; it is not human, except as revealed 
in man; in itself it is impersonal, divine. It is the LOGOS, the WORD of St. John, which 
‘lighteth every man that cometh into the world’ . . . [it] reveals to us from on high the 
truths which it imposes upon us immediately, and which, originally, we accept at once, 
without consulting reflection. It is this admirable and incontestable phenomenon which 
identifies reason and faith with the primitive, irresistible, spontaneous, and unreflective 
apperception of truth.104 
 
But at this stage Henry rejected Marsh’s and Coleridge’s attempt to embrace Christ, the 
Logos, through the practical Reason—through the felt need of a Savior. “[T]he practical 
reason [has] no more objective validity than the speculative.”105 Henry thought that the 
practical (moral) Reason could only establish Christianity subjectively: those who felt the 
need of Christ would believe and those who did not would not. Instead, at least in 1834, 
Henry thought that Cousin’s definition of the spontaneous Reason, particularly its 
unreflective revelation of a triune Infinite, was a surer guide to the Word. 
 Like Henry, Cousin had equated reason with the Logos of Pythagoras and Plato, 
but he made no reference to Christ. When he spoke of the “Word made flesh” he meant 
that reason was incarnated in the human mind as a mediator between God and man but 
was not strictly “the Absolute God in his majestic individuality . . . not the Being of 
beings.”106 If Henry had read more carefully and contextually, Cousin had not said that 
his idea of reason’s triplicity validated the Christian Trinity, but rather that for those 
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French Catholics who were willing to accept the Christian Trinity—many of whom were 
Cousin’s critics—his idea of reason made perfect sense.107 In other sections, Cousin 
embraced what seemed like pantheism, which Henry strenuously disavowed. “If God be 
not everything, he is nothing,” Cousin insisted.108 He maintained that God was not only 
an absolute, infinite cause of the universe, but also its absolute substance.109 In clear 
distinction from orthodox Christian theology, he maintained that the universe was as 
necessary as God—that God could not help but create the world—and that God did not 
create the world out of nothing (ex nihilo) but out of his own substance.110 Though Henry 
thought Cousin provided a philosophy to ground Christian Trinitarianism, he frequently 
had to defend his interpretation of Cousin against charges of the latter’s pantheism.111 
Whatever Cousin’s personal religious beliefs, readers from the sympathetic James Marsh 
to the hostile French Catholics and American Orthodox had a difficult time seeing 
anything but pantheism in Cousin’s system.112 Nevertheless, Cousin joined Coleridge as a 
seminal text in the UVM curriculum under Marsh, and Henry’s translation of the 
Elements of Psychology became an American classic, with transatlantic influence.113  
From 1834 to 1878, the work went through five different editions and twelve printings, 
including three separate printings in London.114 
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 Henry's initial high hopes that Cousin could provide a new spiritual philosophy 
for Christianity became tempered over time. By the late 1830s, and for the rest of his life, 
he often reverted to Coleridgean language about the Reason and Understanding, while 
fusing Cousinian concepts with the Coleridgean distinction. For Henry, Reason became 
that which “grasps the ideas of substance, cause, the infinite, the absolute, of God, of the 
true, the beautiful, the good” by a “power of immediate apprehension or intuition of 
objects in the supersensual sphere.”115 On the other hand, the Understanding grasped 
“abstract conceptions of number and quantity, and of their relations in time and space, 
and operates various processes upon them, as in arithmetic and geometry”; it engaged in 
“logical process.”116  
 Like the other Cautious Romantics, Henry also emphasized an inward turn to the 
self for spiritual perception and experience. While Cousin had emphasized introspection 
to obtain an inventory of consciousness, he never provided a sustained guide to 
introspection either of the spiritual or the psychological sort.117 Henry, like Marsh, 
emphasized an inward turn to the self for spiritual reasons; he sought to foster “that state 
of the inward life, which is the necessary element of spiritual apprehension” so as to 
understand “that which was never designed to fall under the apprehension of the merely 
earthly understanding or of the speculative intellect.”118 In 1834, Henry had rejected the 
argument that practical, subjective need could validate objective, religious truth, but by 
1839 he had come to Marsh’s and Coleridge's position that knowledge of divine things 
came through a practical trial of them in life. Religious truth was “not merely reflective, 
nor speculative, but practical and spiritual” (70). He invoked Anselm and 
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Schleiermacher: “I do not seek to understand in order that I may believe, but believe in 
order that I may understand” (75). Only through the process of a contemplative trial 
could the doubter come to faith. Henry seemed brashly confident that by this process one 
could overcome skepticism. “Retiring within himself, he may defy the cavils of the 
skeptic, and the sneers of the scorner. He is in a higher region, a purer atmosphere” (74). 
While he seemed to offer only subjective mysticism, he multiplied metaphors to try and 
make his appeal more palatable. Spiritual experience was like smelling a rose, loving a 
friend, or enjoying a work of art, it simply could not be explained in discursive terms to 
someone who had not experienced the same thing (74-75). He concluded with an 
attempt to enlist a scientific authority in his favor: 
“It is fit and necessary,” says Lord Bacon, in the introduction to his book on the 
'Interpretation of Nature,' “in the very front and beginning of this work, without hesitation 
or reservation to be professed, that it is no less true in this human kingdom of knowledge, 
than in God's kingdom of heaven, that no man shall enter into it except he first become as 
a little child.” Happily the world have believed Bacon, and nobody thinks of gaining a 
knowledge of nature except by experiment; but how many believe not Jesus Christ, nor 
seek to enter into the knowledge of the kingdom of heaven, by the inward experiment 
proper to that kingdom, by an actual trial of the Gospel, by a full turning of the heart and 
will to God. (76-77) 
 
Just as Francis Bacon had emphasized careful experiment as the method to arrive at 
scientific knowledge, so Henry insisted that one could only believe in theological 
concepts beyond the Understanding by experimenting with them in the practice of faith. 
Prima facie Henry’s claim suffered from a false equation, for of course the results of 
science could be independently verified. But his notion of common experience rescued 
the comparison from being totally inane. Presumably scientific experiments required a 
common community of scientists with experiences similar enough to recognize, converse 
about, and verify experiments. Likewise, Henry thought discovery and discourse about 
spiritual experience, beauty in nature, love of persons, and the appreciation of art could 
in some sense be verified by those who had had similar experiences. Of course, Henry 
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did not address the questions of those who had made a sustained experiment of orthodox 
faith and found it wanting. George Ripley for one might have been interested in such an 
explanation. 
 Like Verplanck, Marsh, and the later Orestes Brownson and Isaac Hecker, Henry 
thought his epistemology and his Christianity mandated a certain form of egalitarianism. 
While it was common, he said, to honor others for their accomplishments and social 
standing, there was a deeper honor due to all persons “not to what is accidental but what 
is essential and essentially the same in all men, namely their humanity, which by 
wonderful expression has been called the ‘image of God,’ an expression which tells us 
that every man in his degree is what God is, a spirit rational, conscious, free.”119 Reason, 
consciousness, and free will were hallmarks of Cousin’s system, and Henry thought these 
formed a commonality between all human beings, entitling each one to respect, and 
suggesting that those of lowly station might be greater than their social superiors in what 
really mattered: character and moral worth. “We trample upon everything sacred when 
we indulge in contempt for the poor, the low, the vulgar, the ignorant on account of their 
poverty, boldness, vulgarity or ignorance. . . . The inferior may in point of character and 
moral worth stand much higher than his superior in station” (105). Henry thought this 
egalitarian moralism would prevail as Christianity prevailed in a culture, for Christ 
himself had demonstrated the principle most clearly in his own lowliness, but Henry 
thought the United States, despite all its egalitarian talk, had not yet come close to 
realizing this ideal (104, 107). “It must be said that the divine power of Christianity has 
yet a great way to go before it penetrates and pervades the great heart of what considers 
itself the most Christian country on the globe” (107). While some might have 
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countenanced an easy equation between America and Christianity, Henry remained 
skeptical. 
 But Henry’s position fell short of a full-scale social egalitarianism. While he 
allowed all men and women the insights of intuitive Reason and the nobility of moral 
character, he remained a strident conservative in his social and political outlook. 
“Freedom is no blessing without public order,” he declared in his earliest published 
writing.120 For all of Henry's wandering in the French Eclectic stratosphere and for all his 
invocation of the ubiquitous image of God, he demonstrated a resolute, conservative 
temperament throughout his intellectual life. Henry's conservatism employed what by 
now had become a common complaint: the United States was too excessively commercial 
and materialistic and thus it stifled liberal learning, intellectual creativity, and the 
spiritual life. Visible in Dana Sr.’s, Marsh’s, Emerson’s, and Margaret Fuller’s different 
analyses of American culture, they nevertheless agreed on this point. Like many other 
self-appointed critics of American culture, Henry declared unequivocally that the life of 
the mind suffered as a result of American commitment only to “politics and business, 
public life and commercial enterprise.”121  
 Henry placed the problem in Romantic epistemological terms; Reason too easily 
became the slave of the senses and the material Understanding too often triumphed.122 
For Henry, Reason was simultaneously an intellectual and an aspirational spiritual 
faculty that required development. As Reason developed, it established the ideals that 
guided all manner of intellectual and spiritual achievement within a culture. Reason 
inspired the philosopher “seeking to make knowledge science,” the artist “working, by 
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forms, or colors, or tones, or winged words, to express the beautiful,” the saint “striving 
to realize in the moral sphere . . . the ideal of goodness.”123 Most importantly it provided 
for all men the “Idea of a Perfect Social State.”124 Without cultivating Reason, a 
civilization would only enjoy blind progress, a “mere going forward, without regard to 
the end to be reached.”125 Applying the Reason-versus-Understanding distinction, Henry 
insisted that “all the dominion over nature which the human understanding gains should 
be subordinated to the control of reason” (236). If scientific progress served only to 
enhance “self-willed pride . . . physical enjoyment or selfish gratification” without being 
informed by Reason and the ends of humanity’s higher, spiritual nature, then a 
civilization stood in danger of being “swept from the earth” as in the days of Noah (237).  
While Henry’s position rang with the acerbity of a cranky, high-minded prophet, the 
point was not without its quasi-environmentalist potential. Pursuing material progress 
without employing Reason to guide that progress might prove disastrous for any 
civilization from a purely ecological standpoint, the judgment of God aside. 
 While Henry believed in Reason’s potential, he shared the other Cautious 
Romantics’ skepticism about that potential as well. In a speech delivered at Geneva 
College—the Methodist institution Gulian Verplanck helped to charter—Henry declared, 
“It is [from] the infirmity of our corrupted nature that the sensual life, as in individuals 
so in nations, is ever tending to predominate over the spiritual.”126 For Henry, corrupted 
human nature led to the greed, commercialism, and political corruption that afflicted the 
nation (9-24). Lecturing on this problem at Marsh’s UVM in 1837, Henry emphatically 
stated that the solution to corrupted human nature and its resulting effects in society was 
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institutions, particularly the church and the university (26-28). But though Henry would 
himself serve as a minister at various points in his career, even emphatically defending 
the minister’s right to preach about political questions against his pro-slavery bishop 
during the Civil War, he emphasized the role of universities in the life of the nation over 
that of the church.127 
 Indeed Henry’s educational vision possessed a kind of religious fervor. In all of 
Henry's writing and publishing on the topic of higher education, he pressed for a much 
more sophisticated university structure. These new universities would train an 
“intellectual High Priesthood” that would both diffuse their knowledge by training 
teachers—“the lower ministers at the altar”—but also engage in a much more specified 
research that was crucial to the progress of the nation.128 Looking to the German system, 
Henry insisted that ”we have in this country no Universities, and we need them: we have 
Colleges; and they need to be reformed—subordinated to the Universities, and connected 
with the lower institutions in such a way as to form a complete and perfect SYSTEM of 
public Instruction” (113). He insisted that the state should take a much more active role 
in all levels of education, especially funding for public universities, and that it should 
organize all educational “institutions into one great whole . . . such as the idea of a 
complete system of Public Instruction implies” (38, 133).  
 Henry’s system was ambitiously liberal for the cadre of elite intellectuals he had 
in mind. He insisted that the universities should promote “all higher cultivation of 
letters, science and art” with generous state funding for libraries, professorships, and 
specialized research (103, 133-134). Like Marsh, he was also generally liberal in his 
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pedagogy. They both sought not to impose a system of thinking, but to develop Reason’s 
activity within each student. Lyman Abbott—a later important spokesman for liberal 
Protestantism—remembered Henry as “a pioneer in the new school of teaching.”129 
Henry sought not to inculcate any particular doctrine but to develop in his students the 
power of Reason to find for itself. “He was comparatively indifferent to what conclusions 
we came, so that the conclusions were our own,” remembered Abbot.130 But Henry also 
exemplified the tension between educational authoritarianism and the sensitive sort of 
education that fostered individual development, a tension seen in various ways in the 
thought of Dana Sr., Leonard Woods Jr., James Marsh, the later Orestes Brownson, and 
Victor Cousin himself.131  
 In the end, Henry’s vision was more fundamentally conservative than 
progressive, and he did not seem as sensitive to expanding university access, as did 
Marsh or the later Orestes Brownson. For Henry, “a learned order is . . . one of the 
conservative powers of a nation, necessary in order to check the undue predominance of 
the more gross and material elements.”132 One of the important functions of a national 
education system with enhanced universities was to maintain “reverence for Justice, Law 
and Public Order” by teaching people to “reverence also the Forms, the Institutions, in 
which those great Ideas are embodied and represented” (93). While the role of Henry’s 
educated elite was to “diffuse around them a love of science, of letters, of art—of all that 
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is liberal,” Henry thought this intellectual cultivation part of a larger, moral, ordered, 
and ultimately Christian culture essential to maintaining the American democratic 
experiment (103-106). He was a thorough republican constitutionalist and distrusted the 
democratic spirit of the nation, which he claimed sought to cast off all restraint (82-86). 
He knew the claim that popular government desperately required “the intelligence and 
virtue of the people” was trite, but he didn’t care; its triteness didn’t make it any less true 
(364). In the end, he thought universities and their sons should guide education 
precisely because politicians—beholden as they were to the people—could not be trusted 
to morally and spiritually guide the nation (103-104). 
 Henry’s posture was not surprising given his penchant for Cousin’s thought, for 
Cousin also exemplified the tension between a liberated epistemology, pedagogy, and 
expanded education, and the more conservative desire to guide and control the process 
in order to shape the French nation. Cousin’s desire to explore the boundaries of 
knowledge and the interior self was at least partially motivated by the desire to confirm a 
unified self in the wake of the irrationalism of the French Revolution.133 In principle, 
Cousin’s spontaneous reason was an egalitarian epistemology granting reason’s highest 
insights—God, identity, etc.—to all people. But by only allowing philosophers to fully 
understand the self through reflective reason, Cousin’s system ultimately retained a 
fairly strong distinction between the intellectual and the non-intellectual.134 This 
distinction permeated Cousin’s educational vision and the cultural triumph of his 
psychology in nineteenth-century French culture. In 1830, Cousin largely abandoned his 
role as a philosopher and lecturer at the Sorbonne to join the five-man Royal Council of 
Public Instruction, and by 1832 he was working alongside the new minister of public 
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instruction, François Guizot, to reform French education. From this position they 
increased centralized state supervision at all educational levels and enshrined Cousin’s 
psychology as the capstone philosophy course in lycée secondary education for bourgeois 
males.135 Cousin’s psychology was seen as important to train the social class entrusted 
with morally guiding the nation—primarily important for educators but also relevant to 
other upper-middle-class pursuits—reinforcing the idea that only a small portion of the 
population could engage in the process of reflective reason. Furthermore, enshrining his 
psychology on an institutional scale—even one limited to a bourgeois elite—sapped the 
potential of Cousin’s process of introspection and development, yielding mostly a 
recitation of the pre-decided facts of consciousness found in textbooks rather than the 
introspective development of autonomous individuals.136  
 
Conclusion 
 As we have seen, the tension between a liberated Romantic epistemology with its 
egalitarian implications and the hope that such an epistemology would yield predictable 
results—a commitment to a broadly orthodox Christianity and a more stable social 
order—framed the Cautious Romantic temperament. This theological and institutional 
conservatism set them apart from the Transcendentalists. But many of the ideas and 
even relationships between members of both camps were historically intertwined. While 
the Cautious Romantics were very different from the Transcendentalists—seen in this 
chapter by comparing Henry’s and Ripley’s appropriation of Cousin—they were both 
interlopers to the theological establishment. One reviewer for the Orthodox Princeton 
Review tellingly chose to review Henry’s edition of Cousin’s psychology and Emerson’s 
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Divinity School Address together, calling Henry’s position a “modified 
transcendentalism.”137 Throughout the sixty-five page article, he warned all sincere 
Christians, particularly the young, in no uncertain terms. “We see not what good purpose 
can be effected by so thin a disguise as that assumed by M. Cousin.”138 Whether reading 
German literature and philosophy itself, or imbibing “its secondary and Gallicized 
division,” the reviewer shrieked, “[u]nder the disguise of romance and poesy, [we] will 
learn to tolerate the hell-born dogmas of the young Germany; the mingled lust and 
blasphemy of Heine . . . [and] the Iscariot Christianity of the disciples of Schelling [and] 
Hegel.”139 In the context the reviewer also warned against Shelley’s “wild and impious 
imaginations” and Wordsworth’s “extreme of poetical license,” which bordered on 
pantheism.140 Compared to all of this, he declared, “Socinianism [Unitarianism] is 
evangelical.”141 This last concession, which no one would have uttered when the 
Orthodox and Unitarians were at each other’s throats in 1805 or 1819, made it clear that 
Romantic influences had changed the fault lines in American theological discourse. 
 But these fault lines were fluid; the identities of the respective actors often in flux. 
The Romantic temperament was nothing if not personal and restlessly searching. Within 
the Transcendentalist ranks lurked a hardheaded but mercurial figure, Orestes 
Brownson, whose quest for intellectual unity would ultimately outdo Dana Sr., Marsh, 
and Henry, both in its capacious fervidity but also its surrender to institutional authority.
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Chapter 9: Orestes Brownson: Transcendentalist, Catholic, Cautious 
Romantic 
 
Introduction 
 One would be hard-pressed to find an American nineteenth-century intellectual 
as prolific as Orestes Brownson. In his lifetime he authored seven books, twenty-five 
pamphlets, and over 1,500 articles.1 His mind was capacious, his views provocative, and 
his pen profuse. This chapter seeks to nuance our understanding of Brownson by 
capturing part of his capacious consciousness and placing him within the Cautious 
Romantic discourse, both intellectually and historically. While he was not an insider in 
the more closely linked Cautious Romantic network, his profile largely matched that of 
what this dissertation has termed a Cautious Romantic type.  
 Brownson emerged from within the ranks of Transcendentalism. His journey 
from Romantic epistemology and liberal social concerns brought him to a Trinitarian 
Christianity identical to James Marsh, Caleb Sprague Henry, and the others. But 
Brownson’s quest for both intellectual and institutional authority to control the excesses 
of Romantic Reason was even stronger than the others. Thus, while Marsh, Henry, and 
Leonard Woods Jr. looked to universities and common schools to guide Romantic 
Reason and all the Cautious Romantics looked to the diffuse institutional influence of 
churches and clergy, Brownson’s reasoning led him to ultimately identify Reason with 
the Catholic Church. Nevertheless, as this chapter demonstrates, Brownson remained 
squarely within the discourse of transcendental Trinitarianism, and he was admired, 
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respected, and even befriended by many of the other Cautious Romantics. His 
intellectual path partially followed that of Caleb Sprague Henry, his educational vision 
comported with James Marsh’s views, and his later political temperament aligned him 
with Leonard Woods Jr.’s and Richard Henry Dana Sr.’s conservative politics. Moreover, 
he was an important influence on several later figures in this dissertation, including 
Isaac Hecker, Sophia Ripley, and George Allen.  
 
Orestes Brownson: Early Tensions 
 Orestes Brownson was born to a poor Vermont dirt farmer in 1803. Two years 
later his father died. With five children and no means of support, Brownson's mother, 
Relief, tried to provide for her family, but she was forced to send away three of the 
children, including Orestes. As a result, Brownson grew up without his family, living with 
an older, unrelated couple. “Properly speaking I had no childhood,” he remembered, 
“and [I] have more of the child in my feelings now than at eight. . . . I had the manners, 
tone, and taste of an old man before I was a boy.”2 While Brownson finally rejoined his 
family in 1818, his life, education, and religious convictions were anything but settled. 
Brownson's biographer has accurately characterized the impact this had on Brownson's 
psychology and later views: “These youthful experiences of separation created in him a 
strong sense of personal independence, initiative, and self-reliance, they also put him in 
a constant search for the communion, continuity, order, and stability that he did not 
enjoy.”3 Throughout his life, Brownson read and wrote voraciously, as he sought for 
intellectual authorities and systems on which to construct a proper philosophy of life. 
Socially and politically, he combined a constant eye for the poor and social justice with a 
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quest for institutions to ameliorate social wrongs. His early thought was a complex web 
of radical social criticism, liberal impulses, and conservative means, identifiable in 
hindsight, but perhaps never fully synthesized. 
 Brownson confessed he always possessed a keen interest in religious matters.4 
Throughout the 1820s and early 1830s, his relentless religious seeking led him from 
Presbyterianism, to the Universalist ministry, then into skeptical, Free Thought activism, 
then into independent ministry, and finally into the Unitarian clergy in 1832. Despite 
Brownson's later reputation as a dogmatic logician, in the 1830s he saw his own 
enduring religious impulse in Romantic terms. From an early age, he explained, “reason 
first awoke, while thought was unfledged.”5 Distinguishing between a higher, spiritual 
Reason and the intellect, like so many other Romantics, Brownson remembered his 
youthful religious sensibility in Wordsworthian terms: 
I loved the night, for it seemed to shadow [God] forth and to give him a local habitation. I 
frequented the deep solitude of the forest; I climbed the craggy mountain, stood upon its 
huge cliffs; I gazed with rapture on nature in her wildest and most fitful moods; for in the 
lone, wild, grand, sublime scenery around me, I seemed to trace his work, and to feel his 
spirit reigning, in silent, but not unacknowledged majesty. I was never alone. I felt the 
Deity was with me.6 
 
For Brownson, the religious perception of God in nature was very different from the 
appeals to the external evidence of God's design. Instead, Brownson saw nature as a 
spiritual medium in symbiotic union with the mind: “I have thus a witness within; and, 
having this witness, I can find its testimony corroborated by the whole of external 
nature” (131-132). He made it very clear that William Paley's natural theology and 
arguments from design could only convince one who already believed, for Brownson 
thought external evidence could never demonstrate whether the universe was eternal or 
required a designer (131). Like so many other Cautious Romantics, Brownson 
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emphasized the inward turn to the self instead. External evidences could not 
demonstrate God’s existence, “but, if [one] will turn [the] mind inward” then one could 
perceive “ the voice of God speaking to his soul. . . . My own faith rests on this internal 
revelation from God to the inner man” (131-132). Of course, this was the 
Transcendentalist Brownson of the 1830s, but even his later explanation of his 
conservative Catholic conversion would carry the residual appeal to the inward turn and 
a higher, spiritual Reason. In time, Reason’s correlative would become the Catholic 
Church and no longer nature. 
 Brownson’s inward religion was not only personal but also restlessly social and 
political. He thought that from within the human soul came the “inward visions of a 
greater good for the human race,” and he thought established religion far too wedded to 
the past, seeking only to justify inherited and oppressive societal forms.7 Brownson 
insisted that the whole point of religion and Christ’s gospel was to provide for “the moral 
and social elevation of the poor, of the lower classes.”8 But this was more than just a 
banal appeal to moral uplift. For one thing, he criticized sharply any clergy that 
attempted to justify social inequality, and in essay after essay Brownson sought to 
explain the causes of inequality and propose solutions.9 The causes he identified were 
quasi-Marxist. “The man who is capable of looking on human society with the eye of a 
philosopher, will readily perceive the cause of the crime and misery . . . chiefly owing to 
the inequality which . . . every institution tends to perpetuate.”10 While he conceded that 
society would always remain partially unequal due to human choices, he lambasted the 
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“non-productive class[es]”: clergy, lawyers, and politicians.11 Brownson argued these 
classes received compensation inversely proportional to their productivity; thus they 
encouraged the denigration of labor itself, while intentionally reinforcing their own 
ruling interests. But there was a latent conservatism in Brownson’s thought as well. His 
religious zeal for ameliorating social wrongs led him to a constant search for institutions 
and ideas powerful enough to right those wrongs. His temperament was not one to 
pragmatically acquiesce to the status quo and tinker gradually to fix problems. Moreover, 
he experienced poverty and social inequality in the stony soil of rural Vermont and the 
small towns in which he preached. His politics tended rather to promote a backward 
looking proprietary capitalism rather than the large-scale Marxist faith in the economic 
and political collective. 
 The tension between Brownson’s radical and conservative impulses could be seen 
in his work with the New York Working Man’s Party in 1829 and 1830. A major player in 
the 1829 state elections, the New York Working Man's Party gave an alternative political 
voice to farmers, mechanics, and laborers in opposition to the National Republicans and 
Jacksonian Democrats. The Workies’ primary organizers and intellectual influences were 
Frances Wright—the Free Thought cultural lightning rod, Robert Dale Owen—the son of 
Robert Owen of New Harmony fame, and Thomas Skidmore—a radical agrarian 
redistributionist. Modestly successful in the 1829 elections, the party garnered one third 
of the New York vote and sent a state senator and state assemblyman to Albany.12 But 
tensions arose immediately following this fleeting success. Skidmore advocated a radical 
redistribution of arable land to reconstitute society in a manner analogous to Jefferson’s 
vision of agrarian freeholders (though Skidmore denounced Jefferson for fatally 
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compromising the language of the Declaration of Independence when Jefferson 
substituted the conceptually limp term “the pursuit of happiness” for the revolutionary 
term “property”).13 On the other hand, Wright and Owen emphasized early and uniform 
state education as the primary balm for social inequality. While their differences with 
Skidmore were hushed enough to ensure the Workies’ 1829 success, the compromise 
could not abide that success, and the party splintered soon thereafter.14 But despite 
Wright’s and Owen’s progressive, centralized, and arguably statist educational schemes, 
they retained an idealistic, countrified orientation as well. Owen had been raised in New 
Harmony, their Free Enquirer magazine had been inherited from that experiment, and 
Wright had led a bucolic experiment of her own, purchasing slaves who worked out their 
freedom on a communal farm in Nashabo, Tennessee. As Brownson explained, they all 
sought to link their universal schemes with “the ultra-democratic sentiment of the 
country, which had from the time of Jefferson and Tom Paine something of an anti-
Christian character.”15 Brownson applauded the schemes of these Free Thought 
radicals—temporarily converting to the atheism of Free Thought himself—and he praised 
their desire to “aim high” and to “make of mankind but one class.”16 
 The Working Man's movement embodied many of the tensions in Orestes 
Brownson's own thought. His background in the Vermont backcountry and his ministry 
to rural and small-town parishes made him sympathetic to the agrarian vision despite 
his quasi-Marxist social-political analysis. In an article entitled “Priest and Infidel,” 
Brownson praised the “character of the backwoodsman, rude, course, strong, hardy, but 
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not destitute of humankindness,” and he painted a village swaddled in nature as an ideal 
type.17 When his disillusioned “infidel” protagonist abandoned his youthful faith, 
overcome by skepticism and the hypocrisy of the church, Brownson set the stage for the 
infidel’s re-enchantment in a village exuding “rural refinement, competence, equality, 
[and] content[ment].”18 
At a short distance, on an eminence which overlooked most of the village, half buried by a 
grove of young pines, near a fine waterfall, where nature seemed to have collected the 
beautiful, the wild, the grand, and the solemn, stood the village church, with its tall steeple 
pointing to a fairer and better world for the good . . . [a] little paradise which lay spread 
out in loveliness before me.19  
 
As Brownson continued to develop his religious, pastoral idyll, he explained that in this 
village young and old were united in a communal, and indeed familial devotion to one 
another and to God.20 Here Brownson’s vision united his concern for familial stability, 
social harmony, and a religion embosomed in nature. “Let legislators follow the plough” 
he insisted in an article on equality written at the height of the Working Man Party’s 
fervor.21 Ideal notions of family, property, and rural life always tinged his perspective. 
 But like the Working Man’s Party, Brownson also attended to the just-emerging 
industrial proletariat. For Brownson, the problem was the same whether in agriculture 
or manufacturing: capital controlled the means of production, diminished wages, and 
ensured that “a man will be respected in proportion to his idleness.”22 Although the 
bucolic idyll was always a part of his consciousness, even Brownson's early writings 
manifested a desire for institutions to help correct the social wrongs he observed. In one 
of his very earliest writings, Brownson maintained that “though our institutions may not 
yet bear the stamp of perfection . . . [the philanthropist] should blend all his support to 
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our institutions that we may never retrograde to keep onward march of improvement.”23 
He could be scathing on the institutions that existed and even advocate their destruction 
and replacement at times. Churches were often well-heeled and out of touch or preached 
a helpless gospel of damnation enervating to true social reform, economic institutions 
were systemically oppressive, and political institutions too often complied with the 
demands of capital.24 Nevertheless, institutions were essential to enacting the justice 
Brownson envisioned. “Man has brought the curse on himself, and he can remove it. . . . 
Let him to work–undo the wrong, supplant his antisocial institutions by social ones.”25 
The search for the right institution(s) would be an ongoing quest, the resolution of which 
he would find in the Roman Catholic Church. 
 Like the Free Thought radicals, Brownson looked to aggressively expand 
education. In its theory of mind, Brownson's educational vision was Romantic. Like 
Richard Henry Dana Sr., James Marsh, and Caleb Sprague Henry, Brownson thought 
that the state of education was woefully inadequate. He insisted that teachers taught too 
much by rote and were too draconian in their forms of discipline. Instead, Brownson 
complained, they should teach that “the mind is omnipotent” and focus on developing 
the mind’s ability to reason for itself.26 But like the plan of his Free Thought colleagues, 
Brownson's educational vision had its authoritarian streak. He insisted that the state 
should educate all classes equally and that the new educational system should raise 
children until they reached maturity. The food would be “Spartan”, the clothing “plain, 
convenient, economical uniform,” both food and clothing would be “chiefly raised and 
                                                   
 23 Orestes Brownson, “The Times,” The Gospel Advocate and Impartial Investigator 7 (May 2, 
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 25 Brownson, “Poverty,” EWOB, 2:186. 
 26 Brownson, “The Times,” EWOB, 1:286, 288. 
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manufactured by the pupils themselves,” and both rich and poor would be taxed to 
support the state’s raising of their children.27 Throughout the 1830s, Brownson 
continued to espouse education as the primary arena where societal ills could be 
addressed.28 
 
Restless Transcendentalist 
 After sojourns as a Universalist minister and Free Thought sympathizer, 
Brownson joined the Unitarian clergy in 1832. In 1834, George Ripley and other 
Unitarian ministers convinced Brownson to come to Boston as an in-the-flesh advocate 
for the working classes.29 In many ways Brownson incarnated the highest hopes of 
Christian liberalism, at least for those outside Boston Brahmin and upper-middle-class 
culture. An autodidact “having never received even the ordinary advantages of our 
common schools,” he embodied a certain ideal of self-culture, voraciously reading 
philosophy and literature and teaching himself the languages necessary to his studies.30 
Prolific in speech and print, capacious in his search to unite the philosophical, religious, 
social, and aesthetic aspects of human experience, and vigorous in his quest after 
egalitarian reform, he manifested what Jacques Barzun has identified as the frenetic but 
quite productive quality of “Romantic life.”31 Financial stress followed Brownson 
throughout the 1820s and 1830s, often exacerbated by his radical views, but it never 
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deterred his prolific writing and preaching. He cut an imposing figure, standing 6’ 2’’ in 
an era when the average male height was 5’ 8”.32 With large hands and lean frame, he ate 
little, chewed tobacco, and went about his duties incessantly drinking coffee and always 
arrayed in the same black, swallow-tailed coat.33  
 In 1836, Ripley invited Brownson to join him for the first formal meeting of the 
Transcendental Club on September 19. Brownson shared Coleridge’s loquaciousness but 
apparently lacked some of the latter’s charm. Whether induced by his dogged logic and 
commitment to social justice, his sometimes-irascible temperament, or his high levels of 
caffeine, Brownson pressed his arguments hard and pounded the table when animated.34 
His style proved a bit strong for the gentlemen of the Transcendental Club, and he 
ceased formal attendance a year later. However, he continued to respect and at times 
confide in Emerson through the early 1840s, and he retained a life-long friendship with 
the more socially conscious George Ripley. “One man, and one man only, shared my 
entire confidence, and knew my most secret thought,” Brownson stated of Ripley in 1857. 
“We have since taken divergent courses, but I love him as I have loved no other man, and 
shall so love and esteem him as long as I live.”35 No doubt Ripley’s earnest quest to 
address social inequality endeared him to Brownson, despite their eventual religious 
differences. 
 Brownson’s embrace of Romantic epistemology—with which he interpreted his 
childhood religious experiences—came partially through his egalitarian social ideals and 
his exposure to various French intellectuals who shared those ideals. His intellectual 
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journey exemplified the use that many Cautious Romantics made of European sources 
beyond Coleridge. Reading the Comte de Saint-Simon, Benjamin Constant, and 
especially Victor Cousin, Brownson became convinced that all the great spiritual systems 
sought human social equality and that the time was ripe for a “new religious institution, 
church, or organization, which shall embody the most advanced ideas and sentiments of 
the race.”36 Constant and Saint-Simon appealed not only to Brownson’s Romantic 
individuality, spirituality, and hopeful belief in collective human progress but also his 
institutional and even hierarchical tendencies. Both Constant and Saint-Simon sought a 
comprehensive reorganization of society. Saint-Simon advocated a “New Christianity,” 
social and immanent, where each person worked according to their capacity, received 
according to their need, and saw their vocation as a religious function in a social 
hierarchy unified by love.37 Constant was more influential and coherent, arguing that 
humanity possessed an undeniable religious impulse that always sought to establish 
itself in institutional forms. For Constant, history was a process of constructing, 
criticizing, destroying, and reinventing these forms, but Constant thought the religious 
impulse never disappeared and was essential to motivate social and institutional 
reinvention.38  
 Brownson, who had soured on the Working Men’s Party for its disaggregation, 
came to concur with Constant that religious sentiment was essential to animate and 
sustain large-scale social reform. Since so much democratic thinking arose in Christian 
cultures, Brownson thought to retain religion’s power to rally people for political 
sacrifice, while dispensing with outmoded, enervating doctrine. To do this, he turned to 
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Christ. “The Christian thought, as it existed in the mind of Jesus of Nazareth . . . was 
coincident with democracy . . . Liberty, equality, fraternity. . . . Here was that Christian 
democracy, as I called it, which constituted the substance of my preaching for ten or 
eleven years.”39 Throughout the 1830s, he insisted on establishing an entirely new 
society, a kingdom of heaven on earth defined not by the outmoded rituals and 
unscrupulous priests of any available church, but rather on a religious quest for a social 
and political order, thoroughly temporal, that preached both political and social equality 
as its gospel. Drawing inspiration from Shelley, Brownson stood within the radical 
Romantic critique that remained resolutely social and political.40 
 Reviewing Constant, Brownson placed himself squarely in the emerging 
Romantic epistemology theorized by Allston, Dana Sr., and Verplanck, codified by James 
Marsh, and fanned into flame by Emerson. Like Verplanck, Brownson insisted that there 
were “passions, emotions, sentiment, affections . . . [that were] as worthy of reliance as 
the understanding,” and in places he even insisted that these were “the most essential 
part of our nature” and “give to man his distinctive character.”41 Sentiment gave rise to 
humankind’s enduring religious impulse, an impulse that for Brownson included art, 
poetry, and encounters with nature; these all provided a sense of the divine.42 Sentiment 
did not just encourage and motivate rationally understood virtue; it discovered new 
truth. It was “that interior craving of our nature which keeps us forever hovering beyond 
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the horizon of what we know . . . enabl[ing] us, by conquests from the dominions of 
mystery, to enlarge the boundaries of our knowledge.”43 Like Kant’s idea of reason—
divorced from the senses but ever speculating beyond direct evidence to establish new 
scientific theories—Brownson thought the sentiments continually transgressed the 
horizon of knowledge to new, intuitive discoveries in the moral and spiritual realms. But 
this was not an enervating sentimentalism. Brownson made it clear that the point of 
defining and fostering sentiments was to “fit them for strong and beneficent action.”44 
Sentiment, not the Understanding, inspired “the reformer’s zeal” and “the martyr’s 
firmness”; the Understanding could only coldly calculate moral action based on self-
interest and could never empower the grand social regeneration that Brownson and his 
French influences sought.45 
 By 1835, Brownson had explicitly applied the Reason-versus-Understanding 
distinction to his ideas about religious sentiment and institutional forms. He claimed 
that “religion exists first in the reason” and, loosely citing Cousin’s argument that God 
and the universal religious impulse resided in the Reason, he further believed that within 
Reason arose “the idea of the holy.”46 Brownson insisted, however, that Reason’s 
religious intuitions were ineffable, subjective, and undefined because humans could only 
conceptualize through the Understanding. Thus, religion needed to “assume some form, 
an outward expression, a symbol;” throughout history these forms were inevitably 
“constructed by the understanding.”47 The Understanding was progressive, ever evolving 
its religious forms by destroying old forms and constructing new forms to conform more 
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perfectly with Reason’s ideal.48 Brownson’s application of the Reason-versus-
Understanding distinction to institutional forms bore a striking resemblance to 
Coleridge’s Romantic theory of art—where the imagination translated Reason’s insights 
into symbolic forms to be perceived by the Understanding. The difference was that 
Brownson claimed that the Understanding itself actually constructed the symbolic, 
institutional forms; he had no role for a mediating faculty like the imagination. But the 
overall point was the same: the spiritual perceptions and aspirations of Reason needed 
symbolic forms to be efficacious.49 Thus Brownson made a Romantic epistemological 
distinction to motivate his own social vision, and he attempted at this stage to shift 
Coleridgean epistemological language into the system proposed by Victor Cousin.50  
 As with Caleb Sprague Henry and George Ripley (in Chapter Eight), Victor 
Cousin’s thought struck Brownson as a potential philosophical system to ground his 
subjective, Romantic epistemology. Brownson had come to what he later called “a sort of 
philosophical sentimentalism, depending on the heart rather than the head”—an 
approach he thought exemplified by Madame de Staël, Benjamin Constant, 
Chateaubriand, and Friedrich Jacobi.51 He thought Cousin might give a more robust 
account of these “vague feelings, and vaguer notions.”52 Cousin’s theory of mind also 
attracted Brownson with its democratic potential. “Your system is perfectly adapted to us 
because it is eminently Christian and . . . democratic,” Brownson wrote to Cousin. “[It 
gives] us the element of the supernatural, and by teaching us to find it in every man 
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gives us a firm basis for our faith as Christians and as democrats.”53 Cousin’s claim to 
reconcile the history of philosophy, particularly Scottish Common Sense and German 
idealism, into a grand and religiously flexible system also proved seductive.54 
 
Everyman a Philosopher: Brownson, Cousin, and Egalitarian Epistemology 
 In 1836, Brownson summarized Cousin’s philosophy in the Unitarian Christian 
Examiner. Ostensibly Brownson’s article reviewed Henning Linberg’s American edition 
of Cousin’s Introduction to the History of Philosophy (1832), Caleb Sprague Henry’s 
American edition of Cousin’s Elements of Psychology (1834), and the second French 
edition of Cousin’s Fragments Philosophiques (1833), but Brownson mentioned Linberg 
and Henry only briefly and instead summarized Cousin in his own words. Nevertheless, 
his interpretation largely followed Henry’s. Like Henry he lauded Cousin’s method and 
the concomitant critique of Locke, he embraced all the fundamental components of 
Cousin’s psychology, he particularly lauded Cousin’s argument that one knew God 
through the spontaneous Reason, and he rejected pantheism.55 Brownson further 
appreciated Cousin’s claim that all historical philosophies emphasized different but 
equally valid aspects of human thought—realism, idealism, skepticism, and mysticism—
and he concluded in language similar to Marsh and Coleridge that “[n]o system of 
philosophy . . . will take in the whole horizon of truth.”56 But while Brownson equated 
Cousin’s spontaneous Reason with “the true light that lighteneth every man” of John 1, 
in Emersonian language he believed that “God then, is our higher, our absolute 
personality” and that Jesus was divine only in that he showed how all humans could be 
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divine.57 Also, while Brownson lauded Cousin’s psychology, he still harbored doubts that 
Cousin had found a way to pass from psychology back to ontology—from the subjective 
to the objective—where Kant had not.58  
 Brownson found Cousin’s intellectual egalitarianism most inspiring.59 As he 
wrote to Victor Cousin, “Mr. [Caleb Sprague] Henry . . . will not do much to aid the cause 
of Eclecticism, for he seeks to link it with the past both in theology and politics.”60 Just as 
James Marsh sought an egalitarian epistemology, Brownson was even more committed 
to such a principle given his social convictions. Like Marsh, Brownson sought to bridge 
the gap between intellectuals and non-intellectuals—common men and philosophers in 
Brownson's language. In this spirit, Brownson attacked an article by Harvard’s Francis 
Bowen in the Christian Examiner, where Bowen sought to defend Locke’s good sense 
and taste in the face of the newly ascendant Transcendentalism.61 “The 
Transcendentalists are used up in the last number of the Christian Examiner,” 
Brownson wrote to Emerson, “Locke’s case is desperate with such a defender, who 
ascribes him no merit but that of writing in a common sense phraseology.”62  
 Brownson accused Bowen of failing to draw the appropriate distinction between 
philosophy and common sense, always judging “the highest philosophy” as that which 
could “be comprehended at once” and by its uses to so-called “practical life.”63 Subtly 
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employing Cousin’s distinction between spontaneous reason and reflective reason, 
Brownson praised common sense for emphasizing the reliability of “the common or 
universal beliefs of mankind, the simple spontaneous beliefs of Humanity,” but he 
insisted that the philosopher delved deeper so “he can tell wherefore he believes” (89-
90). Brownson pressed an egalitarian argument seen among many of the other Cautious 
Romantics. He equated the spiritual experiences of the many with the delving of the 
most profound philosophers. Neither of these processes could be adequately explained 
by appeals to common sense. “Spiritual things are foolishness to the natural man, and 
the common sense man laughs outright at the profound words of the philosopher” (95). 
For Brownson, common sense provided knowledge to be sure, but constantly appealing 
to common sense failed to prompt readers to the individual introspection required to 
obtain “knowledge, in its higher and nobler sense, [which was] ever the mind’s own 
creation” (98). The philosopher and the non-philosopher might obtain this higher 
knowledge, but Brownson thought this process required an “inward experience,” which 
appeals to common sense did not encourage (100). 
 Brownson equated the common sense man with youthful naiveté, where, as 
Wordsworth described his own youth, life and nature were “an appetite; a feeling and a 
love, / That had no need of a remoter charm.”64 “We see no mysteries in nature, in man, 
or in God” when in youth, explained Brownson, “ . . . sun and stars are beautiful, and the 
rain-bow is pleasant. . . . Common sense satisfies curiosity, and prevents inquiry from 
becoming doubt.”65 But just as Wordsworth came to feel “the burthen of the mystery / . . 
. Of all this unintelligible world” and heard as he could not in youth “[t]he still, sad music 
of humanity,” Brownson believed that true philosophy led one beyond the 
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unproblematic, youthful relationship to the world that he claimed characterized 
confident appeals to common sense.66 “One day, one hour perhaps, never to be forgotten, 
a sudden darkness spreads over the universe,” Brownson observed. He unknowingly 
spoke for Allston’s, Verplanck’s, and Richard Henry Dana Sr.’s experience: “Friends drop 
away; we stand among the dead, by the graves of those we loved, surrounded by ghosts of 
affections unrequited, hopes blasted, joys cut short, plans defeated; and—there are 
mysteries.”67 While Frederic Henry Hedge could reject Marsh’s and Coleridge’s appeal to 
mystery as nonsense, Brownson proved quite favorably disposed to the idea. Like Marsh, 
with his “harrowing doubts and maddening skepticisms,” Coleridge in his “delving and 
difficulty,” and Pascal lost in the universe and filled with “dread” at “the eternal silence 
of these infinite spaces,” Brownson insisted that at these moments “in tumult of soul, 
perplexity of mind, and sorrow of heart, we find ourselves standing face to face with the 
dread Unknown.”68 Feeling the “awful Mystery of the Universe is round, about, and 
within us,” we strain, recollect, compare, and reflect “till we obtain the word of the 
universe—God. Then the darkness rolls back . . . conviction supplies the place of lost 
faith. . . . We are no longer in the trustingness of common sense. We have become 
philosophers.”69 Brownson’s Romantic tirade against common sense exemplified the 
common accusation seen among the Cautious Romantics and Transcendentalists. 
Embracing Cousin, Brownson’s epistemology had a great deal in common with Reid and 
Stewart, but his complaint in this passage was that the safe, confident appeals to 
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philosophical common sense vitiated spiritual experience and insufficiently attended to 
human emotional needs.   
 Brownson insisted that any person might go through this spiritual-philosophical 
process, and he also argued that the alleged demand for common sense philosophy did 
not take account of human spiritual experience. To be prepared for the profoundest 
philosophy, one need only “have sorrowed before the Mystery of the Universe, and . . . 
these are not seldomest found in that mighty multitude, on whom we often look down, 
from our high places, in pity or in scorn. We shall, if we seek, often find those who have 
the inward experience required, among those who have been to no school but Nature’s, 
and had no instructors but the internal whisperings of God’s Spirit” (99-100). Building 
on Cousin, Brownson directly attributed this experience to the spontaneous Reason (100, 
102-103). Like Coleridge’s and Allston’s theory of the creative imagination—possessed 
specially by artists to translate the insights of reason to the primary imagination of all—
Brownson insisted that the philosopher’s role was to explain and verify the intuitive 
insights of the spontaneous Reason but that everyone possessed the capacity to enjoy 
these insights. However, Brownson’s point applied to philosophy, Coleridge’s and 
Allston’s pertained to aesthetics, and Brownson was more egalitarian, emphasizing 
philosophers as more passive verifiers of common insights rather than Coleridge’s and 
Allston’s artistic revelators.70   
 Brownson attacked the Lockean notion of a mental tabula rasa as fundamentally 
elitist, claiming that it rendered intellectuals, who had greater capacity for reflection, 
always the teachers of the lowly masses but never instructed by them (101). His class 
consciousness on full display, Brownson insisted that Lockean philosophy accounted for 
why half of the educated classes in America simply snubbed the masses with contempt, 
                                                   
 70 Brownson would attribute artistic inspiration to the spontaneous Reason (discussed later). 
  
357 
and the other half engaged in “great condescension, and vast amount of baby-talk, which 
equally characterize another, but more kind-hearted, portion of the more favored 
classes” (101). Brownson, like Cousin, did not formally reject Scottish Common Sense 
philosophy; he insisted that “the reflective reason has with us legitimated the teachings 
of the spontaneous reason, legitimated common sense” (103). But Brownson thought the 
incessant appeal to a neat and clearly articulatable common sense reason simultaneously 
vitiated both the inarticulate spiritual experiences of common people and the allegedly 
deeper discoveries of the most profound philosophers such as Kant or Cousin. Brownson 
alleged that the easy-going confidence that intellectuals reflected in their devotion to 
Lockean philosophy served only to reinforce those who would “separate themselves from 
the masses,” whereas the more profound philosophy of Cousin and the humility that it 
demanded would “bring them back, and bind them again to universal Humanity” (103-
104). 
 This new philosophy, Brownson thought, served as a rallying cry for democracy 
and the intellectual’s role in the grand political changes that were sweeping the Western 
world. 
True and holy for us then are the instincts of the masses. . . . We stand in awe of them, and 
apply ourselves to the work of enabling them to march to the glorious destiny God hath 
appointed them, and to which his own hand is leading them. . . . ‘Fall into their ranks . . . a 
Divine Instinct guides and moves onward that heaving and rolling mass; and lawless and 
destructive as it may seem to you, ye onlookers, it is normal and holy, pursuing a straight 
and harmless direction on to the union of Man and God.’ So answers philosophy, and this 
is its glory.71 
 
Brownson thought that justice—which he alleged consisted of both social and political 
equality—required the intellectual to enlist philosophy in support of the great democratic 
cause of the times. He thought that intellectuals could serve that cause by “prov[ing] to 
these conservatives, who are frightened almost out of their wits . . . that these 
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movements are from God, and that they, who war against them are warring against 
truth, duty, God, and Humanity” (105). Thus, Brownson gave the intellectual an 
important vocation. Rather than guide the development of Reason as Marsh and Cousin 
had advocated, Brownson thought that the intellectual vindicated the great democratic 
cause of the people. To conclude his article, Brownson insisted that his philosophy made 
democratic sympathizers such as himself “no longer . . . obliged to make apologies for 
their devotion to the masses, their democratic sympathies and tendencies” (105).  
 But while Brownson pressed the egalitarian potential of Cousin’s philosophy, he 
also wrestled with the tension between the ubiquitous spontaneous Reason and the 
reflective reason of philosophers. He concluded his first article on Cousin’s philosophy 
lauding philosophers such as Socrates and Plato as particularly illuminating to the 
human race.72 While in the spiritual, moral, and in some sense intellectual realm 
Brownson granted the insights of Reason to all, in the political realm he was less trusting 
of the unfettered masses. In his above-quoted celebration of democracy’s onward march 
he appealed to the learned to “enable” the masses in their glorious cause. His early Free 
Thought educational schemes were undoubtedly authoritarian, and in 1834, while 
defending Saint-Simon he let slip a fairly elitist sentiment that had emerged from his 
earnest desire to ameliorate social injustice: “He who labors for the industrious classes 
does nobly but he must not expect to be very readily comprehended nor very cordially 
thanked.”73 By 1838, he was carefully distinguishing between the sovereignty of the 
people and democracy, arguing that the constitution and rule of law were necessary to 
check the tyranny of the majority, demagoguery, and the corrosive influence of party 
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fever.74 According to Brownson, the masses were rightly part of “a powerful movement . . 
. toward a better social condition,” but “they go, perhaps, where they ought to go, but 
they go blindly, without legitimating or being able to legitimate their course” (271). He 
concluded that in politics at least, the need for authority was a part of human nature: 
“There must be a sovereign; we feel that there is somewhere an authority we are bound 
to obey” (282). But what or who was sovereign? At this stage Brownson was still content 
with vague assertions that Justice—given by God and written on the conscience—was 
sovereign, that democracy was the ideal form of government, and that through education 
the body politic could come to understand and apply the principles of justice properly 
(282-285, 299). But in his concluding remarks the tension in his impulses emerged. “We 
would think with the radical, but often act with the conservative” (299). In truth, 
Brownson’s thought had always been only partially radical, and it would not be long 
before he would declare himself a conservative. Moreover, his authoritarianism would 
eventually inform his philosophical and theological perspective as well. 
 
Brownson, Bancroft, Cousin, and Transatlantic Authority 
 In applying Cousin’s philosophy to democratic politics, Brownson spoke for 
himself and his friend George Bancroft, who were two of the only intellectuals to enlist 
their minds and pens in the overt service of the Democratic Party. The party’s often anti-
intellectual rhetoric, which dated back to Andrew Jackson, tended to alienate many 
intellectuals from directly supporting them, especially in Boston. In 1836, Bancroft wrote 
Brownson that he was “indebted” for Brownson’s support when Bancroft’s own recent 
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pro-democracy oration had met with “such bitter and long continued assaults.”75 For 
several years, Bancroft purveyed ideas that were similar to those of Brownson in his 
speeches “The Office of the People in Art, Government, and Religion” (1835) and his 
Oration Delivered Before the Democracy of Springfield (1836). Bancroft published the 
latter oration but seems to have waited until later to publish the former; thus his 
comment to Brownson related to the latter address. “A thorough-paced radical oration,” 
one reviewer labeled the Springfield speech, “[we] pronounce it a vigorous, ingenious, 
sophistical, sycophantic, abusive, partisan harangue.”76 The remark, though undoubtedly 
penned by a biased Whig, was not entirely off the mark. Bancroft, though very learned, 
had a habit of enlisting his vast knowledge to support his abstract belief in the progress 
of democracy and the reliability of “the people” collectively. As a result, he tended to 
paint in broad strokes, papering over subtleties in religious and intellectual history, and 
though he invoked Cousin, Coleridge, and German idealism, he often did so superficially 
to support his own political philosophy.77 Though always friendly with Bancroft and 
sympathetic to his overall democratic project, Brownson found Bancroft lacking just 
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such religious and philosophical nuance in 1841 when Brownson reviewed Bancroft’s 
condensed two-volume version of his larger three-volume History of the United States. 
Among other things, he thought Bancroft overemphasized Puritan democratic 
tendencies, understated the supernaturalism involved in the Quaker’s view of the Inner 
Light, and erroneously claimed that religious elites prosecuted the Salem Witch Trials 
without the support of the people.78 
 Together Bancroft and Brownson began to establish transatlantic ties with 
Cousin and French Eclecticism. As Brownson wrote to Cousin, “Philosophers are not 
separated by the artificial boundaries of nations.”79 Brownson sent Emerson’s published 
work to Cousin as well as copies of his own Review, assuring Cousin that he would “make 
[The Boston Quarterly Review] the organ of the New School on this side of the Atlantic” 
and that “the democratic or dominant party” would soon embrace such a congenial 
epistemology.80 Even after his conversion to Catholicism in 1844, Brownson continued to 
write to Cousin, carefully explaining why and how he had altered Cousin’s philosophy. 
Bancroft sent Cousin copies of his History of the United States (1834, 1837) and the 
works of Jonathan Edwards—likely eager to link Edwards’s ideas about Providence and 
the grand history of redemption with Bancroft’s and Cousin’s progressive philosophy of 
history.81 When Bancroft served as ambassador to Great Britain between 1846 and 1849, 
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he visited Cousin multiple times, discussing politics and referring to him as “my dear 
philosopher.”82 
 But while Bancroft’s wealth and connections made him a physical participant in 
the transmigration of Romantic philosophy and democratic theory, Brownson’s 
relationship to Cousin revealed the way that the Atlantic functioned as a boundary for 
intellectual authority as well as a conduit for ideas and culture. Cousin thought 
Brownson “a philosophical writer of the first order” and invited Brownson to live with 
him for a time in Paris, but Brownson with limited means and a large family could not 
indulge such a generous offer.83 Of this unfortunate limitation, Alexander Hill Everett, a 
former editor of the North American Review and brother to Edward Everett, lamented 
to Brownson: 
I have always regretted that circumstances did not permit you to accept Mr. Cousin’s 
invitation to go and live with him at Paris. A residence in his family for a year or two would 
have been, on all accounts, both agreeable and useful, and would have given you 
importance with our wise public who, in general, can only see American merit through 
European spectacles.84 
 
The well-heeled and well-connected Everett had been John Qunicy Adams’s secretary in 
Russia, had worked for many years as the American ambassador to the Netherlands, and 
was ambassador to Spain during Adams’s presidency. He knew full well that living in 
Europe secured him an intellectual authority that he could not have obtained otherwise. 
Indeed, Everett’s brother Edward had been chosen to edit the North American Review 
immediately after returning from studies in Germany despite Richard Henry Dana Sr.’s 
intellectual ability and position as a possible heir apparent. Edward also demonstrated 
the intellectual importance of transatlantic formation when he thought that only 
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someone who had actually been to Europe could have written James Marsh’s “Ancient 
and Modern Poetry.” As the devout, liberal, and vigorously cosmopolitian Catholic 
Englishman, Lord John Acton, later explained to Brownson while trying to coax him to 
Great Britain: “books travel very slowly, with a few exceptions, from nation to nation; 
and there are many good things which wise men keep to themselves . . . and that one 
gathers in conversation.”85 According to Everett and Acton, no amount of reading could 
substitute for transatlantic travel and formation. 
 Like Marsh and Dana Sr., who regretted that their limited circumstances kept 
them from traversing the Atlantic, Brownson remained all too aware of his limited 
intellectual training.86 Despite great verve and philosophical insight in his exchanges 
with Cousin, Brownson confessed a “natural diffidence . . . to obtrude myself upon . . . 
those who stand high in the world’s estimation.”87 Brownson’s diffidence was anything 
but natural, as one searches in vain for it in any of his other writings. The sense of his 
own lack of cosmopolitan polish became even more pronounced some ten years later 
when he wrote to John Henry Newman to decline an offer for a professorship at the new 
Catholic university in Dublin. “I have neither the manners nor the learning you have a 
right to demand in a University lecturer. I am a plain, untutored backwoodsman, wholly 
overrated both as to my talents and as to my acquisitions in both your country and my 
own.”88 Of course, there were other legitimate reasons for refusing the appointment such 
as the expense and Brownson’s large family. Brownson provided these excuses as well, 
and they would have been more than sufficient to politely excuse himself from Newman’s 
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gracious offer without causing offense. That Brownson volunteered the personal 
confession he did suggests that his self-deprecation vis-à-vis his limited intellectual 
formation was genuine. 
 
The Laboring Classes: Apogee and Eclipse of a Would Be Radical Vision 
 Between 1836 and 1840, Brownson continued to apply his social and political 
outlook to his literary criticism and to his philosophy. Though he had begun to 
distinguish between popular sovereignty and the rule of democratic law, and though he 
frequently experimented with institutional and even authoritarian themes in his 
writings, he remained a vocal member of the Democratic Party and a vocal supporter of 
broadly democratic principles. “I took in regard to society, even as late as 1840, the 
Democratic premises as true and unquestionable,” Brownson later explained.89 When 
evaluating Emerson’s American Scholar (1837), Brownson wished that Emerson were 
“more fully warmed with the great social idea of our era . . . which he has hinted at . . . of 
human brotherhood, of sonship to God.”90 When evaluating Wordsworth, Brownson 
employed a rather impoverished poetic aesthetic, claiming that the highest poetry would 
always be popular because the poetic faculty—both for production and reception—was 
the divine, spontaneous Reason possessed by all and exercised specially by the poetic 
genius.91 Using Cousin’s spontaneous reason, Brownson embraced a similar poetic 
theory to that of Allston, Dana Sr., and Coleridge, but Brownson emphasized the 
egalitarian aspects of the theory rather than the emphasis on individual genius. For 
Brownson, since the poet’s inspirations came from the spontaneous Reason possessed by 
                                                   
89 Brownson, The Convert; or, Leaves from My Experience, 253. 
 90 Orestes Brownson, “An Oration Delivered before the Phi Beta Kappa Society, at Cambridge, 
August 31, 1837,” The Boston Quarterly Review 1, no. 1 (January 1838): 107. 
 91 Brownson, “The Poetical Works of William Wordsworth,” 149–150. 
  
365 
all, the people could sit in judgment of the works of genius.92 Practicing geniuses like 
Allston and Coleridge would never accept this pandering to popular taste. Moreover, 
Brownson joined William Hazlitt in faulting Wordsworth for abandoning the French 
Revolution and for his high Toryism that praised common people just so long as they 
remained in their social place, though, as we have seen, one could find evidence to 
convict Brownson of praising the common man for conservative purposes.93 Instead of 
Wordsworth, Brownson preferred William Cullen Bryant—Dana Sr.’s and Caleb Sprague 
Henry’s friend—[a]s the poet of “external nature.”94 Perhaps it was only a coincidence 
that Bryant edited the democratic New-York Evening Post and that in the 1830s he had 
endorsed Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren’s presidential campaigns.  
 Brownson threw in his lot with the official Democratic Party as the best organ for 
realizing his egalitarian vision. But by the early 1840s he began to move from doubt to 
complete disillusionment as to the goals of American electoral politics. Political equality 
had been established for white males, and he harbored sneaking suspicions that the 
Democratic Party was more interested in maintaining political power than in furthering 
the necessary corollary of political equality: social equality. Fearing the party’s 
unwillingness to live up to its alleged social goals, Brownson did what he was wont to do 
throughout his life: he provoked everyone within earshot. In July of 1840, in the heat of 
the Log Cabin Campaign, Brownson launched a proto-Marxist screed against the entire 
political establishment in the form of two articles entitled “Chartism” and “The Laboring 
Classes,” which came to be known by the latter name. 
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 “The Laboring Classes” took aim at the entire capitalist order. With both deft jabs 
and lumbering blows, Brownson hit antebellum America with many of the criticisms 
popularized eight years later in the Communist Manifesto (1848). He lambasted 
capitalists who used wage labor “as a device of the devil for the benefit of tender 
consciences . . . [to avoid] the expense trouble and odium of being slave holders.”95 He 
criticized middle-class marriage for being mercenary and the middle class generally for 
embracing equality only when attacking aristocrats. Reforming educators came in for 
scorn for suggesting that teaching children Greek and Latin would make them “require 
less food and less clothing.”96 And Brownson continued a variation on one of his favorite 
themes to date, that the priests “were always in league with the people’s masters.”97 Most 
provocatively, Brownson advocated the abolition of all inheritance as the only logical 
conclusion to the democratic ideals supposedly embraced by most Americans.98 
Inheritance gave a grossly unfair advantage to the sons of the wealthy, perpetuating a 
systemic inequality that no amount of political suffrage, free trade, or universal 
education and religious culture could overcome.99 Brownson’s heroic intellectual 
independence surprised Emerson, who suggested to Margaret Fuller that he had 
misjudged Brownson based on the latter’s “old views” and that if Brownson would “wash 
himself,” then he should write for The Dial.100 William Cullen Bryant reviewed the article 
favorably, but in general Brownson provoked an uproar. The Whigs—including Horace 
Greeley and John Quincy Adams—gladly attacked, and most Democrats distanced 
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themselves.101 Thus, Brownson was left muttering to himself: “Be Democrats socially, or 
do not claim to be so politically.”102 
 But Brownson’s latent conservative impulses were on display as well, despite the 
prima facie Marxist analysis. He did not advocate the destruction of private property, 
nor did he outline Marx’s vision of an industrial, collective society. Instead, for all 
Brownson’s radicalism he seemed to look to the past. His most radical proposal to 
abolish inheritance was meant to ensure that “all shall be proprietors,” each individual 
combining the functions of labor and capital through equal access to private property.103 
His model was the “agricultural population [that] combines the proprietor and laborer in 
the same individual” (467). Brownson thought that among farmers even hired hands did 
not work harder than those who hired them—with the exception of the gentleman 
farmers whom he criticized—and that all farmers were of the same basic class; they 
dressed, acted, interacted, and were educated alike. For Brownson the key was sweat 
equity: “where the man who owns the plough holds it, there can be no great disparity 
between the employer and employed” (472).  
 Brownson’s notion of property was linked to another distinguishing feature from 
Marx: religion. For one thing, Brownson thought God had given man an “original, innate 
sense of property” (484). Furthermore, Brownson saw his renovation of society as 
religious, and he had argued previously that religious sentiment was critical in 
motivating large-scale social reform. Thus he sought a union of Church and State, rather 
than to give quarter to Marx’s later argument that religion should be abolished. “Our 
views, if carried out,” declared Brownson, “would realize not a union, but the unity, the 
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identity, of Church and State . . . transferring to the State the moral ideas on which the 
Church was professedly founded” (437). He compared his vision to the Puritans’ attempt 
to establish a Christian commonwealth, though he saw his new society as “free from 
[Puritan] theological phraseology” (437). Modestly theocratic, his vision seemed to 
assume large-scale participation in religion—though he did not clearly argue for this—
but his vision of this new American religion was egalitarian and free from many of the 
vices of an actual theocracy. He admired the Quakers, he thought that all should be able 
to speak or preach as led by the Holy Spirit, and he sought to abolish a paid clergy in all 
of its forms (439-459). There would be no priestly class and certainly not one in league 
with capital. Instead, like Christ’s early disciples who were fisherman and St. Paul’s dual 
vocation as a tent-maker missionary, all those who provided religious instruction in 
Brownson’s society would do so bi-vocationally and make their living by the sweat of 
their brow. 
 Brownson’s concern that political democracy should result in social equality and 
justice dominated his thinking throughout 1841. He thought that the 1840 election, 
which sent the Whig candidate William Henry Harrison to the White House, illustrated 
the extent to which political democracy was now thoroughly entrenched, as “[t]he whig 
party ha[d] come into power pretending to be democratic.”104 The Whigs would have to 
govern democratically, or the people would just as soon remove them from office again. 
But Brownson advanced a thoroughly socio-economic perspective on democratic politics: 
the true distinctions were not between Whigs and Democrats, but between capital and 
labor, property and work. Brownson insisted that the Constitution and all the grand 
political language of “Equal Rights” sought ultimately to “secure to the workingman a 
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greater share of the proceeds of his labor,” that the Democrats likely lost the election for 
losing sight of this principle, and that the new Whig administration should be evaluated 
primarily on this basis.105 Throughout 1841 Brownson produced variations on this theme, 
praising the historic Workingmen’s Party and later the Locofocos for distinguishing 
between social democracy and political democracy, criticizing factory owners and society 
generally for stigmatizing “factory girls,” and continuing to elaborate his argument that 
the trajectory of the American Revolution was toward social as well as political 
equality.106  
 
Communion to Christ: Orestes Brownson’s Conservative Religious Turn 
 Throughout his career Brownson had dialectically woven together democratic 
politics, social consciousness, and philosophical theology—theorizing in each sphere and 
attempting to unify them. Brownson found Cousin compelling for his ability to unify 
these three spheres, but as political democracy seemed to hold out less hope for social 
equality, Brownson’s thinking began to shift again as he turned back to philosophical 
theology for insight. “I have worn out the best part of my life in divising [sic] schemes of 
world-reform,” he wrote to Emerson, “And so far as I am concerned to no purpose. I am 
disposed very much to withdraw into myself and confine myself to the discovery if 
possible of the great truth of philosophy and History.”107 Brownson’s continuing 
obsession in philosophy, which continued throughout the early 1840s, was how, given 
the strongly subjective orientation of both Cousin’s and Kant’s epistemology, one could 
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trust their knowledge about the objective world. Kant had simply chosen to maintain the 
mind’s inability to directly access things in themselves, and Cousin had tried to counter 
Locke, not by faulting Locke’s emphasis on human psychology, but by accusing him of 
failing to enumerate all the ideas of the mind before analyzing them. 
 But what if starting with the individual mind was itself an erroneous method? 
Prompted by his fundamentally social concerns and another French thinker, Pierre 
Leroux, Brownson altered his philosophical orientation, replacing the psychologism of 
Cousin and Kant with Leroux’s doctrine of communion.108 Instead of beginning with the 
epistemology of an individual mind, Leroux maintained that the individual human was 
indissolubly social and that relations to nature and particularly other humans 
fundamentally defined the self.109 This was more a matter of emphasis than a technical 
difference from Cousin; Cousin—as we have seen in Chapter Eight—articulated the 
distinction between the self, the not-self, and the relation between the two as present at 
every moment of consciousness. Leroux built on Cousin’s construct by de-emphasizing 
the self and emphasizing the relationship between the self and not-self. In fact, Leroux 
shifted the discussion away from epistemology entirely and toward action and life, 
though his epistemology still cohered with Cousin.  
 What Brownson took away from Leroux was that “man lives and can live only by 
communion with what is not himself.”110 All human consciousness and its potential for 
growth was inextricably connected with others. Brownson explained it to Cousin thusly: 
“I find the point of departure of philosophy in the indissoluble synthesis of subject and 
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object. . . . [I] therefore seek to study the subject in studying the object, or rather what by 
means of the object it feels, knows, and does. Hence, I am synthetic rather than 
eclectic.”111 In one sense, Brownson’s and Leroux’s position invoked the self-evident 
connection between the mind and matter of Scottish Common Sense, but their de-
emphasizing psychology set them apart from the Scots. Instead, their emphasis on the 
dynamic relationship between nature—including other persons—and the human subject 
resembled much more closely Wordsworth’s and Coleridge’s Romantic theory of the 
dynamic relationship between the poet and nature, where both subject and object were 
mutually illuminating. For Leroux and Brownson, personal identity was indissolubly—
though not indistinguishably—bound up with others, a point the Scots did not explicitly 
emphasize. Moreover, Leroux’s emphasis on the social aspect of experience fired 
Brownson’s always socially-minded consciousness. In this new vein, philosophy for 
Brownson became not primarily an epistemology but a “science of life” and action.112 
Though James Marsh emphasized epistemology, he also concluded that the ultimate 
bellwether of philosophy was whether or not it led to a compelling life.113 
 Brownson’s belief in life by communion led him to embrace orthodox 
Christianity, particularly the incarnation of God in Christ and its accompanying 
Trinitarianism. He worked out his argument in The Mediatorial Life of Jesus (1842), a 
published, open letter to William Ellery Channing in which Brownson reasoned his way 
away from the Transcendentalist faith in the divinity of humanity. In the text, Brownson 
tried to explain communion, “the great principle that underlies the whole.”114 He argued 
that Leroux’s idea of communion—that individual identity was fundamentally and 
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inextricably intertwined with others—made sense of Brownson’s own experience and of 
human history: sin was a powerful force that had corrupted human nature (197-202). 
For Brownson, the idea that human identity was fundamentally bound up with others 
explained why the social problems he had identified were so systemic and why any sort 
of reform on the grandiose scale of Brownson’s social vision was so difficult. “The life of 
each man is indissolubly in himself and in all other men. The injury done to the life of 
one man is an injury done to the life of all men” (210). Prompted by his deep social 
concerns, Brownson’s conviction about human corruption was personal and affective. “I 
see mankind practically divided, worrying and devouring each other, and my heart 
bleeds at the wrong they do each other,” he lamented (216). The pathos in Brownson’s 
declaration marked an important shift in his thinking.  
 While he had always bemoaned human oppression and often done so in spiritual 
terms, he thought previously that the selfishness that led to such oppression was merely 
on the surface of human nature; deep down humans possessed a sense of duty, self-
denial, and sacrifice that could be appealed to.115 Rousing the soul to its divine potential 
required fiery preaching and spiritual regeneration, but human corruption was not 
insurmountable in principle. But now, armed with the doctrine of communion, 
Brownson thought he understood why the social and individual evil he encountered was 
so pervasive and intractable. With the introduction of evil into the world, the infection 
ran rampant, since human identity was indissolubly bound up with others. He rejected 
the idea that with Adam’s sin God imputed original sin to the human race or the idea 
that original sin was genetically propagated, but he now embraced the traditional 
Christian account of pervasive, human depravity.116 Throughout history, sin had 
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ingrained itself as a mighty force in all human consciousness as humans communed with 
each other, passing on this disease of the soul. Brownson thus fused traditional Christian 
notions of depravity with Leroux’s doctrine of communion.  
 He now questioned human ability to transcend ingrained evil—both individual 
and social—without more orthodox theories of supernatural salvation by an intervening 
God. Like the other Cautious Romantics, his supernaturalism was partially personal. As 
Brownson looked within, he found himself “too conscious of our own weakness and 
unworthiness” (198). He insisted that since all humans lived in communion with one 
another, humans could never fully regain their communion with the divine and with 
each other “unless the current [of evil] were arrested and rolled back by some foreign 
power” (201). Arresting this current required a mediator, but according to Brownson’s 
logic this mediator needed to stand above the organic corruption that had infected all of 
humanity through communion and yet be human enough to redeem it through 
communion. Brownson’s train of thought thus led him to the orthodox, historical Jesus, 
“in no over-strained, refined sense, but all simply and literally, as the most simple-
minded must understand [it]” (206). Jesus communed directly with his disciples, 
inaugurating restored communion between the human and the divine, and uniting 
individual humans in “intimate relation . . . in the unity of one and the same life” (210). 
Brownson concluded that Christ’s life, organically assimilated by individual human 
beings communing with one another throughout history, held the key to reconciling 
humanity itself.117  
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 In his social, organic account of the historical Jesus, Brownson applied the 
common Romantic celebration of organicism to the question of human depravity, which 
had been bedeviling orthodox Americans throughout the early nineteenth century.118 
Brownson insisted that the life of Christ was an “indwelling seed,” whose germination 
gradually perfected human nature as it passed between individuals in communion with 
one another.119 From Christ’s encounter with his disciples to the present time, a gradual 
purification of the human race had commenced and historically spread. He rejected both 
William Ellery Channing’s view that human nature had always been divine and therefore 
only in need of Christ as a divine exemplar, but he also rejected “now what the church 
generally affirms”: that humankind was “inherently and totally depraved.”120 Instead, 
Brownson thought that human nature had been embarked on a gradual, progressive 
perfection through the centuries. Thus he found the Transcendentalists’ celebration of 
humanity’s divine qualities warranted but not for the reasons they asserted. Human 
nature stood grand and glorious precisely because the historical Christ had begun 
remaking it as such. Brownson thus applied the progressive social optimism of his earlier 
writing to his newfound, conservative Christianity. Like the other Cautious Romantics, 
Brownson painted a dark picture of human corruption, but he, like them, refused to 
grant this corruption an all-pervasive power, at least since the time of Christ.121 
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 Brownson’s newfound Christianity struck Richard Henry Dana Sr. who wrote 
Caleb Sprague Henry to ask what he thought of it. “B— says  good things,” Dana Sr. 
remarked, but he thought Brownson’s thinking rather grand and not carefully thought 
out. In particular, Dana thought Brownson’s application of the organic social principle to 
the physical church misguided. Perhaps sniffing out Brownson’s future Catholicism, the 
tender-hearted father Dana took a more spiritual approach. “Brownson’s application of 
[the organic social principle] theologically makes this half truth a substitute for a deeper 
truth—the inflowing of the father’s spirituous nature and character into the child, and 
that of Christ’s into his church and all its members independent of the formative 
influence . . . of an object.”122 Dana’s Trinitarian Christianity, prompted by his wife’s 
death, also grew from his emotional attachments as a parent, much as Coleridge’s had. It 
was their marvel at the mysterious communication of a parent’s self to a child that drew 
them to their affective Trinitarianism. Dana then echoed a common criticism of 
Brownson, “that when he was made it was forgotten to give him a heart,” suggesting that 
Brownson’s incessant philosophizing undermined his attention to the emotional 
components of faith.123 Nevertheless, Brownson was now on a path that moved him 
toward the other Cautious Romantics, and in fact Dana Sr. was quite mistaken about the 
state of Brownson’s heart. 
 Brownson’s shift to embracing Leroux and eventually orthodox Christianity also 
involved a spiritual experience, a kind of fundamental personal revelation of God’s 
absolute freedom. If God was God, he could not be an impersonal providence, force, or 
fate, identical to the laws of nature or inexorably controlling human destiny like the 
Greek Moirai; God could exercise agency over his creation if he so desired. Brownson 
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accused Unitarians and Transcendentalists of not sufficiently understanding this 
principle, but his assertion also marked a break from Cousin. Cousin’s theology insisted 
both that God created the universe necessarily and—roughly following Hegel—that an 
all-pervading God had been manifested through human history.124 Brownson particularly 
objected to this second doctrine: “when you deduce history from the spontaneous 
Reason, and identify the spontaneous reason with the Logos, and the Logos with God, I 
am unable to find any principle in History but the Divinity, which has quite too strong a 
look towards pantheism.”125 Cousin had given him a definition of spontaneous Reason, 
which Brownson would continue to employ, but as he informed Cousin, “a more 
thorough study of the Fathers” led Brownson to Trinitarian Christianity.126  
 Brownson’s perspective contained a strong emotional component. Part of his 
concern that God was not “a resistless fate, an iron necessity” came not only out of the 
common Romantic obsession with the free will problem—seen in Kant and Marsh—but 
also out of the need for “a kind and merciful Father, who hears when his children cry, 
and is ready, able, and willing to supply all their wants.”127 Attending to Brownson’s 
emotional perspective makes some sense of his grandiose claims for Leroux’s doctrine of 
communion. Brownson brazenly insisted that “I am now able to solve several problems 
which have troubled other and greater minds than mine,” namely the doctrine of 
depravity, redemption through Christ, and Christ’s human and divine nature.128 
 Brownson’s intellectual career was undoubtedly creative and synthetic in his 
attempts to reconcile various authors and ideas, but he seemed to quest after intellectual 
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authority in a particularly fierce way. William Ellery Channing, Cousin, and Leroux each 
enjoyed stints as Brownson’s seminal and highly lauded influences. When Leroux 
superseded Channing, Brownson felt inclined to carefully thank Channing while 
explaining how Leroux differed from him. As Brownson explained, Channing had taught 
Brownson of his likeness to God, which for Brownson was one of the most profound 
moments of his life. “I listened as one enchanted . . . To me this was much. I had never 
known an earthly father, and often had I wept when I had heard, in my boyhood, my 
playmates, one after another, say, ‘my father.’ But now, lone and deserted as I had felt 
myself, I too had become a son, and could look up and say, ‘my father.’”129 He not only 
thanked Channing for this insight, but also declared in no uncertain terms of Channing: 
“You, sir, have been my spiritual father.”130 Though the tough-minded Yankee in 
Brownson defied simplistic psychoanalytic appeals to a disrupted childhood, there was 
something of the fatherless child present in Brownson’s theory of God and constant 
questing for intellectual authority. 
 
Unity in Diversity and the Christian Trinity 
 The fundamental question for Brownson, and indeed for the Romantic Age, was 
how to properly conceive, articulate, and live out the simultaneous experience of unity in 
diversity; the quest for unity seemed to lead to boundless diversity, and the experience of 
boundless diversity inspired belief in an underlying unity in the universe. This impulse 
drove philosophy, art, and science. It could be found in Kant’s categories of Quantity, 
Schelling’s System of Transcendental Idealism (1800), Allston’s pursuit of the vellatura 
technique, and Alexander von Humboldt’s, Sir John Herschel’s, and Mary Somerville’s 
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scientific endeavors.131 Caleb Sprague Henry had ventured an explanation of the 
Christian Trinity based on Cousin’s epistemology, but Leroux prompted Brownson to a 
similar attempt. Only then did Brownson return to Cousin’s spontaneous Reason.  
 Leroux’s doctrine of communion—that the beginning of existence and therefore 
thinking was relationship—inspired Brownson’s answer to the unity and diversity of the 
human race, which he worked out both with and in opposition to the Transcendentalists. 
At times he criticized Emerson, claiming Emerson overemphasized the transcendental 
soul’s oneness with the universe, eliminating the diversity of the individual.132 But 
Brownson also thought Emerson an inspired seer whose literary visions should be 
praised for “the life they kindle up within us.”133 Though Brownson thought Emerson’s 
philosophy likely in error, he also recognized that it inspired a compelling life. Thus, 
when Brownson embraced his newfound doctrine of communion, he thought perhaps he 
and Emerson had travelled different routes to arrive at the same destination: the science 
of life. In November, 1843, after his conversion to orthodox Christianity and a few 
months prior to his entering the Catholic Church, Brownson wrote Emerson a long, 
discursive letter, desperately wanting to speak with Emerson and work through his new 
ideas: 
[W]ithout a true Science of Life, psychology is unexplainable. If this be so, modern 
philosophy is on a wrong track, pursuing a false method, and can arrive at no solid 
[conclusions]. We must then have it, and resume the method of the older philosophies, 
and seek not to explain merely the phenomena of our own souls, but Life itself. . . . I have 
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suspected that I may possibly have misinterpreted you, in consequence of my attachment 
to psychology, and that I have done you injustice in consequence of having judged you 
from a wrong point of view. Has not my misunderstanding come from the fact that the 
problem with you is, What is Life? While with me it has been how do we, or how can we, 
know What is Life? . . . I discern more and more significance in many of your own sayings 
and writings. I may at times, in my criticisms on your writing have done you wrong. If so, 
forgive me . . . 134 
 
In Brownson’s account, he had been more carefully pursuing how humans have 
knowledge, whereas Emerson, while invoking Romantic Reason, did so always with a 
view toward how Reason’s insights inspired a compelling life. For Brownson, this life 
now meant the constant recognition that all life and all human experience came through 
communion. 
 Embracing orthodox Christianity led Brownson to eventually synthesize his 
doctrine of communion with his earlier epistemological concerns, as he now interpreted 
human Reason through the lens of communion. “Human reason is the likeness in man of 
the divine reason, and hence, nothing hinders intercommunion between the reason of 
God and the reason of man.”135 And what was God’s reason? Brownson answered: Jesus 
Christ, a human life no less than “the Logos, or divine reason of St. John, which 
enlighteneth every man that cometh into the world.”136 Though he could no longer affirm 
Cousin’s starting point (psychology), he combined Cousin’s definition of the spontaneous 
Reason with the Romantic Trinitarian theology common to Coleridge, Allston, Dana Sr., 
Marsh, and Henry. Brownson insisted the Logos or divine Reason was “the inner light of 
the Quakers . . . it is the supernatural inspiration we contended for under the name of 
spontaneous reason—that is, the spontaneous activity of reason as the Logos or Word of 
God,” and he lauded the new discussions of Weltgeist (World Spirit) in Germany, 
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France, and America that he thought were helping to reestablish the understanding of 
the Logos in theology.137 But according to Brownson, the Word became flesh in Jesus, 
who both revealed the Trinity and granted the Holy Spirit to sustain his followers.  
 Brownson’s newfound belief in Christ the Logos and his organic work in history 
gave him a conviction in the elusive Christian doctrine of the Trinity. Just as the 
communion of object and subject and the organic relation between them helped 
Brownson and Leroux characterize unity and diversity in historical human relations, so 
Brownson thought that the philosophical commitment to unity in diversity authorized 
rational assent to the Christian Trinity. “We may contemplate the object under the 
several points of view of Plurality, Unity, and Synthesis,” explained Brownson.138 An 
exclusive characterization of life as plurality would yield either polytheism (myriad, 
distinct gods) or atheism (a given diversity of things without a unifying first cause, 
sustaining cause, or underlying meaning in the universe). Conversely, an exclusive 
emphasis on unity would yield pantheism, with all things ultimately unified as God. 
Brownson thought unity and diversity needed to be synthesized. Thus he argued: “God, 
in the view of Christian theology, is not Unity, nor Plurality, but their synthesis . . . the 
indissoluble union of Unity in Diversity and Diversity in Unity.”139 Brownson, like the 
other Romantic thinkers of his age, thought that unity in diversity was “the ultimate 
principle of life itself,” and he thus argued that the Unitarians erred in assuming that 
diversity necessarily subverted unity.140 Again emphasizing the organic, Brownson 
insisted that all but Deists believed God to be “the living God,” and that since the 
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principle of life was the dynamic activity between unity and diversity, God must be 
characterized as Trinity.141 
 For Brownson, the conviction of the Trinity seemed to be both creative and 
palliative. First, he thought a truly living and unified duality would yield a third 
principle. In God, the Holy Ghost “proceed[ed] forth from the Father through the Son,” 
and in human beings the “productive unity” of male and female enabled a “unity having 
the ability to manifest itself in multiplicity.”142 Life required the ability to generate new 
life. Second, and probably more important to Brownson, he thought that conceiving of 
God as Trinity provided hope to overcome the antagonistic dualities that seemed to war 
with each other everywhere he looked. Writing to Parke Godwin—William Cullen 
Bryant’s son-in-law and partner—Brownson insisted that “the evil there is in [the] 
individual and in society” arose from “our loss of unity, and attempting to live in duality, 
that is to say, in multiplicity alone.”143 Brownson thought the French historian Jules 
Michelet substantiated this concern when he asserted in his Introduction to Universal 
History (1843): “with the world commenced a war which must end with the world and 
not before, that of man against nature, of spirit against matter, of liberty against 
necessity. History is nothing else but the recital of this interminable struggle.”144 
Brownson had felt this struggle throughout his life, thought, and reform efforts, and he 
conceded that “with mere duality, we admit that we have and must have war, and war 
only.”145 He hoped, however, that “when we have apprehended the profound mystery of 
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the doctrine of the Trinity, we have learned that the mediator or middle term, the 
reconciler of the two extremes, is integral in the original ground and cause of 
creation.”146 In other words, behind the warring factions and principles in the world—
behind Michelet’s spirit-matter, man-nature, and free will-necessity dualisms—stood a 
God who transcended both stark unities and unreconciled dualities, whose essence was 
relationship and love.  
 For Brownson, the conflicting dualisms of this world could be overcome, since 
the original, generative principle (God) transcended them—though Brownson thought 
the reconciliation required God’s mediating action through Christ. Thus, like Coleridge, 
who moved from a belief in a Platonic trinity to the Christian Trinity, like Marsh who saw 
the Word as a cosmic organizing principle and the Spirit as the power animating life, and 
like Henry, who saw the principle of the Trinity in Reason itself, Brownson thought that 
communion, organicism, and unity in diversity yielded assent to the Christian Trinity. 
He confessed, along with Marsh, that while natural reason might not “comprehend” such 
a mystery, Unitarians and other rationalists failed to “apprehend[ ] the deeper sense of 
the theology from which they dissent[ed].”147 
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Brownson the Cautious Romantic 
 In 1843 and 1844, Brownson’s emerging voice as a proponent of a romantically 
informed orthodox Christianity gained the attention of others who had been contending 
for similar thought since the 1820s. John Wheeler, now president of the University of 
Vermont and a thorough Trinitarian Coleridgean, invited Brownson to speak at the 
university commencement in the summer of 1843.148 Brownson obliged, applying his 
principles of communion and unity in diversity to the role of the intellectual in a 
democratic society in An Oration on the Scholar’s Mission (1843), published later that 
year in Burlington.  
 Brownson grounded The Scholar's Mission on the philosophical principles he 
now embraced. “Man was made for growth. The whole creation is progressive,” he 
insisted emphasizing his progressive organicism, “The end for which God made us, and 
placed us here, is PROGRESS, growth, to be eternally approaching the Infinite God, 
communion with whom is the consummation of the soul’s good.”149 He defined his 
progressive vision as the synthesis of unity and diversity applied to human society. “All 
individual men participate of humanity. . . . But humanity, all and entire, enters into no 
one man. . . . Each man represents a distinct phasis of humanity. . . . Under which it is 
represented by no other; and in this fact consists his individuality” (13). But this distinct 
individuality should serve society, and as society was “a living organism,” diverse 
individuals must conceive themselves fundamentally in relation to the whole (14). 
Celebrating individuality did not mean “a mere assemblage or aggregation of individuals, 
held together by that rope of sand, enlightened self interest” (14). The scholar's mission 
lay in communion. 
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 Brownson thought the scholar a unique member of the human communion, who 
stood as “instructor and inspirer” to the whole human race in its moral, religious, social, 
and intellectual development (20). He argued that at one stage of human development 
the intellectual was right to criticize the abuses of monarchy and aristocracy and thus 
favor democracy. But now as a self-professed political conservative, he argued that 
democratic tendencies had gone far enough. In the mid-nineteenth century the scholar 
should stand as “a prophet and a priest” to criticize the excesses of democracy: churches 
forced to entertain their constituents rather than save them, politicians forced to pander 
to the electorate and toe party lines rather than lead, and presses forced to abandon 
profundity in favor of popular taste.150 Parts of Brownson's speech read like a litany for 
conservative cranks, rehearsed throughout the nineteenth century as political and social 
liberalism gradually gathered momentum.  
 But two important features nuanced Brownson's view. First, he imbued the 
scholar's vocation with not only christological significance but also christological 
sacrifice. “Do not mistake me. The scholar is not one who stands above the people . . . 
with contempt. He has . . . a deep and an all-enduring love for them, which commands 
him to live and labor, and, if need be, suffer and die for their redemption.”151 Elsewhere, 
reviving what Richard Hofstadter has called the “devotional exercise” of intellectual life, 
Brownson exhorted his audience to take Bernard of Clairvaux or George Fox for their 
model and be willing to embrace solitude, poverty, or death if required.152 Second, 
Brownson retained his resolute class-consciousness, which he wove throughout the 
speech. Though he insisted the scholar must stand against “the leveling tendency” of 
contemporary democracy, he also insisted the scholar must stand against “barbarous 
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castes and factitious distinctions.”153 Throughout the piece he lambasted the use of 
learning to foster “foolish aristocratic pride” or inherited privilege, he encouraged his 
charges to “never measure a man’s capacity, attainments, or virtues, by his apparent 
rank, wealth, or education,” and he warned them that American colleges had justly fallen 
under suspicion by the many who saw them as finishing schools of oppression.154 
 Though James Marsh had died the previous year, Brownson's views would have 
delighted him, which is likely why President Wheeler invited Brownson to speak at UVM. 
Brownson delivered the speech on Tuesday afternoon in preparation for UVM’s 
commencement the following day. Allston, Dana Jr., Henry Jarvis Raymond, and 
Edmund Dana had all urged Dana Sr. to deliver the commencement speech on the life 
and character of James Marsh, but Dana Sr. demurred, allowing the role to pass to 
George B. Cheever, who delivered his speech the day after Brownson.155 Marsh had 
linked his Romantic Trinitarianism with his educational vision, and Brownson did the 
same. They both believed in a conservative, organic society and worried about the 
excesses of democracy, but they both believed also in careers open to merit and 
opportunity for those less well off. Likely due to their own humble backgrounds, their 
philosophical interests and attainments, and their limitations vis-à-vis transatlantic 
study and travel, both Marsh and Brownson sought to allow access to higher education 
for others like them. Though Brownson had written extensively on philosophy, politics, 
and religion, he thought this application of his views to education one of his most 
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important works to date. “I have taken great pains with it,” he wrote to his friend Isaac 
Hecker, “and in a literary point of view, I think it as good as anything I have sent out.”156 
 Brownson’s new views also attracted the attention of Leonard Woods Jr., now 
President of Bowdoin College.157 Woods praised Brownson’s Review—reestablished as 
Brownson’s Quarterly Review in 1844—and its “deeper political as well as religious 
philosophy.”158 Like Brownson, Woods’s Romantic Christian orthodoxy had led him to 
favor Catholicism, though he seems to have held somewhat more eclectic ecclesial taste. 
As Richard Henry Dana Jr. recalled on one of Woods’s numerous visits with the family 
during this period, “He baffles the skill of all his friends, to ascertain his position. He is a 
Churchman & in most points goes to the extreme of Romanism, yet he continues in the 
Presbyterian communion, though holding it to be a schism.”159 Unfortunately, only one 
letter survives between Woods and Brownson, but the tone of that letter suggests that the 
two were friends.160   
 Woods thought that Brownson’s ideas harmonized with the French conservative 
political theorist Joseph de Maistre’s Generative Principle of Political Constitutions 
(1814), which argued that written constitutions organically and providentially evolved 
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out of centuries of history, law, and communal consciousness.161 The true constitution of 
a nation was a mysterious combination of these latter forces, and written constitutions 
could only be successful inasmuch as they cohered with the true constitution of a 
nation.162 Constitutions, therefore, could not be artificially constructed and imposed on 
an unprepared people. Woods’s brother-in-law, a Boston physician named R.H. Sadler, 
had recently translated Maistre’s Political Constitutions into English, and Woods urged 
Brownson to publish the translation in his Review.163 Brownson preferred his own voice 
to lengthy translations of other’s work, but Little and Brown published Sadler’s 
translation at Boston in 1847.164 Brownson reviewed Sadler’s translation of Maistre and 
labeled it “almost the only sensible political pamphlet that has ever been published 
amongst us.”165 
 Woods almost certainly introduced Brownson to Maistre’s thought, for Brownson 
made only one perfunctory notice of Maistre’s writing in either the Boston Quarterly 
Review or Brownson’s Quarterly Review prior to the exchange with Woods in 1845.166 
After 1845, Brownson referenced Maistre repeatedly throughout the 1840s and 1850s, 
applying the lofty adjectives “ingenious,” “immortal,” and “illustrious” to the French 
theorist.167 Indeed, Brownson’s encounter with Maistre coincided with a general 
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renaissance of French interest, and a narrow, seven-year period in which the only 
nineteenth-century English translations of Maistre appeared—two of the three coming 
from Americans.168 Woods correctly linked Maistre’s ideas with Brownson’s new, more 
explicitly conservative thought. Not only did Maistre support Brownson’s developing 
views about the limited efficacy of written constitutions on unprepared societies, but 
Maistre also argued that the papacy could provide a supreme mediating force in 
nineteenth-century politics, ameliorating abuses of monarchs so as to prevent 
revolutions.169 This position, which the Protestant Brownson had begun to ascribe to the 
medieval church as early as 1842, became central not only to Brownson’s politics but also 
to his ethics and theological epistemology in his increasing alienation from political 
democracy.170 
 There were important differences with Maistre. Brownson’s background as a poor 
country farmer and his constant attention to the working class was incompatible with 
Maistre’s staunch and reactionary monarchism. But Brownson insisted that “it is not for 
this we commend him” but for his overall theory, namely “the great generative principle 
of political constitutions.”171 Maistre’s theories came out of a specific post-revolutionary 
context; his theory about organic constitutions conveniently cohered with his reactionary 
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monarchism since the European powers were historically monarchies. In Political 
Constitutions, he not surprisingly avoided the question of what precisely his organic 
constitutionalism looked like in the complicated American context. Brownson claimed 
the case was clear: America had evolved as a republic, and thus its republican 
institutions required fervent loyalty.172 Following George Bancroft, Brownson argued 
that nobility and royalty simply did not emigrate to America.173 Brownson thus was a 
conservative republican, but he was no monarchist (as was Richard Henry Dana Sr.). 
Moreover, Maistre sought not only to reestablish the French monarchy but also to 
exorcise any underlying revolutionary tendencies. His reactionary politics led him to a 
mystical view of history as a dual-to-the-death between the Catholic Church and 
monarchy on the one side and all of the various challengers to these institutions on the 
other side. For Maistre, Gallicanism, atheism, Protestantism, Jansenism, Rousseau, 
Bacon, Locke, Kant, materialism, and sensualism possessed “hidden affinities” that 
bound together their opposition despite the obvious differences.174 While Brownson 
could be extremely denunciatory of non-Catholic groups, he saw his conversion to the 
Church not only as a realization of error in these movements but also an appreciation for 
their residual truth about nature and humanity. Moreover, Maistre tended to emphasize 
the sub-conscious and mysterious nature of national organic constitutions, while 
Brownson’s analysis emphasized the ability to identify, explain, and even carefully adapt 
a national constitution “to such social meliorations and such administrative changes as 
time and its vicissitudes may render necessary or expedient.”175 While Brownson shared 
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Maistre’s distrust of political democracy and was willing to entertain certain mystical 
aspects of incarnational theology in his religious views, his politics eschewed Maistre’s 
mystic, cosmic sensibility. 
 Brownson was no monarchist, but in 1840, he more seriously questioned the faith 
in political democracy to provide justice and social equality. Though his authoritarian 
streak existed from the very beginning, he had always supported the Democratic Party 
and refused to identify as a conservative, but he now began to question democracy more 
openly. “They who had devoted their lives to the cause of their country, of truth, justice, 
liberty, humanity, were looked upon as enemies of the people, and were unable to make 
themselves heard amid the mad and maddening hurrahs of the drunken mob that went 
for ‘Tippecanoe, and Tyler too’,” Brownson reflected. “It was a sorry sight, to see the poor 
fellows rolling huge balls, and dragging log cabins at the bidding of the demagogues, who 
were surprised to find how easily the enthusiasm of the people could be excited by hard 
cider and doggerel rhymes. . . .  An instructive year 1840, to all who have sense enough to 
read it aright.”176 In his frustration with the election of 1840, Brownson insisted that an 
easy distinction he and many others had made between “the Stationary Party . . . [and] 
the Movement Party, or Party of Progress” needed revision. The Movement Party 
actually contained two wings, “one the radical section, seeking progress by destruction; 
the other the conservative section, seeking progress through and in obedience to existing 
institutions.”177 In his earlier writings on Constant, Brownson had provided a place for 
the destruction of old institutions so as to build new ones; he now identified more 
explicitly with existing institutions. William Ellery Channing had cautioned Brownson 
strongly against institutions’ spiritual use in what Channing saw as a new, individualistic 
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era of human spiritual development. Instead, using the new language introduced by 
Marsh and Coleridge, Channing insisted that Brownson must trust to “the great, 
everlasting principles, founded in the reason and meeting man’s enduring wants” and 
suggested that “men can only learn it by looking into themselves.”178 For some time 
Brownson had embraced Channing’s ideal of the inward turn, while working to establish 
new institutions and forms to foster it. In the early 1840s, Brownson lost faith in this 
hope. 
 But what existing institutions could ensure the conservative progress Brownson 
still hoped for? Marsh, Henry, and Woods Jr. had all looked to universities as the 
institutions that could guide Channing’s process of men looking into themselves, and 
these men—and especially Marsh’s successor John Wheeler—trusted the activity of the 
Holy Spirit in Protestant churches as another way to mitigate the excesses of democracy 
and inform the decisions of the Republic.179 Brownson needed more. In the face of 
fractious and inefficacious politics, the depredations of industrial capitalism, and the 
religious instability of disestablished churches, Brownson looked to the only spiritual 
institution he thought could guide Christians in this new environment: the Roman 
Catholic Church.180 
 Brownson’s conversion to Catholicism and his subsequently strident 
ultramontane defense of the Church was a synthesis of both his socio-political 
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disillusionment and his Romantic philosophical theology. Brownson insisted, along with 
the other Transcendental Trinitarians that Jesus Christ was “the Divine Incarnate 
Reason or Word” by which God communicated a more unifying truth to the 
disaggregated Reason of humankind.181 As previously noted, he thought, along with 
Coleridge and Marsh, that human Reason was the image of God in humankind and that 
God and humanity could therefore commune through Reason.182 Like Coleridge, Marsh, 
and Pascal, Brownson also thought that Reason reached a horizon where “our reason 
itself bears witness that there is in him above what it apprehends.”183 All these assertions 
endeared Brownson to the UVM professors and others like Leonard Woods Jr. But 
Brownson, now fully convinced of God’s ultimate freedom to do as he pleased in history, 
took one critical step further. “The church exists and lives by direct and immediate 
communion with the Incarnate God . . . the outward, or visible, or sensible continuation . 
. . of the Incarnation. Like our Lord himself, she is at once Divine and human.”184 
Institutionalizing the divine more strongly than the other Cautious Romantics, 
Brownson began to equate the Church with the higher, spiritual Reason for which he had 
so long contended.   
 Brownson used the Reason-versus-Understanding distinction in his leap to 
tangible, institutional authority to mediate between human and divine Reason. He 
insisted, trading on the now ascendant transcendentalist linguistics, that “the 
understanding, or a purely intellectual act” balked at submission to external authority 
but that above the individual Understanding stood a universal Reason—a tribunal to 
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which all thinking persons should submit their individual Understanding.185 He had 
clearly reversed course from his 1835 claim that the human Understanding constructed 
religious forms out of the ineffable insights of Reason. Now divine Reason directly 
delivered the institutional form of the Church to guide and inform the wayward 
Understanding. Brownson reasoned that submission to authority might provide “a real 
light to the understanding,” and the question thus became not whether one would 
submit to authority but to which authority one would submit one’s individual 
Understanding.186 Certainly one might appeal to an internal, universal Reason, but 
Brownson in his disillusion with democracy thought this a hopeless appeal, at least on 
the grand scale that he gave his social aims. Though a few might align their individual 
Reason with universal Reason and live accordingly, this required inclinations, education, 
and good faith not to be found in many people.187   
 In the early 1840s, Brownson seemed willing to include several 
Transcendentalists among the ranks of the few, authentic individuals who lived in 
accordance with universal Reason in their aims, motives, and manner of life, but he 
thought their individualism increasingly misguided in hoping that their own way of life 
could be realized on a large scale.188 In this concern he sounded a similar note to James 
Marsh, who wished George Ripley and Brook Farm well, but thought their grand aims 
could not be realized. Thus, Brownson embraced a power and authority both resolutely 
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spiritual and tangibly temporal. Like Leonard Woods Jr., who argued that institutions 
were an important check on the evil in the human heart, Brownson saw the external 
authority of the Church as a critical check on individual Reason, especially that of “the 
men in whom conscience slumbers, love sleeps, and only the world with its impurities is 
awake?”189 From a belief in Christ as incarnate Reason, Brownson embraced the Catholic 
Church as the body of Christ, the continuance of the Incarnation. This gave him a 
powerful institution to use in counteracting the emerging social and political order. For 
Brownson, the Church, which was no less than Christ on earth, could now stand as an 
institution to war against party politics and social inequality; it was the only institution 
that could stand wholly apart from the political structures that had so disappointed his 
hope for an orderly, backward looking, but still revolutionary social vision.  
 The 1848 revolutions provided a test case for Brownson’s emerging claims. Like 
his now London-based friend George Bancroft, who celebrated the revolutions in no 
uncertain terms, Brownson confessed himself favorable to the interests of many 
revolutionaries.190 But Brownson recapitulated his own political disillusionment by 
arguing that most people did not think carefully enough about the end goal of revolution. 
Ultimately, revolution sought to establish justice on earth, but he accused most 
revolutionaries of equating the political equality of an expanded franchise with political 
justice. Brownson argued that revolution could be justified, but only if the rulers directly 
violated their own laws or if the existing order (including its laws) was fundamentally 
unjust. He granted that rulers had no right to abuse their subjects, even within the laws, 
if these laws were unjust. But who was to decide what was just? The only answer he could 
see, given his new commitments, was that the Church had to decide when the ruling 
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party had committed violations of either law or justice. “The question of resistance, 
presents a case of conscience, a moral question, and as such belongs by its very nature to 
the spiritual order. . . . We claim here no direct temporal authority for the Church, but . . 
. as long as we retain our reason . . . supreme and exclusive jurisdiction over all questions 
which pertain to the spiritual order.”191 For Brownson, violent revolution was a moral 
and spiritual question, and as such it required recourse to reason enlightened by God, 
which was through the Church. Brownson tellingly omitted a concrete discussion of the 
Church’s possible complicity and self-interest with state power, especially with Austria in 
1848, and throughout the late 1840s and 1850s he established himself as one of the most 
vocal conservative intellectual voices in America. 
 
Trans-denominational Conservatism: Brownson and Richard Henry Dana 
Sr. 
 Brownson’s political conservatism and his Romantic Christianity placed him 
firmly within the orbit of the Cautious Romantics. He now came to see Richard Henry 
Dana Sr. as an intellectual ally. Dana Sr., who had restricted his intellectual activity to 
the lecture circuit for some fifteen years, released a second edition of his Poems and 
Prose Writings (1833) in 1850. The work caught Brownson’s attention, and though he 
called Dana “one of the patriarchs of American literature” whose work had “already 
passed the ordeal of the critics,” he felt drawn to comment upon it at length.192  
 Brownson loved Dana’s moral and political essays. “There is one writer amongst 
us, of the highest order of American writers, who dares intimate to his countrymen that 
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their march of intellect is downward, not upward,” asserted Brownson (483). He praised 
Dana for denying “the ‘sacred right of insurrection’,” for questioning the pervasive faith 
in progress and innovation, and for venerating the wisdom of the past (481). Brownson 
reiterated his critique of the intellectual and moral leveling tendency of democracy, 
praising Dana for staunchly opposing it. He lauded Dana’s essays on Edgeworth and 
Hazlitt—where Dana had championed Romantic epistemology, educational theory, and 
poetry—labeling the latter “superior to any thing of the sort written on this side [of] the 
Atlantic” (484).  Brownson’s only criticism of all Dana’s prose was that “he who wrote 
them has not . . . given us many more like them, a regret we seldom have occasion to feel 
in the case of contemporary essayists” (483). 
 Brownson’s assessment of Dana’s poetry and short stories was more mixed. He 
praised Dana’s clarity, description, and “certain reverence for and belief in Christianity,” 
but he thought Dana’s art failed to obtain either the beauty or sublimity “which are the 
secret springs of the Christian’s life” (487). But Brownson’s aesthetic standard at this 
period was extremely didactic. Thus he found Dana’s poetry and stories—most of which 
were composed when Dana intentionally reveled in gothic gloom—“morbid [in] spirit” 
and leaving “a painful and unhealthy impression” (487). Brownson attributed this defect 
to Dana’s Puritan heritage, but making his largely Catholic audience aware of this 
morbid tendency, Brownson went on to commend Dana to young, artistic Catholics. 
We see in his writings the absence of the operations of Catholicity on the mind and heart, 
and the presence of much Puritanic pride and scrupulosity. But we see at the same time a 
writer of great intellectual power, of true genius, and for the most part, so far as the form 
goes, of cultivated, pure, and delicate taste. His style may be studied as a model, and is 
among the very best specimens of pure English that has been written by one born and 
trained on this side of the Atlantic.193 
 
In addition to praising Dana’s political temperament and intellectual posture, Brownson, 
who had labored to carve out his own intellectual reputation without the benefit of 
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transatlantic formation, saw Dana’s accomplishments particularly noteworthy given his 
intellectual limitations in America. 
 The timing of Brownson’s laudatory review was striking, for it came at the height 
of a particularly zealous, post-conversion period in Brownson’s intellectual life. Yearning 
for both spiritual and religious authority as well as a rigorous philosophical consistency, 
Brownson lashed out at the Transcendentalists he had left behind, at Protestants for 
their schismatic tendencies, and even at fellow Catholics such as John Henry Newman, 
who dared flirt with any nuance beyond a straightforward faith in the Church. Though 
his anti-Protestant tendencies can be seen in the review, his willingness to heartily praise 
the non-Catholic Dana indicated trans-denominational intellectual affinity strong 
enough to transcend even the strongest ultramontanism.  
 
Conclusion 
 In his own time, Brownson proved maddening in his frequent conversions, made 
worse to most of his friends by his conversion to Catholicism. Even after converting to 
Catholicism, Brownson wrote his way through strident ultramontanism to sympathy 
with transatlantic, liberal Catholicism and American Republicanism and back around 
again.194 This chapter has sought to provide a fresh interpretation of Brownson by 
placing him within a discourse that bridged the gap between the Transcendentalist 
Brownson and the Catholic Brownson, namely Cautious Romanticism. Brownson’s 
intellectual development thus helps to articulate both the affinities and the boundaries 
between the Transcendentalists and the Cautious Romantics, and it is therefore not 
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surprising that throughout Brownson’s life one finds Caleb Sprague Henry, James 
Marsh, Leonard Woods Jr., and Richard Henry Dana Sr. coming alongside as fellow 
travellers. Moreover, Brownson was an important influence on other Romantic Catholic 
converts such as Isaac Hecker, Sophia Dana Ripley, and George Allen, who enjoyed close 
relationships with the Danas and Marsh and whose story is taken up in Chapter Ten.
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Chapter 10: The Rome-ward Impulse in Cautious Romanticism 
 
  
Introduction 
 “Oh, Rome! my country! City of the soul!” wrote Byron, praising the ancient city’s 
art and history.1 To this day, a sculpted Byron stands silent watch over his treasured city, 
immortalized in stone beneath the pines of the Villa Borghese. Beneath these same pines 
walked Allston and Coleridge as they discussed art, Platonic philosophy, and 
Trinitarianism. But for many Romantic Trinitarians, Rome became more than a setting 
for intellectual inspiration, it became a spiritual home. This chapter describes how the 
fusing of Romantic epistemology and aesthetic sensibility with traditional Christianity 
prompted several important intellectual conversions to Roman Catholicism.  
 By the 1840s and 1850s references to a higher Reason, a more inward spiritual 
religion, and the role of the imagination in religious experience were rife in American 
culture. The Transcendentalists, particularly Emerson, certainly bore some 
responsibility, but despite Emerson’s popularity the historian is hard-pressed to find 
many self-identified Transcendentalists. However, the discourse hinted at by Allston and 
Dana, explicated by Marsh, and fanned into flame by Emerson, began cropping up in 
various cultural forms, not the least of which was Roman Catholicism. 
 These conversions were not isolated, nor did they only invoke common Romantic 
themes—though they certainly did invoke them. Instead, they were linked to other 
figures in this dissertation via concrete, personal relationships in addition to intellectual 
and literary influence. Isaac Hecker—one of the most important American Catholic 
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intellectuals of the nineteenth century besides Orestes Brownson—not only became close 
friends with Brownson, but also with Sophia Dana Ripley, Ruth Charlotte Dana, and the 
entire Dana family. Ripley for her part remained intimate not only with Dana Sr.’s 
daughter, Ruth Charlotte—who also converted to Catholicism—but with Charlotte’s 
father and with Richard Henry Dana Jr. Both Hecker and Ripley represented the 
religious vector that led from transcendental seeking to the transcendent Roman Church, 
the path Orestes Brownson had also traveled.  
 But other paths led into the Catholic Church as well. In the 1850s, Brownson 
began to receive letters from an intriguing Professor at the University of Pennsylvania, 
George Allen, who ribbed the doughty defender of the Church that he was perhaps still 
too accommodating to liberal principles. Allen had traveled a different road, from 
Coleridge’s and Marsh’s cautious religion into the Catholic Church. As one of James 
Marsh’s prize students and as a thorough Coleridgean, Allen had helped Marsh edit the 
Aids to Reflection and later defended Marsh’s role as the articulator of Coleridge to 
America. As a close friend of Henry Reed, Wordsworth’s American editor and friend, 
Allen continued to play an important role in the dissemination of Romantic thinking. 
This chapter thus seeks to explain how the intellectual terms and religious consciousness 
of Cautious Romanticism partially paved various roads to Rome. 
 
Isaac Hecker: Brook Farm Seeker 
 Orestes Brownson was not the only Catholic convert to cross the Tiber after 
sojourning in the forests of Transcendentalism. Isaac Hecker and Sophia Dana Ripley 
joined him in that journey. The details of Hecker’s early life are sparse, but prior to 1843 
he worked with his brothers in New York as they built a bakery and flour mill business 
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up from scratch during the financially challenging years just before and during the Panic 
of 1837. Hecker’s father—a shadowy figure—was a brass-founder whose small business 
collapsed when the children were still small. The Hecker boys, John, George, and Isaac, 
began their flour mill business in their early teens, and by the time John was eighteen, 
the business was stable enough to support the entire family.2 Isaac began work at age 
eleven.3 Family financial demands limited his formal schooling, but they also made him 
forever sympathetic to the plight of the poor and working classes. 
 Throughout the 1830s, the Heckers were intimately involved with New York labor 
politics as these interests morphed from the Working Men’s Party into a sizable and 
vocal left wing of the Democratic Party. Though the formal New York Working Men's 
Party had collapsed in 1830 as a result of political infighting, Workie sentiment and 
organization continued to play an important role in Democratic Party politics throughout 
the 1830s and beyond. Nowhere were Democratic Party tensions more pronounced than 
in New York City. Here the left wing’s concentrated labor interest vied with powerful, 
wealthy, and commercially oriented Tammany Hall conservatives, or so-called Bank 
Democrats, over the direction of the party’s agenda. Among other issues that threatened 
to split the party were the chartering of new banks and the use of paper money. In 1835, 
frustrated by Tammany’s bald-faced betrayal of campaign pledges to oppose banks and 
monopolies, the radical Democrats crowded-out an October meeting and nominated 
their own slate of candidates. When the Tammany establishment attempted to adjourn 
the meeting by secretly switching off the gaslights, the radicals struck matches—called 
“Lucifers” or “loco focos”—lit candles, and prevented the meeting’s adjournment until 
their candidates were finalized. While their ongoing success within the party remained 
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mixed, the stunt at least provided a political label that stuck. Labor Democrats became 
“Loco Focos.”4 
  Given their background, the Hecker’s became dyed in the wool Loco Focos, and 
they likely participated in the Tammany uprising itself.5 In his early teens, Isaac spoke at 
local ward meetings, even proposing successful resolutions on the currency question.6 
The Heckers strongly opposed any concessions to Tammany Hall, and on Election Day in 
1835, George and Isaac could be found printing posters and handbills on their own hand 
operated printing-press, hanging these posters before dawn, and supplying ballots for 
Loco Foco dominated wards.7 It was in this context that Hecker first met Orestes 
Brownson, who delivered a series of lectures in favor of the Working Men in 1834, and 
the Heckers continued to arrange for Brownson to lecture on such topics throughout the 
1830s.8 
 But like Brownson—Hecker’s most formative intellectual influence—Hecker 
began to question the efficacy of political action. Politics seemed to attract those 
“governed more by selfishness and thirst for power than by patriotism and the desire of 
doing good to their fellow citizens.”9 Like Brownson, Hecker began to believe that since 
political solutions seemed unable to address inequality, the problem must be in social 
relations. Hecker insisted that the primary problem was the desire of some to reap vast 
rewards at the expense of others’ labor, a problem he thought became increasingly worse 
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throughout the nineteenth century. Hecker retained this sensitivity throughout his life. 
Evaluating his and Brownson’s enduring views in 1887, Hecker declared: “Nor, as social 
reformers at least, were we given over to theories altogether wrong. The constant 
recurrence of similar epochs of social agitation since then, and the present enormous 
development of the monopolies which we resisted in their very infancy, show that our 
forecast of the future was not wholly visionary.”10 Hecker’s disillusionment with politics 
was not that anti-monopoly, wage, and other labor-friendly legislation could not work, 
but rather that power, greed, and self-interest prevented effective legislation from being 
passed. Thus other social solutions must be required to address inequality.  
 In the 1830s, Hecker viewed religion through this social lens. He belonged to no 
religious group and thought Christianity was primarily an important social ideal. By 
teaching all men’s likeness to and equality before God, Christianity could potentially 
check the greed and exploitation he saw around him.11 But what could be the venue for 
such an ideal? For several years, Hecker entertained the hope that radical come-outer 
communities might provide the appropriate answer to social inequality.12 
 In December 1842, Brownson again came to New York to lecture on politics and 
stayed with the Hecker family.13 Whether prompted by Brownson’s lecturing, long-
simmering tensions of his own, or some other precipitating cause, Hecker experienced 
an intense psychological disruption with accompanying physical symptoms.14 He decided 
to go to Boston and stay with Brownson—indicating the spiritual respect he had for his 
elder friend—as he determined what to do. From Brownson’s home in Chelsea, 
                                                   
 10 Hecker, “Dr. Brownson and the Workingman’s Party Fifty Years Ago,” 207–208. 
 11 Hecker, “Document submitted in Rome,” 1; Hecker, “Dr. Brownson and the Workingman’s Party 
Fifty Years Ago,” 205. 
 12 Hecker, “Document submitted in Rome,” 2. 
 13 OAB to IH, Nov. 28, 1842, BHC, 60-61. 
 14 It is difficult to determine precisely what Hecker experienced, but his brother John spoke of 
“nervous spells” and “spells of despair” which he thought brought on by “too much exercise of mind.” John 
Hecker to OAB, Jan. 7, 1843, Binder 3, IHP. 
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Massachusetts, Hecker wrote apologetically to his brothers to try and explain his 
condition. “The change that I have went under has been so rapid . . . my mind has lost all 
disposition to business . . . my hopes, life, existence, all are in another direction.”15 
Although in 1841 he had poked fun at “those German transcendentel [sic] mystics,” he 
now sought advice from William Henry Channing, a Transcendentalist New York 
minister and contributor to The Dial. Channing referred him to a physician for 
treatment.16 The physician recommended that Hecker marry and settle down or at least 
concentrate on some physical employment, but Hecker maintained that his desires were 
“altogether different.”17 He decided that Brook Farm would be the best place to seek his 
answers for its combination of study and intellectual communion. Thus, armed with a 
reference from Brownson to Brook Farm’s de-facto leader George Ripley, Hecker settled 
at Brook Farm some time in January 1843.18 
 Brook Farm likely attracted the thoroughly undecided Hecker with its 
combination of effervescent spiritual seeking and its earnest desire to attempt an 
alternative response to structural social inequality. No religious structure, creed, or 
churchly example guided the experiment. As Elizabeth Palmer Peabody explained the 
experiment, “Not in the action of the followers of Jesus therefore, are we to seek the Idea 
of Jesus respecting Society; not even of those followers so generally admitted to have 
been inspired . . . Jesus remands us to our own souls . . . to go to God first hand.”19 But 
the aims of Brook Farm were thoroughly religious. That Hecker saw Brook Farm as the 
                                                   
 15 IH to “Brothers”, Dec. 26, 1842, IHP. 
 16 IH to OAB, Nov. 14, 1841; IH to OAB, Dec. 19, 1842, BHC, 59, 62.  
 17 IH to [no salutation - Brothers], Dec. 28, 1842; John Hecker to OAB, Jan. 7, 1843, IHP. 
 18 IH to [no salutation - Brothers], Dec. 28, 1842; IH to [no salutation - Brothers], Jan. 7, 1843, 
IHP. 
 19 Elizabeth Palmer Peabody, “A Glimpse of Christ’s Idea of Society,” The Dial: a Magazine for 
Literature, Philosophy, and Religion, 2, no. 2 (October 1841): 216. 
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best place to answer his questions demonstrates his utter intention to reconstruct his 
spiritual life from the foundation.   
 Established in 1841 on the sloping hills of West Roxbury, Brook Farm’s 170 acres 
boasted pastures, meadows, hardwood lots, and a pine forest in addition to several 
sizeable buildings and the farm.20 Until 1847 it stood as an earnest and admirable 
expression of Transcendentalist social hopes; open to all, the farm sought to unite work, 
study, and play in one harmonious community and thus overcome the more 
individualistic Transcendentalism of Emerson and Thoreau. George Ripley and his wife 
Sophia founded the experiment and served as its de-facto leaders. Though many 
Cautious Romantics like James Marsh and Orestes Brownson balked at Emerson, they 
retained a reserved respect for George Ripley’s scholarly mind and ambitious heart. Even 
the huffy Richard Henry Dana Sr., who enjoyed poking fun at Brook Farm and thought 
Ripley’s religion entirely wanting, still grudgingly conceded that he had “behaved well in 
connexion [sic] with our family.”21 As if frustrated by Ripley’s impeccable character, 
Dana couldn’t resist a nebulous parting barb: “still there is something inside that man 
that has always warmed me off from him.”22 But Hecker’s more charitable temperament 
would lead him, like Marsh and Brownson, to retain great respect for Ripley. 
 As he had hoped, Hecker found intellectual communion at Brook Farm. “They 
met me with such cordiality and friendship that I almost felt like weeping,” he informed 
his brothers.23 He stayed at the Farm for most of the next seven months, and his friend 
George Curtis affectionately named him “Ernest the Seeker” after William Henry 
                                                   
 20 Gura, American Transcendentalism, 155–156. 
 21 RHDS to RHDJ, June 19, 1840, DFP, MHS. 
 22 Ibid. 
 23 IH to “Dear Friends,” Apr. 13, 1843, IHP. 
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Channing’s like-named restless and romantic seeker in The Dial.24 Upon his arrival, 
Hecker began an intellectual diary in which he meticulously recorded the questions, 
influences, and positions he eventually embraced. Many of these conclusions found 
formal articulation in his later apologetics, Questions of the Soul (1855) and Aspirations 
of Nature (1857). He immersed himself in the Romantic authors that had been 
instrumental in helping to shape the views of both the Cautious Romantics and the 
Transcendentalists; Coleridge, Byron, Carlyle, Goethe, Schelling, Kant, Wordsworth, 
Novalis, and Schlegel all made appearances in the diary.25 By August of 1843, when 
Hecker returned to New York, his brother John worried to Brownson: “I think your 
Boston Transcendentalists have had too much influence on his mind.”26 
 
A Romantic Road 
 But while Hecker's primary intellectual influences were romanticist, he was never 
a very careful philosopher. Neither a scholar nor an aesthetician, Hecker read seeking 
answers to his own internal spiritual questions and impulses. When he later embarked 
on serious and sustained philosophical study for the priesthood, he confessed that “my 
intellect in all scientific matters seemed stupid.”27 He exemplified, perhaps too 
dramatically, Emerson's injunction that “books are for nothing but to inspire.”28 Hecker 
sought, to further quote Emerson, to “read God directly” and used books to this end.29 
                                                   
 24 George William Curtis to Walter Elliot in Elliott, The Life of Father Hecker, 55–56. The 
categorization was quite apt, from Ernest’s Protestant mother, to Ernest’s restless seeking, to his attraction 
to Roman Catholicism, see William Henry Channing, “Ernest the Seeker: Chapter First,” The Dial: a 
Magazine for Literature, Philosophy, and Religion 1, no. 1 (July 1840): 48-58;  William Henry Channing, 
“Ernest the Seeker: Chapter II,” The Dial: a Magazine for Literature, Philosophy, and Religion 1, no. 2 
(October 1840): 233–242. 
 25 Hecker Diary, Apr. 20, 1843; Apr. 28, 1843; June 28, 1843; Jan. 3, 1844; June 5, 1844, IHP. 
 26 John Hecker to OAB, Aug. 20, 1843, IHP. 
 27 Hecker, “Document submitted in Rome,” 4. 
 28 Emerson, “American Scholar,” 57. 
 29 Ibid., 58. 
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Hecker’s penchant for spiritual self-making at the expense of philosophical rigor was 
both a strength and a weakness. When he embraced an idea—such as personal asceticism 
or the Catholic Church—it sustained him throughout a life of bodily renunciation and 
institution building, and it further gave him a pastoral sensibility lauded by nearly 
everyone he encountered. But as Hecker's spiritual vision and vocation crystallized over 
the next decade, he felt compelled to communicate his sense that the philosophers and 
poets of the Romantic Age might find a home in the Catholic Church. In this context his 
intuitive road to truth served less well. Though he wielded quotations uttered by 
numerous European romanticists and American Transcendentalists in favor of 
Catholicism’s merits, his arguments often stopped one premise short of sufficient 
demonstration. 
 If Hecker had a primary intellectual influence it was surely Brownson, although 
their temperaments were extremely different. “We had read the same books,” Hecker 
remembered, “but with me [religion and social thought] was from the start more a 
personal affair than it was with him to whom for a long time it was largely a 
philosophical problem.”30 Hecker arrived in Boston as Orestes Brownson embraced his 
own vision of life by communion à la Pierre Leroux. If Brownson’s tenacious style was 
less than welcome at the Transcendental Club, it defined his relationship with the 
younger and more accommodating Hecker, who appreciated Brownson’s headlong 
pursuit of the truth.31 On the latter’s visits, they wandered the streets of Boston and the 
wharfs of Chelsea “biting away at the hard knots of philosophy,” including Cousin, Kant, 
and Leroux.32 In these forays, William Batchelder Greene joined them. Greene was soon 
to turn Transcendentalist Unitarian minister as modern biblical criticism disabused him 
                                                   
 30 Isaac Hecker, “Dr. Brownson in Boston,” The Catholic World 45, no. 268 (July 1887): 471–472. 
 31 Ibid., 468–469. 
 32 Ibid., 468. 
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of his belief in the Trinity, but Brownson’s passion for French socialism found Greene 
travelling frequently from his residence in Newton to meet with Brownson and Hecker in 
Chelsea.33 
 But although Hecker would later declare Brownson “the guide of my youthful 
struggles,” not even Brownson could answer Hecker’s personal questions about social 
inequality, vocation, and the relationship between mind and spirit.34 Instead, Hecker 
attempted to work out these questions at the Transcendentalist communes of Brook 
Farm and Fruitlands, as he became drawn to their potential solutions to the social 
problems he felt so deeply.35 He identified with Goethe’s Werther’s restless yearning in 
The Sorrows of Young Werther (1774), which he read for the first time at Brook Farm. 
Hecker’s longing was not directed at a particular woman; it was rather an equally 
paralyzing desire to find a vocation suitable to his spiritual longing and concern about 
oppressive social structures.36 Indeed, it seems that Hecker’s sense of social oppression 
and inequality likely caused his psychological disruption. His friend, George W. Curtis, 
complained that Hecker’s concern for “beggars in Broadway and Prostitutes at the 5 
Points” had become a “wail.”37 “Cheer up Isaac,” echoed another Brook Farm friend, 
“Burn Werther . . . [and] think how much one strong upright heart can do for the poor, 
the oppressed, the sorrow stricken.”38 His heart apparently on his sleeve, Hecker needed 
a spiritual home and a response to injustice that fit the severity of his feelings.  
 During Hecker’s stay at Brook Farm, he embraced the quasi-Kantian 
epistemology—now thoroughly diffused through Coleridge and Emerson—which he 
                                                   
 33 Ibid.; Gura, American Transcendentalism, 182–188. 
 34 Isaac Hecker, “Dr. Brownson and Catholicity,” The Catholic World 46, no. 272 (November 1887): 
233. 
 35 Ibid. 
 36 Hecker Diary, Jan. 3, 1844; Ida Russell to IH, Nov. 7, 1843, IHP. 
 37 George W. Curtis to IH, Oct. 8, 1843, IHP. Quotation rearranged. 
 38 Ida Russell to IH, Nov. 7, 1843, IHP. Quotation rearranged. 
  
409 
thought authorized spiritual intuition and experience. But Hecker unified the senses, the 
Understanding, and intuition all under the name “reason.” “[W]e would classify the 
functions of the faculty of reason. 1. Simple, external, a posteriori perception 2. Pure a 
priori or transcendental perception of ideas or principles 3. Absolute revelation of 
faith.”39 Like Marsh and Pascal, Hecker at times shifted his language to characterize the 
intuition of the holy as the place where Reason reached its own horizon. “All its attempts 
at comprehending the incomprehensible are futile. Reason serves only to show its own 
weakness.”40 In his later apologetics, Hecker began to capitalize “Reason” because at its 
horizon, it functioned in both the natural and the supernatural realms as it realized its 
own limits. “There is a different kind of exercise of Reason in the natural order from that 
of the supernatural order; but one is no less a ‘part of the action and of the power’ of 
Reason than the other.”41 Reason, which Hecker thought gave birth to insatiable longing 
after something infinite beyond itself, apprehended God, but “the individual reason 
[was] not competent to comprehend the universal truth.”42 Coleridge and Marsh had 
distinguished between “apprehension” and “comprehension” in attempting to 
characterize Reason’s horizon.43 Hecker, likewise, embraced a common rhetorical 
strategy; Reason taught itself its own limitations, rendering faith rational.44 Yet, in 
addition to providing self-revelation of its own limits, Reason could catch glimpses of the 
                                                   
 39 Hecker Diary, Aug. 23, 1844, IHP. 
 40 Hecker Diary, Apr. 2, 1845, IHP. 
 41 Isaac Hecker, Aspirations of Nature (New York: J.B. Kirker, 1857), 303. Hereafter referred to as 
AN. 
   42 Hecker Diary, July 24, 1844, IHP. 
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supernatural, it could weigh the claims of various spiritual systems, and once aided by 
revelation it could set to work in the supernatural realm as well.45  
 Like many of the other Cautious Romantics, he embraced the idea that Reason 
worked in poetry no less than philosophy and logic and that in some ways its insights 
could be superior. “Poetry is a clearer and pure intuition of the absolute under the form 
of the Beautiful. Philosophy of the true. Theology of the good. Religion is the mystic 
union of the good, true and beautiful under the form of the HOLY. The intuition of the 
holy is the highest action of the faculty of reason.”46 As he continued to read in 
romanticist sources, particularly August Schlegel’s Lectures on Dramatic Art and 
Literature (1809-1811), Hecker even came to venerate artists and poets as the highest 
revelators, providing “the truest description of things as they really are.”47 As was 
common with Hecker, the categories and distinctions were mushy. Poetry and art were 
“eternal,” “mystical,” “higher than the reasoning faculty . . . the understanding,” and they 
proceeded by “intuition.”48 Many Romantic aesthetic principles were there, though they 
appeared in the hurried and heady locutions of his ebullient mysticism. Hecker 
celebrated the poet’s ability to clothe infinite reality in tangible, symbolic form, he 
believed that the imagination could grasp and communicate realities unavailable directly 
to the senses, and he criticized an impoverished mechanistic worldview that “would 
reduce music to certain vibrations of air” and “think more of a steam engine than of the 
Divine Comedy.”49 In his later apologetics, his sensitivity to art and the imagination 
would animate one of his arguments for the Catholic Church.50 
                                                   
 45 AN, 303-304. 
 46 Hecker Diary, July 15, 1844, IHP. 
 47 Hecker Diary, June 28, 1845, IHP. 
 48 Ibid. 
 49 Ibid. 
 50 Hecker insisted that religion could not just be “‘a conviction of the understanding . . . [or] mere 
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 Like many other Romantic thinkers, especially the later Emerson, Hecker 
thought the genius of a select few perceived and articulated the spiritual insights of 
Reason, serving as guides to the rest of human beings who also possessed “godlike 
capacities.”51 These few were the “prophets, miracle workers, Providential men, men 
inspired, seers, and poets,” but all human beings possessed the ability to “take 
cognizance of the eternal inner world” and the genius of others simply pointed the way. 
“What any one man . . . has been or done, all may be or do, for each man is a type, a 
pattern of the whole human race.”52 While Hecker embraced the Romantic notion of 
genius—standing amazed at the poets and composers whom “none but the gods know”—
the former Loco Foco activist insisted along with Emerson that Reason’s insights were 
available to all.53 His invocation of “godlike capacities” mirrored Wordsworth’s praise of 
the “immortal soul with godlike powers”; but Wordsworth emphasized the poet, whereas 
Hecker emphasized every human.54 Like many other Cautious Romantics, he remained 
attentive to the American egalitarian zeitgeist and in fact proved more attentive than 
most of them. 
 Hecker’s egalitarian sensibility went beyond that of Marsh and Brownson, who 
had argued that a compelling life was the surest bellwether of true philosophy—a 
philosophy that on their view was synonymous with Trinitarian religion. Marsh and 
Brownson also believed pious Christians were equal heirs to the insights of Reason, but 
at times they tended to focus on the role of intellectuals and the church to guide and 
                                                                                                                                                       
sentimental side of man’s nature” (AN, 241-242). Catholicism’s art, music, and incense allowed “the 
imagination [to be] captivated by what is hallowed and beautiful, and the mind [could thus be] elevated to 
the contemplation of heavenly things” (AN, 324). 
 51 Hecker Diary, July 27, 1843; Sep. 2, 1843, IHP. On Emerson’s similar view see Ralph Waldo 
Emerson, “Representative Men,” in Essays & Lectures, The Library of America (New York: Viking Press, 
1983), 620, 624–625. 
 52 Hecker Diary, Aug. 2, 1843, IHP. 
 53 Hecker Diary, Jan. 14, 1845, IHP. 
 54 On this principle in Wordsworth, see Chapter One. 
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form an individual’s Reason. Thus their politics and temperament were conservative. 
Hecker sought to develop an egalitarian notion of Romantic genius as well as Reason. 
Hecker’s genius emphasized sacrifice and service to others as manifestations of genius 
equal to those exhibited by intellectuals and artists, and like Marsh, Hecker’s notion was 
bound up with his own quest for a vocation. “My life must be poetical, divine, and my 
action pictures, beautiful paintings,” he wrote in his first several months at Brook Farm. 
“Head, Heart and Hands must be in trinity, in one.”55 Just as Allston sought the 
vellatura blending of diverse colors in service of a unified whole, so Hecker saw a life of 
service as a synthesized work of art. “There are those who never wrote a line but whose 
influence is deeper and more extensive than that of those who have written heavy 
tomes,” he insisted.56 In this category, Hecker regarded saints, mystics, and even pious 
persons as geniuses in their own right, an equation that his friend George William Curtis 
found to be an inappropriate application of the Romantic veneration of individual 
artistic genius.57 But throughout his life Hecker remained committed to the idea that 
“every human being strikes me as a wonderful becoming, as if a god were struggling for 
birth in him.”58 
 In truth, Hecker was torn between the wealth and refinement that undergirded 
intellectual life and the way in which he saw massive inequality in these social divisions. 
In his early political activism, he had become convinced that the basic social problem 
was the desire of some to reap leisure and wealth at the expense of others’ labor. But 
seeking answers to his spiritual questions, Hecker also became drawn to the leisure of 
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study and contemplation. Brook Farm charmed the meagerly educated Hecker with its 
Bohemian refinement, intellectual panache, and spiritual earnestness. “Here at Brook 
Farm I become acquainted with persons who have moved in a higher rank in society 
[than] I have, and persons of good education, fine talents, all of which has an improving 
influence upon me.”59 But Hecker knew that intellectual leisure—in which he himself 
indulged more than most in 1843—required the labor of others. His brothers largely 
funded his sojourn among the Transcendentalist come-outers. “I am fully aware that 
man cannot live by spirit alone, neither by bread alone,” he wrote his brothers while 
requesting further funds, “herein lies the struggle; to what extent can we convert the 
actual to the spiritual and live.”60 His social worries continued throughout the next year. 
He worried especially about his own complicity in unjust economic structures, as he 
sought for a way to reconcile the needs of the body with the promptings of the spirit. His 
family’s business had thrived, but he worried that “we cannot perceive how a Christian 
under the present arrangements can become wealthy without violating repeatedly the 
precepts of his religion.”61 Hecker’s concern echoed the young Allston, who had seen 
London as the nexus of great artistic and intellectual accomplishment but also great 
inequality. But while poverty overtook Allston in later life, Allston’s misfortune stemmed 
largely from problems of patronage, a dwindling inheritance, and periods of inactivity. 
Hecker, like Thoreau, sought intentionally to cultivate an ethic of poverty so as to 
disentangle the intellect and spirit from the questions of wealth, power, and inequality. 
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 The attempt to reconcile intellectual life, the demands of the body, and social 
equality lay likewise at the heart of the Brook Farm experiment; it had driven the well-
educated and relatively well-positioned George Ripley to found Brook Farm in the first 
place. During Hecker’s stay in 1843, Brook Farm began a crucial transition from an 
association of well-educated, Transcendentalist seekers to a full-fledged Fourierst 
Phalanx with sixty-hour workweeks and collectives emphasizing manufacturing as well 
as farming. These reforms in turn attracted many more working class members.62 When 
Hecker reported to Ripley that internal spiritual resources helped sustain him in urban 
New York, Ripley was pleased that Hecker could withstand “the evils of a city 
environment . . . [and] the sight of the huge disorders that daily surround you. I hardly 
dare to think that my own faith or hope would be strong enough to reconcile me to a 
return to common society.”63 Ripley thought Hecker an ideal contributor to Brook 
Farm’s grand experiment and pressed Hecker to return with them “to do or die for the 
cause we have at heart.”64 Inadvertently highlighting the tension between material life 
and the spirit, Ripley enclosed Hecker’s bill for his first several months at the Farm, 
which Hecker’s increasingly well-to-do family likely paid, and Ripley also wondered 
aloud whether “there [are] not 5 men in N.Y. city who would dare to venture $200 each 
in the cause of social reform.”65 Try as they might, none of these inveterate seekers could 
wholly quiet the material demands of the Understanding, no matter how earnestly they 
embraced their spiritual Reason.66   
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 Hecker’s attempt to reconcile intellectual and spiritual life with material realities 
led him to an intense, personal asceticism as a way to minimize material demands and 
allow his intellectual and spiritual life the free rein it seemed to require of him. “The only 
way that I can see that I can have sufficient [time] for my spiritual culture is to give up 
the external taste for fine clothing and variety of food. Simple, durable, clothing, simple 
and nutritious diet, are the only means I know of by which I can have time for spiritual 
culture.”67 He sought to avoid the fate of Miles Coverdale in Hawthorne’s Blithedale 
Romance (1852), who came to see that the physical labor required “to lessen the laboring 
man’s great burden of toil, by performing [his] due share of it” ultimately exhausted the 
mind and the spirit, turning it “cloddish.”68 By reducing bodily demands to a bare 
minimum, Hecker hoped to free himself from incessant labor. Hecker’s asceticism was 
not a radical gnostic or Platonic denial of bodily pleasures as evil per se; rather, he 
insisted: “I believe in the fullness of life. . . . But if I have to sacrifice either [Epicurus or 
Plato], then let Epicurus go.”69 One could also discern by mid-1843 that his asceticism 
was leading him toward the Catholic Church. “I would prefer adopting the life of the 
monastery, to that of the external world,” Hecker declared, “I would prefer to go hungry 
in body than in soul.”70    
 But in mid-1843 there were still other hopes for his increasingly intensifying 
asceticism. When another Transcendentalist, Bronson Alcott, embarked on a more 
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radical utopian community that he named “Fruitlands,” Hecker leaped at the chance to 
join him. From the vegetarian community Hecker explained that Fruitlands was 
a place of self-denial, labor, and aspiration after a holy life. . . . If these people are what 
they seem to be, they will be the means of brining out and fixing that which has led me of 
late and been dimly foreshadowed in my speech and action. This I hope. . . . The basis of 
life, of the discipline here . . . is Christlike. They wish to purify soul and body by the 
discipline of restraint and constraint. Instead of ‘acting out thyself,’ it is to ‘deny thyself’. 
Instead of liberty it is mutual dependence. . . . Instead of tolerance it is love. It is positive 
not negative.71 
 
Hecker’s headlong pursuit of bodily control drew him to the even more radical ideals of 
Fruitlands. The dietary austerity of Fruitlands—they attempted to subsist entirely on 
“aspiring” fruits and vegetables, whose edible part grew above the ground–appealed to 
Hecker, as his own diet at this time became extremely Spartan and memorable to 
observers.72 Writing to Henry David Thoreau two years later, William Ellery Channing 
Jr. remarked wryly that Hecker “used to live on two crackers a day.”73 
 Some Fruitlands participants, especially Alcott’s primary confederate, Charles 
Lane, enjoyed further renunciation. Traveling to a nearby Shaker community, Lane 
became convinced that family attachments undermined communitarian goals of what he 
dubbed “the universal family.”74 He thus became a committed celibate. Lane’s revelation 
struck unfortunately after he had embarked on the scheme with the Alcotts, and his 
subsequent appeal that the Alcotts embrace sexual abstinence added a great deal of 
stress to an already stressed community.75 But Hecker’s developing quasi-monastic 
sensibility disposed him to Lane’s perspective. Lane would later speak of “our life” when 
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he informed Hecker that the Shakers still took an interest in him even after Hecker had 
moved on to other pursuits.76  
 Hecker’s celibacy seems to have been driven primarily by his desire to extricate 
himself from the economic encumbrances (or responsibilities) of family life. In his first 
diary entry after he left New York, Hecker wrote: “I labored for riches, but renounced 
them,” and when his physician in New York recommended he marry and settle down to 
calm and direct his purpose, he declared that his desires were “altogether different.”77 
There are a few odd pieces of evidence that hint at possible complexities in his sexual 
psychology—a shadowy, absent father, a strong affection for his mother and other 
motherly figures such as Mrs. Thoreau, a professed lifelong aversion to being touched, 
and the occasional vague nightmare—but these scraps of evidence shed little light even 
when read collectively.78 He seemed attracted enough to women, particularly a separated 
but married woman named Almira Barlow, whose image Hecker declared was 
“stamp[ed] . . . upon my heart and engraved in my memory” even after they parted 
ways.79 For over a year, Almira appeared in Hecker’s diary as a kind of foil to his attempt 
to liberate himself from bodily demands in favor of a spiritual vocation. In one entry, 
after fretting about how Almira would perceive his letter, he formulated what he called 
his “three fold pyramid of reform”: the corners of the pyramid being personal reform, 
social reform, and political reform. In the center of the pyramid he inscribed his 
emerging conviction that these three reforms needed to proceed through “Religion, 
Church, Unity.”80 In another entry, preceded by a realization that the celibate might sire 
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children of “love [and] wisdom,” he wondered: “what position will we [he and Almira] 
occupy in the future.”81 On his first encounter with a woman in his chambers—seemingly 
Almira—Hecker was attracted but torn, concluding the entry dejectedly reflecting that 
“either the Church is not sufficient for my wants or [I] have not seen it in its glory.”82 It is 
telling that Hecker seemed finally able to let Almira go two weeks after his baptism into 
the Catholic Church on August 1, 1844. “Almira has lost all . . . affinity with my life,” 
Hecker recorded, “We do not feel any loss.”83 By this point, his affections would turn 
toward Henry David Thoreau, another celibate whom Hecker viewed as a kindred spirit.  
 Despite Fruitlands’ abstemious diet and Lane’s commitment to celibacy, after 
only a few weeks Hecker found Alcott too idiosyncratic and hampered by the needs of his 
immediate family and the others not sufficiently motivated to produce the food 
necessary to survive. Thus Fruitlands could not fulfill Hecker’s ideal, and Hecker 
returned to Brook Farm and then to New York in August, 1843. He continued with his 
own radical diet of “grains, fruits, and nuts, with simply water to drink” and continued to 
seek a way to realize his spiritual visions of a vocation and community untainted by 
complicity in wealth and power.84 Like James Marsh, who embraced a “Pythagorical 
[vegetarian]” diet while embarked on his attempt to find a grand, unifying principle to all 
his knowledge, Hecker’s avenue to spiritual truth led partially through the discipline of 
the body.85 
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 Fruitlands was a last, radical attempt by Hecker to realize his ideal among the 
Transcendentalists. Before he had left Brook Farm he wrote that it was “not self-denying, 
sacrificing enough for me . . . [being] too much like society.”86 He consulted with his 
brothers whether they could regulate their business according to his austere principles, 
but to no avail. Undaunted that his own desires might be too grandiose, he had insisted 
that the British Romantics had prophetically anticipated the abstemious, moral 
community he sought. Coleridge, Southey, and Shelley, who had explored establishing 
utopian communities of their own (Coleridge and Southey on the banks of the 
Susquehanna River in America), “saw it in the future, they sang of it in their poetic 
strains.”87 In particular, Thomas Carlyle “seem[ed] like an echo of [Hecker’s] own soul” 
when he spoke of making “some nook of God’s creation a little fruitfuller, better, more 
worthy of God; to make some human hearts a little wiser, manfuller, happier, less 
accursed!”88 But Hecker would not be content with a nook. As with so much of his 
reading, he took the Romantic utopian vision in his own ascetic direction. 
  
Transcendental Longing and a Transcendent Institution 
 After a winter in New York with his family, Hecker returned to Concord in the 
late spring and summer of 1844 and boarded with the Thoreau family while studying 
Greek and Latin. In June, 1844, Hecker decided to join the Catholic Church as the 
                                                   
 86 Hecker Diary, June 28, 1843, IHP. 
 87 Hecker erroneously placed Shelley, Coleridge, and Southey in the same group, possibly due to an 
erroneous source he was reading, which he called “a sketch of the life of Shelley,” Hecker Diary, June 28, 
1843, IHP. For a colorful description of Coleridge and the young, bearded Southey’s American scheme to 
realize such “a heady cocktail of all the progressive idealism of the Romantic Age” which ended in Coleridge, 
Southey, and their friend George Burnett sharing a small apartment in Bristol, see Richard Holmes, 
Coleridge: Early Visions, 59-88. Shelley yearned for a similar commune—though more politically radical—
and his attempts to realize his vision took him to Ireland and Lynmouth (UK), while he also wondered if 
Italy might prove salubrious. Richard Holmes, Shelley: The Pursuit, 133-162.  
 88 Hecker Diary, June 28, 1843, IHP. 
  
420 
culmination to all his seeking.89 Hecker’s conversion, like Brownson’s, was intellectually 
distended, agonized over again and again in his diary and letters of the period. 
Throughout Hecker’s published and unpublished work, numerous arguments for his 
conversion might be ventured, but in his diary and letters surrounding his conversion, 
several dominant themes emerged. One striking feature of Hecker’s diary was his 
obsession with the notion of genius. He thought that the Catholic Church synthesized his 
concern to unify Romantic artistic and intellectual genius with his egalitarian impulse to 
emphasize acts of service and a compelling life. Second, he thought that the Church’s 
long-enduring institutional structure provided the crucial ballast for the communitarian 
experiments so close to his heart and that it could foster the life of sacrifice he felt drawn 
to. Finally, Hecker embraced the Romantic philosophical theology of Brownson, which 
traded on the notions of Reason, organicism, and unity in diversity common to the 
Romantic Era. 
 Hecker’s first reason for becoming Catholic was his belief that the Church best 
fostered genius in all of its myriad manifestations. “Every man is called to give 
expression to the highest, [and] the finest in him; and to this only is he called.”90 The 
Church, Hecker argued, “nurtured and encouraged men of genius” by inspiring and 
patronizing beautiful music, art, and poetry, but also by giving “the inborn capacity of 
genius highest inspiration . . . even so with the most ordinary man.”91 This did not mean 
that everyone could become geniuses in the same sense, but that the godlike capacities of 
each person could find expression in the vast structure of the Church. The Catholic 
Church allowed one to affirm that “every true man is a genius” with full-throated, 
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Emersonian verve but also to recognize that this genius often came in the form of 
individual callings and humble acts of service.92 “It is here, in silence, in private, alone, 
that deeds can be done which shall outstrip the Alexanders and Napoleons in their 
eternal effects.”93 By providing a fixed and supernatural standard, the Church provided a 
notion of genius that could be realized by all, with promised rewards and punishments 
perhaps realized only in eternity. 
 The notion of genius was extremely personal for Hecker as he sought to realize 
his own vocation. His diary and letters revealed a heart burdened with the cares of the 
world, a mind fired by romanticist writers, and a spirit enflamed by visions and desires 
that he himself could not always articulate. But the diary also revealed a passive paralysis 
in Hecker’s nature from which he desperately needed to escape.94 For Hecker, the 
Church could provide the structure and discipline necessary to channel and direct his 
own insatiable longing and his desire toward the social, intellectual, and spiritual ends 
he had in mind. As if to highlight the point, the pushy and self-assured Brownson 
insisted that Hecker join the Church precisely because it would give discipline and 
direction to his desires.95 “I certainly should recommend any person in my position and 
disposition as O.A.B. has recommended me,” Hecker conceded while wrestling mightily 
with the idea of submitting his “self-will” to “the involuntary will of the soul” that was 
leading him toward Catholicism.96 Hecker’s inability to fully live up to his own moral 
standards—in his case particularly pristine and ascetic standards—made his conversion 
similar to that of Coleridge and Richard Henry Dana Jr., whose moral failings led them 
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to Trinitarianism. While Hecker found within himself the spiritual vision promised by 
Romantic introspection—“the perception of the eternal spirit or laws which are the one 
unitary foundation of the infinite in man and nature”—he could not find within himself 
the ability to translate perception into action and personal reformation.97 For Hecker, 
this required objective, external intervention: a visible, embodied form and authority to 
aid him in reforming the self and guiding its vocation.  
 Hecker’s need for institutional guidance also led him to embrace the Church’s 
institutional efficacy on a broader scale, as Orestes Brownson had argued. Throughout 
his time at Brook Farm, Hecker maintained a close friendship with Brownson, and thus 
Hecker’s own conversion shared much of Brownson’s appeal to institutional authority. “I 
have taken up, and answered, as well as I could, the very questions laboring in your 
mind,” Brownson wrote to his friend, “no work of reform can be carried on with . . . 
success, till we have recovered the unity and catholicity of the Church.”98 Hecker 
concurred, finding communion at Brook Farm and Fruitlands but also disillusionment 
about their long-term prospects for success, and he thanked Brownson for helping him 
see the importance of institutional authority.99 As Hecker later explained to Thoreau 
while taking priestly vows in Holland: “When I remember the dreams of fruitlands and 
see how far below their boldest aspirations fall from what has existed for centuries in the 
C. Church and now exists, I am led to smile, but I esteem truly these men as far as they 
went.”100 Hecker saw within the self a psychological war of angelic and diabolical 
proportions, and he thought his Transcendentalist friends did not fully appreciate the 
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limitations of internal sin. “There are spirits found in men all around us . . . struggling 
for their freedom, kept in the chains of self-will. . . . Our souls are the entertaining rooms 
for angels . . . they are not wicked, wicked spirits have taken possession of them.”101 
Hecker’s “chains of self-will” echoed Allston’s fear in “The Atonement” of what Allston 
called “the living chain of self, self wrought,” and his view of a spiritual-psychological 
war within the self mirrored many of the other Cautious Romantics’ similar fears.102 
 Unlike Brownson—who exhibited a life-long authoritarian streak—Hecker’s 
commitment to authority was less inveterate and very much contrary to his seeker’s 
temperament. Indeed, Hecker’s letter from Europe coincided with a period where he 
immersed himself in many great Catholic mystics, and he even experienced visions of his 
own, much to the consternation of his authoritarian spiritual directors.103 He thus 
appreciated the seeker’s temperament in his Transcendentalist friends to a point, though 
he thought they erred in making seeking the end of faith instead of the means.104 Hecker 
praised Emerson for his iconoclastic attack on American religion. According to Hecker, 
Emerson brought the seeker back to “stand upon man’s simple nature,” a position that 
Hecker insisted would lead one to see the merits of Roman Catholicism.105 Likewise 
Hecker lauded the aspirations of the Transcendentalist communitarians, but sensed that 
even while Brook Farm thrived, it labored under a hopeless problem. George Ripley 
thought that communal societies stood as the alternative to the desiccated spirit and 
encrusted forms of extant churches; Hecker, like Marsh, thought human depravity would 
ultimately undermine all of Ripley’s visions without a stronger objective institution to 
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counteract individual selfishness and error.106 According to Hecker, his sojourn at Brook 
Farm had taught him that “the evils of society were not so much social as personal”; for 
Hecker the conversion of the soul required external religion.107 Having deemed the 
institutional power of the visible church necessary to the sustainability of communal 
institutions, Hecker sought a church that could provide a place for mystical individual 
seeking, communal societies, and personal sacrifice.108    
 But having sojourned with the Transcendentalists and taken their claims 
seriously, Hecker wrestled most with the meaning of Christ’s nature and work. As late as 
December, 1843, he was inclined to rank Christ as the highest of such inspired geniuses 
as Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, and others—the general Transcendentalist view.109 But by 
June, 1844, he came to believe in a Catholic Christ, just as Brownson had. “Jesus was the 
Christ, the Word made flesh,” and his life manifested through the Catholic Church.110 
And what authorized this revelation? Hecker recurred again to Romantic Reason, the 
“function of the human soul through which knowledge is gained which is higher than 
that of human philosophy by analysis, induction, or any other human method. Call it 
inspiration, intuition, or faith, it is, and that it is is all. . . . It is the perception of the 
eternal spirit or laws which are the one unitary foundation of the infinite in man and 
nature.”111 Reading extensively in Christian Platonism like Coleridge, but also leaning 
heavily on Brownson’s thinking, Hecker became a Transcendental Trinitarian.112  
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Transcendentalist Criticism  
 The Transcendentalists were perplexed. Why would such a devoted seeker and 
mystic surrender his intellectual prerogatives to an ancient and hierarchical institution? 
Hecker’s conversion took place while he lived in Concord, where he counted Emerson, 
Thoreau, and Bronson Alcott among his friends. When Emerson heard about Hecker 
considering Catholicism, he invited him to tea to feel him out. For the next several days 
Hecker accompanied Emerson and Alcott to visit the Shaker community at Harvard, 
Massachusetts, where they both attempted to ascertain his reasons and dissuade him.113  
Emerson thought Hecker’s conversion likely due to an attraction to art and architecture, 
an equation that since has served as a convenient shorthand explanation for so many 
nineteenth-century Romantic conversions to the Catholic Church.114 The claim annoyed 
Hecker, who felt he had reasoned his way to Catholicism as earnestly as Emerson had 
out of Unitarianism.115 Hecker’s concerns were largely social, epistemological, and 
vocational, though he would come to incorporate Catholic art and architecture into his 
later apologetics. Others likewise struggled to understand his decision. Hecker’s fellow 
Fruitlands celibate, Charles Lane, scoffed at “the dead antique garment of the bygone 
world”—though he later conceded that Hecker was not as “overlaid by the ‘Roman’” as by 
the “Catholic” attitude.116 Debora (Ora) Gannett, a Brook Farm friend, told Hecker 
wistfully that she was re-reading “Ernest the Seeker” in The Dial, but that it would no 
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longer interest him as he had chosen “shackles” as well as “beauty” in the Catholic 
Church.117 
 Perhaps most disappointing to Hecker was Henry David Thoreau’s response. The 
day before Hecker was baptized he excitedly thought to undertake an ascetic pilgrimage 
to Rome with Thoreau: 
To work, beg, and travel on foot so far as land goes to Rome. The idea has seized me then 
and I should not hesitate to start tomorrow on the journey. I mean to write Henry Thoreau 
on the subject. We know of no pleasanter, better way both for soul and body than to make 
such a pilgrimage in the old middle-age fashion. Suffer hunger, storm, cold, heat, thirst, all 
they can affect [is] the body of flesh.118 
 
Despite their later religious differences, Thoreau and Hecker shared an almost unique 
relationship; they were mirror images, examples of the different roads the ascetic and 
celibate Transcendentalist might take. “Let us be Janus-faced,” Hecker suggested to 
Thoreau, “with a beard and a beardless face.”119 Hecker told Thoreau that Thoreau had 
“no slight influence” on his idea to pilgrimage in the first place and that Thoreau and 
pilgrimage had arisen simultaneously in Hecker’s mind.120 Hecker’s letter appealed to 
several characteristics that unified them, especially bodily asceticism and a love of 
nature.121 But Hecker was more masochistic than Thoreau, emphasizing what they must 
“suffer.” Thoreau sought simplicity for the moral and intellectual peace of mind it sired, 
not for the spiritually purgative aspects of suffering itself. In Walden (1854), he would 
explicitly maintain that food, shelter, clothing, and fuel were imperative to spiritual life: 
“not till we have secured these are we prepared to entertain the true problems of life with 
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freedom and a prospect of success.”122 Recently returned from the Catskills, “subsisting 
mainly on bread and berries, and slumbering on mountaintops,” Thoreau confessed that 
Hecker’s scheme greatly appealed to him, but that his excursions were leading him to 
“the Farther Indies . . . to fresh faith in a kind of Brahminical, Artesian, Inner Temple 
life.”123 He could accomplish this journey as well at home.  
 The Atlantic Ocean itself served as a metaphor for their differences. “The ocean! 
if but to cross this being like being; it were not unprofitable,” Hecker exclaimed, while 
Thoreau found himself “to have a firm ground anchorage” in America “though the 
harbor is low-shored enough, and the traffic with the natives inconsiderable.”124 Hecker 
wanted to explore the past with “reverence” and “love” before “going farther in the 
woods,” while Thoreau confessed that while he briefly glimpsed Hecker’s draw to 
Catholicism the thought had vanished “as when a dry leaf falls from its stem over our 
heads, but is instantly lost in the rustling mass at our feet.”125 He wished Hecker well, 
apologizing that “the Genius will not let me go with you” but suggested that after all their 
adventures they might “compare notes at least.”126 Within a year Thoreau had settled 
into his two-year adventure by Walden Pond, while Hecker sped across the Atlantic 
looking, as one onlooker recalled, like “‘a transcendentalist, not excepting his long hair 
flowing down on his neck.’”127 
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Transatlantic Translation of a Roman Faith 
 Hecker remained in Europe for six years, training for the priesthood and reveling 
in the writings of Catholic mystics such as John of the Cross and Theresa of Avila. Even 
as he set sail, he had found his vocation: to translate the European Catholic faith for a 
still-hostile American audience, using the Romantic idioms that continued to guide his 
thinking. More than Brownson, Hecker sought to explain—both to himself and to 
America—how his conversion to Catholicism was the logical extension of transcendental 
seeking. Even from Europe, he continued to write letters attempting to convert Thoreau, 
and Hecker’s final work, The Church and the Age (1887), published one year before his 
death, ended with one last attempt to show how Catholicism answered the 
Transcendentalist call for a “religion which shall find fast foundations in the human 
breast.”128 Hecker returned to America as a Redemptorist priest in 1851 and worked 
among German Catholics in New York and Pennsylvania. The work proved exciting, but 
in time tensions emerged between many English-speaking convert Redemptorists and 
the German identity of the order. The German Redemptorist leaders tended to focus on 
caring for immigrant Catholics, whereas the American convert priests sought to inspire 
conversions like their own. In August 1857, Hecker returned to Rome to seek the blessing 
for a new order of priests whose mission would be to translate Catholicism to an 
educated, English-speaking America.129  
 Hecker not only attempted to explain Catholicism to a predominantly Protestant 
America, he also sought to vindicate his submission to the authority of the Catholic 
Church in light of Transcendentalist criticisms. The tension was stark. How could Hecker 
                                                   
 128 Isaac Hecker, The Church and the Age: An Exposition of the Catholic Church in View of the 
Needs and Aspirations of the Present Age (New York: Office of the Catholic World, 1887), 300-322; IH to 
HDT, May 15, 1847 and IH to HDT, [Summer 1849], IHP. Quotation is from The Church and the Age, 305. 
 129 General narrative for this paragraph taken from O’Brien, Isaac Hecker, 85–133. 
  
429 
reconcile his individualistic, and indeed idiosyncratic, seeker’s temperament with the 
submission to authority demanded by the Catholic Church? Throughout his life, Hecker 
attempted to answer that question. His diary made clear that he thought Catholicism the 
most effective way to balance “unity and individuality.”130 As he would later remark to 
Sophia Ripley, he thought that the Roman Catholic Church was a great nation that 
allowed individuals to choose various towns and styles of home to inhabit based on their 
own vocations and spiritual needs.131 But this metaphor required an explanation. 
 During his work with the Redemptorists, Hecker published Questions of Soul 
(1855), his most developed attempt to explain how his fidelity to the inner voice 
comported with Catholic authority. Questions of the Soul was part argument and part 
confession. It was also a patchwork of romanticist sources, stitched together to support 
Hecker’s points. Goethe—who had inspired Hecker at Brook Farm—seemed the primary 
intellectual influence, and Emerson served as the primary foil amidst references to 
Margaret Fuller, William Henry Channing, Longfellow, William Cullen Bryant, 
Wordsworth, Byron, Shelley, Maistre, Schiller, and Tennyson.  
 At times Hecker cited these authors without fully engaging their settled position. 
He quoted Goethe’s and William Henry Channing’s praise for the Catholic Church’s 
order, beauty, and contributions to civilization, but he failed to mention that these 
authors saw Catholicism as part of a progression to a more liberated era of individual 
inspiration and social reform outside of the Church.132 In another section, Hecker 
enlisted Margaret Fuller’s claim that “we shall not decline celibacy as the great fact of the 
time,” allegedly showing that the wants of the age comported with Catholic sexual 
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discipline.133 However, he did not cite her further explanation that the reason celibacy 
was the great fact of the time for women was because of a faulty relationship between the 
sexes. Hecker had no interest in gender equality and sought instead to exploit Fuller’s 
position to generate vocations to the nunnery.134 
 But Hecker provided more substantial arguments as well. He praised the 
Transcendentalists’ infinite longing, and he celebrated the reform efforts this longing 
yielded at Brook Farm in particular. According to Hecker, theirs was “truly a most 
religious life.”135 However, he reemphasized his key disagreement with them. For Hecker, 
a thorough examination of the self yielded a “dark, cloudy, night side,” requiring external 
aid to fully discover and overcome.136 He saw this night side in Byron’s Childe Harold, 
whose guiding mantra as he left Cadiz was “Smile on—nor venture to unmask / Man’s 
heart, and view the Hell that’s there.”137 Hecker also found sanction for humanity’s 
tangled interior from Goethe, who saw human nature as “so involved and complicated, 
that none / May hope to keep his inmost spirit pure, / And walk without perplexity in 
life.”138 Hecker might have chosen or explained this line more skillfully. The quotation 
came from Goethe’s Iphigenia in Tauris (1786), where Pylades went on to exhort 
Iphigenia not to be imprisoned in her desire for an unattainable purity but rather to 
refrain from judging herself and “with circumspection to pursue [her] path.”139 For 
Pylades, perfect purity was a hopeless ideal. But Hecker was not without warrant in 
citing the play itself. Iphigenia in Tauris sported an extremely violent context. As a 
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priestess of Artemis in Tauris, Iphigenia ritually sacrificed foreigners, and an important 
part of the story was her dubious fratricidal lineage—her mother, Clytemnestra, 
murdered her father, Agamemnon, and her brother, Orestes, murdered their mother in 
revenge. Thus Hecker’s concern about the dark forces at work within the human soul 
seemed quite applicable to Goethe’s play. Hecker’s tender soul, like Iphigenia, yearned 
for that “perfect ease, / When not a stain pollutes [the heart].”140 He could not acquiesce 
to Pylades’s pragmatism.  
 Hecker’s stains were not as dark as Coleridge’s or Dana Jr.’s moral failings, but 
they were every bit as frightening. As we have seen, Hecker’s passivity and paralysis 
threatened to overwhelm him as he labored under the weight of his own demanding 
moral vision of service to others and self-denial. He lacked the internal vigor of men like 
George Ripley and Henry David Thoreau—the former sharing his desire to serve others 
and the latter sharing aspects of his asceticism. What Hecker perceived and indeed felt at 
a very deep level—and what he praised the Brook Farmers for seeing—was that the 
“existing social organization” was inherently oppressive, requiring a radical response if 
one hoped to reform these evils and keep the self pure.141 What frightened Hecker was 
his own inability to sufficiently discipline himself and extricate himself from complicity 
in social evil. When he left Brook Farm he reflected that laborers in oppressive 
conditions likely produced his food and clothing, and he continued to worry that no 
middle-class life could be obtained “unless you cheat some one else out of the hard-
earned value of his labor.”142 Moreover, by 1855, the heady utopian promise of come-
outerism had all but faded. As Hecker pointed out in Questions of the Soul, the reform 
wing of Transcendentalism and other new forms of come-outerism seemed untenable. 
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Here he was generally correct. To take the Fourierist examples, all of the twenty-five 
Fourierist phalanxes founded in the mid-1840s had closed, their average life-span lasting 
just over two and a half years.143 Most poignant of course for Hecker was the demise of 
Brook Farm. “Alas,” Hecker sighed, “that such should be the results of so many generous 
efforts and self sacrifices, ‘Employed / In forming models to improve the scheme / Of 
man’s existence, and recast the world.’”144  
 Of course one could give up these aspiriations as so much hopeless idealism; 
Hawthorne, whom Hecker quoted, certainly took that position.145 But Hecker remained 
resolute. To dismiss the desire for a pure soul and a just society amounted to infidelity to 
the self that sired these yearnings. On the other hand, the self seemed restricted in its 
attempts to realize its inchoate visions, whether personal or social. “How rich and gifted 
is man’s nature!” Hecker wrote right after his conversion, quickly followed by the 
lament: “Oh, man is his own worst enemy.”146 Like the other Cautious Romantics, Hecker 
suffered from an acute sense of humanity’s simultaneous greatness and wretchedness. 
From his vantage point there was only one explanation. The fundamental problem 
afflicting society was personal sin rather than errant social organization.147 At this point, 
Hecker saw two options: abandon the hope of finding an answer to one’s insatiable 
longing for personal and social regeneration or find a more sustainable approach to 
communitarian self-sacrifice that also addressed the darkness within that undermined 
these communal experiments. 
  Hecker argued that this reconciliation could be found in the Catholic Church. 
The Church provided knowledge of the transcendent God for whom the soul yearned, 
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spiritual self-knowledge through instruction and guidance, and the institutional stability 
necessary for those drawn to come-outerism to succeed.  
What was attempted by those engaged in such movements as Brook Farm, Fruitlands, and 
other places of a similar character, the religious orders in the Catholic Church have always 
realized. . . . It is a happy moment, indeed, when we find that the inmost sentiments of our 
hearts, the lovely dreams of our youth, the desire of our manhood for self-sacrifice and 
heroism, are not only understood, but fully appreciated, and all the means [given] to their 
fulfillment. . . . Happy are they who find out in their youth what all men discover at some 
period of life, that God, and God alone, can satisfy the inmost wants of the soul, and 
consecrate themselves to his service.148 
 
According to Hecker, the Catholic Church had a long and venerable tradition of fostering 
come-outer communities devoted to self-denial and social service. Moreover, they 
boasted great saints and mystics, spiritual seekers who often aligned their spiritual 
insights with care for the poor and marginalized (251-257, 276-277). Unlike Protestants, 
they did not denigrate these vocations as aberrant and subversive but gave concrete form 
and encouragement for those inclined to live more fully as Christ had, embracing 
celibacy and poverty (148-156). Like Protestants, the Catholic Church recognized Christ’s 
sacrifice as necessary to redeem the darker aspects of the self. But Hecker thought that 
unlike Protestantism, Catholicism provided a particular medium for this process: the 
confessional.  
 The confessional allowed one to explore the dark depths of the self and find 
expiation and release. For Hecker, the priest served an important role as “spiritual 
physician” and “divine friend,” standing directly between the self-affirming friend—who 
could not always be trusted to probe deep enough—and the unfriendly judge from whom 
one need cower in fear (190-196). Hecker argued that the modern spate of confessional 
literature exemplified by Rousseau’s Confessions (1782), Goethe’s Autobiography (1811-
1830), and Byron’s allegedly scandalous literature and life demonstrated the human 
need for the therapy of confession. In particular, he fingered Goethe’s admission that 
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The Sorrows of Young Werther (1774) was a “general confession” that made him “once 
more happy and free” after struggling in various ways with depression and suicide.149 
Hecker found this particularly scandalous, as Werther had inspired many suicides 
among its readers—a point Goethe himself conceded was unfortunate. Hecker didn’t 
blame this impulse; he thought that the drive to confession was natural, even primal, as 
it pointed to the sin within. But he thought that the public nature of confession in 
romanticist literature was pernicious. “How many crimes would have been unknown in 
society, if such men as Goethe, Schiller, Rousseau, Byron, Shelley, Bulwer, had sought 
relief for their consciences in the divine sacrament of penance, instead of flooding society 
with the details of their secret vices and miseries, and thus feeding men’s passions until 
they ripen into crime.”150 According to Hecker, the spirit of the age proved his own 
experience that within the self lurked sins requiring confession and salvation. Citing 
Joseph de Maistre, Hecker believed that the Church “revealed to man the knowledge of 
himself” (206). 
 The confessional was one important facet of what Hecker thought Catholicism 
provided: an objective form of Christ’s body, with which the self could commune and 
against which it could check its darker aspects. While in one sense all parties, even the 
Transcendentalists, could agree that the soul sought after God, the question was how to 
conceive of God and his relationship to human beings. Hecker insisted that since human 
beings were physical as well as spiritual beings, their encounter with God must be 
partially a physical encounter to be spiritually efficacious (121). The idea hinged on the 
extent of God’s love. According to Hecker, “Love is not satisfied till she gives herself 
entirely to the object loved,” and this required God “to clothe himself in a visible form, 
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become like one of us, and so be ours in a full and adequate manner” (121). This meant 
not just the incaranation of God in Christ, but the continuation of that embodied reality 
in the Church (110). Of course, Emerson had argued that nature was God’s visible 
manifestation, but Hecker thought this untenable. Conflating nature with God made God 
ontologically inferior to the self, and thus all the spiritual insight from nature would be 
too thoroughly self-conditioned to be trusted with personal redemption from sin (25).  
 According to Hecker, once one realized the cosmic psychological battle within the 
self, one was less inclined to blanch at authority. One came to realize that “the first and 
deepest want of man’s heart is guidance. But it must be an unerring and divine guidance. 
. . . That religion, therefore, which does not recognize obedience, but throws man back 
upon his own authority, condemns itself as inadequate to meet the wants of man’s heart” 
(112-113). Like Brownson, Hecker blamed Protestantism for inaugurating an appeal to 
private judgment in spiritual matters, a position that logically led to untempered 
spiritual egoism (132-133). He seemed genuinely unable to understand Emerson’s or 
Fuller’s appeal to the spiritual projects of constant seeking and self-culture. “All that self-
culture can do for man is to make him feel more keenly and painfully his wants and 
deficiencies, but it can do nothing to satisfy or supply them” (280). Hecker agreed with 
Fuller that the age labored under “the consciousness of an unattained Ideal,” but he also 
believed that these questions of the soul required a transcendent object.151 Like Leonard 
Woods Jr., he found the long history of Catholic theology and philosophy rich and varied 
enough to provide “the intellect ever brighter visions of truth” to satisfy his seeker’s 
temperament, but for Hecker the Catholic Church also provided other benefits: 
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forgiveness and structured vocational direction.152 This is what he meant when declaring 
that the Church was a great nation in which unique individuals like himself could find a 
home. 
 Hecker and the Transcendentalists seemed to be speaking similar words but 
continually talking past each other. Thoreau remained unresponsive to Hecker’s 
repeated outreaches, and Fuller thought him “shallow” for being so sure that his 
conversion “could give permenance to the Mood.”153 For his part, Hecker could be 
equally denunciatory. When he read in Fuller’s Memoirs that according to Fuller, “the 
only object of life is to grow,” he snorted: “a squash, could say the same.”154 But he 
genuinely respected the Transcendentalists’ earnestness, their authenticity, and many of 
their high ideals.  
Their independent spirit and indifference to all human respect, the generous efforts and 
sacrificies which they have made to realize their aspirations, excite our admiration, win 
our love, and command our respect. Though unsuccessful, still all aspiration after a purer 
and better life is not extinct in their bosoms. They still feel;--they feel wants which have 
never been met and satisfied (285). 
 
They had effectively undermined Protestantism’s stranglehold on the American mind by 
questioning its ecclesiastical forms, and they felt the questions of the soul stronger than 
most other Americans. But he thought that, especially by 1855, “they seem to announce 
new truths, but it is only a tame repetition. . . . They are encircled and imprisoned by 
self” (179-180). 
 In the end, Hecker’s explanation of his own submission to authority could not 
significantly overcome the traditional Christian paradox that freedom came through 
submission (235-236). Throughout his life he attempted to employ his Trinitarianism to 
help, suggesting that one might rely on the Holy Spirit within for spiritual direction, and 
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that the Holy Spirit preserved God’s truth in the Church. But when push came to shove, 
Hecker seemed unable to move beyond his doctrine of submission. Even in his later life, 
when his commitment to the indwelling Holy Spirit and his attempt to reconcile 
Catholicism and American democracy placed his legacy in jeopardy with more 
conservative churchmen, Hecker remained clear that the spirit within should submit to 
the Church.155 In his twighlight reflections in The Church and the Age (1887), the 
relationship was clear. “The criterion or test that the soul is guided by the Holy Spirit is 
its ready obedience to the authority of the Church.”156 That Hecker failed to nuance his 
position was surprising. With his celebration of prophets and mystics, he might have 
developed a more thorough account of how the Holy Spirit worked through inspired 
individuals to correct Church abuses and participate in its organic development. Indeed, 
throughout his own life he exemplified the role personal insight and conviction could 
play in reforming the Church. But for Hecker, the need to check and reform the sinful 
self remained strong enough to demand a thorough commitment to Catholic authority. 
 
Hecker’s Legacy 
 But Hecker felt his apologetic required more than his pen. In August 1857 he 
traveled to Rome to consult with the Redemptorist General, Fr. Nicholas Mauron, about 
the possibility of establishing an explicitly American wing of the order. When he arrived, 
Mauron promptly dismissed him from the Redemptorists for insubordination in making 
the journey in the first place. But hierarchy it would seem had its liberating side. He 
appealed to the Pope, who granted him a sympathetic audience. Hecker’s exchange with 
Pius IX demonstrated the former’s cleverness and resolve. When the Pope worried that 
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Americans were too worldly, harbored and encouraged political radicals, and were an 
overly fractious society because of abolitionism, Hecker explained that American wealth 
made them more generous, that disestablishment and republicanism made Americans 
more religious, and that the fevered pitch of American politics in the late 1850s made 
them all the more ready to embrace an authority like the Church. “’Bravo! Bravo!’” the 
Pope whispered to him as he rose to leave.157  
 Over the next several months, Hecker carefully negotiated his case for an 
American order. In addition to the Pope, his winsome skill and arguments for an 
American order impressed Cardinal Alessandro Barnabo, Prefect of the Congregation 
Propaganda Fide, the Pope’s vice-president of missions and non-Catholic countries.158 
Hecker’s former superior Mauron could not believe the Yankee’s diplomacy: “[I]t is 
unbelievable how many powerful protectors Hecker and his friends found here and in 
America,” he lamented.159 In the end the Pope released Hecker and the American 
Redemptorists from their vows, commended them to their American bishops, and 
encouraged them to pursue their vision under those bishops’ direction. Hecker returned 
in 1858 and established the Paulist Fathers, a unique order focused on translating 
Catholicism to America that continues to exist. In 1865, he founded and edited The 
Catholic World, which along with Brownson’s Quarterly Review and the Freeman’s 
Journal became an important outlet for American Catholic intellectuals, remaining in 
print until 1996.160 But throughout his life, Hecker remained a Romantic seeker. His 
disciple Walter Elliot concluded his lengthy biography recalling that “his peculiar trait 
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was fidelity to the inner voice.”161 Hecker had decided, however, to pursue what he called 
the “ever brighter visions of truth” within the limitations of Catholic authority and 
doctrine.162 But for Hecker, these horizons were liberating rather than restricting; the 
vastness of the Church—with its history, art, religious communities, and heroic saints—
allowed him to find a tangible institution to guide his equally vast spiritual desires. 
 Hecker’s conversion was yet another example of the Romantic paradox, that the 
inward turn and trust in self-revelation might yield assent to transcendant religion. As 
with so much other Cautious Romantic discourse, the question hinged on precisely what 
one discovered by turning inward. For them, it was a realization of humankind’s 
simulatneous greatness and wretchedness, a wretchedness that compelled them—for 
individual reasons—to seek transcendant aid. On Hecker’s telling, this was not a retreat 
from psychological responsibility. Facing this reality required “the highest kind of 
courage,” and the submission to authority represented “a sincere and heroic resolve of 
the soul to free itself of all self-love, delusion, and sham.”163 There was no question that 
on a personal level, the Catholic Church provided Hecker with discipline and direction, 
and it ultimately gave him a legacy that he seemed unable to obtain in any other way. If 
he lacked the literary talent of an Emerson or a Fuller, the philosophical ability of a 
Brownson or a Parker, and even the natural fortitude of a George Ripley or Thoreau, his 
residual influence on the hundreds of Paulist priests who eventually came through the 
order and the thousands of readers of The Catholic World was all the more impressive. 
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Sophia Dana Ripley, Ruth Charlotte Dana, and Father Isaac Hecker 
 When the newly ordained Isaac Hecker returned from his studies in Europe in 
1851, he found an old friend waiting for him. Sophia Dana Ripley, a close cousin of the 
Dana Family, had joined the Catholic Church while Hecker had been in Europe, and she 
excitedly welcomed him back.164 Like Hecker, Ripley had travelled a similar path from 
Brook Farm to the Catholic Church, only her career as a formal Transcendentalist had 
been much more sustained. She had been a “dear friend” of Margaret Fuller, who 
admired Ripley’s intellectual authenticity and consulted Ripley when she pioneered her 
innovative intellectual conversations for women in Boston.165 Ripley also wrote several 
articles for The Dial, attended meetings of the Transcendental Club, and with her 
husband George worked tirelessly to ensure the success of Brook Farm.166 
 At Brook Farm, Hecker had been particularly attracted to Ripley's sacrificial, 
spiritual life—a life he was just then theorizing for himself. He thought her “a highly 
intellectual women” who unified the life of the mind with a spirit of service.167 “Her 
desire to realize a social life more noble and Christian than was ordinarily practiced in 
the world,” Hecker declared, “led her to take a full share in the menial duties of the 
establishment.”168 But at Brook Farm, Hecker admired Ripley largely from a distance, 
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while presciently feeling a unique similarity between them. “Tis strange that I feel the 
presence of Mrs. Ripley so near me as I have for this week [past],” he confided in his 
diary upon returning to New York. “It is not alone her nearness to me but her oneness 
with me, her near natural relationship, when I have not heretofore felt this at any time, 
in her presence or otherwise.”169 Thus, when Hecker returned from Europe as a newly 
minted priest, he and Ripley became fast friends, and Hecker became her confessor and 
spiritual director from 1851 until her death in 1861.  
 But Hecker had little direct influence on Sophia's conversion to Catholicism. 
Instead, Ruth Charlotte Dana, Richard Henry Dana Sr.’s beloved daughter, served as 
Ripley’s primary confidant and spiritual influence. Charlotte had been an ardent student 
of James Marsh’s thought, asking her brother Edward for reports of the Burlington 
professor’s teaching, as she was “very much interested in those sort of things.”170 
Sometime in the early 1840s, Charlotte converted to Roman Catholicism, demonstrating 
an independence of spirit, as her brother, Richard Jr., and her father eventually became 
devout Anglo-Catholics. She had pre-empted them in a vigorous study of the Oxford 
Movement’s Tracts for the Times (1833-1841); Dana Sr. reported that she had made 
herself “master” of them, while he had only briefly read them.171 Charlotte’s conversion 
did not disrupt the family relationships, however, and instead drew Isaac Hecker into the 
Dana family’s orbit and esteem. Dana Sr., who rarely resisted making acerbic barbs at 
any position contrary to his own, helped Charlotte obtain a Roman breviary, visited 
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Roman Catholic services with Sophia Ripley, kindly received Hecker at his home, and 
encouraged Hecker’s influence on his daughter.172   
 From the mid-1840s until her death in 1861, Sophia Ripley’s numerous letters to 
Charlotte testified to an intimate union that they alone shared as kindred, intellectuals, 
women, and converts to an alien religion. It was Charlotte who escorted Ripley to the 
latter’s first Holy Week mass, quickening Ripley’s interest in Catholicism, and Charlotte 
also introduced her to the Roman breviary and other devotional items.173 By May, 1847, 
Ripley had begun to refer to the Catholic Church as “our Church” and while still 
harboring questions, she yearned to partake in the Catholic Eucharist.174 
 
From Brook Farm to the Breviary 
 Ripley’s initial attraction to Catholicism came from her passionate commitment 
to the communitarianism of Brook Farm, requiring as it did a level of sacrifice 
approaching the saintly. In February 1844, she wrote excitedly to Charlotte that Brook 
Farm was now “organising [sic] our labor and education according to the strictest 
principles of [Fourierist] Association” and that association served as her church and her 
“sacred cause.”175 Like her husband, George, she hoped that the communitarian 
experiments of the 1840s would replace the established churches. In the same letter she 
also informed Charlotte that reading books about the Catholic monastic communities at 
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Port Royal, La Trappe, and La Grange Chartreuse nurtured her zeal. “[T]hese I have 
perpetrated on your Father [Richard Henry Dana Sr.],” she explained, “but precious tales 
of the last days and death bed scenes of the exiled nuns and old servants of Port Royal 
which would make the room fragrant with the odour of sanctity, I must keep locked up in 
my own breast, till I see you again.”176 Though Brook Farm was her church, she drew 
strength from the examples of saints. Her dabbling in Catholic spirituality was not 
entirely idiosyncratic among the Brook Farmers. Besides Hecker’s Catholic questioning 
during his tenure, the quirky Charles Newcomb—sporting long, dark hair, gold 
spectacles, and a memorable guffaw—kept an altar in his room with portraits of Jesus 
and the saints, though he never did convert to the Catholic Church.177 
 In March 1846, disaster struck as fire consumed Brook Farm’s newly constructed 
and uninsured main building. As the building burned, Ripley could not even bring 
herself to watch, knowing full well that the Farm’s debt from the building would now 
sink the experiment.178 She had labored incessantly for six years to realize this heaven on 
earth, only to see it consumed in a conflagration which to her must have seemed like 
hell-fire. Even before the fire, Ripley had begun to fuse Catholic spirituality with the 
ideals of Brook Farm, consecrating her school to “our blessed mother.”179 But throughout 
1846 she still saw the goals of Association as commensurate with those of the Catholic 
Church. Aligning herself with liberal French Catholics like Frederic Arnaud, she sent 
Charlotte copies of The Harbinger—the Brook Farm reform-minded intellectual 
magazine overseen by her husband George—explaining that the periodical was “like a 
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precious child to me.”180 The childless Ripley did not say precisely what she meant by 
“precious child,” but the periodical certainly united the two primary aims of her life to 
date: intellectual culture and communitarian reform.  
 Ripley's conversion to Catholicism, unlike Hecker’s, did not come primarily from 
a desire for institutional authority that could sustain her communitarian impulses, 
though her avid social work demonstrated a commitment to institution building. 
Although she did become disillusioned with Fourier and radical Associationist visions 
during her conversion and although her communitarian impulse continued as a lay 
benefactor and worker for convents and Catholic charities, Ripley maintained that her 
initial faith in the Church was “a union of my intellect with God . . . [which] was growing 
clearer and firmer every day; [and which] filled my imagination completely.”181 The 
authority of both the intellect and the imagination in the conversion process embraced 
the Romantic epistemology by now common in transcendental circles.   
 The authority of the imagination was so common in fact, that Ripley seemed to 
assume it and not develop it particularly clearly. She was less intellectually articulate 
than her husband George or her friend, Margaret Fuller—at least on Fuller’s account. 
According to Fuller, Ripley “usually goes higher and sees clear than [George] does,” and 
though she had “confidence in her,” Fuller found it difficult at times to “understand her 
mental processes” causing Ripley to appear “factitious at first.”182 Ripley had minimal 
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taste for Coleridge, and it is unclear whether she read other important commentators on 
the imagination, such as Wordsworth, Emerson, or Carlyle.183 Her primary intellectual 
influences were French writers, such as the Abbe Martinet—a Gallican priest and 
Catholic apologist—and his theory of the imagination relied on François-René de 
Chateaubriand.184 Chateaubriand’s appeal to the imagination dominated his Genius of 
Christianity (1802), but his technical definition of it remained vague, even by his own 
admission.185 Still, Martinet’s and Chateaubriand’s understanding of the imagination was 
clear enough in a general Romantic sense. It worked with the intellect as an equal or 
even superior avenue to truth—like so many romanticist writers they were not always 
clear on this point.186 It was both a creative faculty of geniuses, artists, and poets and also 
a receptive faculty possessed by all to enjoy such creations, and it operated on “the heart” 
and “the feelings” bringing them into union with the intellect.187 Ripley had come to 
associate art and philosophy as equal avenues to truth as early as 1841, when in The Dial 
she wrote: “Phidias [the sculptor] sits by the side of Plato uttering in marble, as his 
brother philosopher in words, his profound interpretation of all that had gone before.”188 
She equated the ability of both the philosopher and the sculptor to crystalize and 
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communicate the “immortal” essence of Greek history and culture.189 Likewise, the 
visible and auditory forms of Catholic worship increasingly captivated Ripley.  
 But while Ripley embraced the imagination as an avenue to truth, throughout her 
life she was even more concerned that women be ascribed intellect equal to that of their 
male counterparts. In her boldest and most important contribution to The Dial, Ripley 
had excoriated the prevalent notions of female domesticity, intellectual inferiority, and 
even gender difference. She railed against the clergy in particular for teaching women 
“what lovely beings they may become, if they will only be good, quiet, and gentle, attend 
exclusively to their domestic duties, and the cultivation of religious feelings, which the 
other sex very kindly relinquished them as their inheritance.”190 She dismissed any 
idealized notion of feminine beauty as an attempt to mollify women while circumscribing 
them within a clearly defined sphere; such idealization was simply false. “All adjusting of 
the whole sex to a sphere is vain, for no two persons naturally have the same. Character, 
intellect creates the sphere of each” (362). She insisted that whatever religion one 
embraced, it must grant to the sexes equal intellectual powers and equal standards; there 
could be no “different qualities of head and heart” (363). She encouraged women in their 
current situation to “bring out all the faculties of the soul” and educate themselves to 
thereby find their place in society, and not simply the home (364–365). Their “own 
individuality should be as precious” as any man's love, she insisted, and she concluded 
that there was no difference between the ideal woman and the ideal man (366).   
 Ripley retained her strident commitment to the intellect even after her 
conversion. She sought to reconcile modern geological discoveries with the biblical 
account of creation, at least in her own mind, and she translated several lengthy—and in 
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some cases philosophically sophisticated—Catholic texts.191 She also refused to play a 
docile role in intellectual conversation and confessed that she knew she could come 
across as a “scarecrow” to some.192 On one such occasion Leonard Woods Jr., who was 
apparently friends with the Ripleys, became the object of Sophia’s candid reflections. 
“Where is Pres. Woods?” she wrote to Charlotte, “I do believe he has been here and given 
me the slip, lest I should persist in dragging him to the Episcopal Residence. He 
recollect[s] the evening when you made me appear so bold and forward in his eyes.”193 It 
seems that the sharp-witted Ripley in her newfound Catholic piety sought to press the 
Catholic-sympathizing Presbyterian president to a logical consistency he would rather 
have avoided, whether from an ecumenical temperament or the desire to retain his 
professional status as president of Bowdoin College.194 In any event, Ripley was keenly 
aware that she could be perceived as an intellectually forward woman, a stigma Margaret 
Fuller also had to endure.195 
  But while Ripley's conversion to Catholicism involved the intellect and the 
imagination on her account, the underlying motivations were also personal and 
psychological. “I saw that all through life my ties with others were those of the intellect 
and imagination and not warm human heart ties,” she wrote a few years after her 
conversion, “that I do not love anyone and never did, with the heart, and of course never 
could've been worthy in any relation.”196 She characterized all of her reform efforts as an 
attempt to “repair the injury of this deathlike coldness,” and she saw her own heart as 
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“stony soil,” unable to feel either religious warmth or warm affections toward others.197  
Ripley’s depiction of her heart as “stony soil” unsuitable to the organic growth of faith or 
affection poignantly recapitulated Brook Farm’s demise, as it also suffered year after year 
from stony, New England soil resistant to even the most saintly effort.198 But even more 
poignant was her declaration that she “never could have been worthy in any relation,” 
which referenced a deep wound left by her absent father, the feckless Francis Dana. The 
same man who had squandered the Dana family fortune in speculation—undermining 
Richard Henry Dana Sr.’s hope for a smooth intellectual career—had abandoned his 
daughter Sophia and the rest of his family when she was only a few years old.199 At some 
point Francis returned home to Boston, but throughout the 1850s he adamantly refused 
to see, let alone reconcile with, his daughter. Ripley’s numerous letters from the period 
thus rang with an enduring grief.200 
 In the Catholic Church, Sophia found both a rehabilitated heart and the 
affirming, familial warmth whose absence had precipitated the problem in the first place. 
She made a full confession of her lifelong struggle to Archbishop John Hughes in New 
York, fully expecting rebuke and judgment. She found instead gracious encouragement 
as the Archbishop pointed out that many of the great saints, particularly St. Theresa of 
Avila, had labored for years under the curse of a cold heart. “At these words which came 
to me as from an angel, I passed, as it were, from death unto Life,” Ripley exulted.201  
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Moreover, the nuns and priests of the Church served as an extensive family to her. “I feel 
almost at home with them now,” Ripley wrote after visiting the Sisters of Mercy convent, 
“and I go to their blessed house as I should go to my own kindred.”202 As she continued 
to worship and minister with the nuns and seek spiritual direction from various priests, 
she even began to see “Catholic kindness”—replete with warm embraces and, on one 
occasion, a kiss on the lips—“[as] sweeter and richer and warmer . . . even than the love 
of kindred.”203 In some ways the role of priest as father and the female authority of a 
Reverend Mother gave Ripley an affirming and stable environment from which to pursue 
her social causes without the frenetic desire to prove her righteousness and affection to 
herself through social service. “I can't tell you how inexpressibly sweet it is, when [Father 
Hecker] and Revd. Mother direct me as if I were a servant or little child, gently but with 
authority about little matter[s] they wish me to attend to for them. It seems to me I am a 
child, for the first time. One of their children.”204 
 Ripley's psychological confessions to Charlotte might be read as an unfortunate 
infantilizing of a once daring intellectual woman. But Ripley was aware of the problem. 
“Woman in her thirst for affection, and in the prospect of loneliness is not to be trusted,” 
she averred.205 Nor was she content to play only the role of the docile woman or child in 
her post-conversion life. On one occasion, after visiting Jeremiah Cummings and 
Ambrose Manahan—the learned rectors of St. Stephen’s Church with Roman doctorates 
and connections—she proudly confessed, “I am afraid I was not womanly!”206  Moreover, 
she had insisted to Charlotte that her conversion had been initially that of the intellect 
and imagination, only then leading to the more fulfilling life of her Catholic family. But 
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the celebration of the imagination and the familial, and indeed tactile, warmth that 
Ripley found were not mutually exclusive. Both revealed a spiritual craving for physical 
form. Just as Hecker needed an embodied guidance by which to realize his spiritual 
vocation, Ripley found in the Catholic Church tangible forms for her own spiritual needs. 
 But how could she reconcile and explain her conversion to a prescriptive, 
patriarchal institution as at least commensurate with female power and agency, if not 
consistent with the goals of her earlier transcendental feminism? Had she the formidable 
intellect of her old friend Margaret Fuller—which she did not—she might have penned 
apologetic texts. But Ripley differed from Fuller in that communitarian social reform 
drove Ripley, both in her days at Brook Farm and during her post conversion 
Catholicism, whereas Fuller’s primary impetus was the intellectual self-culture so suited 
to her almost unique abilities. Even Fuller, whose boss was the eccentric, avant-garde 
editor Horace Greeley, had to sign her articles with an anonymous asterisk in order to 
court readers who would unknowingly applaud her “bold and manly independence” of 
thought.207 Moreover, if Fuller and others struggled under the lack of any institutional 
support for intellectual women, Ripley’s Catholic position made her project doubly 
marginal as a member of an alien religion.208 
 
Translating a Feminine Faith 
 In the end, Ripley found translation to be a powerful intellectual medium that 
could chart a middle way between the diaries, letters, and general reading, which usually 
circumscribed the antebellum female intellect, and the sermons, lectures, and 
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intellectual publishing available to their male counterparts.209 In particular, Religion in 
Society, or the Solution of Great Problems Placed within Reach of Every Mind, written 
by Abbe Martinet, provided a way for Ripley to articulate both a Romantic intellectual 
vindication of her conversion and a powerful vision of Catholic femininity. As she 
explained to Orestes Brownson, “Though the form of the work is popular, it bears the 
marks on every page, of the most profound thought and patient labour, and an almost 
supernatural insight into the intellectual habits and tendencies of all classes and 
conditions of men from rationalistic Germany to rationalistic and ultra transcendental 
Massachusetts.”210  
 Religion in Society (1850) articulated nearly all of the arguments and categories 
now common in Cautious Romantic discourse. Though the work did not carefully 
distinguish between Reason and Understanding as Marsh had done—Ripley seemed to 
prefer French sources to Coleridge—Martinet employed many of the other categories 
seen in Coleridge’s, Dana Sr.’s, Marsh’s, Brownson’s, and Hecker’s work. Utilizing the 
same distinction between apprehension and comprehension, Martinet argued that 
reason could be trusted within its proper sphere, but that fully embracing reason led one 
to recognize reason’s own limits; reason could be both used and abused.211 Like Hecker, 
Martinet thought that reason raised mandatory questions, which it could not fully 
answer apart from revelation: “What am I? Whence do I come? Where am I going?” 
(1:11). He maintained that indifference, pantheism, and atheism could not answer these 
questions. Martinet thought that indifference was intellectually lazy, and pantheism was 
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too permissive to condemn individual immorality of any kind. Against atheism, Martinet 
employed conventional theistic arguments that the origin of the universe, design in 
nature, and the mind’s ability to conceive of perfection and infinity all justified belief in 
God, adding that all human societies possessed a belief in a higher, spiritual power 
(1:12–41).  
 But could the paradoxical mysteries of Christian revelation really comport with 
reason? Martinet insisted that there was no “truth in the natural order which [we] 
entirely comprehend” and that most of what humans commonly believed and even 
claimed as knowledge they had gained only by trusting the authority of others (1:166-
169). Spiritual apprehension or the discriminating assent to just a few “mysteries,” as 
opposed to complete intellectual comprehension, could yield “an abundance of 
historical, moral, and philosophical knowledge,” according to Martinet (1:168). Just as a 
young student trusted Newton and Kepler and might never fully comprehend their 
systems, so an unbeliever might trust the historical, moral, and philosophical knowledge 
of the Church (Ibid.). 
 But while Martinet thought reason established God’s existence, spiritually 
apprehending the rationality of Christian revelation involved two appeals utilized by the 
other Cautious Romantics: the Marshian appeal to internal spiritual reflection and the 
belief in the reliability of the imagination. Spiritual apprehension and faith came by 
“enter[ing] into [one]self, and ris[ing] by reflection” or by the imagination, by which 
artists “translat[ed] . . . the interior results” of spiritual apprehension into the external 
forms of “fine arts, expressions, [and] images” (1:80, 1:232). Martinet relied on 
Chateaubriand to ground his theories of the imagination, and Martinet distinguished 
between reason—using the word in its traditional sense—and the imagination. However, 
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the belief that the imagination—the ability to create and to receive art—was a reliable 
route to religious truth was akin to Romantic trust in the faculty. Religion in Society 
replicated numerous other appeals already discussed in this dissertation—Pascal, 
mystery, Christ the Word (Logos)—but it pressed the egalitarian argument most 
strongly: 
[H]uman thought alone becomes immeasurably enobled [sic] and elevated by its union 
with the divine thought. . . . There alone is found true equality, minds enlightened by the 
same knowledge, and wills restrained by the same duties. Governing and governed, 
pontiffs and people, the highest genius and the lowest intellect, descend to the same level, 
or rather rise on the wings of faith, to the height of the same conceptions. In the order of 
necessary truth, Bossuet and Fenelon know nothing which a peasant boy of twelve years 
old does not know as well as they.212 
 
Again and again, Martinet appealed to this egalitarian sensibility, which is why his title 
claimed to place the great problems of existence within the reach of every mind.213 All 
could possess what the Catholic Church counted as spiritual knowledge, and within its 
fold one could allegedly find a place where all were equal before God.  
 Religion in Society concluded with a lengthy and intriguing addition to these 
themes common to Cautious Romantic consciousness, which helped Ripley unify her 
new faith with her concerns to vindicate woman. Ripley embraced Catholicism for its 
comprehensiveness, its egalitarianism, its praise of the imagination, and its alleged 
celebration of reason. The church was “a great nation” as she remembered Isaac Hecker 
saying, but “we are [also] to find in that nation a town and house to live in, suited to our 
wants.”214 Beyond all the arguments for Romantic Catholic orthodoxy, Religion in 
Society ended with a lofty veneration of the Virgin Mary as the new Eve and an explicit 
claim that the Catholic Church celebrated “heroes . . . of either sex.”215 “In the plan of 
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regeneration,” explained Martinet, “the woman occupies the first rank.”216 Unlike Eve 
who was named by Adam, God approached Mary directly, waiting on her consent. It was 
she who named Jesus and exercised authority over him for thirty years, whereas Adam 
only named Eve and ruled over her after the Fall. In the end, Jesus and Mary warred 
together with Miltonic valor in Martinet’s vision of Catholicism. “Satan, at the foot of the 
Cross, appeared to triumph over the Woman . . . but it was there that the victorious foot 
of Mary crushed his head, and before leaving Calvary the Sorrowing Mother hears 
heaven, earth and even the demons of hell rendering homage to the Divinity of her Son, 
and at the same time to her Divine Maternity.”217 After sixteen pages of similar 
reflections, Ripley’s translation project came to an end, insisting that anything less than 
complete veneration of the most holy human being apart from Christ was “repugnant to 
the feeling [and] the understanding of the Christian.”218 
 This was not proto-feminism. Rather than highlight an androgynous ideal of 
gender equality, Martinet’s case for Mary’s veneration turned on her explicit role as a 
mother. As such there were specifically feminine aspects to her power, and that power 
seemed quite limited if only actualized through childbirth. But on the other hand, this 
was not a republican mother with the authority only to raise children. Mary’s perpetual 
motherhood of the entire human race, male and female, her mystical participation in a 
literal incarnation, and her privileged relationship with God all rendered her a special 
symbol for Ripley who was already drawn to Catholicism for other reasons. The images 
of battles with Satan and claims such as “can one be a brother of Jesus Christ without 
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being a child of Mary?” staked out a position of power and authority unavailable in other 
forms of organized Christianity.219 Ripley heartily embraced this veneration of woman. 
She had reported to Brownson that if Religion and Society sold well, Archbishop Hughes 
wanted her to translate the final two volumes.220 The work did sell, “better than any 
Catholic book of the same stamp in America”; the first edition disappeared within a few 
months, and the work quickly went through four editions—the Dana family and George 
Ripley helping with corrections.221 But instead of translating the rest of Martinet’s text, 
she left the work to run its course with its Marian conclusion. She then turned to 
translating St. Alphonsus Liguori’s Glories of Mary (1852) and later the Life and 
Doctrine of Saint Catharine of Genoa (1874), furthering her desire to establish a robust 
Catholic vision of woman. 
 Throughout her letters she expressed a constant devotion to the Virgin Mary and 
studied female saints. Their example sustained her as she raised money for and worked 
with numerous convents, including the Sisters of Charity, the Sisters of Mercy, and the 
Sisters of the Good Shepherd. For her part, Sophia saw these institutions’ care for 
orphans, prostitutes, prisoners, and others as crucial to the life of the nation.222 The 
Sisters of the Good Shepherd esteemed her especially as a “foundress of the Institution,” 
and Ripley continued her charity work even after developing terminal breast cancer.223  
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On February 4, 1861, she died from the disease, nursed unceasingly by her husband 
George, who was aided by Charlotte and an especially saddened Dana Sr.224   
 A few days later, Ripley was laid to rest in the Dana family tomb in Cambridge. 
Richard Henry Dana Jr. and Edmund (Ned) helped to arrange the logistics, while 
Charlotte attended to the mass at George’s former Purchase Street Church in Boston. 
There was no conflict of interest however. That particular Unitarian church was now 
Catholic, an architectural symbol of Sophia’s inner transformation.225 A disconsolate 
George returned to New York, to streets “thronged with spectres” and the relics of his 
wife’s presence.226 For the next year, every day seemed agonizingly slow since “those 
solemn weeks when we were brought face to face with such a dread mystery.”227 He 
clearly loved her. Though his intellect could not embrace her faith, his imagination could 
not abandon his companion of thirty-three years. Her books and relics joined the 
prominent pictures of Mary and the Pope as “very precious and sacred as memorials” in 
the boarding-house room he now shared with himself.228 
  
George Allen: Marsh Student, Catholic Convert 
 In 1849, Sophia Ripley met an anonymous “lady from Philadelphia” who queried 
her about Catholicism and asked for a daily form of prayer. Ripley obliged the woman 
and included a letter of introduction to George Allen and his wife, Julia, in Philadelphia 
so the woman could continue her inquiries.229 Allen was Professor of Languages at the 
University of Pennsylvania, and like Ripley and Charlotte he had recently converted to 
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Catholicism. Sympathetic to the new converts in New York and Boston, Allen loaned 
them books from his library—including John Henry Newman’s Loss and Gain (1848)—to 
help foster their newfound faith.230 
 Allen was a scion of James Marsh’s educational system. Born in the tiny farming 
village of Milton, Vermont, his father, Heman Allen, was a Burlington lawyer, judge, and 
eventual U.S. Congressman. George attended the University of Vermont from 1823 until 
1826, James Marsh arriving in Allen’s senior year. “I have never felt so much reverence 
and affection for any teacher as for this great and amiable man,” Allen declared.231 Under 
Marsh’s instruction Allen developed a life-long ardor for various Romantic thinkers, 
especially Wordsworth and Coleridge, and although he later professed classical 
languages at the University of Pennsylvania, he maintained capacious interests in all 
forms of modern literature and the fine arts. 
 In August, 1828, Marsh invited Allen to temporarily replace the departed Joseph 
Torrey, Professor of Languages at the University of Vermont, who had departed on a 
two-year, studying and book-buying European tour (largely financed by his own 
independent wealth). The UVM appointment prepared Allen for his future career as a 
professor of classics, forcing him to “five years reading [in] eighteen months,” although 
he “injured [his] health most seriously by neglect of all hygienic considerations in [his] 
excessive enthusiasm for study.”232 The appointment also placed him at UVM during a 
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propitious intellectual moment. As a prized understudy, Allen aided Marsh in bringing 
out the Aids to Reflection (1829) and The Friend (1831) by proofreading, providing 
criticism, and overseeing the printing logistics.233 However, when Torrey returned in the 
summer of 1830, Allen was forced to seek other employment. After a brief and 
unrewarding flirtation with the law and an Emerson-officiated wedding to his fiancée 
Julia, Allen became an Episcopal priest in St. Albans, Vermont, until 1837. Preparing 
weekly sermons, he drew not only on theology but also on all of his literary interests, 
particularly Coleridge. “I fell back naturally upon my Coleridge reading as furnishing the 
philosophical basis of theology,” he remembered.234 
 Allen took his interests with him when in 1837 he took a professorship at 
Delaware College in Newark. Following Marsh’s example, he made Coleridge's 
Biographia Literaria and Wordsworth's poetry important staples of his curriculum.235  
His more manageable workload allowed him to write for Caleb Sprague Henry’s New 
York Review, and he contributed to the Cautious Romantic cause with an essay on the 
“Study of Works of Genius” (1837) for Henry’s first number. In that article, Allen 
advanced the Reason-versus-Understanding distinction and also maintained that 
aesthetics played an important role in religious belief. He argued that studying works of 
artistic genius cultivated the higher mental powers also utilized in religion, helping to 
alleviate skepticism by training Reason as opposed to the Understanding. Poetry in 
particular allowed one to see human “moral nature . . . this living, aspiring, enjoying, and 
suffering humanity,” as no metaphysical argument could.236 We turn to Shakespeare’s 
characters, Allen argued, to learn about human nature and ourselves and to cultivate an 
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“introspective eye . . . [to see] the ruin and disorder of nature within” (173). Like the 
other Cautious Romantics, Allen perceived the self as ruined and disordered, requiring 
redemption. At times the argument could be spurious—such as his claim that artistic 
taste and refinement were self-evident goods; at times his claims were benign—such as 
the claim that beautiful art was psychically healthful, encouraging a “placid, cheerful, 
equable temper,” which even the utilitarian John Stuart Mill would have supported 
(175). But in general, the article focused on the confluence between Romantic 
epistemology, aesthetics, and religion, and Allen insisted that the imagination could be a 
“fair . . . handmaid to the noblest exercises of religion” (177). 
 Allen’s critical categories came largely from Coleridge. Both in the article and in 
his notebooks, Allen reiterated the common Romantic distinctions between the two 
mental powers of Reason and Understanding, the two creative powers of genius and 
talent, and the two aesthetic powers of imagination and fancy.237 Reason distinguished 
humans from animals in its self-consciousness, its recognition of other minds, and its 
spiritual perception; the Understanding “provide[d] for the common wants of life . . . by 
attaining a greater mastery over nature.”238 Talent was the useful application of the 
Understanding to mastering nature, learning the rote skills from others necessary to this 
end; genius came from the mind of the individual as a “flash upon his inward eye” 
enlivening the artist’s imagination to create wholly new works that enlivened others' 
imaginations. The genius’s imagination “dissolved, reunited, moulded, and disposed by 
the law in [its own] power, whereof the original idea is developing itself” (169). 
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Imaginative genius allowed artists to translate the insights of Reason to the imagination 
of others and thereby foster their own spiritual insight. 
 Allen’s familiarity with Coleridge allowed him to defend his mentor, Marsh, when 
the latter came under attack in an affair that became known as the McVickar 
Controversy. In 1839, an Oxford-inspired High Churchman and Professor of Moral 
Philosophy at Columbia College, John McVickar, published a new American edition of 
Coleridge’s Aids to Reflection. This was the same McVickar whom Gulian Verplanck had 
hoped that Richard Henry Dana Sr. might supplant as a professor of literature at 
Columbia College in 1822. Penning his own preface to Aids, McVickar insinuated that 
Henry Nelson Coleridge—Coleridge’s literary executor—had sanctioned his edition, and 
he alleged that Marsh’s attempt to ground Christianity on epistemology “certainly is not 
the creed of the Church.”239 McVickar complained that Marsh’s essay assumed too much 
learning, was preoccupied with Congregational-Calvinist concerns, and that as an 
Episcopalian he, McVickar, was better able than was Marsh to articulate Coleridge for a 
larger audience.240 The Episcopalian Allen, intimately acquainted with the Marsh 
edition, leaped to defend his old mentor. In Henry’s New York Review, Allen pointed out 
that McVickar’s edition—including its title page—insinuated itself as the new authorized 
edition, but that in fact Henry Nelson Coleridge’s London edition lauded Marsh and 
retained his “Preliminary Essay” calling it “superior to anything [H.N. Coleridge] could 
have hoped to accomplish himself.”241 Allen continued: Marsh was no Calvinist, his 
appeals to “Evangelical Doctrines” meant the Trinity and Incarnation rather than any 
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sectarian creed, and any system purporting to be “theology” and not just blind faith had 
better take epistemology seriously.242   
 For several months, letters, copies of articles, and editions of Aids crisscrossed 
the Atlantic as the American parties sought to establish the correct interpretation of 
Coleridge’s misty text. “You would be much interested and amused by the papers and 
letters which come to me from unknown Yankees,” Henry Nelson Coleridge wrote to 
Coleridge’s son Hartley.243 In the end, Henry Nelson decidedly linked Coleridge’s legacy 
with Marsh. “I trust that you are to be the editor of the new [American] edition of 
[Coleridge’s] other works,” he wrote Marsh.244 After reviewing all the documents sent 
him by Marsh, Allen, and McVickar, Henry Nelson concluded: “The Editor, [McVickar], 
seems to me totally unfriendly, not to you only, but to Coleridge.”245 Duly chastened, the 
New York publishers immediately released a second edition of McVickar’s work in which 
they forthrightly admitted that they had altered Henry Nelson Coleridge’s own words 
and intentions.246 Though the affair was mildly vexing, Marsh remained encouraged that 
Coleridge’s thought now circulated through American culture such that “the ordinary 
interest of the Book Trade” now fought for access to the market.247 
 But George Allen was his own man, neither a fawning disciple of Marsh nor of 
Coleridge and his British legatees. He confessed to Marsh that Coleridge was not always 
consistent, particularly on theological matters, and that “if an enemy had such 
knowledge of Coleridge as I have, he could cut him up terribly.”248 He also privately 
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confessed to Marsh that he thought Henry Nelson Coleridge ran into “that wishy-washy, 
‘gelatinous’ mystic prettiness of style which appears to constitute the dialect of second-
rate Coleridge-men.”249 In 1847, after carefully following the Oxford Movement into 
increasingly Anglo-Catholic views, Allen and his family converted to Roman Catholicism.  
 The record on Allen’s conversion is sparse, as he was not interested in 
apologetics; the University of Pennsylvania at this time was largely Episcopalian, and 
many of the faculty who had voted for his appointment initially felt betrayed. Allen 
apparently had little sympathy with the Episcopalians who defended their church merely 
on the grounds that bishops provided stable, hierarchical authority, and according to his 
student, Robert Ellis Thompson, Allen also “found more of profession than of faith” 
among many ranking Episcopalians.250 He took the name Bernard for his Catholic name, 
the same saint whose program—“we must retire inward if we would ascend upward”—
guided Marsh’s “Preliminary Essay.”251 Though he had left behind the religion that he 
practiced in Burlington, there seemed some continuity to his spiritual journey. 
 Allen's identity as an American intellectual convert brought him within Orestes 
Brownson's orbit. Throughout the 1850s, Allen maintained a friendly correspondence 
with Brownson, wrote articles for Brownson’s Quarterly Review, and seemed to travel a 
continually intersecting, dialectical path with the mercurial Catholic thinker.252 While 
initially influenced by John Henry Newman, in the 1850s Allen ribbed Brownson about 
the latter’s increasing Gallicanism (the attempt to accommodate papal authority to more 
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republican principles, particularly in the distribution of power to local bishops).253 In 
1851, Allen confessed himself “as Ultramontaine [sic] as anybody can be—as you said . . . 
’of the extreme right.’”254 However, they both became anti-slavery Unionists during the 
Civil War, and then in the polemical ether of Vatican I and the debates on papal 
infallibility they again parted ways.255 Allen now embraced Newman’s careful 
accommodation to the Council’s decree on papal infallibility, while Brownson defended 
the proclamation with full vigor.256 
 
Conclusion 
 The Catholic conversions of Isaac Hecker, Sophia Dana Ripley, Ruth Charlotte 
Dana, and George Allen were all distinct, motivated by the vicissitudes of their individual 
experiences. And yet notions of a higher, spiritual Reason, theories of the imagination, 
and romanticist authors fundamentally informed their religious consciousness. Their 
stories represented the important if more diffuse role that Romantic categories played in 
what became an increasing trend of Catholic conversions in the mid-nineteenth 
century.257 Like Orestes Brownson, the other Catholic converts chose to embrace their 
Romantic epistemology and aesthetics cautiously, subsuming its potential for radical 
individualism within the authoritative structure of the Catholic Church. But for these 
converts, the tradeoff was worth it. For Hecker and Ripley at least, the Catholic Church 
provided a tangible structure that allowed them to connect with others in ways they 
could not outside of its walls. In Hecker’s case, the Church provided the communal 
context and vocation that he had been vainly seeking among the Transcendentalist 
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come-outers; in Ripley’s case, the Church provided affirming familial warmth and 
meaningful charitable work.  
 The Catholic converts differed from their Protestant brethren in the intensity of 
their yearning for concrete physical forms of religious encounter. As Hecker put it: “We 
for our part refuse to acknowledge for our Saviour, one dead and separated from us by 
eighteen centuries; nor can we admit that a book, written in a dead language by his 
disciples, containing, at best, but a small part of what he said and did, is the fountain-
source of God’s eternal and everlasting Truth.”258 The Church provided a physical form 
to provided instruction, guidance, and even answer their “pressing need of love of the 
infinite God.”259 Their choice to trade the freedom of unfettered spiritual seeking for the 
institutional stability and rich imagination of the Catholic Church also set them apart 
from the Transcendentalists. But they retained close and mutually rewarding 
relationships with other non-Catholic Cautious Romantics. This could be seen in Isaac 
Hecker’s and Sophia Ripley’s ongoing relationship with the Dana family, but it could be 
most clearly seen in the close intellectual relationship of George Allen to another 
University of Pennsylvania professor, Henry Reed. 
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Chapter 11: Cautious Anglicans: Henry Reed and Harriet Beecher Stowe 
 
Introduction 
 Although George Allen’s Catholic conversion initially alienated some friends at 
the University of Pennsylvania, he remained close with Henry Reed, Professor of 
Rhetoric and English Literature from 1835 to 1854. While Allen found the Episcopal 
Church a half-way house between his Congregational background and his Roman 
Catholic conversion, Reed remained a staunch and influential layman of the Episcopal 
Church and saw himself as an intellectual kinsman to Allston and the Danas in Boston. 
Anglicanism proved an important religious identity for other Romantic intellectuals such 
as Harriet Beecher Stowe, who sought an ecclesiastical home that embraced art, poetry, 
and music but who balked at the overweening authority of Rome. While Reed’s primary 
Romantic influence, William Wordsworth, travelled an increasingly conservative path 
from his early nature-pantheism to Anglican Trinitarianism, Stowe found her Episcopal 
faith by leaving behind a conservative, Calvinist evangelicalism. This chapter charts the 
formation of Henry Reed and Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Anglican identities, the role that 
transatlantic exchange played in their formation, and the relationships that made these 
figures Cautious Romantics. 
 
Henry Reed, George Allen, and the Romantic Imagination at the University 
of Pennsylvania 
 If Washington Allston was Coleridge’s closest American friend and James Marsh 
his primary American intellectual articulator, Henry Reed served both functions for 
William Wordsworth. Between 1836 and 1846, Wordsworth and Reed kept up a vigorous 
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correspondence ranging from the religious and spiritual union of the United States and 
Great Britain to the vicissitudes of the American market. By the mid-nineteenth century, 
Reed had developed an intellectual reputation as an important American literary critic, 
particularly of Wordsworth’s work. He edited what became the authoritative American 
edition of The Complete Works of William Wordsworth (1837, rev. ed. 1851) and a more 
concise Poems from the Poetical Works of William Wordsworth (1841), as well as the 
works of many other English poets. In addition, Reed developed several courses of 
lectures at the University of Pennsylvania that articulated Romantic conceptions of 
history, literature, and the imagination and were published posthumously in the 1850s. 
 Reed and Allen apparently became friends while Allen was at Delaware College, 
as they both shared an affinity for the Lake Poets and the Episcopal Church.1 Reed, 
whose academic reputation exceeded the other professors at the University of 
Pennsylvania, helped to secure Allen his position as Professor of Languages.2 While 
Allen’s teaching focused on classical languages, and eventually focused exclusively on 
Greek, his learning and continued inquiry ranged across the history of literature.3 He 
thus assisted Reed in editing his Lectures on English History and Tragic Poetry As 
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Illustrated by Shakespeare (1855), which enjoyed eight printings—including one London 
edition—and three different publishers from 1855 to 1876.4 
 Reed’s Lectures on English History exemplified historical method in the 
Romantic mood. He combined Shakespeare's historical plays with traditional English 
history to arrive at what Reed maintained was a richer understanding of the past. “I have 
a deep conviction,” Reed confessed, “that Poetry has a precious power of its own for the 
preservation of historical truth; that it can so revivify the past—can put such life in it—as 
to make it imperishable.”5 The doctrine of the imagination, which Allen had articulated 
in “The Study of Works of Genius,” guided Reed’s fusion of literature and history. For 
Reed, history required “that creative power . . . without which there may be acute 
intellect . . . fine talents, but there cannot be that which is known as GENIUS. I mean 
that inventive wisdom, which brings the truth to life by the help of its own creative 
energy” (16).  
 Reed called this power imagination and argued that history required it for four 
reasons, two of which authorized the use of artists in understanding history and two of 
which applied directly to the historian’s method. First, the imagination allowed an artist, 
visual or poetic, to vivify historical events such that the audience was more likely to 
remember them (16). Second, the imagination allowed an artist to help his audience 
enter into the full scope of suffering experienced by historical actors. Whereas “the 
intellect calmly comprehend[ed] the facts” and empowered a chronicler to placidly 
explain how, for example, the Earl of Flanders besieged Ghent in 1382, the poet captured 
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the “peevish, pining child, and moaning mother / [the] aged man, that in his dotage 
scolds, / Not knowing why he hungers . . .” (21). Reed argued that only by recurring to 
poetry and art could one gain a full understanding of the past. 
 The imagination also applied directly to the historian. Since history presented 
either “the scant materials of a dim antiquity” or “the immense accumulation [of 
materials] from . . . a later time,” a creative, synthesizing power beyond “only the logical 
processes of the intellect” was necessary to discriminate between the dizzying array of 
irrelevant details. The imagination sifted and fused historical material with the “poetic 
vision, by which the dead, the distant, are made living and present” (28). While the 
intellect—“cool reason” or “the understanding” as Reed elsewhere called it—could gather 
and analyze historical data, good history required artistic imagination to discriminate 
between irrelevant details and narrate the past in a meaningful way.6 As William James 
would later argue, the mind itself was like a sculptor engaged in a constant process of 
shaping reality and discriminating between “the primordial chaos of sensations,” and 
this shaping process often took place beneath logically articulable consciousness.7 
Finally, the imagination helped the historian overcome the overweening political and 
religious biases of his own perspective. Like Herbert Butterfield’s later iconic critique of 
Whiggish history, Reed argued that many historians were so politically minded as to see 
their own respective creeds inexorably developing from the ancients to the present.8 The 
same problem afflicted religion; Protestant and Catholic polemicists produced 
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remarkably disparate accounts of church history because their creed gave them little 
sympathy with other points of view.9 
 Reed’s language and categories illustrated the extent to which Romantic 
epistemology and aesthetics had come to influence his thinking. He embraced the 
notion—highlighted by Coleridge and Wordsworth—that the imagination was both 
productive and receptive and that inspired painters and poets revealed their insights to 
the observer’s imagination.10 Reed did not make the same claim as Coleridge that 
imagination translated the ineffable insights of Reason, but he did distinguish the 
imagination from “the practical understanding,” which he also called the “logical 
processes of the intellect,” the “mere speculative power,” and the “pride of the 
understanding.”11 But like Coleridge’s Reason, Reed thought that the imagination was 
“sovereign among the faculties of the mind” and could be trusted with humanity’s 
highest concerns.12 Many of these convictions Reed had developed as early as 1839 in a 
lengthy essay on “William Wordsworth” for Caleb Sprague Henry’s New York Review.13 
He cited Bacon, Spenser, Milton, and Coleridge in favor of “a high road to truth, a sacred 
way lighted by the highest intellectual faculty—the imagination,” which was quickened 
by retiring into “the recesses of its own being.”14  
 As with the other Cautious Romantics, Reed insisted that the inward turn could 
be trusted because the Fall had not extinguished the image of God in humankind. The 
great poets prompted this inward process. Poetry evoked in the soul of its hearer an 
ineffable desire after something for which “the world around us” did not provide “the 
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archetypes,” and “to the poet’s most enraptured strain, there issues from the recesses of 
man’s heart, an echo.”15 Like his friend, George Allen, Reed trusted the imagination as an 
avenue to religious faith. Unlike Marsh, who had worried that modern consciousness was 
in danger of turning all religion into poetry, Reed thought that poetry and revealed 
religion were worthy bedfellows, a “humble alliance for the rescue of exposed humanity” 
(27).  
 Here Reed became cautious. Although Trinitarian Protestantism had begun to 
shed its emphasis on total depravity, Reed worried that his view of the reliability of the 
inward turn and poetry’s religious function might raise Trinitarian eyebrows. “We must 
step cautiously,” he averred, “it is not uncommon . . . [that] the state of man since the fall 
is fearfully exaggerated” (13). Responding to potential orthodox critics, Reed insisted 
that poetry and introspection could be trusted precisely because the inward turn revealed 
humankind’s dual nature; it gave voice to the “self-condemning spirit in each mortal 
bosom” and the “fitful aspirations for its native brightness” (13-14). In a Pascal-flavored 
locution, Reed argued that poetry—from the ancient Greeks to Wordsworth—established 
“consciousness of our mingled nature” (13, 16).16 The celestial bliss of the immortals 
haunted Pindar, Shakespeare spoke of the poet “glanc[ing] from heaven to earth, and 
earth to heaven,” and Wordsworth’s autumnal scenes of “leafy shade, unfaded, yet 
prepared to fade” all fostered the belief in humanity’s dual nature and a spiritual reality 
beyond the disappointing world of sense (15-18). Reed then turned to Wordsworth’s own 
prose to explain the principle further, the “true sorrow of humanity . . . [was] that the 
course and demands of action and life so rarely correspond with the dignity and intensity 
of human desires,” and poetry captured this reality more than any logical argument (26). 
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This was, in Wordsworth’s words, “poetry—passionate for the instruction of reason,” just 
as “religion—ma[de] up the deficiencies of reason by faith” (28). While Coleridge and 
Marsh had pursued reason to its horizon to authorize their step of faith, Wordsworth—
on Reed’s reading—used poetry for a similar result. 
 
Transatlantic Trinitarians 
 The faith that Reed had in mind was Trinitarian Christianity, a creed that placed 
both him and Wordsworth in the company of the other Cautious Romantics. When 
Wordsworth wrote regretting the death of “his old Friend” Allston, Reed concurred, 
explaining that Allston and Dana Sr. had been likeminded standard-bearers in a hostile 
intellectual environment.17 “They were both free . . . from all taint of the Socinianism 
[Anti-trinitarianism] which a good deal vitiates the intellectual atmosphere of that 
section of country, [Boston], in which they lived.”18 The early Wordsworth had 
abandoned historical Christianity for a pantheism more resilient to Enlightenment 
assault, but by the time Reed established his friendship with Wordsworth, the poet had 
become an Anglican Trinitarian. His Ecclesiastical Sonnets, which first appeared in 
1821/22 but continued to be revised, demonstrated a palpable affection for “the 
incarnate Lord . . . whose lifeblood flowed, the price / Of your redemption.”19  
Wordsworth also spoke of God’s Spirit, which “Broods . . . the mystic Dove” over both 
nature and the established church built by human hands, equal manifestations of God’s 
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Spirit.20 Characteristically, Wordsworth refrained from sustained metaphysical 
speculation on the Trinity, preferring to hold it as a “sacred mystery” arising from the 
divinity of Christ rather than as a technical metaphysical doctrine.21 He despised 
Unitarian rejections of Christ’s divinity and Athanasian technicalities equally.22 But 
Wordsworth’s invocation of Trinitarian “mystery” was fully in keeping with Marsh’s and 
Coleridge’s ultimate characterization of the doctrine, and just as he left Coleridge to 
philosophy in Germany while composing his own poetry in a quite cabin, Wordsworth 
left the full-fledged Trinitarian speculation to those like Coleridge who were more 
inclined. 
 But Wordsworth’s later creed remained much more inflexible than in the days of 
his early poetry and placed him now within the discourse of the Cautious Romantics. He 
wholeheartedly rejected the transatlantic brotherhood—the “Par nobile Fratrum”—of 
Emerson and Carlyle.23 “Do you know Miss Peabody of Boston?” he wrote to Reed, “She 
has just sent me with the highest eulogy certain Essays of Mr[.] Emerson. Our Carlyle 
and he appear to be . . . two present Philosophers, who have taken a language which they 
suppose to be English for their vehicle, and it is a pity that the weakness of our age has 
not left them exclusively to the appropriate reward[,] mutual admiration. Where is the 
thing which now passes for philosophy at Boston to stop?”24 Wordsworth’s unwillingness 
to grant Emersonian language or philosophy a single complement demonstrated just 
how conservative the aging poet had become. Even the committed Episcopalian George 
Allen had expressed sympathy with Emerson’s Romantic daring, which Allen thought 
stirred the waters of the equally stagnant Unitarian and Trinitarian religious springs. For 
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his part, Reed answered Wordsworth’s rhetorical question about Emerson’s and Carlyle’s 
philosophy. “I fear that there is desperate unsoundness in their philosophical and 
theological views. You ask where is the thing they now call philosophy at Boston to stop? 
It has assumed all the various phases of Socinianism, and with the restlessnesss of that 
heresy, it seems to be travelling to infidelity and pantheism.”25 Reed clearly shared the 
other Cautious Romantics’ frustration with the Transcendentalists.  
 
Ties of Culture, Chains of Silver: Wordsworth, Reed, and “The Transatlantic 
People” 
 Wordsworth’s theology, articulated in the Ecclesiastical Sonnets, was first and 
foremost an ecclesiology—a theory of the institutional role of the Church of England in 
society. Indeed, this theme guided Wordsworth’s narrative more strongly than any other. 
It was the Church of England, organically evolving across time but resolutely rooted in 
Britain’s physical space, that civilized the repeated waves of barbarians that afflicted 
Britain’s shores and tamed the violence inherent in human nature.26 Moreover, the 
Church provided spiritual consolation from birth to death through its sacraments, and in 
its liturgy gave bardic voice to all the faithful as they approached God’s throne, “harp in 
hand.”27 At times the Church worked with nature; at other times she eclipsed nature 
when nature, in the dead of winter, could no longer enflame the cold heart.28 All the 
while, the Church of England carefully navigated between the dangerous, and at times 
violent, excesses of popery and Protestantism—whether its arid scholasticism or its 
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enthusiastic evangelicalism—to establish a “golden mean” between high and low church 
religion.29  
 The view that the Anglican Church served as a stabilizing institution, both 
intellectually and socially, helped to foster a unified, transatlantic cultural identity 
between Reed the Episcopalian and Wordsworth the establishment poet. Just like 
Wordsworth, Reed thought that the Episcopal Church provided a model of discipline, 
only Reed applied the view to American democratic institutions. “The Church [of 
England] in this country has moved onward in perfect harmony with our popular 
systems of government, and without any direct connection, will, I am persuaded, prove 
one of the indirect means of checking any tendency in those systems to irregularity, for 
the Church carries along with it a spirit of discipline.”30 The transition out of Erastian 
strictures required careful accommodation to a disestablished America, but according to 
Reed, Episcopal reverence, hierarchy, and charity helped to tame the excesses of political 
democracy and the market. “Political Economy,” Reed complained, which was now 
“assumed to be sole arbiter” in social questions, lacked the spiritual understanding of 
“that brotherhood of man and man that exists in the Church, but can be found in no 
political system that ever was devised by human skill.”31 Wordsworth concurred, 
insisting that “the higher principles of Christianized humanity, and humble-minded 
Brotherhood” and the Church’s teaching of “fraternal equality” were essential to tame the 
rich in an England devoid of the “old feudal dependencies and relations.”32 Of course, 
such niceties might prove to be so much fusty cant, cloaking the class privilege of two, 
well-established intellectuals; Brownson certainly accused Wordsworth of such 
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posturing. But Wordsworth pressed the point frequently in the Ecclesiastical Sonnets, 
suggesting that the sentiment at least was genuine, and his poetry of “universal 
inclusiveness” inspired liberal social reformers within the Church of England such as 
F.D. Maurice.33 
 To further foster the religious and cultural union of the two countries, Reed 
suggested that Wordsworth revise his Ecclesiastical Sonnets to include a sonnet on the 
consecration of American bishops immediately following the American Revolution in 
1787. That act, Reed maintained, demonstrated the “admirable spirit of ecclesiastical 
love prevailing on both sides,” underscored by the fact that one of the bishops, William 
White, had been chaplain to the revolutionary Congress.34 Wordsworth not only acceded 
to Reed’s post-revolutionary suggestion but also extended his reflections back to 
Plymouth, bringing America within the scope of his grand historical argument about the 
Church of England. Despite his previous celebration of Archbishop William Laud as an 
exemplary example of the Anglican synthesis, Wordsworth praised the “Blest Pilgrims . . 
. by sovereign Conscience sanctified” whose “Spirit from the woods ascend / Along a 
Galaxy that knows no end, / But in His glory who for Sinners died.”35   
 Here Wordsworth accorded the American Puritans several of his Ecclesiastical 
Sonnets’ most important themes: liberty of conscience, union with nature, and pious 
Christology. According to Wordsworth, the same conscience and virtue that had led to 
the Puritan errand into the wilderness now drew many in the American church back to 
the benefits of “Rite and Ordinance.”36 Wordsworth abstained from even the slightest 
whiff of political haughtiness; he characterized Americans as politically “freed” from 
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English oppression.37 But they were now becoming “[p]atriots informed with Apostolic 
light,” and where political “force had severed” the two nations, “England’s Church . . . 
[and] the seed / Of Christian unity” were now linked through a grand religious 
institution that transcended political creed.38 
 But for all the railing against immoral avarice in favor of the transatlantic 
spiritual union of Anglicanism, the two nations remained linked in the vice-grip of a 
mutually dependent, transatlantic political economy. In the 1830s, surging demand for 
cotton, relatedly speculative territorial expansion, and a Whig appetite for internal 
improvements lured British capital into American state bonds at unprecedented levels.39 
By mid-1836, the overextended Bank of England’s specie reserves had fallen 
precipitously low. To correct the imbalance, the Bank not only raised interest rates on 
new loans but also refused to grant further credit to British firms whose capital had 
fueled a large portion of the American boom. Within a few months, British investment 
capital declined and cotton demand slowed substantially, interest rates in New York hit 
24%, and some 93 New York firms collapsed, sparking an economic panic that dragged 
on from 1837 well into the 1840s.40   
 Wordsworth—no longer the starving poet of Dove Cottage but now the sinecured 
sage of Rydal Mount—could not withstand the allure of cashing in on American avarice, 
whatever its morally questionable nature. Indeed, as the financial pressure on over-
extended state banks and bonds began to mount, Wordsworth’s and Reed’s 
correspondence began to ring with ritualistic requests for information on the Bank of 
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Pennsylvania and Mississippi. Close friends and family members were heavily invested 
in Pennsylvania, where foreign investors held two-thirds of the state’s bonds.41 
Wordsworth’s brother Christopher, the retired Master of Trinity College, Cambridge, had 
been “induced by the aspect of things at home, to confide the whole of his savings during 
rather a long life, to what he thought the stability of Pen[n]Sylvania [sic] credit,” and 
William thus continually queried the Philadelphian Reed about the state of 
Pennsylvania’s finances.42  
 The situation in Mississippi was much worse. As a gentleman, Wordsworth never 
spoke in numbers about his own investments, and it seems that his own personal 
fortune—which at this period amounted to £6000 of available invested assets—was 
wisely invested elsewhere.43 But Wordsworth was financially responsible for many 
people, including his unmarried daughter Dora and his wife’s sisters, Sara and Joanna 
Hutchinson. He had invested a combined £2230 of these three women’s money in state-
backed Mississippi banks, which froze interest payments in 1839 and eventually 
repudiated the entire principal of their outstanding obligations.44 While Pennsylvania 
eventually resumed its interest payments, Wordsworth was only able to recover $2250 of 
the Mississippi funds, which at the average exchange rate for the period amounted to 
22% of the principle.45 The sum, when compared with Wordsworth’s own fortune, was 
substantial. It might as well have been his own money, for as he explained to Reed, these 
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women “could so ill spare the loss” and the affair left him altering his own will to see that 
they were properly cared for.46 
 To assuage the afflictions of mammon, Wordsworth turned to the muse, the 
church, and to God to punish the “dishonours [sic] . . . [of] the Transatlantic People.”47  
In one sonnet, he appealed to their common heritage. “Think ye your British ancestors . . 
.  / From unsubmissive necks the bridle shook / To give, in their Descendants, freer vent 
/ And wider range to passions turbulent.”48 To the Pennsylvanians he composed another 
sonnet to enshrine their “state dis-honour black as ever came / To upper air from 
Mammon’s loathsome den” in future editions of his work, despite Reed’s protests.49 He 
abandoned the Mississippians “to utter profligacy [which] in the course of a righteous 
Providence will be doomed to suffer for their iniquity.”50 And he sent an outraged letter 
on Mississippi to the Episcopalian Bishop, George Washington Doane, who published 
the letter in The Banner of the Cross (an Episcopal publication), the Philadelphia 
Gazette, and the National Intelligencer.51 Though hardly Wordsworth’s best literary 
performance, his outrages captured the frustration on both sides of what Reed more 
coolly characterized as “a fatal facility in lending on the one side mated to a fatal facility 
of borrowing on the other.”52 Though the bonds between Wordsworth and Reed were 
cultural and religious, they were also partially forged in silver. 
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Anglo-American Diplomacy and Abolitionism 
 While the Panic of 1837 highlighted problems with the Anglo-American bonds of 
silver, British investors were as amenable as ever to the westward expansion of King 
Cotton once economic conditions had stabilized. Moreover, by 1846 Great Britain and 
the United States had settled territorial disputes that had aggravated diplomacy since the 
American Revolution. The Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842 finalized the border 
between Maine and New Brunswick, and a wily President Polk had secured the Oregon 
territory at the 49th Parallel while posturing with the “54° 40’ or fight” crowd.53 By the 
1850s, the bonds of silver were as strong as ever. United States exports to Great Britain—
major foodstuffs as well as cotton—more than doubled that of any competitor, and the 
United States imported 20% of British exports.54 These factors facilitated an 
unprecedented period of cultural goodwill between the two nations, which came to an 
end with advent of the Civil War.55 
 But even prior to the Civil War, the American South complicated the trend 
toward Anglo-American rapprochement. One primary issue was the Republic of Texas. 
Economic crisis had forestalled Democratic aims on Texas by making the politically 
savvy President Van Buren unwilling to inflame northern constituents by pressing for 
annexation (which Andrew Jackson had favored).56 Seeking cheaper cotton and capital 
investment opportunities, British commercial interests attempted to establish much 
closer links with the new republic.57 In this endeavor, British business enjoyed the full 
support of their government. 
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 British involvement in Texas represented a great hope for Anglo-American 
abolitionists. The British foreign minister, Lord Aberdeen, and a vocal abolitionist 
constituency linked abolition to Texas policy. Until the United States annexed Texas in 
1845, Aberdeen attempted to convince Mexico to recognize Texas—a concession 
desperately craved by the independent Texans—in exchange for emancipation. Aberdeen 
and the British abolitionists argued that Mexico benefited immensely from Texas 
abolition. If Texas could be persuaded to come further under British auspices as a great, 
free-labor, cotton republic, then the threat of United States’ annexation would be largely 
diffused, dominated as it was by the slave interest. An independent and free Texas would 
secure the rest of Mexico against US aggression.58 But with US annexation and war, 
disappointed abolitionists saw not only all hope for their ambitious Texas agenda vanish, 
they also saw the slave-driven cotton kingdom stretching potentially across the 
Southwest.59 In the interest of business and larger diplomacy, both the British and 
American federal governments had settled even more firmly into a policy of placating the 
South, failing even to protect the rights of black British sailors in a defiantly repressive 
South Carolina.60  
 As Anglo-American diplomatic and cultural relations warmed generally, political 
abolition seemed increasingly elusive. Moreover, escalating factionalism between 
American anti-slavery groups tended to bleed across the Atlantic, particularly 
challenging unity by the 1850s.61 In this context, Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s 
Cabin (1852) ignited fresh hope in British minds that their American brethren might be 
                                                   
 58 Ibid., 272-274. 
 59 Frank J. Klingberg, “Harriet Beecher Stowe and Social Reform in England,” The American 
Historical Review 43, no. 3 (April 1938): 544. 
 60 Betty Fladeland, Men and Brothers: Anglo-American Antislavery Cooperation (Urbana, IL: 
University of Illinois Press, 1972), 319–320. 
 61 Ibid., 342-343. On growing abolitionist factionalism throughout the 1840s, see Ibid., 274-301. 
Fladeland has argued that while initially stimulating to transatlantic fervor, factionalism by the 1850s had 
become “an albatross around the neck of the abolitionists” (376). 
  
481 
brought around to the enlightened ideology of free labor.62 The work made her an 
international celebrity and helped to finance three transatlantic tours in the 1850s. These 
tours made her an important participant in transatlantic institutional reform, but they 
also prompted the full flowering of Stowe’s Romantic religious consciousness. This 
consciousness had been growing since her youth. 
 
A Young Romantic: The Spiritual Journey of Harriet Beecher Stowe 
 In 1852, Richard Henry Dana Jr. caught a train from Boston to New Haven, 
Connecticut, to argue a legal case. He decided to improve the time by reading Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin, released in a complete two-volume set one month earlier by Jewett and 
Company.63 As he looked around, he noticed four more unrelated people were all 
engrossed in the same novel, and he recorded the “singular fact” in his journal.64 Just as 
his own Two Years Before the Mast (1840) had inspired New York farmers on Illinois 
stagecoaches, Uncle Tom’s Cabin’s cultural footprint was becoming ubiquitous. When 
Dana arrived in New Haven he finished preparing his case but returned to the novel for 
the rest of the evening. 
 In the 1820s, the Beecher family and the Danas had been friends and allies as 
important voices for the beleaguered proponents of Trinitarianism in Boston. Dana Sr. 
wrote occasionally for Lyman Beecher’s Spirits of the Pilgrims, and the families called on 
each other frequently. The teenage Dana boys, Richard Jr. and Edmund—not yet 
converted to the orthodoxy of their father and just blossoming into patrician manhood—
were unimpressed by the Beecher clan whom they saw as interlopers to Boston Brahmin 
culture.  
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Ned & I had not been favorable to the Beecher dynasty, adopting, perhaps, some of the 
prejudices of our Unitarian friends, but naturally repelled by their to us new & unusual 
style of manner & dress. They were careless of both, inattentive to what we had been 
sedulously taught as ‘the Minor Morals’, &, indeed, there was a want of reverence in their 
religious exercise, & a familiarity in their manner of speaking of the Most High & of the 
Savior which shocked us in Church, as much as their want of refinement did in society.65 
  
This observation occurred during Dana Jr.’s Unitarian phase, and he conceded that after 
the Beecher’s left Boston and he had converted to Trinitarianism, he could better 
appreciate the family. The exception to the case was the eighteen-year-old Harriett, 
whose combination of kindness, quick wit, and romantic charm won Dana Jr. over 
completely. She “seemed like a person that might fall in love, as well as take a pun,” he 
remembered, and he developed a teenage crush on the young woman.66  
 The families also shared a love of romanticist authors. Byron and Scott were read 
assiduously in the Beecher household, the patriarch Lyman decreeing that unlike most 
novels there was “real genius and real culture” in Scott.67 Byron’s death in 1824 was like a 
death in the family. When news reached Lyman, he reported solemnly at the dinner 
table, “My dear, Byron is dead—gone,” and after a long silence lamented, “I did hope he 
would live to do something for Christ. What a harp he might have swept.”68 The wound 
lingered as Beecher co-opted a parishioner’s funeral that Sunday to lament the 
imperishable beauty of the poet’s great language but also his “wasted life and misused 
power.”69 If Byron “could have only talked with [Nathaniel] Taylor and me,” Beecher 
often lamented, “it might have got him out of his troubles.”70 But the key difference 
between Beecher and the Cautious Romantics was that Lyman Beecher did not find 
Romantic literature, philosophy, or aesthetics applicable to orthodoxy or Trinitarian 
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theology. Instead, he aligned himself with the careful Protestant scholastic Taylor, who 
had thoroughly edited Marsh’s Coleridgeanism out of Marsh’s article “Review of Stuart 
on the Epistle to the Hebrews.”71 Lyman seemed drawn to these writers’ ability to inspire 
heroic thoughts, nothing more. 
 Harriet was different. In addition to Byron and Scott, Stowe reveled in other 
Romantic authors like Germaine de Staël. Just as the young James Marsh glimpsed in 
Romantic poetry and literature something of the spiritual life missing in New England 
Protestant orthodoxy, so Stowe lamented that her Christianity seemed devoid of literary 
or poetic seers. “[A]ll that is beautiful and lovely and poetical has been laid on other 
altars. Oh! [W]ill there never be a poet with a heart enlarged and purified by the Holy 
Spirit, who shall throw all the graces of harmony, all the enchantments of feeling, pathos, 
and poetry, around sentiments worthy of them?”72 As if responding to the altar call of the 
Muse, she audaciously hinted that she might fulfill this high calling. “He has given me 
talents, and I will lay them at his feet. . . . All my powers He can enlarge. He made my 
mind, and He can teach me to cultivate and exert its faculties.”73 Like the young 
Washington Allston, the young Harriet did not lack for ambitious pluck. Four years later, 
she confessed “an intense sympathy” with Madame de Staël’s Corrine. “All that is 
enthusiastic, all that is impassioned in admiration of nature, of writing, of character, in 
devotional thought and emotion, or in the emotions of affection, I have felt with 
vehement absorbing intensity—felt till my mind is exhausted, and seems to be sinking 
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into deadness.”74 It was these qualities that set Harriet apart from her family and drew 
the teenage Dana Jr., soon to set off on his own adventure before the mast, to the young 
writer in the making. 
 Whatever deadness Stowe’s reading interests and intensity of feeling produced, it 
did not last long. Indeed, throughout her life she seemed most often the soul of strength 
and intellectual energy, despite her own healthy portion of the physical, emotional, and 
financial stresses endured by most nineteenth-century women. In 1832, she headed west 
with her father to Lane Seminary in Ohio and married a Lane professor Calvin Ellis 
Stowe in 1836. Between 1832 and 1849, Harriet published two books and numerous 
articles, all while becoming a mother to six children. Calvin’s work frequently took him 
away from home as he raised money for the seminary via speaking tours back East. In 
these conditions, he was subject to what seems from their correspondence a fairly 
serious depression. Harriet remained stalwart. Letter after letter rang with 
encouragement and exhortation, demonstrating both the openness of their relationship 
and the resilience of her character. 
 Much of Stowe’s resilience in exhorting her husband came from a watershed 
conversion in 1843. She experienced a “baptism of the spirit” and a renewed 
commitment to Christ more powerful than any in her evangelical upbringing.75 Stowe 
explained that the experience came from a “deep immortal longing” that had haunted 
her; without a channel into Trinitarian piety it would crush her in “mania or 
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moroseness.”76 The experience was similar to that of Allston, Dana Sr., and Isaac Hecker, 
who all sought shelter from the mania or moroseness of their own experiences in an 
affective Trinitarianism. In his stories for The Idle Man, Dana Sr. in particular had 
explored the problem of improperly channeled feelings that led to the manic and morose. 
From Stowe’s newly invigorated spirituality, she frequently exhorted her theologian 
husband to look to Christ and consider that even Christ’s humblest servants probably 
knew more than he did despite his biblical learning and erudition.77   
 To encourage Calvin, she recorded a remarkable experience. She lay on her bed, 
awake but with eyes closed, and was taken up to heaven “as in a vision.”78 She saw Jesus, 
she claimed, in the dazzling “splendeurs of a regal palace” and sitting “simple as a little 
child, yet majestic as a God.”79 The letter continued, with odd dashes inserted constantly 
between perceptions and concepts, seemingly highlighting the visionary character of her 
experience.80 
There hour after hour I see applicants – each admitted alone – old feeble men, lisping 
children, - illiterate poor slaves, - the despised – the forsaken – the guilty – the despairing 
all come – those whom the world has cast out and the church rejects come – and none are 
cast out – all when they enter, feel his might – his majesty – they bow the knee – they 
tremble – yet strange to hear when they speak it is with such deep out pourings of love as 
never came to the ears of an earthly majesty – Each one – while prostrate with veiled face 
they adore – murmurs – ‘thou are the Beloved – each one, says – my God, - my Saviour, - 
my Friend – and He – is never weary – still that godlike immortal youth – that fullness of 
power, that fullness of peace rests in his glorious face.81 
 
 Stowe hoped that her experiences would rouse her husband, who she characterized as 
“vitiated in imagination” and “paralytic in spiritual sensation.”82 The visionary scenes 
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were those of Washington Allston’s Jacob’s Dream (1817, fig. 11), where Jacob’s ladder 
was not merely a thin and precarious ascent between heaven and earth, but where the 
grand, marble steps of the celestial realm descended right to the earthy foot of Jacob 
himself. In Allston’s conception heaven and earth intermingled such that one with the 
proper spiritual sense could perceive it. Likewise Wordsworth, inspired by Jacob’s 
Dream, illustrated the idea in his “Composed Upon an Evening of Extraordinary Beauty 
Splendour and Beauty” (1818) where “An intermingling of heaven’s pomp is spread / On 
ground which British shepherds tread!”83 The weary traveller needed only to “attune his 
soul to meet the dower / Bestowed in this transcendent hour!” to “with immortal Spirits 
blend” and perceive the “[w]ings at my shoulders [which] seem to play.”84  
 Indeed, during this period Stowe derived “a wild poetic thrill” from reading the 
Old Testament and perceiving the “interviews of the yet veiled WORD with Abraham, 
Isaac, Jacob, Moses, and onward.”85 She drew particular inspiration from Jacob, who 
demonstrated that God entered “into all the little plans of a shepherd’s life . . . how 
admirably did the divine WORD adapt himself; how he upheld him at every step with 
dreams and visions.”86 Stowe’s invocation of the Johannine Word (Logos) as the 
superintending revelator of dreams and visions made her of a mind with Allston’s 
Romantic Christian Platonism—Christ the informing Word inspired the heady 
inspiration of the artist. But her emphasis on Jacob as a humble shepherd, and her own 
egalitarian vision of heaven replicated the Wordsworthian impulse to celebrate “heaven’s 
pomp” spread amongst “British shepherds.” 
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 As with so many of the Cautious Romantics, Stowe’s heightened spiritual 
sensitivity was heavily prompted by personal loss. On July 1, 1843, Harriet’s brother 
George—who she called “one of my dearest friends”—committed suicide, gruesomely 
applying a double-barreled shotgun to his temple.87 In a poignant letter to her other 
brothers, Harriet ransacked the Bible with Protestant vigor to try and keep herself united 
to George. With reference after reference, she theorized that he had “joined the great 
company of those who are ‘ministering spirits sent forth to minister to those who shall be 
heirs of salvation.’”88 George had become a “fellow servant” to the angelic messengers 
and the prophets that translated between the divine and human realm.89 “O that I could 
fully feel this,” she lamented, “and that the illusion which makes it seem so much better 
to hold communion in the flesh might be dispelled!”90  
 This desire for communion with the dead—seen poignantly in Novalis’s visions of 
his departed fiancée Sophie—animated numerous forms of spiritualism in nineteenth-
century America.91 It also provided a particularly compelling impetus for many 
conversions to Roman Catholicism whose prayers, saints, masses for the dead, and other 
rituals promised greater connection to the departed. Upon losing a daughter, George 
Allen explained to Orestes Brownson, “What a wide gulf between vague actions of a 
departed spirit in some ‘intermediate state’ [in Protestantism], and the state of mind in 
which I daily and hourly beg my sweet child to pray for me, now that she is able to do 
much for me in the presence of God!”92 Hearing of her old friend Margaret Fuller’s tragic 
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drowning within sight of the New York shore, Sophia Dana Ripley mourned to Charlotte 
Dana, “What have the Fullers, poor souls! but the unmingled horror of that never to be 
forgotten shipwreck, to feed upon for the rest of their lives, if they do not seek the 
consolations of their father's house.”93 Likewise, Isaac Hecker confessed that among his 
numerous other reasons for converting to Catholicism, “I found that in the Church there 
was no impassable barrier dividing the living from the departed. That was an intense 
delight to me.”94 Prompted by her conversion and an increasingly spiritualist and 
sacramental sensibility, Stowe began to leave behind what Charles Foster has called “the 
rungless ladder” of her previous, ascetic Puritanism. Instead, she sought for what were, 
for her, the richer pastures of Romantic religion: the gradual, Platonist return of the soul 
to God through natural beauty, poetry, music, visible sacraments, and the imagination.95 
Drawing on Plato’s Phaedrus, she insisted—like Henry Reed and the other Cautious 
Romantics—that “Man’s soul, in a former state, was winged and soared among the gods” 
and that music, poetry, and visual beauty inaugurated a trustworthy quickening and 
straining toward that former greatness.96 
   
Imagining the Incarnation: The Trinitarian Performance of Uncle Tom’s 
Cabin  
 In 1850, Calvin Stowe accepted a position as professor at Bowdoin College under 
President Leonard Woods Jr.97 The family thus found themselves in New Brunswick, 
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Maine, when the passage of the Fugitive Slave Act in 1850 began to inflame Stowe, as it 
did many others. Arriving in the East, she remembered, “[we] were shocked and 
outraged by finding both in church and state, a universal bowing down to the fugitive 
slave law.”98 According to Stowe, while receiving communion in New Brunswick she 
received “almost as a tangible vision” the death of Uncle Tom and fought to hold back 
“the convulsion of tears” in public.99 After the service, she hurried home and scribbled 
down what she had seen: the first words of Uncle Tom’s Cabin (1851-2). Whether 
factually accurate or a projection of Stowe’s later affective commitment to the physical 
Eucharist, her own perception of the matter illustrated the centrality of the Incarnation 
as inspiration for the novel. 
 Stowe’s Trinitarianism applied not only to Christological typography, but also to 
the process of composition itself. She saw the Holy Spirit as the quickening power in her 
literary inspiration. “I can write such things as are given me,” she wrote to a Quaker 
friend, “but other things I cannot write even when I most desire them. . . . In this respect 
I am a full believer in the doctrine of your sect of an Inward Light.”100 Although Stowe 
was moving away from the starkness of Puritan and Quaker worship, she embraced the 
Quaker emphasis on a kindling Spirit within. Just as she had yearned for the Holy Spirit 
to empower the inspirational poets and writers of her youth, she now realized that ideal 
in herself. Moreover, her Trinitarian worldview extended not only to the composition of 
her book but also to the act of reception. “I have looked for my hope in this Anti Slavery 
matter, to the work of God[‘]s Holy Spirit on the minds and consciences of Slave 
holders[.] My mind has been much drawn out in prayer for the Holy Spirit during the 
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writing.”101 For Stowe, the Holy Spirit not only animated the literary artist, it served also 
to deliver the artist’s visions to others. Whatever impact the novel had on the consciences 
of slaveholders, it overcame Quaker scruples about novel reading as they made an 
exception to their normal restriction of the practice.102 
 The appeal to the Holy Spirit for artistic inspiration was a common trope of the 
Transcendental Trinitarians. Allston had invoked the Spirit as animating the artistic 
process and Marsh claimed the Spirit enlivened the “creative imagination . . . that magic 
power which language imparts to the genius of the poet.”103 Even Isaac Hecker had 
ventured that God, through the “invisible Spirit,” inspired “all the geniuses of the race,” 
though he never elaborated further aesthetic implications of the idea.104 Like Hecker, 
Stowe seemed to use the idea more than develop it. She tended to see writing as a means 
to her moral and spiritual ends and refrained from developing her own elaborate 
aesthetic theories or from sustained philosophical study.105 But although Stowe was no 
formal aesthetician, her view that Christ the Word revealed dreams and visions and that 
the Holy Spirit empowered the artistic process of translating spiritual vision to others 
was akin to Allston’s and Marsh’s.  
 The Romantic categories of Stowe's consciousness were on full display in the 
most important performance of her life. Tom's most important battle against Simon 
Legree came not in his final hour of death, important as that was, but in a preceding 
chapter appropriately named “The Victory.” It was not the terror of death but the soul-
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crushing grind of unremitting toil and frequent beatings—judiciously constructed to 
wound the soul but not fully incapacitate the body—that proved to be Tom’s greatest 
struggle. “He could bear torture and fire, bear anything, with the vision of Jesus in 
heaven but just a step beyond.”106 It was when “he used to come home so exhausted, that 
his head swam and his eyes failed” that his own experience compounded into the great 
problem of evil itself (552). “The gloomiest problem of this mysterious life was constantly 
before his eyes,—souls crushed and ruined, evil triumphant, and God silent” (552). Tom's 
experience was in many ways that of her husband Calvin writ large, namely the struggle 
to maintain Jacob’s Dream and Wordsworth’s vellatura blending of the spiritual and 
physical realms in the face of depression and despair. Death was as nothing compared 
with the death of the spiritual sense. It had always been the role of poets and artists to 
keep this sense alive, and for the fervent Stowe, the Bible was a primary conduit of this 
inspiration. Thus, in his affliction Tom began to see the words of the biblical “seers, poets 
and sages” flicker and die, losing all perception of “the great cloud of witnesses who ever 
surround us in this race of life” (553). In the extreme moment, Tom could only respond 
as Job: “I'll hold on. The Lord may help me, or not help; but I’ll hold to him, and believe 
him to the last!” (554). 
 When Tom's faith was at its lowest ebb, his spirit about to succumb to Legree’s 
taunts, Stowe gave Tom her own vision from 1844. In Stowe’s narrative, Tom saw the 
incarnate Christ “crowned with thorns, buffeted and bleeding” with “deep, prophetic 
eyes [which] thrilled him to his inmost heart,” and his spiritual perception returned: 
Gradually, the vision changed: the sharp thorns became rays of glory; and, in splendor 
inconceivable, he saw that same face bending compassionately towards him, and a voice 
said, ‘He that overcometh shall sit down with me on my throne, even as I also overcome, 
and am set down with my Father on his throne’ (554). 
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Just as Stowe had seen all manner of downtrodden persons approaching the glorious 
throne of Christ, so Christ appeared to Tom at his moment of greatest need and 
promised Tom a place on Christ’s throne. In her previous vision Christ sat alone, “simple 
as a little child—yet majestic—as a God,” governing all of creation; Tom now sat with 
him, or soon would.107 Which status Tom occupied was not entirely clear as Stowe 
characterized Tom’s deification as a “process . . . [of being] made a priest and a king unto 
God!”108 On her telling, Tom became as Christ, not only in his excruciating suffering but 
also in assuming the functions of Christological power: the priestly mediator between 
God and humans and thus a ruler over them.  
 Tom’s liberation employed the images, concepts, and associations common to the 
other Cautious Romantics. She drew the tag line to the entire chapter from the same 
passage with which Allston ended his poem “The Atonement,” which voiced his own 
Trinitarian conversion. “Where now, O Death, thy sting, O Grave, thy victory?” exulted 
Allston, quoting I Corinthians 15:55; “Thanks be unto God, who giveth us the victory,” 
Stowe finished the refrain two verses later.109 Stowe also characterized Tom’s renewed 
spiritual perception in quintessentially natural-supernaturalist terms: “Tom looked up to 
the silent, ever-living stars,—types of the angelic hosts who ever look down on man.”110  
Tom’s soul was, in Wordsworth’s words re-attuned “to meet the dower / Bestowed in this 
transcendent hour!” and perceive the heavenly realms revealed in nature just as the 
young Coleridge did on the leaded roofs of London.111 Moreover, after his spiritual 
liberation, Christ the Word began to appear to Tom, just as in the theophanies to the 
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patriarchs, prophets, and seers in the Hebrew Bible that so fascinated Stowe. Even 
Legree could sense that “GOD . . . was standing between him and his victim,” and she 
later related that “[t]here stood by him ONE, . . . ’like unto the Son of God,’” whom even 
the callous Sambo eventually perceived visibly.112 
 The visions that Stowe gave Tom represented a faith in the imagination very 
similar to numerous Romantic critics. To justify Tom’s vision of Christ, she resorted to a 
brief defense of the imagination’s capacity to create entirely from internal resources. 
“The psychologist tells us of a state, in which the affections and images of the mind 
become so dominant and overpowering, that they press into their service the outward 
imagining. Who shall measure what an all-pervading Spirit may do with these 
capabilities of our mortality” (555). When hope became unavailable in external vision, 
Tom experienced an empowering internal vision derived from the deepest resources of 
the self, what Stowe earlier referred to as “his deepest soul” (555). In other writings, 
Stowe seemed to agree with her formative influence, Walter Scott, that a healthy 
imagination needed to be “nourished by a constant and minute observation of nature.”113 
Scott’s theory of the imagination straddled the fully liberated trust in the faculty 
displayed by many Romantic writers and Enlightenment rationalists’ distrust of it, a 
dialectical dynamic he worked out in his novels.114 But with Tom, Stowe took one step 
further toward the Romantic faith in the imagination. For her, it could be a faculty of 
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reliable “spiritual sensation,” but like the other Cautious Romantics, she checked the 
appeal to the imagination by insisting that it needed to be guided by the Holy Spirit.115 
How could one know that the Spirit guided these visions and not delusion or the Devil? 
Stowe did not provide a direct answer, but she seemed to assume that the Spirit would 
guide one to something like Trinitarian piety as it certainly did for Tom.  
 Her characterization here was problematic, for she claimed that such visionary 
experiences were “very common among . . . the slave population,” which could easily play 
into assumptions about black mental inferiority in her nineteeth-century context.116 Her 
tendency toward racial essentialism seems even more problematic as her 
characterizations of her own visions—both in her letter to Calvin and in her eucharistic 
revelation of Tom’s death—were qualified by the phrases “as in a vision” and “almost as 
a tangible vision.”117 Stowe’s locution here might be read in three ways: either she was 
carefully qualifying her visionary experiences for her rational self, or for her rational 
audience (in which case the visions might have been stronger than she let on), or she was 
reaching out for full-fledged visions which only just eluded her. On balance, the evidence 
suggests one of the latter two interpretations. Her fascinations with Jacob’s visions, her 
use of the Holy Spirit to describe both her own poetic inspiration and Tom’s visions, and 
her desire for a spiritual union between the dead and the living all suggest that whatever 
the status of her own visions, she herself greatly desired them in all the reality with 
which she bequeathed them to Tom and other black slaves.  
 Stowe’s emphasis on imagination as spiritual sensation also highlights an 
important distinction. While she celebrated artistic creativity and even maintained that 
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literary “fiction [could be] truer than fact,” she did not have a developed aesthetic theory 
about the imagination’s role in the process of artistic creation.118 She never interacted 
critically with Coleridge, Wordsworth, Shelley, or Schlegel (though she read some of 
these writers), but she seemed rather to be preoccupied with the imagination’s role as a 
receptive faculty—though receptive in a highly liberated and spiritual way. As we shall 
see, art could play an important role in the process of spiritual vision, but Stowe was a 
successful practitioner of the creative process rather than a theorist of it. In this role she 
seemed content, for the success of Uncle Tom’s Cabin would pave the way for further 
spiritual visions in her three transatlantic tours of the 1850s.  
 
Reform and Romanticism: Stowe’s Transatlantic Awakening 
 Uncle Tom’s Cabin enjoyed even greater success in Britain than in the United 
States. The work sold 1.5 million copies in Britain and her colonies, half a million more 
than in America.119 Less than a year after its debut, eleven different companies had 
brought the novel to the British stage, and entrepreneurs of all sorts came out of the 
woodwork to offer songbooks, wallpaper, stationary, and board games based on the 
book.120 In the 1850s, Stowe enjoyed a transnational literary celebrity that was second to 
none. The success of Uncle Tom’s Cabin provoked energetic reactions from all voices, pro 
and con, British and American.  
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 There were tensions, however, to this outpouring of attention that one British 
periodical dubbed “Tom-mania.”121 For one thing, the British could not resist moralizing 
their own superior position on slavery. Many of the British publishers subtitled Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin and wrote prefaces to emphasize its Americanness, while reviewers and 
playwrights joined the publishers in censuring Americans for the egregious 
contradictions between their political ideals and the reality of slavery.122 Abolitionist 
disunity was also palpable. As just one example, William Lloyd Garrison dissuaded 
Stowe from accepting subsidies offered by the Glasow-based New Ladies’ Anti-Slavery 
Society and the New Association for the Abolition of Slavery, breakaway groups from 
Garrison’s supporters in Scotland.123 But for all the tensions, Stowe managed to inspire 
and help to unify the abolitionists. Throughout her lengthy, two-volume account of her 
travels, she continued the work of reconciliation, reporting positive encounters with 
Garrisonian, come-outer abolitionists as well as politically pragmatic groups.124 
 Crisscrossing Great Britain on her first tour in 1853, Stowe was fêted at organized 
lectures and receptions as well as by various common people she met throughout her 
travels. In Liverpool, Glasgow, Edinburgh, Aberdeen, Dundee, and numerous venues in 
London, British men and women gathered to—in the words of one hundred students at 
Glasgow University—“join with thousands on both sides of the Atlantic, who offer fervent 
thanksgiving to God for . . . the noblest testimony against slavery, next to the Bible, 
which the world ever received.”125 Evening tea drew some 2,000 people at the Glasgow 
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Antislavery Society.126 In London and Liverpool, she met with various liberal reformers 
such as the Duchess of Sutherland, Lord Shaftesbury, and Sir George Stephen.127 But 
Uncle Tom's Cabin did not just reach wealthy aristocrats or middle-class reformers; 
everywhere she went, Stowe reported school children, boatman, housekeepers, and 
landladies had all read the novel.128 
 Stowe’s transatlantic tour was both a personal Romantic bildung as well as a 
transnational conversation about social reform. Like the other Cautious Romantics, 
Stowe was quite attentive to institutions, and she spent a great deal of her time rallying 
the fractious abolitionist movement, pressing for British temperance reform, and 
studying British settlement houses. But upon encountering a much more richly aesthetic 
Christianity, she also came to appreciate art, music, and architecture as conduits of the 
spiritual life, eventually equating them with sacraments. While it might seem difficult to 
reconcile Stowe’s commitment to real-world social reform with some of her imaginative 
flights of revelry, she herself consciously wrestled with just this question. “The poetic 
mind is not always the progressive one,” she reflected, “it has, like moss and ivy, a need 
for something old to cling to and germinate upon.”129 But referencing her and the British 
Romantics’ favorite seer, Shakespeare, she wondered “it is not quite certain, after all, 
that Shakespeare might not have been a reformer in our times. One thing is quite certain, 
that he would have said very shrewd things about all the matters that move the world 
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now.”130 Like Isaac Hecker, she saw her own reform work as a kind of poetry, and her 
own role as a writer made the connections between her two identities doubly important. 
 Stowe's trip opened her eyes in a new way to the transatlantic ties between British 
and American religious and literary culture. Like Dana Sr., Stowe insisted, “[British] 
literature, laws, and language are our literature, laws, and language,” though her own 
reflections on the cultural union between the two nations often wandered into the 
prejudices of the time wherein “Anglo-Saxon vigor” animated American expansion in “a 
new era in the world's development” (18). She found a reciprocal cultural sentiment in 
England where she was amazed by how many British citizens “keep their eyes upon our 
papers, our public documents and speeches in Congress” (25, 292). She found Scotland 
even more sympathetic to the United States, the Scots identifying with American political 
traditions that stood “against oppression” (100). At one dinner, the Lord Chief Justice 
Campbell praised the emerging exchange between British and American legal theorists, 
and another speaker placed Uncle Tom's Cabin and Dickens’s novels together as a 
species of “Anglo-Saxon literature” that was waking up both nations to social oppression 
(263-264). 
 Attentiveness to social oppression drew Stowe’s attention throughout her tour. 
Her first journey to Europe certainly stoked her literary ego and provided an excuse for 
the Grand Tour, but the trip also allowed her to exchange ideas about reform with like-
minded British reformers. Abolition, of course, animated many inquiries. The Duchess of 
Sutherland gathered some 500,000 signatures from British women and sent them to 
American agents whom Stowe nominated, and a group of Liverpool women collected 
20,000 more (xviii, xli). One group in Liverpool, after apologizing for introducing slavery 
                                                   
 130 SMFL, 1:198. 
  
499 
to America, stated they had “returned from [their] devious paths” and “implored [their] 
honored transatlantic friends to do the same” (xvii).  
 But the same Liverpool group conceded that American women had much to 
contribute to help remedy the social evils in Great Britain. On the question of 
temperance, American middle-class reformers seemed ahead of their British peers. In 
1851, the Americans passed some of the most ambitious temperance legislation yet seen. 
Partially aimed at immigrant Irish and German groups, Maine abolished the use of 
alcohol in the state and a dozen states soon followed with similar legislation.131 Stowe 
observed that many British reformers, especially Lord Shaftsbury, were ardent 
temperance supporters and many of them inquired after the Maine law with interest.132 
The Maine law particularly inspired the Scottish Temperance League—180 ministers and 
4,000 meeting attenders strong—to advance a campaign for similar legislation.133 
 In addition to abolition and temperance, the Model Lodging Houses in London 
most impressed Stowe, just as they had apparently impressed the American minister 
who had recently completed his own inspection. Established for working people in place 
of squalid tenements, these houses provided kitchens, baths, and in some cases books as 
well as a room. Housing from 100 to 300 people, these houses were Lord Shaftesbury’s 
great pride, and they had inspired similar models across England and Scotland. From 
her American perspective, Stowe pressed the temperance question, insisting that liquor 
undermined prosperity; Shaftsbury heartily agreed but compassionately nuanced the 
point. “A reform of the dwellings will do a great deal towards promoting temperance 
reformation. A man who lives in a close, unwholesome dwelling, deprived of the natural 
stimulus of fresh air and pure water, [came] into a morbid unhealthy state” and then 
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sought to cope through stimulants.134 Stowe was impressed and insisted in her published 
account that America “should add to the force of our Maine law by adopting some of the 
restrictions of the lodging house act.”135 Subtly shifting Shaftsbury’s emphasis on male 
working dignity, she admonished “rich Christian men” of New York to raise such houses 
for the “health, comfort, and vigor [of] thousands of poor needlewomen.”136 
 Stowe and her husband, Calvin, observed and commented on numerous other 
institutions such as insane asylums and so-called “ragged schools” for poor children. Her 
husband declared in no uncertain terms, “I went, with the strongest love of my country, 
and the highest veneration for her institutions; I every where in Britain found the most 
cordial sympathy with this love and veneration; and I returned with both greatly 
increased.”137 But while Calvin sought to criticize the so-called peculiar institution of 
slavery, Harriet's institutional perspective enjoyed grand historical contours informed by 
the older societies of Europe. Reflecting on the Middle Ages, she insisted, “[W]e must 
consider that for all the literature, art, and love of the beautiful, all the humanizing 
influences which hold society together, the world was for many ages indebted to these 
monastic institutions” (157). She reflected on the institutional benefits and drawbacks of 
aristocratic manor houses, though she insisted that such arrangements provided only 
cause for observation on the nature of the community and did not necessarily represent 
the interests of working people (69-70, 239).  
 But for all the common interests and institutional reform that Britain and 
America shared, Stowe observed one important difference in their approach. She 
suggested that the British received the critiques of their institutions with equanimity, 
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which was why Dickens enjoyed laud and honor despite his criticizing so much of 
English society. Conversely, Americans were too proud of their institutions and hated to 
have them criticized. Reflecting on British equanimity, Stowe admonished her American 
audience to embrace forthrightness and fruitful, comparative criticism: “[F]or us to be 
annoyed when any of our institutions are commented upon, is in the highest degree 
absurd” (265). The question of renewed institutions was so close to her heart that she 
could not help reflecting on them while enjoying an extended Alpine excursion, 
seemingly as far away from human artifice as possible.  
In every blue ravine you can hear the clink of dropping water, and those great defiant 
blocks of ice, which seem frozen with uplifted warlike hands, are all softening in that 
beneficent light, and destined to pass away in that benignant change. So let us hope that 
those institutions of pride and cruelty, which are colder than the glacier, and equally vast 
and hopeless in their apparent magnitude, may yet, like that, be slowly and surely passing 
away. Like the silent warfare of the sun on the glacier, is that overshadowing presence of 
Jesus, whose power, so still, yet so resistless, is now being felt through all the moving 
earth. . . . Those defiant waves of deathlike ice might as well hope to conquer the calm, 
silent sun, as the old, frozen institutions of human selfishness to resist the influence which 
he is now breathing through the human heart, to liberate the captive, to free the slave, and 
to turn the ice of long winters into rivers of life for the new heaven and the new earth.138 
 
With post-millenial exuberance she saw the renewal of human institutions etched by the 
sun’s finger in glacial ice. She thought to bring the kingdom of God, not only in her 
abolitionism, but also by reforming all the institutions of pride and cruelty.139 
 But for all of the hardheaded attention to social reform, Stowe's transatlantic 
travels had an even more important influence on her developing religious consciousness. 
Throughout her life she demonstrated a fervent, evangelical piety that guided her reform 
impulses, her literary productions, and her interior consciousness. But like James 
Marsh, she began to seek other streams from which to water the garden of her spiritual 
life. While Calvinist orthodoxy in the early seventeenth century might have inspired the 
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enchanted vision of the world she seemed to desire, by the nineteenth century she found 
that Calvinism lacked the appreciation for “the aesthetic principles of our nature.”140 As 
her youthful enchantment with Romantic authors, her quest after visionary experiences, 
and her desire for spiritual union with the dead all attested, Stowe was groping her way 
into what can only be described as Romantic religion. 
 This personal tension was on display throughout her travels, prompted by 
tangible encounters with other sorts of Christianity. A transformation began almost 
immediately. Four days into the journey they arrived in Glasgow, where the daughter of 
the Puritans stood entranced beneath the Gothic arches of the massive twelfth-century 
cathedral. “This was my first experience in cathedrals. It was a new thing to me 
altogether, and as I walked along under the old buttresses and battlements without, and 
looked into the bewildering labyrinths of architecture within, I saw that, with silence and 
solitude to help the impression, the old building might become a strong part of one's 
inner life.”141 The fact that Glasgow Cathedral hosted a crypt scene from her beloved 
Walter Scott's Rob Roy (1817) helped to enhance her enchantment, but Stowe's emphasis 
on “one's inner life” proved a mantra that guided what was for her a serious religious 
quest. Arriving in Aberdeen some days later, she mourned the iconoclasm of an 
impoverished Protestant fervor. “These granite saints and bishops, with their mutilated 
fingers and broken noses, seem to be bearing a silent, melancholy witness against that 
disposition in human nature, which, instead of making clean the cup and platter, breaks 
them altogether” (102). Her lingering Protestantism could tolerate the desire to cleanse a 
corrupt inner heart from the excesses of Roman abuses, but she thought that the 
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destruction of beautiful, external forms equally revealed a corrupt religious heart. Such 
iconoclasm destroyed the sacramental connection between the worlds of flesh and spirit. 
“I cannot get over the feeling, that the souls of the dead do somehow connect themselves 
with the places of their former habitation, and that the hush and thrill of spirit, which we 
feel in them, may be owing to the overshadowing presence of the invisible. St. Paul says, 
‘We are compassed about with a great cloud of witnesses’” (103). Again and again she 
began to rehearse this theme; the disembodied, anti-aesthetic tendencies in 
Protestantism were not only unfortunate excesses, but these tendencies also undermined 
religion itself.142  
 As Stowe continued her travels, her aesthetic religious sensibility became so 
imbued with Romantic principles that she began to employ the term itself in multiple 
contexts. She spoke of the castles she encountered as having a “romantic appearance” 
and she lauded nature as possessed with “romantic charm.”143 These were not merely 
vague associations, but part of a developing aesthetic religious sensability. Like 
Wordsworth, Stowe embraced the idea of a dynamic union between the artist and nature. 
Moreover, what made the crumbling ruins of the past “romantic” was that these ruins, 
along with nature, provided the synergistic context for artistic creation.144 Standing 
beside the grave of Sir Walter Scott, the poet who guided her journey through Scotland 
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as much as he had inspired her youthful reverie, Stowe reflected that he lay among “the 
two things he loved most—the wild bloom and beauty of nature, and the architectural 
memorial of by-gone history and art” (141-142). Both nature and the past—made 
manifest in ruined architecture—fed his artistic imagination. 
 The union of haunting, ruined architecture with nature became a religious 
revelation for Stowe. While ancient ruins could inspire the artist, they also revealed the 
Pascalian dual-nature that was so much a part of the Cautious Romantic consciousness 
(that Gulian Verplanck, Richard Henry Dana Sr., and Leonard Woods Jr. had all 
identified): 
The deep consciousness that we are ourselves ruined, and that this world is a desolation 
more awful, and of more sublime material, and wrought from stuff of higher temper than 
ever was sculptured in hall or cathedral, this it must be that touches such deep springs of 
sympathy in the presence of ruins. We, too, are desolate, shattered, and scathed; there are 
traceries and columns of celestial workmanship; there are heaven-aspiring arches, 
splendid colonnades and halls, but fragmentary all.145 
 
Pascal maintained that “[a]s man’s insight increases so he finds both wretchedness and 
greatness within himself.”146 Stowe found this idea powerfully symbolized in ruined 
architecture, which spoke of the “desolate, shattered, and scathed” human nature that 
nevertheless displayed “celestial workmanship” and “heaven-aspiring arches.”147 For 
Stowe, nature symbolized the hopeful remedy to humankind’s dual nature. “Yet above us 
bends an all-pitying Heaven, and spiritual voices and callings in our hearts, like these 
little singing birds, speak of a time when almighty power shall take pleasure in these 
stones, and favor the dust thereof” (245). Elsewhere, she reflected that the ivy on the 
sides of old architecture “might, also, symbolize that higher love, unconquerable and 
unconquered, which has embraced this ruined world from age to age, silently spreading 
its green over the rents and fissures of our fallen nature, giving ‘beauty for ashes, and 
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garments of praise for the spirit of heaviness’” (64-65). Appealing to the divine healing 
properties of nature was a Romantic strategy—seen most clearly in Wordsworth’s work—
but Stowe’s belief in a God behind nature’s fabric demonstrated that whatever Romantic 
sensibilities she was developing, her naturalism still aimed at a supernatural destination. 
 The union of human art and nature drew Stowe ineluctably to the Gothic 
architecture whose veneration was so common in the Romantic Era. In one of many 
characteristic outbursts, Stowe praised Roslin Chapel in Midlothian, Scotland as “a 
perfect cataract of architectural vivacity and ingenuity, as defiant of any rules of criticism 
and art as the leaf-embowered arcades and arches of our American forest cathedrals” 
(181). Stowe argued that Gothic form enjoyed numerous advantages over its rivals. First, 
as the aforementioned quotation suggested, Gothic form “studied at the fountain head 
[of nature]” (152). Second, it was “a most catholic and tolerant system,” which gave free 
range to what she referred to as “the Shakespearean imagination of the Gothic artists”—
by which she meant the freedom to capture the range of human emotion in the faces of 
gargoyles and saints (152). Finally, because the individual imagination of Gothic artists 
studied at the fountainhead of nature the buildings were records of the “growth, 
character, and individualities of its builder’s soul” and were unique wholes animated by 
an internal principle brought out by the inspired artist (153). Thus, what Stowe meant 
when she suggested that Gothic form might become “a strong part of one’s inner life” 
was that these ancient forms unified nature and art—including the inspiration of 
individual artists—in a spiritual appeal to the individual worshipper’s religious 
imagination. She became increasingly convinced that not only revelation but also art and 
nature played an essential role in religious consciousness. 
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 Stowe’s travel account served as a Romantic bildungsroman in ways beyond the 
scope of this inquiry. Reflections on Byron, quotations from Shelley, comparisons 
between the “prophet painter” Gericault’s Raft of the Medusa (1818-1819) and 
Coleridge’s Rime of the Ancient Mariner (1798), intentional tours of Melrose Abbey by 
moonlight (which Allston would have loved), and praise for the “wildness” of English 
gardens all indicated a thoroughly developing Romantic consciousness.148 On a more 
developed level, her fascination with religious architecture led her to synesthetic revelry 
as she mixed sensory modes to describe her experience. At times she insisted that 
architecture was poetry in stone, at other times it was music. According to Stowe, the 
architect of Melrose Abbey was “a Mozart in architecture” weaving the “multiplied 
shrines, and mouldings, and cornices . . . endless in [their] variety” like “different strains 
of a harmony, to the general effect of the whole.”149 Not only did Stowe’s aesthetic 
sensibility embrace the Plotinian notion of beauty as unity in diversity—embraced by 
Allston and Coleridge—but her understanding of the synesthetic quality of art was a 
Romantic insight, initiated by Schiller’s reflections in the Aesthetic Education of Man 
(1794), carried through Novalis’ aesthetic theory and Wagner’s ideal of 
Gesamtkunstwerk.150  
 It is probable that Stowe encountered the principle of architecture as music in 
either Byron or de Staël, authors with whom she was familiar and who borrowed the idea 
of architecture as “frozen music” from Schelling and Schlegel.151 But Stowe’s aesthetic 
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sensibility was not merely imitative. She went beyond the image of frozen music in one 
spiritual moment at the Cathedral in Cologne, Germany: 
hidden in the midst of forest arches of stone, pouring forth its volumes of harmony as by 
unseen minstrelsy, [the cathedral] seemed to create an atmosphere of sound, in which the 
massive columns seemed transfused,—not standing, as it were, but floating,—not resting, 
as with weight of granite mountains, but growing as by a spirit and law of development. 
Filled with those vast waves and undulations, the immense edifice seemed a creature, 
tremulous with a life, a soul, an instinct of its own; and out of its deepest heart there 
seemed to struggle upward breathings of unutterable emotion.152 
 
The fusion of music and architecture produced a new experience for Stowe, and she 
resorted to spiritual personification in terms of her own religious experience with 
references to the cathedral’s “soul” and “unutterable emotion.” For her, architecture, 
when enlivened by sacred music, transcended its role even as frozen music and took on 
an organic life of its own, conducting the soul toward God. As with her thinking on the 
imagination, Stowe emphasized the subjective effect of living art—in this case on her—
rather than the creative process that brought to life authentic organic forms. While her 
emphasis on “growth” and the “law of development” were quintessential Romantic 
idioms and her invocation of “forest arches” versus “granite mountains” gestured at 
nature, her image of the cathedral as an ill-defined creature fell short of Coleridge’s or 
Emerson’s ideal of organic form. Both thinkers insisted that organic form required a 
coherent, organzing principle that grew from within, just like nature’s forms.153 Though 
Stowe seemed to have an organic sensibility, her explanation of the relationship between 
living and static forms was underdeveloped.  
 Stowe left Europe with an intensely religious appreciation for architecture and 
music and the role it might play in her inner life. She declared that “[t]o me all music is 
sacred . . . in its passionate earnest[ness], its blendings, its wild heartsearching tones, [it] 
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is the language of aspiration.”154 Elsewhere, reflecting on the extreme Protestantism in 
Quaker simplicity she insisted, “I reverence the pious and unworldly spirit which 
dictated the peculiar forms of the Quaker sect, I look for a higher development of religion 
still, when all the beautiful artistic faculties of the soul being wholly sanctified and 
offered up to God, we shall no longer shun beauty in any of its forms.”155 While in the 
context she reflected on dress and household adornment, her yearning for consecrated 
artistic faculties equally applied to the house of God. Hecker had insisted that the church 
must give voice to artistic genius, and Stowe now concurred. Stowe thus returned to 
America armed with a thoroughly Romantic sensibility as she began her own pilgrimage 
into high-church Episcopalianism. 
 
A High-Church Episcopalian 
 While Stowe’s first visit to Europe inspired an emerging appreciation for the role 
of architecture and music in cultivating spiritual experience, she continued in the 
evangelical, Protestant communion of her husband Calvin’s Andover Seminary. Despite 
her emerging views of art in worship, her desire for communion with the dead, and her 
increasingly high view of communion—since her revelation for Uncle Tom’s Cabin—
Stowe was not yet overwhelmed by what would become a later attraction to Roman 
Catholicism. On her first journey, she attended her first Catholic high mass at La 
Madeleine Church in Paris but confessed: “I cannot say I was moved by it Rome-ward. 
Indeed, I felt a kind of Puritan tremor of conscience at witnessing such a theatrical 
pageant on the Sabbath.”156 She thought the music “fine,” but stated that while “it ought 
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to be impressive,” she remained largely unmoved.157 When she returned to Europe in 
1856, she went one step further: “The fine arts are the sign.—What Christ gives by his 
disciples his training & schooling is the thing signified. The fine arts were meant to be 
sacraments ‘outward and visible signs of an inward and spiritual grace’.”158 By her 
third and final trip in 1859, she became irresistibly drawn to all the richness of Roman 
Catholic worship. While sitting and gazing at the Basilica di Santa Maria del Fiore in 
Florence, she again marveled at “that miraculous perfection of [gothic] architectural 
loveliness.”159 The fusion of the fret works and mosaics into “a golden equality of tone,” 
the great bell of the Campanile throbbing “like the muffled beat of some great heart of 
the upper spheres,” and the chants from within “now rising and now falling like the voice 
of waters” all drew Stowe inescapably into the church.160 “I raised the heavy curtain of 
the door and passed within—strolling up the long . . . aisle till I stood under the splendid 
central dome, darkly bright with its painted windows whose [aspects] present every color 
of the kaleidoscope.”161 No longer was the Roman Catholic mass the unimpressive 
pageant offensive to her lingering Puritan sensibility. She later recounted her Florentine 
experience in her novel Agnes of Sorrento (1862): 
What the Puritans of New England wrought out with severest earnestness in their 
reasonings and their lives these early Puritans of Italy embodied in poetry, sculpture, and 
painting. They built their Cathedral and their Campanile . . . to express their sense of God’s 
majesty and beauty. The modern traveller who visits the churches and convents of 
Florence . . . feels . . . [the] aspiration far transcending the limits of mortal capacity.162  
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In this self-revelatory passage, Stowe recounted her own spiritual union of Puritan 
earnestness with the more soothing aesthetic religious sensibility that aspired to the 
divine. Although she set her novel in fifteenth-century Italy, she repeatedly insisted that 
the charm of Florence remained undiminished in “modern times.”163 
 In the early 1860s, Stowe’s letters attest that she had embraced numerous aspects 
of the Roman Catholic Church. Its high view of the sacrament, its veneration of saints, 
and most of all its appeal to the imagination through art, music, and architecture all met 
her need for a deeper religious aesthetic experience.164 But the Yankee, Puritan social 
reformer in her could not place herself fully under the sway of Rome. As she later 
explained to her son, Charles, “I have that half to my mind which expressively feels all 
the devout attraction of the Romanish Church—but I have as you have the half also that 
sees the impossibility of that hierarchy.”165 She could not follow Brownson’s assertion 
that Christ as Reason was incarnated in the Church. Instead, as she explained in Agnes 
of Sorrento, submission to that hierarchy was “to bury [the] gift of individual reason” 
and blindly accept the intrigues of power present in any hierarchical institution as the 
working of God’s ineffable will.166  
 The Church’s stance on abolition angered her as well. In Agnes, when a pious 
monk attempted to defend the Church as the protector of orphans, widows, and the 
redeemer of slaves, Stowe’s protagonist Agostino retorted that the Church “seek[s] to 
keep all the world in slavery to themselves!”167 Finally, as several commentators have 
noted, Stowe found the Catholic confessional and fears of hell eerily similar to Puritan 
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obsessions about election, a psychological reality that she sought to leave behind.168 She 
thus objected to the hierarchy of both Catholic spiritual and temporal authority, which 
for her rendered the Roman Church impossible as a spiritual home. 
 In 1862, Stowe applied for a seat at the local Episcopal church in Andover. The 
seat was ostensibly for her daughter, but Stowe declared, “I shall sometimes go with 
you—always to sacrament because I find that service is more beneficial to me than 
ours.”169 Calvin remained a Congregationalist, Stowe reported, and Stowe did not 
formally join the Episcopal Church until Calvin retired from Andover Seminary and the 
family moved to Hartford, Connecticut, in 1863. But Stowe’s convictions were already in 
place. She was drawn to the Episcopalian sacrament because it affirmed “our [human] 
dignity” and unified the participant with the “members in corporate [sic] of his body as 
members of that pure and holy church whose perfected members are now walking in 
white with Jesus.”170 Her understanding of this principle she had learned from 
Catholicism she averred, but Stowe felt the Episcopal Church best unified the insights of 
Catholic sacramentality and her own emerging, liberal ecumenism. The earthly members 
of Christ’s body, Stowe insisted, were “scattered through every nation and every different 
denomination [but were] all being led by one Spirit.”171 She was also drawn to 
Episcopalian liturgy. While visiting her brother Henry Ward Beecher’s Plymouth Church 
in Brooklyn, she compared his prayers to the high art she had encountered in her travels. 
They created “a great upward current as Titian represents in the Assumption of the 
Madonna.”172 This transcendent experience she asserted “is just the way the church 
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service always affects me,” but her brother’s Congregationalism relied too heavily on 
strong personalities to create such an experience: “but how few men—single men there 
are with this power of being the moment more than a whole liturgy.”173 Like 
Wordsworth, who thought the Anglican liturgy placed a harp in every hand, Stowe saw 
liturgy as a work of art, bringing the soul to God. 
 Stowe’s high-church Episcopalianism drew her to Boston for the Holy Week 
services of 1863. She was particularly impressed with the Church of the Advent, the 
Anglo-Catholic affair begun by the Danas and others in 1844. The chanting and fervor of 
the people led by seven ministers created a “feeling . . . like electricity” that “goes from 
heart to heart,” she reported.174 After the service, she shook hands with Richard Henry 
Dana Jr.’s wife, Sarah, who with Richard and their daughter had called on Stowe the day 
before and insisted that the families develop a more intimate relationship. Stowe was 
delighted, “It is a family [with whom] I should like to cultivate an acquaintance. They are 
interesting people.”175 Like her, they now shared the appreciation for art, music, and 
tradition in their Episcopalian worship. “I do not think they will go into the Roman 
Catholic Church. They only have a great deal of the sentiment of religion and love to 
express religious emotion in those poetic forms that are hallowed by associations of 
antiquity. We can ourselves feel what that is.”176 Lyman Beecher was likely rolling over in 
his three-month-old grave. In 1827 he had exulted to his daughter Catharine about her 
and Harriet’s Hartford Seminary: “I am glad your plan is likely to succeed and I am glad 
that there is a Beecher in Hartford. That Episcopacy may not bind them all hand and foot 
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there while they sleep[;] your academy will be a discomfiture of their plans.”177 By 1863, 
both Catharine and Harriet had become Episcopalians, as had the rest of the Dana 
family, Lyman’s erstwhile Trinitarian allies in Boston. There was still a Beecher in 
Hartford, but her faith was very different from that of her father. 
 
Conclusion 
 Henry Reed and Harriet Beecher Stowe were both drawn to Anglicanism, but in 
many ways they exemplified complimentary impulses that informed the other Cautious 
Romantics. They both venerated the imagination, but Reed—with a more thoroughly 
formed Romantic aesthetic—emphasized its creative power. On the other hand, Stowe 
tended to emphasize the imagination as a receptive faculty of spiritual vision. The 
religious discourse had subtly shifted from Marsh’s and Coleridge’s emphasis on 
“Reason” in the Aids to Reflection. For Coleridge and Marsh, Reason reached a horizon 
where it experienced moments of spiritual insight; the imagination translated them. For 
Reed and Stowe the imagination was Coleridgean (and Emersonian) Reason. But though 
the language differed, the belief was essentially the same: humankind possessed a 
godlike faculty for religious perception, beyond the bounds of Enlightenment reason. It 
was this position that made them Romantic. 
 Both of them also participated in a transatlantic dialogue about institutions. For 
Reed and Wordsworth, the Anglican Church provided social stability, whereas Stowe 
looked to reform institutions for much the same reason. But for both of them the 
Anglican Church served an important spiritual function. It provided them with what 
Wordsworth called a “golden mean” between Protestantism’s weak aesthetic and Roman 
                                                   
 177 Lyman Beecher to Catharine Beecher, Feb. 3, 1827, Folders 2-4, BSFP. Incidentally, Sarah 
Watson Dana had been a student at the Beecher sisters’ Hartford Seminary. 
  
514 
Catholicism’s overbearing authority. They could retain their affective belief in the 
Incarnation and the role of the Holy Spirit working through nature, the church, and 
individual artists, while still retaining the integrity of individual conscience. Moreover, 
they could engage in the sensuous, reverent worship that embodied their aesthetic 
beliefs. In the Anglican liturgy and institutional structure, they found the stability and 
harmony conducive to their cautious Romantic sensibility. 
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Epilogue: Liberal and Conservative Religion 
 
 While Uncle Tom’s Cabin had helped to start the Civil War, in the war’s aftermath 
American Protestantism faced a mounting array of intellectual challenges. The most 
daunting came from Charles Darwin, whose Origin of Species (1859) and The Descent of 
Man (1871) undermined not only literal interpretations of biblical creation but also the 
confidence that all of creation evidenced God’s magnificent design. Most American 
religious intellectuals embraced a “doctrine of static design,” emphasizing its coherence 
with a Newtonian universe of fixed laws and a Baconian scientific method.1 Darwin 
presented a different picture: a dynamic bloody competition for survival, where many 
nineteenth-century Christians struggled to account for God’s goodness and 
benevolence.2 Moreover, with the war won, reform fervor—which had united northern 
American Protestants around the question of slavery—could no longer be looked to as 
the unifying force that it had been.3 There were other challenges as well, though Darwin 
was certainly the greatest.4 Geological evidence already mounted to undermine literal 
readings of Genesis, and the gradually accumulating weight of biblical criticism—based 
on the assumption that the Bible should be evaluated critically and historically like any 
other book—asked difficult questions about the reliability of certain biblical events and of 
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Jesus’s teachings. Nor could the pressing social concerns prompted by rapid 
industrialization and population growth be ignored.5 
 Particularly in the intellectually dominant Northeast many Protestant 
intellectuals met the challenge by adapting Christian theology to the new demands of 
modern thinking and modern life.6 They attempted to synthesize Christianity with 
evolutionary theory, not by denying divine design altogether, but by arguing for a much 
more complex form of design where God dynamically interacted with the world through 
organic evolution.7 They also generally embraced the new higher criticism of the Bible, 
stressed God's immanence in the natural world and the human soul, insisted on human 
free will, and highlighted the moral and social implications of Christ's teaching.8 Finally, 
they manifested a spirit of ecumenism, desiring to minimize theological disputes in the 
hope of bringing greater unity to Protestantism.9 As a result of its tolerance and the 
myriad of issues to which theologians were called to respond, liberal Protestantism 
tended to be diffuse. At its root was the idea that Christian theology could retain and 
even enhance its spiritual relevance and Christian authenticity without grounding its 
theology on external authority.10 But despite its diffuse nature, one historian of the 
movement has suggested that by 1920 liberal Protestants occupied more than a third of 
American pulpits and at least half of the organs of intellectual life, especially the 
seminaries and journals.11 
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1900, xix; William R. Hutchison, The Modernist Impulse in American Protestantism, 3-4. 
 9 Ahlstrom, A Religious History of the American People, 780. 
 10 Dorrien, The Making of American Liberal Theology: Imagining Progressive Religion, 1805-
1900, xiii. 
 11 Hutchison, The Modernist Impulse in American Protestantism, 3. 
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 Although admittedly a diffuse movement, liberal Protestantism found one of its 
most formal articulations in Theodore Munger’s seminal text, The Freedom of Faith 
(1883)—particularly his introductory essay, “The New Theology.” Munger admitted that 
the New Theology was a “movement” and not an organization or definable dogma, but he 
also attempted to draw “a line of demarkation [sic] between sympathies that cling to the 
old and that reach out after the new.”12 He quoted from Wordsworth on the title page: 
“Peace settles where the intellect is meek; / the faith Heaven strengthens where He 
moulds [sic] the creed,” and in his second major work, Munger lifted one of Marsh’s and 
Coleridge’s primary mantras right out of the Aids to Reflection.13 “Christianity is not a 
theory or a speculation, but a life;—not a philosophy of life, but a life and a living 
process.”14 For Munger, Christianity was a spiritual process of development, and the 
individual creeds invented by the intellect were suspect if not truly molded by God. 
 Several of Munger’s most important distinctions could be found in the Cautious 
Romantic writings that had anticipated him. Most notable was his understanding of 
Reason. He insisted on a “broader use of the reason than has been accorded to theology,” 
and he was quick to qualify what he meant by ‘reason’ in language reminiscent of 
Coleridge, Marsh, Henry, the early Brownson, and the other Cautious Romantics.15 
Reason was not “mere speculation nor a formal logic, but that full exercise of our nature . 
. . man's whole inner being” (11). In Munger’s continuing explanation, he managed to 
squeeze many of the Cautious Romantics’ characterizations of Reason into one sentence. 
“Especially [reason] makes much of the intuitions—the universal and spontaneous 
                                                   
 12 Theodore Thornton Munger, “The New Theology,” in The Freedom of Faith (Boston: Houghton, 
Mifflin, 1883), 4, 43. 
 13 Theodore Thornton Munger, The Freedom of Faith (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1883), ii. 
 14 Theodore Thornton Munger, The Appeal to Life (Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1891), 2. Gary 
Dorrien has cited this quotation but not identified the Aids to Reflection as the source, see The Making of 
American Liberal Theology: Imagining Progressive Religion, 1805-1900, 298. 
 15 Munger, “The New Theology,” 11. 
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verities of the soul; and in this it deems that it allies itself with the Mind through which 
the Christian revelation is made. . . . The inmost principle of revelation is that the mind 
of God reveals itself to the mind of man” (11, 13). Verplanck had emphasized internal 
evidence, Henry and Brownson embraced the spontaneity of Reason, and Allston’s and 
Marsh’s Platonism advocated human Reason’s direct correspondence with the Divine 
Mind. Munger’s emphasis on the inward turn, the reliability of spontaneous intuition, 
and the idea of a direct and trustworthy correspondence between the divine and human 
mind were all themes that the Cautious Romantics had highlighted.  
 Munger also thought that arguments for external revelation were weak: God's 
static “mechanical” design in nature, the authority of the Bible, or the fact that miracles 
validated Christ’s divine message.16 Here again, Munger was akin to the Cautious 
Romantics. He rehearsed the common complaint against William Paley and arguments 
from design that came so quickly to the Cautious Romantics’ lips, and he discounted the 
Biblicism and miracles that the Cautious Romantics also found intellectually 
underwhelming. Looking to nature, the New Theology saw it neither as a self-evident, 
static testimony of God’s design, nor as a purely material construct, but it perceived in 
nature “analogies to the spiritual world” and “divine immanence in creation.”17 To be 
sure, liberal Protestants read their Transcendentalists, which partly contributed to their 
sacralizing of nature. But the liberal Protestants’ ongoing commitment to Christian 
doctrine—particularly the Trinity and the Incarnation—and to the institutional church 
made them more direct successors of the Cautious Romantics. 
                                                   
  16 Munger, “The New Theology,” 16-21, 26. On Munger’s utter rejection of supernatural miracles, 
see Theodore Thornton Munger, “On the Reception of New Truth,” in The Freedom of Faith (Boston: 
Houghton, Mifflin, 1883), 62-63. 
 17 Munger, “The New Theology,” 25-26. 
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 Munger also emphasized the role of art and the imagination as a route to 
religious truth, just as many of the Cautious Romantics had. In insisting that Reason 
involved humankind’s “whole being,” Munger explained that the New Theology “deals 
with human life as do poets and dramatists” (28). It embraced “that logic which is found 
in Macbeth, and Hamlet, and the Scarlet Letter, in Prometheus and Job” (35). It sought 
“to broaden the domain of theology till it shall embrace the breadth of human nature and 
the knowledge of the world” (31). In contemporary intellectual life, Munger conceded, 
“the teachings of literature have prevailed over the teachings of the systems of theology. 
One covers the breadth of human life, the others travel a dull, round in a small world of 
their own creation” (30). Here again Munger echoed the common arguments rehearsed 
by Allston, Woods Jr., George Allen, Henry Reed, and Harriet Beecher Stowe. God 
revealed himself in many ways, in nature, in art, and in what these forms revealed about 
the human soul. Like Stowe, Munger lacked a developed aesthetic theory, but he believed 
the imagination “carrie[d] with it a plain intimation of a larger sphere than the 
present.”18 The imagination empowered the soul to draw from nature’s symbols—
generally those of the sublime—“a truer measure of its own vastness . . . [and] a truer 
symbol of itself,” and it gave birth to “those blind emotions that fill the mind whenever 
we listen to the music of the masters, or look upon true art . . . assert[ing] a perfection 
and a life of which this is but a foretaste.”19 For Munger, spiritually revelatory resources 
for the New Theology were considerably broadened, as were the venues in which 
spiritual experience might take place. 
 That Munger’s thought resembled so much of the Cautious Romantic agenda was 
not surprising. His two immediate predecessors in pioneering liberal Protestantism 
                                                   
 18 Theodore Thornton Munger, “Immortality and Nature,” in The Freedom of Faith (Boston: 
Houghton, Mifflin, 1883), 245. 
 19 Munger, “Immortality and Nature,” 244-245. 
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enjoyed direct links with the Cautious Romantics. Horace Bushnell, whom Munger 
characterized as the founder of the movement, was the most intellectually important 
predecessor.20 Bushnell cited Coleridge—particularly the Aids to Reflection—as his most 
formative influence, and he labored over Aids for “a whole half year.”21 What Aids to 
Reflection taught Bushnell was that language itself was “two stories high,” that in its 
symbolic function language gained access to spiritual truths in ways unavailable to logic, 
demonstration, or the arguments of prose.22 But symbolic language’s power also pointed 
to the fundamental limitations of language itself. Poetry captured truths unavailable to 
argument and prose because it could approach an idea from multiple angles at once, 
dialectically fusing and unifying the insights gained into a larger unified and suggestive 
structure.23 Particularly in explaining humanity, “poets, then, are the true 
metaphysicians, and if there be any complete science of man to come, they must bring 
it.”24 The suggestion of a “complete science” was facetious; Bushnell’s entire theory 
served to chasten all language and thereby human hubris. Elsewhere he suggested that 
religious language was “a kind of painting, in which the speaker, or the writer, leads on 
through a gallery of picture or forms, while we attend him, catching at the thoughts 
suggested by his forms.”25 Thus, Bushnell embraced the Cautious Romantic contention 
that art best captured human nature, and he, like them, invoked the Christian Platonist 
                                                   
 20 For two helpful discussions that see Bushnell in his own historical moment and help to nuance 
his role as a precursor to Munger, see Robert Bruce Mullin, The Puritan As Yankee: A Life of Horace 
Bushnell (Grand Rapids, MI: W.B. Eerdmans, 2002); Dorrien, The Making of American Liberal Theology: 
Imagining Progressive Religion, 1805-1900, 111-178. 
 21 Mary Bushnell Cheney, Life and Letters of Horace Bushnell (New York: Harper & Brothers, 
1880), 208-209, 499. 
 22 Ibid., 209. 
 23 Horace Bushnell, “Preliminary Dissertation on Language,” in God in Christ, Three Discourses, 
with a Preliminary Dissertation on Language (London: John Chapman, 1850), 58. Another major influence 
on Bushnell was Victor Cousin, who introduced Bushnell to a residual Hegelianism that emphasized the 
dialectic nature of truth, see Conrad Cherry, Nature and the Religious Imagination: From Jonathan 
Edwards to Horace Bushnell (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980), 161. 
 24 Bushnell, “Preliminary Dissertation on Language,” 63. 
 25 Bushnell cited in Cherry, Nature and the Religious Imagination, 172. 
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belief that God’s divine Word manifested through history and in Christ, but he extended 
their emphasis to a more sophisticated focus on human language.26 He fused their 
sometimes-inchoate ideas about the imagination into a more explosive theology that 
emphasized the symbolic nature of all language, including religious and biblical 
language. 
 Bushnell became a pioneer of liberal Protestantism by developing Romantic 
insights and distinctions. In his first and theologically controversial work, Bushnell 
insisted that scripture and Christ’s language transcended the “speculative 
understanding” (65). Instead, “the scriptures of God, in providing a clothing for religious 
truth, have little to do with mere dialectics, much to do with the freer creations of poetry” 
(66). As with scripture, so with the established creeds that had caused so much 
theological strife in New England: “[they] have not the certainty they are commonly 
supposed to have” (69). Religious language was symbolic; like poetry, it communicated 
deeper insights by presenting itself clothed in forms available to the Understanding. 
Bushnell understood the Coleridgean idea that the imagination was both receptive and 
creative, and Bushnell emphasized the importance of openness to receiving symbolic 
revelation. It was best that Moses perceived God in the burning bush rather than 
stopping to ask chemical questions. When interacting with a friend we do well to accept 
their face as expressing moods of the soul rather than scientifically analyzing the face as 
a physical object.27 In this sense, he embraced the common and more vaguely Romantic 
exuberance about perceiving spiritual symbols in nature, in art, and in liturgy (the 
general position of Stowe and Munger).  
                                                   
 26 Bushnell, “Preliminary Dissertation on Language,” 63-65. 
 27 Cherry, Nature and the Religious Imagination, 173-174. 
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 But to retain their efficacy, religious symbols required dynamic engagement from 
an active imagination to interpret and refresh their power.28 The role of the preacher or 
the theologian was like that of the poet, constantly seeking to enliven religious symbols 
by probing them for new facets of meaning and then presenting those revelations to 
others. Like the Cautious Romantics, Bushnell stood between the two traditionally 
warring parties in American theology. He accused the Orthodox Trinitarians of failing to 
recognize the symbolic and suggestive nature of their doctrines, calcifying them in creeds 
and formal dogmas. And he accused the Unitarians of failing to appreciate the important 
spiritual function of historical Christian doctrines as containing inexhaustible symbolic 
meaning.29  
 There were other direct links to Cautious Romanticism. Henry Ward Beecher, the 
immensely popular minister of Plymouth Church, Brooklyn, was not only very close to 
his sister Harriet, he also advocated a warmed over Coleridgeanism. He believed that the 
physical world of facts, science, the senses, and causation were legitimate but lower 
functions of the mind and poetry, symbols, art, and God in nature could lead to a higher, 
spiritual truth.30 Beecher was not a careful intellectual, but with a large and affluent 
congregation, a successful religious journal entitled The Christian Union, and extensive 
lecture tours, he was incredibly influential. He also thought of himself as a kind of 
Romantic seer in his successful oratory: “I do not seem to think, I see,” he explained 
about his preaching and writing.31 Harriet fully embraced her brother’s more liberal 
                                                   
 28 Ibid., 175-176. 
 29 Ibid., 170, 175. 
 30 Dorrien, The Making of American Liberal Theology: Imagining Progressive Religion, 208; 
ANB. 
 31 Beecher cited in Dorrien, The Making of American Liberal Theology: Imagining Progressive 
Religion, 193. 
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views. When her son, Charles, spoke of joining the Unitarian ministry because his uncle’s 
thought seemed intellectually slapdash, Harriet leaped to Henry’s and her own defense: 
As to saying that you despise Liberal orthodoxy for its slovenly inconsistency and its 
dishonesty I cannot imagine what you mean. What I, and your Uncle Henry believe and 
teach is not either slovenly or inconsistent and we are neither of us dishonest. Your uncle 
is precisely the model I would hold up to you of how a manly and honest man should guide 
himself in the ministry in an age when God is shedding new light on religion thro[ugh] the 
development of his own lateral laws in Science.32 
 
 Harriet’s avowal admitted frankly that given new scientific discoveries, her 
brother’s method was the best way to keep faith relevant. But there were limits to her 
liberalism, as Harriet equally opposed Charles’s entering the Unitarian ministry. The 
problem was that Unitarians rejected too much of historical Christianity. “As a whole, it 
is a little band dissociated from the great body of Christ’s Church. Latin[,] Greek[,] 
Anglican[,] and American.”33 Moreover, according to Harriet, numerous conservative 
Unitarians were converting to Episcopalianism, and Unitarian ministers such as Cyrus 
Bartol and Octavious Brooks Frothingham were degenerating into naturalists.34 Despite 
being the most liberal of the Cautious Romantics, Stowe thought that historical Christian 
forms—particularly the Eucharist—still provided important checks on a full-fledged 
Romantic individualism.35 She followed Bushnell in her ongoing commitment to the 
Christian context of Romantic revelation.   
  There were important differences between the Cautious Romantics and later 
liberal Protestants. Munger emphasized that while the New Theology believed in the 
Trinity, it was “indifferent to the use of the word” and did not seek to defend a “formal 
and psychologically impossible Trinity.”36 Even the more theologically liberal of the 
                                                   
 32 HBS to “Charley,” Feb. 4, 1881, Folder 221, BSFP. 
 33 Ibid. 
 34 Ibid. 
 35 On Stowe’s contention that the Eucharist provided the “nearest possible approach to Christ,” see 
HBS to Charley, Feb. 20, 1881, Folder 221, BSFP. 
 36 Munger, “The New Theology,” 9. 
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Cautious Romantics, Marsh and Henry, sought to defend the formal Trinity and seemed 
committed to the doctrine rather than indifferent to it.  
 Munger also denigrated Pascal for his emphasis on the limits of reason, whereas 
the Cautious Romantics tended to laud Pascal for highlighting humankind’s dual nature. 
The difference was subtle but instructive. The Cautious Romantics embraced Pascal 
neither for his radical neo-Augustinianism, nor for his more denunciatory views of 
reason, nor for his problematic suggestion that reflection should end in self-hate. Rather, 
they thought Pascal captured the high-stakes psychological war within the self between 
good and evil, and they saw him as a precursor to a more complete definition of Reason 
that emphasized the union of the head and the heart. The Cautious Romantics were part 
of a gradual and ever so subtle transition from the darker emphasis on depravity and the 
internal ravages of sin to the liberal Protestant emphasis on God’s love and the ongoing 
spiritual conversion of the self over time. The Cautious Romantics sought to hold up both 
the darkness and the light within, in all of their respective terror and splendor, hoping to 
revitalize the spiritual appeal of Christianity.  
 Finally, while the Cautious Romantics had generally distrusted arguments for 
Christianity on the basis of external evidence and seemed to sense that problems could 
arise from too closely allying the Christian faith to Newtonian science, those who 
survived the Civil War demonstrated no ability or inclination to creatively interact with 
Darwin or the theory of organic evolution. Among those who lived to see Darwin’s 
theory, the Danas had stopped publishing anything of intellectual note, Henry remained 
silent on the issue, and Brownson and Hecker actively attacked any accommodation to 
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the doctrine.37 Harriet Beecher Stowe was an exception, as she seemed to embrace 
modern scientific discoveries, but she had little to say about them intellectually. 
Although the Cautious Romantics helped to pioneer Romantic aspects of later attempts 
to reconcile Christianity and modern science—the emphasis on inward spirituality and 
God’s immanence in nature, art, and the soul—they provided little creative engagement 
with science as such. 
 And what of the Catholics? If liberal Christianity frowned on appeals to external 
authority, the Catholic Cautious Romantic conversions represented a clear rejection of 
this principle. Moreover, some of the Protestant Cautious Romantics harbored 
authoritarian tendencies. Dana Sr. and Woods Jr. were notably in this camp. One of the 
keys to understanding the authoritarianism of certain conservative Cautious Romantics 
is comparing it to the liberal Protestant emphasis on the development of civilization. 
Both the conservative Cautious Romantics and the later liberal Protestants eschewed an 
unqualified appeal to the Bible as the sole source of authority—an appeal that defined 
most orthodox and evangelical Protestant groups. Instead, they all saw God's revelation 
as a process of historical development. Woods Jr. in particular had argued for this idea. 
The question was how the Spirit of God worked historically through institutions. In the 
late nineteenth century, the liberal Protestant answer tended to embrace the 
development of American civilization and all of its institutions as a whole.38 As Theodore 
Munger explained, “humanity is charged with redemptive forces. . . . Hence its ethical 
emphasis; hence its recognition of the nation, and of the family, and of social and 
                                                   
 37 Isaac Hecker, “Science and Sentiment,” The Catholic World 29, no. 171 (June 1879): 412; on 
Brownson, see Allitt, Catholic Converts, 83-84. The record remains silent on George Allen and Leonard 
Woods Jr. 
 38 Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture, 24. 
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commercial life, as fields of the manifestation of God and the operation of the Spirit.”39 
In their emphasis on non-church reform, Verplanck, Marsh, and Stowe seemed 
sympathetic to this view, and Henry could be found explicitly advocating it by the 
1860s.40  
 On the other hand, the more stridently conservative Cautious Romantics took a 
much more pessimistic view of Western civilization as a whole. Brownson's quasi-
Marxist sensibility and later ultramontane defense of the papacy, Hecker’s fear of being 
complicit in oppressive social structures, Sophia Ripley’s trading of Brook Farm come-
outerism for charitable work among cloistered nuns, Dana Sr.’s inveterate criticism of 
American society, and Woods Jr.’s taste for Friedrich Schlegel’s philosophy of history all 
pointed to this general pessimism. Thus, the Catholic Converts opted for the Catholic 
Church and its strong authority as an alternative institution to allegedly stand against the 
corruptions of modern civilization. Among the non-Catholics, Woods Jr. displayed a 
strong sympathy with the Catholic Church such that others wondered why he didn’t 
convert, and Orestes Brownson found Dana Sr. a thoroughly kindred spirit. As late as 
1870, the two were apparently friends. Writing to Caleb Sprague Henry, whose son was 
also friendly with Brownson, Richard Henry Dana Sr. declared, “[Brownson] seems to 
like me, heretic as I am.”41 Brownson liked Dana so much because Dana “dare[d to] 
intimate to his countrymen that their march of intellect is downward, not upward,” and 
because Dana manifested a thorough distrust of democracy.42 Of course, Dana Sr. and 
Brownson could complain about the need for increased political authority to solve the 
problems they perceived. But in Dana’s case these complaints were half-hearted; the only 
                                                   
 39 Munger, “The New Theology,” 25. 
 40 On Henry’s social and institutional vision, see Ronald Vale Wells, Three Christian 
Transcendentalists: James Marsh, Caleb Sprague Henry, Frederic Henry Hedge, 78-95. 
 41 RHDS to CSH, Dec. 29, 1870, DFP, MHS. 
 42 Orestes Brownson, “Poems and Prose Writings. By Richard Henry Dana,” 481, 483. 
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institution that excited his interest and active participation was Church of the Advent. 
While more politically vocal, all of Brownson’s post-Civil War rhetoric sprang from his 
deeper conviction in the Church and its increasingly marginalized position vis-à-vis 
other political and social institutions.43  
 Restless, introspective, and often idiosyncratic, the Cautious Romantics 
nevertheless exerted a great influence on American intellectual and religious history. 
They aided the Transcendentalists in inflaming intellectual discourse with the notion of a 
higher, spiritual Reason and the visions of the imagination, though of course that aid was 
largely unintentional. Their full impact on this change in discourse itself is impossible to 
trace, but most of the Cautious Romantics left other legacies as well. In many cases, their 
influence was more than they could have hoped. Dana Jr.’s and Stowe’s literary successes 
far outstripped their expectations. From a barely-educated orphan, Brownson rose to 
become the most prolific American Catholic intellectual of the nineteenth century, and 
Allston managed to become the preeminent American painter of his generation, despite 
his afflictions of mind, body, and patronage. Hecker was perhaps the most intriguing in 
his transition from self-doubting transcendental seeker to the founder of a substantial 
religious order. He once claimed saints as exemplars of artistic Romantic genius; it is 
perhaps fitting that despite his limitations as an author and apologist, the Catholic 
Church he set out to serve is now evaluating the case for his sainthood. 
 Not all of the Cautious Romantics became household names. Verplanck, Woods 
Jr., Marsh, Henry, Allen, and Reed exerted a quieter but still direct influence on the 
hundreds of students they taught and on the institutions they helped to establish. As 
scholars and teachers they contributed to the full flowering of Romanticism in America 
in ways thus far unrecognized. Seeing them as a group in dialogue with one another 
                                                   
 43 Carey, Orestes A. Brownson: American Religious Weathervane, 379. 
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helps to rectify our understanding of their contribution. But contributions, influence, 
and accomplishment were only one part of their story, as they all well knew. They saw 
the world with spiritual vision, but theirs was a vision frequently shrouded by unfulfilled 
longing, loss, and an affective sense of sin. It is fitting that the ninety-two-year-old Dana 
Sr. should watch the entire whole story unfold with his deep, sad eyes. More than most, 
he could “see the ill where it is palpable,” and his Romantic spirit remained discontent 
with the world around him.44 “O, if you but knew what yearnings there were in my soul 
after something here that would correspond to the images of the beautiful in my own 
spirit,” he declared to Charlotte.45 He spoke for all the Cautious Romantics as they 
attempted to chart a course between the ideal visions of their own souls and the world as 
they found it. Though their success at charting such a course varied, they all attempted, 
in Stowe’s words, to “live a real life in this world of illusions and shadows.”46
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 45 Ibid. 
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Appendix 1: Figures 
 
Figure 1: Franciso Goya, The Sleep of Reason Produces Monsters, c. 1803, Johnson 
Museum of Art, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Washington Allston, Moonlight, 1819, Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, 
Massachusetts 
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Figure 3: Washington Allston, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, 1814, National Portrait Gallery, 
London, United Kingdom 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Washington Allston, The Poor Author and the Rich Bookseller, 1811, Museum 
of Fine Arts, Boston, Massachusetts 
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Figure 5: Washington Allston, The Angel Releasing St. Peter from Prison, 1814-1816, 
Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, Massachusetts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Washington Allston, Jacob’s Dream, 1817-1819, Petworth House and Park, 
West Sussex, London and South East, National Trust, England 
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Figure 7: Washington Allston, Contemplation, 1817-1818, Lord Egremont, Petworth 
House, Sussex, England1 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Washington Allston, Ann Channing Allston, 1809-1811, Henry Channing 
Rivers Family2 
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Figure 9: Henry Fuseli, The Nightmare, 1790-1791, Goethemuseum, Freies Deutsches 
Hochstift, Frankfurt am Main, Germany 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Washington Allston, Tragic Figure in Chains, 1800, Phillips Academy 
Addison Gallery of American Art, Andover, Massachusetts 
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Figure 11: Washington Allston, Elijah in the Desert, 1818, Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, 
Massachusetts 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Caspar David Friedrich, The Wanderer Above a Sea of Fog, 1817, Hamburger 
Kunsthalle, Hamburg, Germany  
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